The Politics of Shari'a Law

Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia

Michael Buehler



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The Politics of Shari'a Law

The Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 presents an underexplored puzzle: Why has there been a rise in the number of *shari'a* laws despite the electoral decline of Islamist parties? Michael Buehler presents an analysis of the conditions under which Islamist activists situated outside formal party politics may capture and exert influence in Muslim-majority countries facing democratization. He argues that introducing competitive elections creates new pressures for entrenched elites to mobilize and structure the electorate, thereby opening up new opportunities for Islamist activists to influence politics. Buehler's analysis of changing state–religion relations in formerly authoritarian Islamic countries illuminates broader theoretical debates on Islamization in the context of democratization. This timely text is essential reading for students, scholars and government analysts.

Michael Buehler is a Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). With an emphasis on Southeast Asia, his teaching and research interests evolve around state–society relations under conditions of democratization. His publications include articles in disciplinary journals such as *Comparative Politics* and *Party Politics* as well as in area studies journals, including the *Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies* and *South East Asia Research*.

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Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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Abbreviations

AGAP	Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan	The Alliance of Anti-Apostasy Movements
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	Justice and Development Party
BKPRMI	Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia	Organizing Body of the Youth Groups of Indonesian Mosques
BMI	Bank Muamalat Indonesia	
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia	Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council
DIY	Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	Special Region of Yogyakarta
DKI	Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta	Special Capital District Jakarta
DPD	Dewan Pimpinan Daerah	Provincial Party Headquarters
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah	Regional Representative Council
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat	National Party Headquarters
FKPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penegakan Shariaht Islam	Preparatory Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law
FMSI	Forum Mudzakarah Syariah Islam	Forum Discussing the Islamic Shari'a
FPI	Front Pembela Islam	Islamic Defenders Front
FUI	Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah	Brotherhood of Islam Forum
FUI	Forum Umat Islam	Islamic People's Forum
FUUI	Forum Ulama dan Umat Islam	Ulama and Muslim Community Forum
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka	Free Aceh Movement
GAMAS	Gerakan Anti Maksiat	Anti-Immorality Movement
GAPAS	Gerakan Anti Permurdatan dan Aliran Sesat	The Movement Against Apostasy and Misguided Cults
GARIS	Gerakan Reformasi Islam	The Islam Reform Movement
GERAM	Gerakan Rakyat Anti Ahmadiyah	The People's Movement Against Ahmadiyah
GPI	Gerakan Pemuda Islam	Islamic Youth Movement
GUPPI	Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam	Federation for the Advancement of Islamic Education
HDI	Hizbud Dakwah Islam	Islamic Mission Party
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam	Muslim Student Association
HMI–MPO	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam–Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi	Muslim Student Association–The Organization Salvation Council

(*cont.*)

ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia	Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals
IM	Ittihadul Muballighin	Union of Missionaries
TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia	Islamic Indonesian Army
Kakanwil	Kepala Kantor Wilayah	Regional Government Unit
KAMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia	Indonesian Students Action Front
KAMMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia	Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union
KAPPI	Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pelajar Indonesia	Indonesian Pupils Action Front
KPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam	Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Shari'a Law
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer	Regional Army Command
Korem	Komando Resort Militer	Subregional Military Command
LP2DE	Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pengembangan Dakwah dan Ekonomi	Institute for Education and the Development of Islamic Propagation and the Economy
LP3Syi	Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan Dan Penerapan Syari'at Islam Islam	The Institute for the Assessment, Enforcement, and Application of Shariah
LPPI	Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam	Center for the Assessment and Propagation of Islam
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia	Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations
Menperindag	Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan	Ministry for Industry and Trade
MI	Muslimin Indonesia	
MIAI	Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia	Islamic High Council of Indonesia
MoHA		Ministry of Home Affairs
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia	Indonesia Mujahidin Council
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat	People's Consultative Assembly
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia	Indonesian Council of Ulama
NII	Negera Islam Indonesia	Islamic State of Indonesia
NIT	Negara Indonesia Timur	State of East Indonesia
NIT	Negara Islam Tejamaya	Islamic State of Tejamaya
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama	Revival/Awakening of Ulama
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional	National Mandate Party
Panwas	Panitia Pengawas	Election Monitoring Commission
Parmusi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia	Indonesian Moslem Scholars Party
PAS	Parti Islam SeMalaysia	Islamic Party of Malaysia
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang	Crescent Star Party
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi	Reform Star Party
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan	Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle
Perma	Peraturan Mahkamah Agung	Supreme Court Regulation
Persis	Persatuan Islam	Islamic Union

(*cont.*)

Perti	Partai Islam Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah	Islamic Party of the Islamic Educational Movement
PII	Pelajar Islam Indonesia	Indonesian Islamic Students
PK	Partai Keadilan	Justice Party
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	National Awakening Party
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia	Indonesian Communist Party
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	Party of Indonesian Justice and Unity
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	Prosperous Justice Party
PNS	Pegawai Negeri Sipil	Career Civil Servant
PNU	Partai Nahdlatul Ummat	Nahdlatul Community Party
PPKI	Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia	Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	United Development Party
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia	Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic
PRTI	Pergerakan Rumah Tangga Islam	The Islamic Households Movement
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia	Islamic Association Party of Indonesia
PUI	Partai Ummat Islam	Islamic Community Party
PUSKOPAD	Pusat Koperasi Angkatan Darat	Army Cooperative
RESAN	Resimen Santri	Santri Student Regiment
RFS	Republik Federasi Sulawesi	Republic of the Federation of Sulawesi
RPII	Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia	Unified Islamic Republic of Indonesia
SH	Sarekat Hijau	Green Association
SI	Sarekat Islam	Islamic Association
SK	Surat Keputusan	Government Decree
SR	Sarekat Rakyat	People's Association
TSM	Tasikmalaya Solidaritas Muslim	Tasikmalaya Muslim Solidarity
TKR	Tentara Keamanan Rakyat	People's Security Army
UMI	Universitas Muslimin Indonesia	Indonesian Muslim University
QCA		Qualitative Comparative Analysis
YASPUMAH	Yayasan Pemberdayaan Ummat Marhamah	Foundation for the Empowerment of the Marhamah Community
YFM	Yayasan Fathul Muin	Foundation Fathul Muin
YPDI	Yayasan Pembinaan Darul Istiqamah	Foundation of Darul Istiqamah Education
YPWI	Yayasan Pesantren Wahdah Islamiyah	Boarding School of Foundation Wahdah Islamiyah
YWI	Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyah	Foundation Wahdah Islamiyah

Introduction

As large parts of the Muslim world embark on a democratization of politics, "elected governments face growing pressure to expand or preserve Islamic law."[1] Consequently, there has been an Islamization of politics in a number of democratizing Muslim-majority countries that has expressed itself in the adoption of *shari'a* law.[2]

This is also the case in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy. Soon after the collapse of President Suharto's New Order military regime in 1998, observers of Indonesia's democratization process noted an Islamization of politics and public life. Emblematic of this development were local regulations with an Islamic overtone that were adopted in provinces, districts and municipalities across the archipelago.[3] These include regulations prohibiting alcohol consumption, gambling and prostitution as well as those regulations on the collection of religious alms, Qur'an reading, education and women's dress code.[4] Referred to as *shari'a* regulations, "their enactment clearly represents a historical breakthrough in the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia."[5]

Current scholarship neither describes nor explains this development sufficiently. For instance, existing studies grossly underestimate the number of these *shari'a* regulations, stating that there are between 78 and 160 such *shari'a* regulations in the entire country.[6] In reality, at least 443 *shari'a* regulations were adopted in Indonesia between 1998 and 2013. At the same time, alarmist accounts talk about the "creeping shari'a-ization"[7] of Indonesia and have left many readers with the impression that these *shari'a* regulations are a widespread phenomenon. However,

[1] Kendhammer 2013, 291.
[2] Riaz 1985, 41–7; Kendhammer 2013, 291; Villalon 1994, 434; Yavuz 1997, 63.
[3] Rural districts (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kota*) are situated below the province in Indonesia's institutional hierarchy. Governors run provinces, while district heads and mayors control districts and municipalities respectively. For brevity's sake, I will refer to district heads and districts only unless there are dynamics distinct to mayors and municipalities.
[4] Bush 2008, 172–4; Lindsey 2008, 206–8; Salim 2007, 126. [5] Hasan 2007, 10.
[6] Bush 2008, 76; Lindsey 2008, 206. [7] Anwar 2003.

such regulations exist in a confined number of provinces and districts only. In fact, 67.5 percent (299/443) of all *shari'a* regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 cluster in only six provinces: Aceh, West Java,[8] East Java, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. This is not to say that the surge of *shari'a* regulations is trivial. The six *shari'a* clusters include Indonesia's most populous provinces and encompass half of the country's population. However, it is important to understand that there is considerable variance in the Islamization of politics *within* Indonesia.

The failure of existing scholarship to grasp the prevalence and distribution of these *shari'a* regulations has led to equally unsatisfying explanations about the driving forces behind the Islamization of Indonesian politics. Most accounts argue that Islamist parties, which were established after 1998, have pushed the adoption of *shari'a* regulations. However, the combined vote share of Islamist parties has been in steady decline since 1999. Furthermore, Islamist parties dominate neither parliaments nor executive governments in localities that have adopted *shari'a* regulations, as I will show in subsequent chapters. The few rank-and-file Islamist party members who have been elected as district heads since 1998 have mostly refrained from adopting *shari'a* regulations.

At the same time, all of the aforementioned *shari'a* clusters, with the exception of East Java, are home to Islamist movements whose origins date back to the beginning of the Indonesian republic in 1945. These movements resurfaced in the aftermath of the political opening in 1998. However, due to a combination of ideological, historical and institutional factors, and on which more below, they have neither entered party politics nor managed to occupy formal state positions.

In fact, the overwhelming majority of governors and district heads who adopted *shari'a* regulations are state elites who began their careers during the New Order regime and who have no affiliations to Islamist parties or movements.[9] In other words, *ancien régime* figures seem to play a role in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations too.

This peculiar pattern in the Islamization of politics in Indonesia suggests that, although a variety of Islamist actors have *mobilized across* Indonesia since 1998, *only some* have gained *influence* in politics. Against this backdrop, the research question animating this book asks: Why have Islamist movements that mobilized at the same time as Islamist parties in

[8] Banten province split from West Java province in the year 2000 and became a province in its own right. Due to its shared history, I refer to West Java province only unless there are developments distinct to either province.

[9] During the New Order, all members of the state apparatus automatically became members of the Golkar party, the civilian backbone of the military regime.

Indonesia in 1998 subsequently gained political influence, while Islamist parties have not?

I argue that the key to unlock the mystery behind Indonesia's peculiar Islamization of politics lies not with Islamist parties and movements but is made possible by opportunist Islamizers[10] that are situated within the Indonesian state. In other words, the adoption of these *shari'a* regulations is driven by political expediency rather than ideological shifts within the Indonesian polity.

Concretely, the political opening in 1998 has changed relations among elites who dominate the state apparatus. Recruitment, promotion and retirement for state elites during the New Order were all oriented toward the central government and therefore were ultimately regulated by President Suharto. By controlling competition from within the regime, as well as suppressing discontent and challenges from below, the New Order administration created and maintained a certain unity among these elites. With their political survival at stake after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1998, leading New Order figures hastily adopted various institutional changes, including free elections, an overhaul of the legal framework for parties and the decentralization of power. These changes not only led to fierce competition among state elites but also made their political fortunes much more dependent on mass support. To find allies in their electoral skirmishes with one another, state elites were subsequently forced to "reach out" and "reach down" in the political arena, which made them more receptive to societal pressures from below.

It is important to note, however, that state elites are flexible to the demands of societal groups *only if* these groups can provide resources that help those elites gain power in Indonesian electoral politics. Resources that elites value include power brokers who can mobilize the electorate, the means to finance their political battles and "cultural capital" that will boost their legitimacy and recognition among voters. As they negotiate for these resources, state elites also *mediate* the influence of societal groups and interests because of their dominant position within the state and political institutions. In short, the two developments that, in my view, are behind the Islamization of politics in Indonesia follow a clear sequence. Competition among state elites has *subsequently* allowed Islamist groups situated in society to gain influence in politics. In other words, without competition among state elites induced by institutional changes after 1998, Islamist groups would have remained as politically impotent as they were during the New Order period.

What insights do we gain from a view that assigns causal primacy to dynamics within the state when analyzing the Islamization of politics in

[10] Nasr 2001, 21.

the context of democratization? First and foremost, the book shows that an Islamization of politics is underway via *democracy* itself. Current analyses are either missing or misunderstanding how this process is unfolding because the Islamization of politics occurs in a realm (and via processes) that do not involve the ascendance of parties with an overt Islamist agenda. Therefore, the argument presented here can explain better than existing accounts when, where, by whom and why *shari'a* regulations are adopted in Indonesia. This book shows that there was considerable temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia after 1998 and provides an explanation for these patterns. In addition, the findings presented in this book refute arguments about the decline of political Islam in Indonesia, which are inaccurate or at least premature.[11] Such studies miss the point because they are overly fixated on election results that indicate waning support for Islamist parties. Better to study Islamist groups. Interstices that have opened up as a result of increasing competition between state elites have allowed Islamist groups to push the Islamization of Indonesian politics forward, despite sitting entirely outside the formal party system.

Furthermore, *shari'a* policymaking in Indonesia confirms the need to examine Islamist activism aimed at elections and elected officials. Most studies on Islamist activism in Indonesia are preoccupied with terrorism and political violence conducted in the name of Islam. This literature often assumes that Islamic activism is crisis-driven and that Islamist groups push through the adoption of religious laws in the context of broad social and political changes.[12] In reality, the most consequential forms of Islamist activism are much more stable and routinized. They unfold within the boundaries of formal politics and under "normal" conditions, i.e. once the tumultuous weeks and months of regime transition are over. This book therefore adds to a still small literature on the political *impact* of *non-violent* forms of Islamist activism.

My analysis of *shari'a* policymaking in Indonesia also contributes to a number of broader theoretical debates. Most importantly, it gives a close account of the factors that facilitate the *influence* of Islamist activism. Social movement theory has been devoted almost exclusively to the conditions that allow groups to *mobilize*. Only recently have scholars started to systematically and comparatively examine factors that define the influence of movements.[13] This lack of research is even more pronounced in the literature on *Islamist* movements, with seminal works

[11] See, for instance, Assyaukanie 2009; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Hamayotsu 2011.
[12] See, for instance, Hasan 2006.
[13] See Amenta et al. 2010 and Tarrow 1998, 161–4 for overviews of this literature.

constructed almost entirely around the origins of these movements and the catalysts that mobilize people in the name of Islam.[14] To the best of my knowledge, there is no account explicitly dedicated to factors that determine the impact of Islamist activism. Perhaps, this is because many studies just seek to explain how Islamist activists overcome "collective action problems," that is, how movements emerge and mobilize.[15] Hence, these accounts simply assume that once collective action problems have been solved (i.e. mobilization in the name of a state based on Islamic law), collective benefits will follow *automatically* (i.e. Islamic law will be adopted).[16] Put another way, studies on Islamist activism assume the "political opportunity structures" that enable mobilization will also allow groups to influence politics. The findings in this book qualify such a view. Political opportunity structures do not necessarily allow movements to shape politics because policymaking is hardly ever under the control of a single actor.[17] Arguably, this is particularly true in democratizing Muslim-majority countries in which remnants of the previous authoritarian regime continue to play a role in politics because regime change usually occurs through palace revolutions rather than social revolutions. It is certainly true in the politics of democratizing Indonesia.

Through such findings, this book bridges scholarship on Islamist movements with public policy literatures, which have long recognized that a diverse set of actors are involved in the policymaking process[18] and so policies are a "negotiated order" among different actors.[19]

A number of books on Indonesia and other Muslim-majority countries have emphasized the "convergence" of Islamist and secular forces during democratization,[20] but they seldom elaborate on the motives that spark this cooperation, its potential outcomes and what it reveals about the post-authoritarian power constellations in these countries.

Structure of the Book

In Chapter 1, I review the literature on the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization and show that it overly focuses on Islamist parties, thereby ignoring the potential role of Islamist movements *outside*

[14] See, for instance, Wiktorowicz 2004.
[15] Wiktorowicz 2004. For a critique of rational choice theory approaches to "collective action problems," see Green and Shapiro 1994, 47–71.
[16] Amenta et al. 2010, 295. [17] Amenta et al. 2010. [18] Sabatier 2007, 199.
[19] Barratt 2004, 253.
[20] See, for instance, Teik et al. 2014 and Platzdasch 2009a on Indonesia as well as Turam 2007 on Turkey.

formal party politics. Even research that references these movements is incomplete because it often neglects the role of the state in this process. The few existing accounts of *shari'a* politics that focus on the "convergence" between the state and society as a result of democratization rarely explain the *concrete mechanisms* that lead to the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority nations. Arguably, this is because scholars often conflate conditions that allow societal actors to *emerge* and *mobilize* with conditions that allow societal actors to *gain* and *maintain influence*.

The chapter then provides a hypothesis about what kind of Islamist actors are expected to gain influence in democratizing Muslim-majority countries and how their influence is mediated by elites in control of the state. In the final part of Chapter 1, I define key concepts before critically detailing my methods of comparison, case selection and data collection.

Chapter 2 offers a brief history of Islamist activism in Indonesia as a backdrop for analysis in subsequent chapters. Disagreements about the proper place of Islamic law in Indonesian politics date back to the constitutional debates of 1945. Since these debates constitute one of the most enduring ideological fault lines in Indonesian politics, they act as a valuable gauge for the influence of Islamist activism *across time*. To compare the influence of Islamist activism *across space*, the second section of the chapter zooms in on the history of political Islam in West Java and South Sulawesi. Islamist movements have been present in both provinces since 1945, yet elites in control of the state were not responsive to their demands prior to 1998.

In Chapter 3, I explore how reforms adopted after 1998 have uprooted the logics in the accumulation of power and how this has created conditions that have made elites more receptive to societal pressures. Concretely, electoral and institutional changes have concentrated power within local executive governments, at the expense of local parliaments. Governors and district heads are therefore the most powerful local political players. Data on the background of candidates competing in these elections reflect the dominance of academics, bureaucrats, military personnel and businessmen who came to power during the New Order. These state elites rarely face electoral challenges from candidates rooted in society. Most importantly, members of both Islamist parties and Islamist movements are notably absent among both *candidates* and *winners*.

Yet, the democratization of politics has changed the relations among these state elites and with it the logics of amassing power. Even while horizontal accountability has diminished in Indonesian politics, the introduction of free elections has considerably strengthened linkages between

local government heads and the electorate. In other words, due to various reform initiatives, power has come to be concentrated in subnational executive government head offices. At the same time, candidates competing for these powerful governor and district head posts are keen to acquire the support of the mass electorate, rather than a small group of national leaders, which was the case prior to 1998.

Chapter 4 shows how competition among candidates vying for local executive power has become real and intense, forcing them to depend on mass support. Yet gaining and maintaining support is difficult for these state elites because the Indonesian electorate is relatively independent. This requires candidates in newly democratic Indonesia to establish linkages to the electorate, which has created logistical and financial challenges. Concretely, candidates need to find ways to mobilize thousands of voters, secure the means to pay for their campaign expenses and also establish a public image that resonates with voters.

Chapter 5 starts with data establishing that the relationship between Islamist party strength and the adoption of *shari'a* regulations is spurious at best. Islamist parties did not dominate a single parliament that adopted a *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013. Furthermore, the majority of local government heads who adopted *shari'a* regulations were also not Islamist party members. Arguably, political parties have remained without much influence in politics because they have neither the mobilizational nor financial capacity to help state elites accumulate power. Islamist parties also do not enjoy much credibility among the Indonesian electorate, so the parties cannot help boost a candidate's public persona in ways that would enhance his[21] credibility with voters.

In Chapter 6, I dig into the Islamist movements, examined in Chapter 2, which resurfaced in both West Java and South Sulawesi after 1998. I then parse the organizational structure of these movements and their lobbying activities for a state based on Islamic law to show how Islamist movements situated outside formal politics are better than Islamist parties in delivering political resources state elites deem useful.

In Chapter 7, I turn to the impact these Islamist movements have had on the *shari'a* policymaking process. Based on an original dataset, the chapter provides figures on the number, dispersion and kind of *shari'a* regulations adopted in West Java and South Sulawesi province. I also outline the mechanisms through which such groups gained influence. In the second section of the chapter, I examine the adoption of *shari'a*

[21] The majority of candidates in local elections are men although women have made inroads into local politics too in the context of direct local government head elections. See Kurniawati 2015.

regulations across the archipelago to see whether the argument for the Islamization of politics in West Java and South Sulawesi also applies to *shari'a* policymaking elsewhere. The analysis shows that *shari'a* regulations cluster in provinces where local Islamist movements have deep historical roots. I then focus on the last stage of the policy cycle, the *implementation* of various *shari'a* regulations. Interestingly, the same dynamics within the state that allowed Islamist groups to *gain* influence also *limit* their influence. In other words, changing power dynamics among elites permitted certain Islamist groups to gain and exert influence over the *agenda-setting* and *adoption* stage of the policy cycle. The same logics of power accumulation, however, also explain why Islamist groups struggle to affect the *implementation* stage of these policies. This, again, attests to the power of state elites to mediate the influence of Islamist activism.

I summarize the main theoretical contributions of this book in Chapter 8 and point to future avenues for research on the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization in Muslim-majority countries.

1 State Elites and the Influence of Islamist Activists

1.1 Introduction

After President Suharto left office in 1998, his successor Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie introduced competitive elections, allowed parties to form freely and decentralized political and fiscal powers to provinces and districts. Scholars argue about the *democratizing* effects of these reforms. Almost all agree, however, that the opening in 1998 has changed the contours of Indonesian politics.[1]

One of the most visible transformations has been the Islamization of political and public life through hundreds of Islamic regulations adopted by provinces and districts across the archipelago.[2] The institutional and legal renovation after 1998 officially remained under the national government's authority, but the devolution of political powers gave provinces and districts the authority to draft, adopt and implement local regulations to amend higher-level legislation.

1.2 The Islamization of Politics in Indonesia and beyond

Most existing studies analyze the *consequences* the adoption of *shari'a* regulations had on politics and public life in Indonesia.[3] By contrast, this book examines the circumstances that *caused* these regulations to emerge. The few studies that do investigate the origins of *shari'a*

[1] See Aspinall and Fealy 2003, Aspinall and Mietzner 2010 as well as Ford and Pepinsky 2014 for a collection of different assessments.

[2] Several studies published in recent years have documented the growing piety in Indonesian society overall. See, for instance, Beatty 2009; Hefner 2010 situated these developments in the context of a worldwide trend of growing piety in both Muslim and Christian societies. In this book, I am only focusing on the adoption of *shari'a* regulations, which I believe is a phenomenon that derives from relatively narrow political reforms rather than broad-based societal changes.

[3] Balowski 2012; Bush 2008, 172–4; Buehler 2008, 262; Crouch 2011, online; Hasani 2012; Holike 2008; Lindsey 2008, 206–14; Salim 2007, 126; Tanthowi 2008. The adoption of Islamic law, in other countries too, is usually examined from a human rights perspective rather than a political perspective, as Villalon 1994 has pointed out.

regulations almost all connect the Islamization of Indonesian politics to the emergence of Islamist parties after the demise of the authoritarian New Order regime. After every election in Indonesia and as soon as the results for Islamist parties are in, academics and the media alike begin to ponder anew how the future trajectory of political Islam may look.[4] In this vein, scholars have argued that "radicals" concentrated in Islamist parties[5] "[playing] Muslim identity politics"[6] for political ends[7] have revived the debate about the proper place of Islamic law in Indonesian politics amid democratization. After winning elections, these parties adopted *shari'a* regulations[8] as "Trojan Horses" for an Islamist takeover of Indonesia[9] because they failed to push through national amendments in the constitutional debates of 2001, which would have placed the Indonesian state under Islamic law. In short, Islamist parties emerged and mobilized amid the political opening in 1998 and demanded the establishment of a state based on Islamic law. Proponents of this theory consider the growing number of *shari'a* regulations across Indonesia to be a symptom of Islamist parties' increasing assertiveness.

Such explanations, however, are at odds with the empirical situation on the ground. The overall number of votes for Islamist parties has been in steady decline since the first free legislative elections in 1999.[10] Struggling for political survival, most Islamist parties have officially abandoned their *shari'a* platforms and adopted more moderate agendas as a consequence.[11] Furthermore, data in Chapter 5 demonstrate that *all shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2013 were adopted in provinces and districts where secular parties controlled local parliaments. Conversely, the few Islamist party members that won local executive government elections mostly refrained from adopting *shari'a* regulations. In addition, most *shari'a* regulations were adopted by local government heads who had no affiliations with Islamist parties.

Adding complexity to the situation, *shari'a* regulations are not adopted as widely as claimed by previous studies.[12] At least 443 *shari'a* regulations

[4] See Cochrane 2014 and Assyaukanie 2009, 159–223 for such coverage of recent elections and Kahin 1970 for an older assessment written in a similar vein. Tanuwidjaja 2010 is the only scholar I am aware of who has cautioned against equating the decline of Islamist parties with the decline of political Islam.
[5] Assyaukanie 2009, 184. [6] Nakamura 2005, 28. [7] Ferdhi et al. 2006, online.
[8] Abuza 2007, 66–82; Dhume 2007, 6–13; Machmudi 2008, 191–212; Sidel 2009, 182.
[9] Noor 2011, 7.
[10] Buehler 2009a, 60; Hadiz 2011, 1–18; Steele 2006, online; Tanuwidjaja 2010, 29–49.
[11] Buehler 2012; Bubalo et al. 2008, 73; Chernov Hwang 2010, 635–74; Hadiz 2010, 71; Permata and Kailani 2010, 56; Shihab and Nugroho 2008, 233–67; Tomsa 2010, 13.
[12] Anwar 2003.

appeared between 1998 and 2013.[13] Regarding the geographic dispersion of these regulations, data provided in Appendix 1 shows that 44 percent (15/34) of all provinces passed at least one *shari'a* regulation. Meanwhile 32 percent (133/412) of all districts and 52 percent (48/93) of all municipalities adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013.[14] In short, less than half of all provinces, around one-third of all districts, and slightly more than half of all municipalities in Indonesia have adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation in the period under examination here.

While 85 percent (29/34) of all provinces have approved at least one *shari'a* regulation at the provincial, district or municipal level, the bulk of these regulations cluster in the rural districts of a relatively small number of provinces, as shown in an analysis of the total number of *shari'a* regulations. The provinces with the most *shari'a* regulations are West Java (103),[15] West Sumatra (54), South Sulawesi (47), South Kalimantan (38), East Java (32) and Aceh (25). In other words, 67.5 percent (299/443) of all *shari'a* regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 cluster in only six of Indonesia's thirty-four provinces. Finally, there is also variance *across* government layers. Only 9.3 percent (41/443) of all *shari'a* regulations were adopted at the provincial level, as seen in Appendix 1. There is, therefore, great *variation* in the Islamization of political and public life within Indonesia.

The spread of *shari'a* regulations despite a decline in support for Islamist parties, as well as subnational variance in the Islamization of politics, suggests that such parties, which have a nationwide presence, are not steering the adoption of *shari'a* regulations.

A few scholars have provided alternative explanations for this puzzle. Some argue that it is not Islamist parties driving the adoption of *shari'a* regulations, but rather individuals affiliated with the Islamist cause who

[13] This figure is based on an original dataset I compiled for this book and which was the most comprehensive dataset on *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia available at the time of writing. I would like to acknowledge once more the help of Dani Muhtada in collecting large parts of the dataset. See also Muhtada 2014.

[14] The number of administrative units in Indonesia has increased sharply after 1998 as Kimura 2013 showed. This administrative fragmentation continued at the time of writing. Hence, even official figures on the number of administrative units are contradicting each other. I used the figures published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) as a baseline for the descriptive statistics in this book. The MoHA counted 539 autonomous administrative units in Indonesia at the end of December 2013. This excludes one district and five municipalities in the capital district of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta) that are ruled differently than the rest of the country. The 539 units consisted of 34 provinces, 412 districts and 93 municipalities. See MoHA 2013.

[15] Remember that I treat Banten and West Java as a single province because they only split in 2000. However, even if examined separately, they rank among the provinces with the highest number of *shari'a* regulations as Banten and West Java adopted at least 18 and 85 such regulations respectively between 1998 and 2013.

joined secular parties during the New Order. After that dictatorship was established in 1965, many Islamist party members joined the regime party Golkar out of opportunism or force. This Islamist migration into Golkar explains why such regulations surfaced in Indonesia after 1998, despite the poor showing of Islamist parties at the ballot box, according to this theory.[16] It goes further in arguing that the Islamization of politics in Indonesia *varies* because politicians adopt *shari'a* regulations mainly in areas that were Islamist party strongholds when Indonesia was an electoral democracy in the 1950s.[17]

Again, empirical evidence does not support these hypotheses. Many of the provinces where politicians affiliated with secular parties have approved *shari'a* regulations since 1998 were *not* Islamist party strongholds in the 1950s. For instance, in West Java province, where local governments have adopted the highest number of *shari'a* regulations since 1998, secular-nationalist parties accumulated 51.38 percent of the votes, while Islamist parties garnered 41.83 percent in the 1955 elections.[18] In South Sulawesi, where local governments have adopted the highest number of *shari'a* regulations in Eastern Indonesia since 1998, the Islamist Masyumi party indeed came out on top in the 1955 elections, collecting 39.7 percent of the votes. However, the results have to be interpreted with great care.[19] Many voters were unable to cast their vote due to a rebellion in the province at the time, which is covered in Chapter 2. More important, in South Sulawesi and many other provinces that welcomed *shari'a* regulations after 1998, Islamist party members were deliberately *excluded* from the Golkar party after 1965.[20] Finally, the "Islamization" of Golkar occurred all across Indonesia[21] and therefore cannot explain the variance in the Islamization of politics countrywide.

In short, explanations that see the "greening" of Golkar as the reason secular politicians have adopted most *shari'a* regulations since 1998 fail to cover not only the territorial deviations but also the timing of *shari'a* regulations. The greening of Golkar occurred *throughout* Indonesia and *several decades ago*.[22] Hence, it is unclear how an Islamist migration into Golkar can spur the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in a *confined* number of provinces and districts *after* 1998.

[16] Maftuhin 2007, 33.
[17] Assyaukanie 2007, 2; Hefner 2011, 302; Pringle 2012; Tanuwidjaja 2010, 29.
[18] Maftuhin 2007, 33. The 1955 elections were the first and last free elections in Indonesia between independence in 1945 and the rise of the New Order in 1965. In West Java, the Islamist Masyumi party became the strongest party in *subnational* parliaments after the 1957 elections for *local* legislatures. See Ricklefs 1993, 260.
[19] Santoso et al. 2004, 32. [20] Amal 1992, 64; Magenda 1989, 915.
[21] Cahyono 1992. [22] Samson 1973, 131.

All this suggests the possibility that actors other than Islamist parties or "Islamist cells" in nominally secular parties may underlie the Islamization of politics in the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy.

In light of the weak explanatory power of studies with a focus on Islamist parties, a small body of literature has emerged that names political actors situated outside the formal party system as driving the Islamization of Indonesian politics.

This literature argues that a broad range of Islamist groups outside the party system – including groups linked to transnational Islamist networks such as Hizbut Tahrir, local organizations with deep historical roots[23] as well as relatively new groups[24] – has emerged in the context of democratization after 1998 to call for a state based on Islamic law. Van Klinken and Barker describe "the ideological strategy conservative religious groups deploy to try to move public debate their way . . . " and mention how "[t]he antiheresy discourse . . . only emerged once the military-dominated New Order had crumbled."[25] Similarly, Feillard and Madinier argue "a new generation of militants, with or without direct links to the Darul Islam movements, has managed to expand its influence . . . " after 1998.[26] Irianto observes that "[c]onservative forces have used localization of power to their own advantage."[27]

The strategies to achieve this goal occasionally have included violence and terror acts but mostly have involved ramping up pressure on politicians through demonstrations and direct lobbying. Several scholars have shown how local, conservative pressure groups outside the party system approached politicians after 1998 to press for the adoption of Islamic law,[28] thereby contributing to the "conservative turn" in Indonesian politics.[29]

However, studies that emphasize Islamist groups also leave important questions untouched. Many of these studies remain vague as to who these conservative pressure groups are. Most accounts are also single case studies that only present anecdotal evidence of these groups' activities in an individual province or district. Hence, these explanations, too, struggle to answer *why* these groups managed to push through their *shari'a* agenda, unlike Islamist parties, and through *what mechanisms* exactly the groups have influenced politics. These studies also cannot

[23] Hasan 2006. [24] Wilson 2008. [25] Van Klinken and Barker 2009, 14.
[26] "[U]ne nouvelle génération de militants, avec ou sans liens directs avec les mouvements liés au Darul Islam, a su étendre son influence gràce à la fondation d'écoles coraniques," according to Feillard et Madinier 2006, 99.
[27] Irianto 2006, 9.
[28] Fealy 2010; Hamdan 2006; Mujiburrahman 2013; Olle 2009; Wildan 2013; Wilson 2008.
[29] Van Bruinessen 2013.

explain why Islamist activists became influential after 1998 and only in a confined number of provinces and districts.

Without addressing important questions about agency, sequencing and countrywide variance, the existing literature on *shari'a* policymaking in Indonesia mirrors the broader literature on the Islamization of politics during democratization in Muslim-majority countries.

1.3 Gaps in the Literature

1.3.1 Political Parties and the Islamization of Politics

Islamist activism manifests in a range of forms. Still, most studies on the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization center just on Islamist parties.[30] The main argument is that impulses to adopt Islamic law emanate from Islamist parties that are rooted in society and take advantage of "political opportunity structures" that emerge in the context of democratization.

Indeed, Islamist movements established political parties in the democratization of places as diverse as Algeria, Afghanistan, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey and Yemen.[31] After victories at the ballot box, often first in local politics, Islamist party representatives came to occupy parliamentary seats and executive government posts and used these as springboards for national politics. They then used their new positions in formal politics to adopt Islamic laws.[32]

Closely related to this narrative is the claim that Islamist parties pursue and adopt *shari'a* law *in opposition* to "the state," which is dominated by politicians affiliated with secular parties.[33] Islamist parties have frequently used *shari'a* agendas as a means to oppose secular-nationalist or military governments. In Pakistan in the 1960s, the Assembly of Islamic Clergy (*Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam*) demanded the adoption of *shari'a* law to express its opposition to the regime of General Ayub Khan.[34] In Afghanistan in the 1970s, the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-i-Islami*) made *shari'a* endorsement the point of contention with the secular government under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan,[35] as did the Muslim

[30] Wiktorowicz 2004, 9.

[31] Barfield 2011, 185–98; Eligür 2010, 182–213; Esposito and Voll 1996, 3–32; Robison 1997, 373–87; Schwedler 2006; Stacher 2002; Kalyvas 2000; Kendhamer 2013; Langhor 2001, 591–610; Lust-Oskar 2001, 545–69; Nasr 2001, 100–7; Ullah 2014, 75–105; Wiktorowicz 2004, 11–12; Yavuz 1997, 66; Zaman 2011, 216–24.

[32] Akinci 1999, 84; Massicard 2009, 21–39.

[33] Ghadbian 1997, 149. For a critique of using "Islamist–secular" dichotomies when studying the Islamization of politics, see Teik et al. 2014 and Agrama 2012.

[34] Zaman 2011, 207–43.

[35] Barfield 2011, 184–5.

Brotherhood when re-entering Egyptian politics during the reign of Anwar al Sadat.[36] In Turkey, Islamic law was first associated with opposition against colonial powers during the Ottoman Empire, then in opposition to "the other Turkey" of secular elites who were in control of the state but detached from "the masses."[37] Likewise, the political opening in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia in the early 1990s led to the birth of a political opposition under the banner of Islam that pushed for a state based on Islamic law.[38] In Nigeria, with the advent of democratization in 1999, politicians revived a debate over Islamic law that had been simmering for decades[39] to oppose the influence of the Christian-dominated state.[40] In Pakistan in 1990, an alliance of Islamist parties, the *Muttahida Majlis-i 'Amal*, exploited a proposed change in the country's Hudood Ordinances as a platform to oppose the military government of Pervez Musharraf.[41] In Yemen in 1999, the Islamist Islah party won local council elections in several districts after it had couched its opposition to the state in *shari'a* terms.[42] Finally, in North African states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, many Islamist groups have framed their resistance to the state in *shari'a* terms for decades.[43]

This focus on opposition Islamist parties as the main instigator of *shari'a* policymaking is problematic, however, for several reasons. First, it implicitly assumes that Islamist movements that emerge in the context of democratization morph into parties and subsequently compete in elections.[44] This literature takes for granted that dominant societal cleavages are expressed in a democratizing country's party system.[45] Long argued to be the case in Western democracies,[46] this may differ in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.[47] Islamist movements may fail to

[36] Brown 2011, 111.
[37] Yavuz 1997, 65; From the 1980s onwards, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*), the National Salvation Party (*Millî Selâmet Partisi*), the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*), the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) were all banned or threatened to be banned because they allegedly tried to replace the secular basis of the Turkish state with Islamic law. See Ayata 1996, 43; Yavuz 2011, 146–59. Since the electoral victory of the AKP in 2007, analysts have argued that secular *opposition* parties are needed to safeguard Turkey's democracy against the Islamization of politics. See Somer 2007, 1271–89.
[38] Roy 2001, 49–65. [39] Elaigwu and Galadima 2003, 125–33.
[40] Harnischfeger 2008, 112–235; Suberu 2009, 549.
[41] Zaman 2011, 222; Ullah 2014, 98. [42] Longley 2007, 254–6.
[43] Storm 2009, 1003. [44] Hefner 2011, 43.
[45] Noor 2003, 200–32; Schwedler 2006, 30, 2011, 347–76.
[46] Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 554. For a recent counterargument, see De Leon et al. 2015.
[47] See Ullah 2014, 107–9 on how assumptions in scholarship on consolidated Western democracies have biased research on democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

establish enduring movement parties[48] or may not want to form parties to participate in elections for ideological[49] or strategic reasons.[50]

Furthermore, research on post-authoritarian countries concludes that political parties are often *not* the transmission belt for the agendas of societal forces into formal politics, particularly in new democracies.[51] Even if Islamist parties emerge during democratic transitions, there is nothing preordained about the role parties play in the Islamization of politics. Finally, Islamist parties rarely come to dominate politics in post-authoritarian countries but have to pursue their agenda against the interests of a plethora of actors in a highly complex political environment.[52]

In short, the literature on Islamist parties in democratizing Muslim-majority countries often simply assumes that the mobilization of Islamist parties automatically leads to the Islamization of politics.

1.3.2 Social Movements and the Islamization of Politics

The broader literature on Islamist movements' contribution to the adoption of Islamic law in democratizing Muslim-majority countries is incomplete, too. Studies usually highlight the factors that facilitate the emergence and mobilization of these movements. Many of these studies ask how social movements mobilize resources or frame issues they consider pertinent to the mobilization of followers.[53] However, none of these studies provide an account for how concretely Islamist movements influence policymaking and push through the adoption of Islamic laws. One of the main reasons for these shortcomings in the literature is that it focuses on internal dynamics of movements and neglects the broader context in which they are embedded. Inspired by social movement theories that have urged "resource mobilization" and "framing theories" to take "political opportunity structures" into account, recent research on Islamist movements has examined the broader political context in which Islamist movements are embedded. However, this literature also overly stresses opportunity structures that allow movements to emerge and mobilize and does not explain how political conditions shape the influence of movements. Most studies focus on how Islamist activists solve "collective action problems,"[54] that is, the settings in which movements emerge and mobilize.[55] However, overcoming "collective action problems" (i.e. mobilizing supporters for the Islamist cause) does not mean that

[48] Wickham 2002, 2013. [49] ICG 2004, online; Hasan 2007, 18.
[50] Willis 2004, 53–81. [51] Hale 2006.
[52] Noor 2011, 18; Storm 2009, 1000–5; Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 158.
[53] See, for instance, Clark 2012; Elshobaki 2012; White 2012.
[54] Tarrow 1998, 71–140. [55] Wiktorowicz 2004.

"collective benefits" (i.e. *shari'a* laws) will follow automatically.[56] Conditions that facilitate Islamist mobilization sometimes indeed align with conditions that allow Islamists to influence politics.[57] This may not always be the case, however. In other words, scholars looking at democratizing Muslim-majority countries may simply have looked at cases in which the political conditions conducive to the emergence and mobilization of Islamic activism coincidentally changed in tandem with political conditions facilitating the influence of Islamist movements in politics.

However, to gain a better understanding for how movements shape the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries, scholars must examine the political opportunity structures that allow movements to emerge and mobilize and disentangle that from the political opportunity structures that allow movements to shape politics. The role of the state is important in this respect.

1.3.3 The State and the Islamization of Politics

A third body of works looks elsewhere to explain the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries. Acknowledging that Islamist parties bear little responsibility for *shari'a* regulations, and that Islamist movements often refrain from participating in formal politics, a few scholars have recently turned their attention to the state. Timothy Lindsey argues that in Indonesia a *new* breed of politicians affiliated with secular parties have adopted *shari'a* rules since *direct* elections for local government heads were introduced in 2005. They do so to differentiate themselves from New Order figures, he argues.[58] Once again, however, empirical evidence in Indonesia does not support these claims. Despite Lindsey's arguments, "new men" are largely absent in Indonesian elections. The overwhelming majority of candidates competing for executive and legislative elections are linked with the authoritarian New Order regime.[59] Furthermore, beyond a vague assertion that they want to differentiate themselves from New Order figures, Lindsey does not explain what exactly motivates such figures to take up *shari'a* regulations. He also does not acknowledge the temporal and spatial variance in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations identified earlier.

Scholars also research the state's role in the Islamization of politics in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries.[60] For instance, states

[56] Amenta et al. 2010, 295. See also Green and Shapiro 1994 for a broader critique.
[57] Meyer 2004, 137. [58] Lindsey 2008, 206. [59] Buehler 2010, 275.
[60] The study of the role of "the state" in shaping state–religion relations is of course not confined to Islamic countries. See, for instance, van der Veer 2001 on the impact the British state had on Hinduism and Sikhism in colonial India.

can define the use of religious symbols, thereby rooting Islam in the public sphere.[61] In Egypt, the *state* absorbed the *public shari'a* discourse[62] and used Islamic clerics to bolster its legitimacy,[63] expand its power[64] or otherwise "functionalized" Islam for political ends.[65] Likewise, in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, elites in control of the state have made frequent use of Islamic symbols during election campaigns to maintain power.[66] In Pakistan, the secular government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto intended to establish *shari'a* law in early 1977 before losing power in a coup. Bhutto's successor, military strongman Zia ul-Haq, continued and amplified Pakistan's state-driven Islamization by reforming the Islamic penal code.[67] In Sudan, the government declared *shari'a* national law in 1983 and subsequently promoted *hudud* punishments.[68] Sudan also promoted other forms of Islamization, mainly to assert the dominance of the north over what is now the autonomous country of South Sudan. In Jordan, the government expanded state control over mosques and other religious institutions, centralized the education system for preachers and bureaucratized the broader religious sphere to maintain political control in reaction to the growing strength of Islamist groups.[69] In Malaysia, Prime Minister Muhammad Mahathir's administration took advantage of society's Islamic resurgence in the 1980s to expand state power through mosque-building programs, the promotion of Islamic courts and the establishment of various organizations that regulate missionary activities (*dakwah*).[70] After Mahathir stepped down in 2003, later administrations, dominated again by secular parties, broadened Malaysia's religious bureaucracy,[71] prompting debate over whether Malaysia is experiencing a "secularization" of *shari'a* law.[72]

However, theories that place "the state" at the center of their analysis disregard important issues affecting the Islamization of politics amid democratization. Most importantly, many of these works treat "the state" as a black box. Dynamics within the state and how they may shape the adoption of *shari'a* laws are rarely explicitly examined. Arguably, the fact that many studies "tend to overlook the microprocesses at work in the generation of Muslim politics"[73] is one of the main reasons this state-centered research struggles to explain when, why and how states

[61] Beck 2009, 338; van Bruinessen 2002, 149–54; Eligür 2010, 85–135; Starett 1998, 14; Keppel 2000, 351–64; Moaddel 2002, 374; Nasr 2001, 105–57; Taylor 2008, 43–4; Woodward 2010, 6.
[62] Brown 2011, 95. [63] Taylor 2008, 41–62. [64] Reeves 1995, 306–23.
[65] Agrama 2012; Starett 1998, 6. [66] Jourde 2005, 421.
[67] Hasan-Askari 1974; Nasr 2001, 130–57.
[68] Esposito 1986, 181–202; Fluehr-Lobban 1990, 610–23; Warburg 1990, 624–37.
[69] Antoun 2006, 372–93; Wiktorowicz 2000, 43–61. [70] Camroux 1996, 858.a.
[71] Liow 2009, 149–77. [72] Mohamad 2010, 505–24. [73] Moaddel 2002, 374.

start to actively pursue *shari'a* politics[74] or why states become "vulnerable to an ideological challenge from below, [taking] the form of Islamism."[75]

In the context of such criticism, various studies have emerged in recent years that, rather vaguely, talk about a "convergence" between Islamist forces and the state in the context of democratization and how this interaction shapes political Islamization.[76] For instance, in Bangladesh between 1982 and 1990 staunchly secular parties pursued a "politics of expediency" through alliances with Islamist parties to oppose the military junta under Hussain Muhammad Ershad. These alliances not only legitimized Islamist parties but also pulled the political discourse in new directions. Eventually, military strongman Ershad abolished the secular constitution and declared Islam as the state religion.[77] Scholars make similar arguments about Pakistan. There, the adoption of *shari'a* law in the Swat region was the result of haggling between the state and local Islamist groups situated outside formal politics.[78] Likewise, in Senegal the state adjusted to influential Islamic networks to maintain and expand power.[79] Arguments that democratization led to a "convergence" of Islamist and secular forces and eventually the Islamization of politics also have been applied to Turkey.[80]

Similarly, in Indonesia, a small group of scholars has argued democratization after 1998 resulted in a "convergence" between society and the state, of which the Islamization of politics is an outcome.[81] Felix Heiduk gives a concise summary of the argument, stating "it is a stark characteristic of post-Suharto Indonesia that the relationship between the state and Islamist actors has lost its cohesion."[82] Again, however, neither Heiduk nor his colleagues describe the increasing ties between societal forces and the state and how exactly this convergence is supposed to explain the Islamization of politics.

To summarize, a focus on Islamist parties ignores the potential of relatively unorganized Islamist groups to mold *shari'a* policymaking from outside the formal political arena. A narrow focus on these groups risks ignoring the crucial function the state plays in the Islamization of politics. Finally, studies that emphasize the "convergence" between secular and Islamist forces in the context of democratization have little to say about the concrete *mechanisms* through which this interaction leads to the

[74] Hefner 2011, 308. [75] Nasr 2001, 11.
[76] Ayata 1996, 40; Eligür 2010, 85–135; Nasr 2001, 9; Liow 2004; Teik et al. 2014.
[77] Riaz 2004, 41–7. [78] Zaman 2011, 232. [79] Villalon 1994, 434.
[80] Turam 2007, 2012; Yavuz 1997, 63.
[81] Aspinall et al. 2011, 30; Harijanto 2010; Hefner 2011, 308; Heiduk 2012, 38; Platzdasch 2009a, 2009b; Sukma 2010, 65; Tanuwidjaja 2010, 29–49.
[82] Heiduk 2012, 34.

Islamization of politics. A discussion of the state in less isomorphic tones is needed to better understand the dynamics of political Islamization as expressed in *shari'a* policymaking. All these studies also leave out important questions with regard to the variance, timing and sequencing of the Islamization of politics.

1.4 Research Question and Argument

Data on the adoption of *shari'a* regulations presented earlier showed a concentration of such rules in a small number of jurisdictions where Islamist movements outside the formal party system have deep historical roots. Taking the peculiar subnational variance in the Islamization of politics as a starting point, I will address the aforementioned gaps in the literature on Islamization in democratizing Muslim-majority countries through the following question: *Why have Islamist movements that mobilized at the same time as Islamist parties in Indonesia in 1998 subsequently gained political influence, while Islamist parties have not?*

I argue that one needs to distinguish between political conditions that allow Islamist activists to *emerge and mobilize*, on the one hand, and conditions that allow them to *gain and maintain influence* in politics, on the other.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that has tried to detach these disparate conditions. However, in recent years a small body of literature has delved into the influence of social movements in the politics of consolidated democracies.[83] It is in this literature that my argument is rooted. I will therefore touch on these works' main arguments before showing how their findings may illuminate the Islamization of politics in Indonesia and other democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

A country's policymaking process is almost never under the absolute control of a single political actor. Arguably, this is especially true in formerly authoritarian Muslim-majority countries, where it is likely that non-Islamist interests affiliated with the old regime still dictate formal politics beyond the transition.[84] This suggests looking beyond Islamist parties and movements for factors that determine the influence of Islamist activism.

Edwin Amenta and his colleagues note that "[m]any social movements attempt to gain collective benefits through the state, and so variations and

[83] Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 2004; Gamson 1975; Giugni et al. 1999; Piven and Cloward 1977; Soule and Olzak 2004.

[84] The discussion surrounding the role the "deep state" plays in the democratization process following the Arab Spring in the Middle East exemplifies my point. See, for instance, Economist 2013.

changes in important dimensions of the states are likely to have systematic influences on important aspects of social movements."[85] Of course, not all social movements target the state in their lobbying efforts. However, Islamist movements almost always do since their main goal is to establish a state based on Islamic law. In light of this goal, the characteristics of "the state" also could influence how and why only certain Islamist activists gain and exert political influence. It is highly likely that politics (and policies) result from cooperation between Islamist actors and political figures in control of the state.

In this context, I argue that dynamics within the state define the Islamization of politics in Indonesia and explain why Islamist movements but not Islamist parties have gained power in the midst of democratization. Elites running the state *mediate* the influence of groups situated in society.[86]

To explain the influence of social movements, studies on policymaking in consolidated Western democracies have identified several factors: the degree of democratization, the capacity of the state and the partisanship of elites controlling the state and political institutions.[87] Concretely, this movement influence is likely to be weak in states where participatory rights are restricted or elections are not competitive. At the same time, electoral rules that allow voters to *directly* affect politics tend to buttress the impact of movements.[88] Influence also depends on the partisanship of institutional power holders. For instance, bureaucrats whose agenda overlaps with the interests of activists would amplify the political pull of movements,[89] as would elites in the executive or legislative branch of government who benefit from supporting these movements. In democracies, elites in control of the state often support challenger groups for election-related reasons.[90] In fact, some scholars believe activists have a hand in policymaking "only to the extent that the movement's activities provide elected officials and politicians with information and resources

[85] Amenta et al. 2002, 56.

[86] For a similar argument made with regard to a range of other policies in consolidated democracies, see Amenta and Zylan 1991, 250–65; Amenta and Caren 2004, 464–88; Amenta et al. 2010, 287–307; Giugni 1999, xi–xxxiii and 371–93; Meyer 2004, 136–7; Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1462; Piven and Cloward 1977.

[87] See Amenta et al. 2002, 48. Conditions facilitating or inhibiting the *emergence* and *mobilization* of movements include the degree of popular access to the political system, the disunity among elites, the tolerance for a movement on the part of elites, alliances between elites and social movements, the permeability and ideology of political parties, state capacity as well as the territorial organization and repressive capacity of states. See, for instance, Boudreau 1996, 175; Goodwin 2011; Jenkins and Perrow 1977, 249–60; Meyer 2004, 135; McAdam et al. 1996, 139–227.

[88] Amenta et al. 2002, 60.

[89] Amenta and Caren 2004, 475.

[90] Goldstone 2003, 1–24; Amenta et al. 2010, 289.

relevant to their re-election ... [because] ... what politicians want and need most is essentially information about electorally relevant resources."[91] For these reasons, movements are most likely to affect policy change in a context of high "electoral volatility."[92]

Finally, studies on the influence of movements in consolidated Western democracies also prove the importance of institutions and the state's administrative capacity. One element is the vertical and horizontal concentration of power within states. Edwin Amenta and his collaborators note that in decentralized states the influence of movements increases because such institutional configurations provide more "entry points" to activists.[93] Movements operating in decentralized polities are therefore said to be most influential at the subnational level.[94]

In addition, the power dynamics *within* government layers, particularly between government branches, define the political impact of movements, scholars have argued. A balanced distribution of power along horizontal lines is said to disadvantage movements since the legislature may use its veto powers against the executive and vice versa. States in which horizontal power is relatively *equally* distributed are biased in favor of "inaction rather than action."[95] By contrast, a concentration of power in one government branch tends to invite the influence of movements over politics. Finally, movements can only be effective if the state has the capacity to both adopt *and* implement the policies movements demand.[96]

There have been no commensurate theoretical developments in the research on Islamist activism. The literature has drawn on political process theory to study how the *emergence* and *mobilization* of Islamic activism depends on these variables: the levels of formal and informal access to state institutions, political receptivity to challenger groups, the prevalence of allies and opponents, the stability of ruling elite coalitions, state repression and the institutional capacity of states.[97] However, to the best of my knowledge no study has explicitly examined the environment in which Islamic activists *gain and maintain political influence* as mentioned before.

In this context, I make two arguments to explain the peculiarities of the Islamization of politics in Indonesia. The first argument is that changes in the power relations *among* elites who dominate the state apparatus have facilitated political Islamization in contemporary Indonesia and not collective action from below. New Order recruitment, promotion and

[91] Burstein and Linton 2002, 386. [92] Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1469.
[93] Amenta et al. 2002, 59. [94] Staggenberg 1998, 180–204.
[95] Amenta et al. 2002, 59.
[96] Amenta et al. 2002, 66; Buehler 2011 makes a similar argument for the case of Indonesia.
[97] Wiktorowicz 2004, 13–14.

retirement mechanisms for elites controlling the state were all upward-oriented and therefore regulated by President Suharto.[98] Most important, the national government *appointed* local government heads during the New Order. Therefore, political hopefuls aspiring to become governor or district head were co-opted into the vertical hierarchy of the military dictatorship. Since the New Order regime exerted authoritarian pressure along horizontal lines as effectively as it suppressed discontent along vertical lines, it created and maintained a certain unity among elites.[99]

After the collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998, New Order elites whose political survival was at stake hastily enacted various institutional changes. They unveiled free elections for both the legislative and executive branches of government, allowed political parties and decentralized fiscal and political authority to provinces and districts.[100]

These reforms changed the logics of power accumulation among elites in control of the state, forcing them into real and intense competition.[101] Popular support has become the most important asset for state elites jockeying for power in newly democratic Indonesia.

To find allies in their battles with *one another*, New Order politicians *subsequently* started to reach out and reach down in the political arena. They now rely on "society" to a degree unimaginable during the New Order.[102]

At the same time, Indonesian voters enjoy a relatively high degree of "economic autonomy"[103] compared to electorates in other parts of Southeast Asia. As I show in Chapter 4, large landholdings and other concentrations of economic activity are largely absent in the country. Indonesian citizens are therefore independent compared to the "locked-in" electorates common in neighboring countries such as the Philippines.[104] Since local politicians struggle to find viable economic bases to construct electoral machines, they yield to numerous power brokers and vote-getters to "structure" and "work" the electorate. The mobilization of the electorate rests heavily on clientelistic linkages between political elites, intermediaries and the masses.[105]

[98] McLeod 2000, 2005.
[99] Malley 1999, 145–95; Pepinsky 2009, 42–60; Sidel 1998, 159–94; Slater 2010, 113; Winters 2011, 135–9.
[100] Crouch 2010, 43–75; Smith 2008, 211–34. [101] Buehler 2007, 119–47.
[102] Olken 2007, 200–49; Ryter 2009, 215.
[103] See McMann 2006, 28–43 for an analysis of how the economic autonomy of citizens shapes democratic consolidation.
[104] Scott 1969, 1146, footnote 16.
[105] Buehler 2007. Kitschelt 2000 differentiates between charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic linkages between voters and political elites.

My second argument is that elites in control of the state have the dominance to *mediate* the influence of societal groups. The new power dynamics among these elites make them receptive to the groups' demands, *but only if* these groups provide resources that help elites gain and maintain power. Resources that elites value include "social capital," i.e. networks to mobilize the electorate; "economic capital," including money and property to bankroll campaigns;[106] and "cultural capital," such as cultural goods and symbols.[107] Groups situated in society that cannot provide such resources may *mobilize* in the context of democratization but are unlikely to subsequently gain *influence* in politics.

Islamist parties are ill-equipped to help candidates establish linkages to the masses since they are poorly institutionalized at the subnational level.[108] During the New Order, parties were not allowed to have organizational structures below the provincial level. They also could not campaign between elections. Consequently, most Indonesian parties lack the capacity to mobilize voters or even provide vote-getters. This is also the case for Islamist parties, most of which are elite parties that lack stable constituencies. The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), the only Islamist movement party in Indonesia, is confined to its small urban middle class and also subject to moderating tendencies in national politics. The party is not of use to elites outside urban centers, nor does the party allow local cadres to advocate for Islamic law.

By contrast, in a small number of provinces, networks of local Islamist movements are more developed than those of Islamist parties. In all *shari'a* clusters, except East Java province, revolts in the name of Islam erupted after Indonesia gained independence in 1945. Stemming from a district class of affluent traders and farmers, the Islamist networks have had a presence in these jurisdictions for decades. In the context of elections, elites in control of the state have therefore approached these Islamist groups to tap into a comparatively extensive web of boarding schools, mosques and prayer circles.

Islamist groups situated outside formal politics have also been useful allies for state elites in their quest to raise money, albeit in a more indirect manner. The adoption of *shari'a* regulations gives state elites the opportunity to accumulate economic capital. For instance, local leaders exploit *shari'a* policies on religious taxes by drafting the fine-print to grant

[106] Various studies have shown the growing importance of money and resources in Indonesian elections. See, for instance, Mietzner 2009, 124–50; Rinakit 2005.

[107] For an examination of these categories and the role they play in politics, see Bourdieu 1983.

[108] There are similar developments in Pakistan. See Khan 2014.

themselves great discretionary power over the dispersion of funds.[109] Local government heads frequently use the funds to establish loyalty bonds to politically valuable power brokers and vote-getters, including Islamist groups.[110] In addition, *shari'a* restrictions increase the leverage of local executive heads over bars, gambling dens and massage parlors. Entertainment venues often stay in business only if they can reach "agreements" with local officials, as evidence provided in subsequent chapters shows. *Shari'a* regulations have also been crucial in establishing alcohol monopolies to benefit state elites. In South Sulawesi, several districts adopted *shari'a* ordinances that did not outlaw alcohol entirely but, in fact, only regulated it. Members of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law (KPPSI, *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam*), a conservative pressure group (on which more below), pointed out the rather cynical rationale of local governments for adopting *shari'a* regulations on alcohol consumption and distribution. Sawati Lambe, KPPSI Deputy Head in the city of Parepare, said during a parliamentary debate on *shari'a* regulations against alcohol: "If [the selling of alcohol] is only regulated [but not completely forbidden], this is just abusing [the regulation]. This regulation on liquor is just going to enrich certain people."[111] Finally, *shari'a* regulations against religious minorities have also been used to establish protection rackets. There are accounts of Islamist groups forcing Ahmadis, members of a heterodox Islamic group, to make financial contributions to local governments and Islamist groups to avoid harm.[112]

Again, local Islamist movements have a distinct edge over Islamist parties in helping politicians accrue (and spend) financial resources. Entering alliances with such groups has shored up the capacity of local governments to push through *shari'a* regulations that allowed them to reap economic profits and to exert moral pressure on local populations to fall in line. Anecdotal evidence provided in subsequent chapters shows that Islamist groups have collected money on behalf of state elites. Furthermore, the fact that such Islamist groups are placed outside formal politics allows local governments to disperse financial capital in a discretionary (and discreet) manner on behalf of local state elites, much more so than they could do under an official partnership with local Islamist party branches. The latter are not only accountable to national party headquarters, thus reducing the authority of local

[109] IMZ 2009; Buehler and Muhtada 2016. [110] Buehler 2008
[111] See Tribun Timur July 3, 2006, 30.
[112] Mudzakkir 2012. The Ahmadiyah is a heterodox Islamic sect that was founded in British India at the end of the nineteenth century and that has come under increasing pressure from both Islamist groups and local governments in Indonesia in recent years.

government heads, but also under a lot more media and public scrutiny than local Islamist groups outside the formal political arena.

Finally, state elites have approached Islamist groups situated outside formal party politics to help them accumulate cultural capital. Elites are increasingly seen as corrupt and entangled in rent-seeking activities by the local electorate on whose support they now depend.[113] Indeed, several local government heads who adopted *shari'a* regulations were previously involved in corruption cases as well as drug and sex scandals.[114] Arguably, adopting *shari'a* regulations and collaborating with Islamist groups helped state elites to build up cultural capital to pay off "cultural debts" by improving their reputation. Other local government heads passed *shari'a* regulations to distance themselves from peers involved in drug and sex scandals. Furthermore, adopting *shari'a* regulations allowed state elites to point out competitors' lack of religious credentials. As a local observer noted: "The success of Patabai Pabokori [the first district head of Bulukumba in South Sulawesi after 1998] and his movement to formalize Islamic Law in Bulukumba created a distinct reputation for being one of the district heads that pays more attention to religious matters."[115]

Again, Islamist groups can support state elites in such endeavors. In the lead-up to elections, local Islamist movements have frequently endorsed local government heads who had adopted *shari'a* regulations. In return, state elites have emphasized the support of Islamist groups to boost their public image and religious credentials with the electorate. Islamist parties (as with most other Indonesian parties), in contrast, have been marred by numerous corruption and sex scandals since 1998 and therefore struggle to offer alternative narratives to Indonesian voters disenchanted with mainstream politics. Hence, the support and endorsement of Islamist parties are increasingly seen as a liability by local elites competing in elections.[116]

In short, the expansion of one's reach over social networks (social capital), the accumulation of financial means (economic capital) and the creation of a reputation as a leader with outstanding religious credentials (cultural capital), all translate eventually into political capital.

It is important to note that I am not suggesting that these Islamist movements provide a genuine social base that state elites can use to mobilize the masses in campaigns and that the support of such groups guarantees a win at the ballot box. Approaching such Islamist groups is only one among several strategies candidates employ and it by no means

[113] McGibbon 2006, 334. [114] Bush 2008, 186; Parsons and Mietzner 2009, 23.
[115] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 184. [116] Buehler 2013.

guarantees electoral success. However, the networks these groups constitute are *relatively* stronger and more densely knit than local Islamist party structures. In addition, the ability of these groups to operate outside the boundaries of the law, to project violence at politically opportune moments, and their aggressive rhetoric when presenting themselves as the arbiters of "true Islam" have allowed such groups not only to attract media attention but also to occupy the interstices that have opened up in Indonesian politics following democratization. Candidates from within the state elite profit from cozying up to such groups because it creates media coverage and signals to the electorate that one is a truly innovative political entrepreneur. The support of such groups serves as a "show of force" that signals to competitors and the electorate alike that one is the only electable candidate or at least a candidate endorsed by forces that voters will ignore at their own peril. In short, while these Islamist groups should not be seen as a stable group of supporters that vote as a bloc in support of a candidate, these groups have the capacity to bring a candidate into the media and create excitement about his candidacy.

All these forms of capital have become essential in a political environment characterized by true electoral competition, but also a "personalization" of politics as a reaction to weakly institutionalized parties that do not provide resources to state elites. This "personalization" of local politics is a phenomenon that can be observed across Indonesia.[117] However, it has acquired a distinct form in provinces where Islamist movements have strong historical roots. Here, as a *consequence* of electoral competition, exchanges between state elites and Islamist movements have increased.

Patterns in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations confirm that they are the outcome of the growing electoral competition between state elites and the resulting interdependence between state elites and societal forces. Of all *shari'a* regulations 33 percent (146/443) were adopted between 1998 and 2004 when local government heads were elected *indirectly*. Meanwhile 67 percent (296/443) of these regulations were adopted between 2005 and 2013, that is, after *direct* elections for local government heads were introduced, as shown in Appendix 1. This amounts to an annual average of 21 *shari'a* regulations per year between 1998 and 2004 and 37 *shari'a* regulations per year between 2005 and 2013. Arguably, this jump is the result of increased competition among state elites and the more accommodative stance toward Islamist groups that followed from it. Another indication that *shari'a* regulations are driven by political expediency rather than ideological shifts within the Indonesian polity is the fact that local government heads passed most *shari'a* regulations in their first term.[118]

[117] Buehler 2009b. [118] Pisani and Buehler 2016.

For the two provinces used as case studies, fewer *shari'a* regulations were adopted in second terms. In other words, local government heads not facing re-election were less inclined to adopt *shari'a* regulations, as I show in Chapter 7.

To summarize, an argument rooted in political process theory that emphasizes the importance of "the state" can best tackle questions about the agency, the subnational variance, as well as the timing and sequencing with which the Islamization of politics unfolded in Indonesia after 1998. Existing accounts solely focus on Islamist parties or Islamist movements. With regard to agency, Islamist groups outside politics have gained political influence while Islamist parties have not because the former provide state elites with resources they deem necessary in their competition against one another. The mediating role of state elites also explains the variance in the Islamization of politics both within and across Indonesian government layers. Newly competitive state elites approach Islamist movements in provinces where such groups have a well-established local presence and can therefore provide the aforementioned resources to candidates. This explains why *shari'a* regulations cluster in a relatively small number of provinces, where such Islamist movements have strong historical roots. Likewise, fewer *shari'a* regulations have been adopted beyond the district level because Islamist groups do not have strong networks at the provincial and national levels. They are therefore of less use to state elites competing for power at the higher levels of the political system. In addition, provincial elites have to sway a larger electorate to their side. Hence, provincial state elites' personal networks are likely to include a broader range of power brokers and vote-getters than the networks of their counterparts at the district level. These networks are likely to include representatives from religious minorities and other groups that do not approve of Islamic law.[119] Since provincial electorates are more heterogeneous than district-level electorates, adopting *shari'a* regulations at the provincial level may put off sizeable groups of voters. Again, the mediating role of state elites explains why Islamist activism is more influential at the district level than in provincial or national politics.

The mediating role of state elites is also evident because Islamist activists gained influence in Indonesia as competition among elites increased (and therefore the need for election-related resources increased). Finally, this mediating role has even limited the power of Islamist groups that state elites deem useful. Since elites only care about those groups' support during elections, their influence diminishes after

[119] National leaders are also increasingly relying on mass media, which further reduces incentives to establish personal networks. See Liddle and Mujani 2007, 832–57.

polls close. Concretely, Islamist groups steered the *agenda setting* and *adoption* stage of the policy cycle but were relatively powerless in the *implementation* of policies.[120]

Overall, heightened competition has carved out new interstices in the political system that some groups have managed to occupy. Locally confined, relatively unorganized groups outside the political arena have the upper hand in policymaking compared with established Islamic parties because state elites deem them useful allies to accumulate resources.

1.5 Terms and Concepts

To gain a better idea of how political influence is exerted, actors involved in the policymaking process sketched earlier need to be disaggregated.[121]

1.5.1 The State, Political Institutions and State Elites

The argument proposed here is that the logics of power accumulation within "the state" and "political institutions" have defined the influence of Islamist activists since 1998. "The state" consists of the three government branches and the bureaucracy.[122] The regulations concerning the electoral and party system constitute "political institutions." I do not suggest that "institutions" should be understood as "technical" or "value free."[123] "The state" and "political institutions" are the outcome of

[120] The four stages of the policy cycle are explained in Lasswell 1956.

[121] Meyer 2004, 138.

[122] There are of course limits to such a narrow understanding of "the state." Anderson 1983, 478 emphasized that "'the state' is a notoriously slippery entity for political theory and political sociology. It is only too easy to collapse it into either a legal fiction or a collectivity of persons ('the bureaucracy'). The fact is that the state has to be understood as an institution, of the same species as the Church, the university, and the modern corporation." One may also question whether elected officials such as governors and district heads represent "the state" or whether the motivations and behavior of non-elected bureaucrats ought to be examined too. Several points are important in this respect: This book takes dynamics among state elites only as a starting point to examine the mechanisms of *shari'a* policymaking and critically discusses the boundaries between "the state" and "society" in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, subsequent chapters will show that governors and district heads are the single most important actors in the *drafting* and *adoption* stage of local policymaking. Arguably, non-elected bureaucrats play an important role in the *implementation* stage of the policy cycle, which is not the immediate focus of this book. Poulantzas' observations about the "apparatuses of the state" and how they shape politics are also potentially useful for examining the role of the state in shaping politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries. See Poulantzas 1975, 14–27. On the difficulties of drawing a boundary between "the state" and "society," see Mitchell 1991.

[123] For the latest study in with a "technical" understanding of institutions in Southeast Asian politics, see Ziegenhain 2015. For a critique of such a "technical" understanding of institutions in the literature on Indonesia, see Hadiz 2004. For a critique of rational

struggles between political interests[124] that have their origins in *specific* historical contexts.[125]

Regarding "the state," I focus on actors controlling state institutions at the local level because most *shari'a* regulations entered at the subnational level after 1998 for reasons hypothesized earlier. The most important actors in the adoption of local statutes are local executive government heads, namely governors overseeing provinces, district heads in charge of rural districts and mayors running municipalities, as I will show in subsequent chapters. Therefore, I closely examine the backgrounds of the figures competing for these posts.

I call these figures *state elites* due to their proximity to and dependence on the state. The genealogy of elites sketched in later chapters also confirms that they are linked to the state elites of the Dutch East Indies described by Heather Sutherland.[126] As I show later, the candidate pool in Indonesia's local elections differs markedly from that of other democratizing countries in both Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. Concretely, in Indonesia it is mostly bureaucrats who compete for *and* win executive government posts.[127] By contrast, in the Philippines most candidates are career politicians or come from families whose power is based on large landholdings.[128] In Thailand, many candidates hail from an extra-bureaucratic bourgeoisie of merchants and trading communities in bigger cities. In rural areas, locally influential thugs have also successfully contested local government head elections.[129]

Furthermore, I call them state elites because they resemble a Millsian "power elite"[130] that derives authority from the commanding positions they hold within institutions rather than from material wealth.[131] My understanding of elites is congruent with that of Jeffrey Winters, who says that elites emerge whenever coercive power, mobilizational power, official positions and/or political rights are "distributed in a highly exclusive or concentrated [way]." While local state elites are not oligarchs defined by material power, this is not to deny that *some* Indonesian political actors are indeed defined by their relationship to the means of production. However, many figures consequential in Indonesian local politics are *political elites* rather than oligarchs or class-fractions in the Marxist sense.

choice institutionalism and how it differs from historical institutionalism, see Steinmo et al. 1992, 8.

[124] Poggi 1978. [125] Badie and Birnbaum 1983. [126] Sutherland 1979.

[127] In fact, the only countries where bureaucrats have become as dominant in local politics as in Indonesia are the former member states of the Soviet Union. See Hale 2003.

[128] Anderson 1988. [129] Anderson 1990; Ockey 2000. [130] Mills 1956.

[131] See Winters 2011a, 16 and Mills 1956, 259–62. For a more detailed discussion, see Buehler 2014.

1.5.2 Islamist and Secular Parties, Islamist Movements

What exactly constitutes an Islamist party in Indonesia is subject to debate, and parties in Muslim-majority democracies regularly shift back and forth on the secular-*shari'a* scale.[132] An Indonesian newspaper article published in 2004 classified Islamic parties into the following categories: orthodox Islamic parties, which included the Crescent Star Party (PBB, *Partai Bulan Bintang*); progressive Islamic parties, which included the aforementioned Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*); traditional Islamic parties, which included the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (PPNUI, *Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia*), the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) and the Reform Star Party (PBR, *Partai Bintang Reformasi*); modernist Islamic parties, which included the National Mandate Party (PAN, *Partai Amanat Nasional*); and nationalist-religious parties including the National Awakening Party (PKB, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*).

If, however, one looks at parties whose official platform after 1998 called for Islamic law as the basis of the Indonesian state, only the PBB, the PKS, the PPNUI and the PPP are Islamist parties.[133] Parties that did not explicitly place the adoption of Islamic law on their agendas I call "secular parties." They may still pursue "Islamic" issues but, overall, they do not question the secular basis of the Indonesian state.[134]

Movements, on the other hand, have been defined as "a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others."[135] Therefore, I understand Islamist movements as continuous claims for a state based on *shari'a* law made by groups outside the formal political domain.[136]

1.5.3 Influence over Politics

Political actors can influence politics in different ways. They may change the broad structures of a polity, such as the scope of participatory rights or the rules for party formation.[137] However, most set their sights on a more intermediate object, namely public policies.[138] They may push for the

[132] Ullah 2014, 42–5.
[133] "Islamists [are] devout Muslims active in politics on the basis of their religious ideology," according to White 2012, 60.
[134] See Kompas 2004, 8. For a recent classification of Islamist parties across Muslim-majority countries, see Ullah 2014, 11.
[135] Tilly 2004, 4.
[136] For a broad overview of the literature on the differences between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics, see Goldstone 2003, 1–26.
[137] Amenta and Caren 2004, 464. [138] Amenta et al. 2010, 290.

adoption or prevention of new policies as well as the extension or revocation of old ones. Political actors may also try to change the levels of appropriations for established policy programs.[139] Furthermore, political players may affect politics unintentionally by triggering backlashes, such as an increase in state repression or surveillance.[140] Finally, political groups may not have any influence in politics but still present new advantages to those who support them.[141]

The debate about Islamist actors' impact on politics in democratizing Muslim countries has centered around questions of Islamic law since "the core imperative of Islamic movements is a desire to create a society governed and guided by the shari'a ..."[142] As I want to explain the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization that has expressed itself in the adoption of Islamic law, I interpret "political influence" as "influence over policymaking."

Influence over policymaking is gradual. If a party or movement manages to push through a policy that has major, enduring benefits for its constituency, it is considered influential. Political actors are considered less powerful if the policy adopted has no long-term consequences for their constituency.[143] However, these benchmarks are from research conducted in consolidated "Western" democracies. Given the history of state repression vis-à-vis societal forces in Indonesia and in many other Muslim countries, I consider the *adoption* of a policy that matches the agenda of Islamist actors to be a sufficient indicator of their influence. In fact, this approach sets a high threshold for measuring influence, given the poor record of many developing countries to adopt any policies *at all*.

1.5.4 Islamic Law and Shari'a *Regulations*

Islamic law has been described as a "total discourse" that includes religious, legal, moral and economic rules and regulations.[144] Hence, *shari'a* is to be understood in broader terms than just "Islamic law." *Shari'a* has also only been codified in the context of colonial transformations of Muslim countries.[145] Islamist movements in Indonesia, too, have a rather vaguely defined understanding of what constitutes "Islamic law" and how a society based on it would look.[146]

I confine my analysis to local regulations with a religious connotation adopted in Indonesian provinces and districts after 1998. Religious affairs

[139] Meyer 2004, 138.
[140] Fording 2001, 115; Piven and Cloward 1977; Snow and Soule 2009, chapter 6; Tilly 1999.
[141] Amenta et al. 2005, 516–38; Skrentny 2006, 1762–815. [142] Wiktorowicz 2004, 15.
[143] Amenta and Caren 2004, 464–5. [144] Messick 1993, 3.
[145] Hallaq 2009, 371–499. [146] See Pradadimara and Junedding 2005, online.

remained under the authority of the central government even after decentralization in 1998. To avoid interference with the national government on religious matters, local governments usually refer to their rules as public order regulations and avoid using Islamic references in both title and text.[147] Academics, journalists, watchdogs and government officials usually refer to these as *shari'a* regulations, as I will do in this book.

There are two legal types of such *shari'a* regulations. The first is a local regulation (*peraturan daerah*) drafted and adopted in a complex process that, theoretically, includes both the executive and legislative branches. These regulations have a fairly strong standing in Indonesia's legal hierarchy. The other category of local regulations consists of executive instructions and decrees, circulation letters, appeals letters and executive regulations (*Instruksi; Keputusan; Surat Edaran; Surat Himbauan; Peraturan gubernur/bupati/walikota*). They sit below *peraturan daerah* in the legal hierarchy and come from the executive branch without parliamentary consultation.[148] Appendix 1 lists local regulations and executive regulations separately to give readers an idea of the role the executive branch of local governments is playing in the Islamization of politics. Of all *shari'a* regulations, 15 percent (66/443) are executive orders, while 85 percent (377/443) are local regulations (*peraturan daerah*). The latter are supposed to involve local parliaments, but in reality, most *peraturan daerah* in Indonesia are initiated, drafted and adopted by the executive branch, on which more is discussed in Chapter 3. For brevity's sake I therefore refer to both types of legal documents as *shari'a* regulations.

To avoid legal ambiguities about the *classification* of local regulations and to facilitate comparison with other research, I follow the criteria used in previous studies to establish the "*shari'a*"-content of regulations.[149] Most fall into three distinct categories. There are regulations on "public

[147] Parsons and Mietzner 2009, 206.

[148] Law No. 10/2004 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations established the following hierarchy of Indonesian legislation (1 being strongest): (1) 1945 Constitution (UUD'45, *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*); (2) Law (UU, *Undang-Undang*) and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu, *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang*); (3) Government Regulation (PP, *Peraturan Pemerintah*); (4) Presidential Regulation (Perpres, *Peraturan Presiden*); (5) Regional Regulation (Perda, *Peraturan Daerah*).

There are also Presidential Instructions (Inpres, *Instruksi Presiden*), Ministerial Decrees (Kepmen, *Keputusan Menteri*), Circulation Letters (*Surat Edaran*) and Appeals Letters (*Surat Himbauan*). These executive orders all have their equivalent at the provincial and district level, for instance, *surat gubernur* and *surat bupati* respectively. These subnational executive orders are legally less binding than regional regulations (*peraturan daerah*).

[149] See Bush 2008.

order and social problems," such as alcohol, gambling and prostitution. There are *shari'a* regulations on "religious skills and obligations," such as regulations on Qur'an-reading skills or the payment of religious alms. Finally, there are regulations referring to "religious symbols" such as dress codes for Muslims.[150]

1.6 Method of Comparison, Case Selection and Data Collection

To gain as complete a picture as possible of the Islamization of politics in Indonesia, I compare the influence of Islamist activism *across time*, *space* and *type of movement*. I also examine the influence of Islamist activists at individual stages of the policy cycle. These comparisons aim to illuminate the relationship between Islamist actors and the state and explain how this shapes the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization.

Concretely, I compare *single* Islamist movements over time to examine the conditions that shape their political influence in Indonesia. A longitudinal lens allows me to compare the influence of a movement before and after changes in any political context deemed consequential. If a movement's agenda is suddenly adopted after a shift in its political surroundings, assuming all else is equal, there is reason to believe this movement has gained influence over politics. Such longitudinal comparisons are neglected in social movement theory.[151] Hence, there is very little research on what occurs in the years *prior* to the enactment of a policy because most studies on the political sway of movements focus on adoption and implementation stages of the policy cycle.[152] It is in this context that calls have been made for more "historical comparative design[s] aimed at analyzing concordances and differences ... [and] ... in-depth comparisons ... of different movements over a relatively long period."[153] These shortcomings are also present in the literature on Islamic activism. Scholars have pointed to the "serious methodological problems" in much of this literature due to a lack of "systematic historical comparison."[154] Arguably, this neglect of a long-term perspective makes it hard to determine whether "society" or "the state" is the driving force behind political Islamization during democratization, as well as identify the *sequencing* in the Islamization of politics.[155]

I agree that we should make more comparisons across movements and study their influence by placing case studies in comparative and historical

[150] Salim 2007, 126. [151] Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1459.
[152] Burstein and Linton 2002, 476. [153] Giugni 1998, 389. [154] Moaddel 2002, 365.
[155] See, for instance, Beck 2009, 337–56.

perspective.[156] The Islamization of Indonesian politics in the form of *shari'a* regulations lends itself to long-term analysis for two reasons: The adoption of Islamic law in Indonesia is one of the few tangible policy discussions evident in a political system defined by clientelist rather than programmatic politics. It is also one of the most enduring fault lines in Indonesian politics, dating back to the constitutional debates in 1945.

In this context, I will examine in Chapter 2 Islamist movements that first surfaced in various Indonesian provinces in the 1940s and later entered an alliance with one another under the name "Darul Islam" (Abode of Islam). I describe their origins and then trace their agendas and activities until 1998. In Chapter 6, I look at activism emanating from the same movements *after* Suharto stepped down in 1998. The fact that *shari'a* regulations were adopted after 1998 in localities where movements have been active since the late 1940s suggests that Suharto's demise strengthened these groups' political influence. However, the size of these movements has remained relatively constant as has their presence on the ground. This implies their boost in influence resulted from changes in state and political institutions after the collapse of the dictatorship, rather than characteristics immanent to these movements.[157]

Besides assessing *shari'a* policymaking over time, I compare different Islamist groups at a given point in time. Again, direct comparisons of Islamist movements outside formal politics with Islamist parties within formal political boundaries are rarely conducted in the literature on the Islamization of politics.[158] Arguably, this is because most studies focus on the *emergence* and *mobilization* of movements and how they morph into political parties.[159]

To demonstrate how the state mediates the influence of Islamist activism, I compare *different kinds* of Islamist groups that mobilized at the *same* time but subsequently had a *different* impact on policymaking. To this end I contrast Indonesia's Islamist parties with the relatively unorganized Islamist movements rooted in the Darul Islam rebellion. I argue the political impact of disparate *types* of Islamist activism differs due to the mediating role of the state. Islamist movements operating outside the political system offer state elites information and resources relevant to the latter's (re)-election. Islamist parties cannot provide such services, which has depressed their influence over policymaking.

[156] Amenta et al. 2010, 287.

[157] My argument confirms recent research on religious violence in Indonesia that showed how the size and strength of religious groups is not necessarily linked to the propensity for religious violence. See Sidel 2006, 13. I will return to this point in Chapter 8.

[158] Ullah 2014 is a rare exception. [159] See, for instance, Wickham 2013.

I also compare the influence of Islamist activism both *within* and *across* government layers. For instance, a review of the presence and absence of Islamist movements in different localities reveals that fewer or no *shari'a* regulations have been adopted in places without Islamist movement activists. However, comparing districts where Islamist parties are strong versus where they are weak exposes no such clear pattern. Furthermore, comparing *shari'a* policymaking across government layers will cast light on why movements have become more influential at the district level than at the provincial level, or why state elites have taken up more *shari'a* regulations in some districts than in others.

Finally, comparative studies of policymaking usually disaggregate the policy cycle[160] and separately evaluate the influence of political actors on agenda setting, the legislative debates about the content of a policy, the adoption of a policy and the implementation of a policy.[161] Following this approach, in Chapter 5 I provide an account of the role Islamist movements had in the *agenda-setting stage*. In Chapters 6 and 8, I focus on the most tangible signs of influence, namely the *adoption* and *implementation* of *shari'a* regulations.

1.6.1 Case Selection

I will conduct the aforementioned comparisons through case studies.[162] To select my cases, I counted the number of *shari'a* regulations per province as well as the number of districts in a province that adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation after 1998. West Java, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi came out on top in both measurements. Between 1998 and 2013, West Java adopted 103 *shari'a* regulations, while West Sumatra and South Sulawesi adopted 54 and 47 *shari'a* regulations, respectively, as mentioned earlier.[163] With regard to the dispersion of such regulations across districts *within* provinces, 95 percent (18/19) of districts in West Sumatra, 91 percent (31/34) in West Java[164] and 54 percent (13/24) in South Sulawesi have approved at least one *shari'a* regulation since 1998.[165]

[160] The most important stages in the policy cycle are "agenda setting," "policy adoption" and "policy implementation" according to Lasswell 1956 as mentioned before.

[161] Andrew and Edwards 2004, 479–506.

[162] See Slater and Ziblatt 2013 for an assessment of case study-based comparisons vis-à-vis other methods of comparison.

[163] The number of *shari'a* regulations adopted in these three provinces account for almost half (46 percent) of all *shari'a* regulations adopted in Indonesia for the period examined here.

[164] If looking at the numbers for West Java province only and excluding Banten province, 100 percent (26/26) of districts in West Java adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013.

[165] For the numbers of *shari'a* regulations in other provinces, see Muhtada 2014, 51.

For logistical and financial reasons I could conduct research only in two of these provinces. I selected West Java because it has the most *shari'a* regulations by far and because it is Indonesia's most populous province. I chose South Sulawesi because it has the most *shari'a* regulations in Eastern Indonesia, an area neglected in research on Indonesia. Due to its history, South Sulawesi is also "probably the most influential part of Indonesia's outer islands."[166] Political dynamics in South Sulawesi are therefore likely to be representative of politics in other parts of Outer Island Indonesia.

Selecting cases based on the dependent variable may bias results.[167] A common mistake when choosing cases based on the dependent variable is to assume that a relationship between variables within the cases reflects a relationship in the entire population of cases.

I am, however, interested foremost in examining the *process* by which Islamist actors gained influence over policymaking after 1998. Current theories assume the emergence, mobilization and influence of parties and movements "reflects, responds to, and sometimes alters the realities of politics and policy, although most works give short shrift to *how*."[168] Arguably, this is because most qualitative comparisons of contentious politics are based on "most similar" or "least similar" case study designs.[169] While the Millian comparative methods provide a sound logical basis for *eliminating* potential, sufficient and necessary causes, they struggle to *generate* explanations for the influence of political activism.[170] Furthermore, showing causality does not yet explain causal *mechanisms*. Hence, it is important to identify the mechanisms through which parties and movements influence politics and how these causal mechanisms originate and depend on the broader political context.[171] To this end, informed by process-tracing methods,[172] I will pay particular attention to *describing and examining the mechanisms* through which societal forces gain and exert influence as a consequence of heightened competition among state elites. Selection bias is less of a concern in such an undertaking.[173] Still, to address potential selection bias in my findings, I will examine

[166] Van Bruinessen 2013, 10. [167] Geddes 1990.
[168] Meyer 2004, 138. Emphasis added.
[169] Giugni 1998, 372; Kriesi and Wisler 1999, 42–65.
[170] Mahoney 2000, 392. These methods of comparison are also less helpful when trying to identify whether a *combination* of political factors may facilitate or prevent movements from influencing politics and if so what the *relative* contribution of each factor is to the final outcome. Scholars examining the political influence of parties and movements have addressed some of these challenges through joint-effect models based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). See Giugni and Yamasaki 2009, 467–84.
[171] Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1483. [172] George and Bennett 2005, 205–32.
[173] George and Bennett 2005, 3–36.

shari'a policymaking in all Indonesian provinces at the end of Chapter 7 to see whether my findings from the two provinces hold true across the archipelago.

1.7 Variables and Data Collection

To address the argument that changing relations among state elites during democratization allowed certain Islamist groups to gain influence, I first have to give evidence that New Order elites remained firmly in control of "the state" after 1998.

To this end, I dissect the backgrounds and careers of candidates who have participated in subnational government head elections. I focus on local executive elections because previous research has shown that governors and district heads are the driving force behind local policymaking in Indonesia. This analysis is based on an original dataset that I compiled from official documents obtained at the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), the national election commission in Jakarta and its local counterparts, as well as three years of field research between 2005 and 2008 and five four-month-long visits between 2009 and 2013.

Local parliaments elected governors and district heads between 1998 and 2005. As power struggles mainly occurred within local parliaments, these elections were not very transparent. Hence, the names of candidates who ran in these elections were difficult to find, as was information on their backgrounds. Likewise, election results were not available at local election commissions, as these votes were held behind closed doors. I collected as much information as possible on the candidates competing in elections between 1998 and 2005 from local newspaper archives. I tried to verify this information through interviews with knowledgeable local sources such as journalists and election commissioners in the respective locality. Despite these efforts, data on the background of candidates and election figures for the *indirect* government head elections between 1998 and 2004 remain patchy.

Data on the career trajectory of candidates competing in *direct* local government head elections after 2005 were, theoretically, easier to obtain. Law No. 32/2004 on regional governments required candidates running in local government head elections to submit a standard form with information on their date of birth, marital status, education, work experience, institutional and party affiliations and "other" information.[174] This standard form for biographical and career data of candidates is used in every

[174] The last category is usually used to list awards and achievements candidates deem important.

district across Indonesia.[175] The information available on this form usually dates back to at least two decades. Candidates usually also submit photocopies of all official documents listed in these forms such as school diploma or references from former employers.

Neither the MoHA nor the National Election Commission is collecting data on subnational executive elections. Instead, when questioned about such records they refer to regional government laws that place these elections under the authority of subnational election commissions. Hence, in order to obtain this data, I personally visited the three provincial, 43 district and 16 municipal election commissions in Banten, West Java and South Sulawesi between 2005 and 2013, each trip lasting several months.[176] I also used these trips to collect information missing from the official data sheets by interviewing candidates, local academics, election commissioners and journalists. In this way I identified 1,128 candidates competing in the elections between 2005 and 2013. I managed to assemble 907 related official *curricula vitae*.

Finally, to show that relations among state elites became competitive after 1998, I relied on data from local election commissions for the direct elections after 2005. For the indirect elections between 1998 and 2005, I collected results from government and local newspaper archives. Based on these data, I calculated the number of "effective candidates" for all races in West Java and South Sulawesi since 1998. This refers to candidates with a good chance of winning and relative strength based on the number of votes they obtained.[177] In other words, it provides an account of the fragmentation of the local political system.

There were various challenges to collecting a comprehensive dataset on *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia after 1998: One, legal ambiguities with regard to handling religious affairs at the subnational level make a classification of these local regulations difficult.[178] Two, datasets in Jakarta are incomplete because local governments regularly fail to report new regulations to the national level even though they are required to do

[175] In West Java and South Sulawesi, the form is titled "Model BB10-KWK KPU Daftar Riwayat Hidup Calon Kepala Daerah" and "Model BB3-KWK KPU Daftar Riwayat Hidup Calon Kepala Daerah" respectively.

[176] Remember that Banten was part of West Java until 2000 and is treated as part of West Java unless stated otherwise. I therefore refer to the two provinces as West Java only.

[177] See Laakso and Taagepera, 1979, 3–27.

[178] Remember that the decentralization laws adopted after 1998 assigned responsibilities for religious affairs to the *national* level. Theoretically, local-level governments are only allowed to adopt local regulations that amend national laws. Hence, local governments try to avoid references to "religion" or "Islam" in both title and text when adopting such *shari'a* regulations as mentioned before.

so.[179] Consequently, scholars' estimates of the number of *shari'a* regulations fluctuate widely.[180] To address this predicament, I compiled an original dataset through the analysis of local newspapers, the examination of previous studies on the topic, the collection of lists from local government offices and watchdog organizations, as well as on-the-ground research between 2005 and 2014. When possible, I collected a hard copy of the regulation. Based on these criteria, I collated a dataset of 443 *shari'a* regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013, making it by far the most comprehensive catalog of *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia currently available.

Three, it is challenging to establish a baseline to compare *shari'a* regulations across time and space because new provinces and districts are popping up each year. I used the number of provinces, districts and municipalities issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2013 as a benchmark. At the time of writing, there were 34 provinces, 412 districts and 93 municipalities in Indonesia, as noted previously.

1.8 Conclusion

Hundreds of *shari'a* regulations took effect after the collapse of the New Order in 1998, a development usually ascribed to the rise of Islamist parties. However, the Islamization of politics in Indonesia during democratization shows peculiar patterns unexplained by the party system. Electoral support for Islamist parties has been in steady decline, while the popularity of *shari'a* regulations continues unabated. In addition, Islamist parties lobbied for the national adoption of Islamic law across Indonesia. Yet, most *shari'a* regulations were adopted at the subnational level. This is at odds with accounts that assign causal primacy in the Islamization process to Islamist parties.

There is also considerable territorial diversity in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations. The majority of them cluster in only six provinces. Islamist movements situated outside formal party politics have had a strong presence in all *shari'a* clusters for decades, except East Java.

The peculiarities of this Islamization after 1998 suggest that, although many Islamist actors emerged after Suharto's downfall, only some gained influence in politics. I propose the key to understanding this inconsistency lies within "the state." That is, state elites and power relations among them define the power of Islamist actors in democratizing Indonesia.

[179] Approximately, 40 percent of newly enacted local regulations are not reported to the national level. See Lewis 2003, 177–93.

[180] For instance, Bush 2008, 176 and Lindsey 2008, 206 mention 78 and 160 *shari'a* regulations respectively.

Groups that provide state elites with resources the latter consider necessary for electoral battles will gain influence. If groups struggle to provide such resources, as is the case for Islamist parties, they may mobilize in the context of democratization but are unlikely to gain traction.

Examining the mediating role of state elites, I support calls for more research on Islamist activism with a focus on the state and the elites inhabiting it, so as to understand these elites as actors in their own right.[181] Furthermore, the interaction between "the state" and "Islamist forces" sheds light on the Islamization of politics during democratization if we separate the conditions that facilitate the *emergence* and *mobilization* of Islamist actors from the conditions that allow parties and movements to *gain* and *exert political influence*.[182]

To provide a reference point for the various comparisons suggested, the next chapter will examine the relationship between the state and political Islam in its various manifestations in Indonesia before 1998.

[181] Smith 2004, 187. [182] Yavuz 1997, 70.

2 Islamist Activism and the State 1945–1998

2.1 Introduction

One way to support the hypothesis that dynamics within the state shape the Islamization of politics in democratizing Indonesia is to compare the influence of Islamist activism over time. If the agenda and size of Islamist groups stayed stable before and after 1998, we need to dig deeper to explain their newly gained influence. To understand the political influence of Islamist groups, it is also important to understand why they emerged in the first place and what function they inhabit in Indonesia's political ecology.

I provide a reference point for such a longitudinal comparison of Islamist activism and its influence by first describing how political Islam found expression in parties and movements during the colonial period, and how it made inroads into the formal political system after the Japanese occupation. Then I show that discussions about the proper place of Islamic law in Indonesian politics date to the constitutional debates in 1945.[1] However, after the country became independent, political Islam was successively pushed to the margins, first by Sukarno, then by Suharto. Islamist activists remained mostly impotent in politics as a consequence. Yet, despite state oppression during Guided Democracy and the New Order, Islamist networks stayed intact by shifting their activities away from politics and moving underground.

In the second part of this chapter, I show that these broad national patterns in state–Islam relations are mirrored in West Java and South Sulawesi, the two case studies. In both provinces, a relatively stable set of actors has pushed for an Islamic state since 1945. Again, these groups lacked political clout until 1998.

[1] For a rich account of groups who sought to make Indonesia a state based on Islamic law, see Fogg 2012.

2.2 State–Islam Relations in Indonesia until 1965

Movements rallying for an Islamic state date back to the colonial period.[2] Yet these Islamist movements remained at the fringes of politics until the final years of the Dutch East Indies because they were "greatly overshadowed by a form of political thinking usually called 'secular nationalism,' which privileged the idea of a free Indonesia as the goal to be achieved, and which sought, above all, the unity of all Indonesians, whatever their ethnicity and form of belief, as the sole means of obtaining hoped-for independence."[3]

Islamist movements became more vocal and visible thanks to the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945.[4] Hoping to amplify resentments against the West and win the loyalty of Indonesians, Japan courted religious teachers (*kyai*) and showed leniency toward Islamist groups that had been suppressed under the Dutch. The Japanese also revived the Islamic High Council of Indonesia (MIAI, *Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia*), an Islamic federative organization established in 1937,[5] and oversaw its transition into the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi, *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*) in 1943.[6]

Japan also tried to build a volunteer army of indigenous Indonesians to reinforce its own troops. To this end, the Japanese not only established their own Islamist militia but also tasked the Masyumi to train Islamist paramilitary groups. These paramilitaries, which gained "a heightened sense of their own importance"[7] during the Japanese occupation, became the nuclei for various Islamist movements and parties that turned more vocal and visible after Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945.

The declaration of independence marked the beginning of a debate about the proper role of Islamic law in Indonesian politics that continues until today. In early 1945, a Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI, *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) was formed to draft a constitution. Soon, a heated debate ensued between a

[2] Noer 1973.
[3] Elson 2009a, 106. For a similar argument, see Elson 2007, 2009b; McVey 1983, 204. While Islamists wanted a united Indonesia as much as secular nationalists, the former rejected a secular or ecumenical ideology as the basis of the state.
[4] The Japanese occupation was a "critical juncture" for the empowerment of societal forces across Southeast Asia because "Western-run colonial states were demolished and Japanese occupying forces would build precious little infrastructure for systematic rule in their place" (Slater 2010, 57).
[5] Syaroni 1998.
[6] Elson 2009a, 107. For a comprehensive overview of Islam under the Japanese occupation, see Benda 1955, 78–185 and Horikoshi 1976.
[7] Elson 2009a, 108.

"secularist–nationalist" and an "Islamist" camp because the latter wanted to include a sentence in the preamble requiring all Muslims to observe Islamic law.[8] This preamble was called the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*).

Since the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, the Jakarta Charter would have turned Indonesia into a state based on Islamic law. However, the wording in the preamble was changed after the secular nationalists, under the auspices of future vice-president Mohammad Hatta, persuaded Islamist representatives to drop their demands. Instead, the PPKI adopted the ecumenical *Pancasila* ideology that only ordered all Indonesians to "Believe in One God."[9] Ever since, the decision to exclude the Jakarta Charter has served as a rallying point for Islamist parties and movements who want an Islamic state.[10]

After 1945, the Masyumi party became the most vocal group in the formal political arena calling for Islamic law and the main channel through which devout Muslims, the *santri*, participated in politics. Initially, the Masyumi included both traditionalist and modernist *santri*,[11] but figures who wanted to place the state under *shari'a* law soon dominated.[12] After the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) left to form its own party in 1952,[13] the Masyumi became *the* platform for Islamists demanding the adoption of Islamic law.

In fact, in the first elections held in independent Indonesia in 1955, the Masyumi campaigned on the promise to establish an Islamic state.[14] The party did reasonably well at the ballot box but failed to win a majority of votes.[15] Over the next few years, the Masyumi regularly

[8] "Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya," which translates as "Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law."

[9] Elson 2009a.

[10] The majority of Indonesia's Islamist movements are not anti-statist. They just want a state based on Islamic law. See Assyaukanie 2009, 57.

[11] To be a traditionalist *santri* means "adherence to the Syafi'i *mazhab*, or school of legal interpretation, one of four major schools in Sunni Islam worldwide" while to be a modernist *santri* means to show "a preference for *ijtihad*, individual interpretation of the Qur'an, over adherence to the Syafi'i or any other *mazhab*." See Liddle 1996, 622.

[12] Feillard 1995, 45. The Masyumi leadership was dominated by figures from Muhammadiyah and Persis, two modernist Islamic organizations. See van Bruinessen 1996, 25.

[13] Noer 1987, 79–94; Following NU's split from Masyumi in 1952, NU adopted a rhetoric that was strongly in support of Islamic law. However, this was mainly a reaction to Masyumi accusations that NU was not sufficiently Islamic. NU's pro-*shari'a* course had subsided by 1953 and flared up again briefly in the context of the 1955 elections. See Bush 2009, 50.

[14] Assyaukanie 2009, 71.

[15] Secular-nationalist and religiously inclusive parties such as the Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Partai Nasional

raised its voice against the government and eventually left the cabinet in 1957 to, among other reasons, express its solidarity with the Darul Islam, an Islamist movement that had started a revolt against the national government in 1948, on which more below.[16] A year later, several leading Masyumi figures were joining another rebellion, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) Revolt in West Sumatra, which the military associated with the Darul Islam.[17] Another discussion about the Jakarta Charter flared up in May 1959 and the Masyumi supported the proposal in parliament. However, Sukarno once again rejected the possibility of an Islamic state and dissolved the parliament in July 1959.[18] A year later, he banned the Masyumi party altogether.[19] In addition, by the mid-1960s, the republican army had quashed all local revolts under the banner of Darul Islam. Later political developments marginalized Islam even further.

2.3 State–Islam Relations during the New Order

In 1965, a military coup sidelined Sukarno in favor of army leader Suharto, who established the New Order,[20] one of the most enduring authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. At first, both traditionalist and modernist *santri* backed Suharto because the New Order government collaborated with Islamist groups, mainly to purge (alleged) communists. As soon as the communist party had been eradicated, however, the government turned against Islamist groups.

For the next three decades, the government's two-pronged strategy toward Islam was to promote personal piety and religious practice in private life but to oppose the politicization of religion.[21] To this end, Islamists were successively eliminated from parliament and most Islamist groups outside formal politics were suppressed.[22] The New Order also upheld the ban of the Masyumi party. In 1968, a presidential decree established the Indonesian Moslem Scholars Party (Parmusi, *Partai Muslimin Indonesia*), the official successor of the

Indonesia (PNI), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) together obtained 42 percent of the vote. Parties associated with "traditional" Islam such as NU, Perti and PSII together collected 23 percent of the votes. Masyumi obtained 21 percent of the votes. See King 2003, 125. However, the Masyumi gained significantly higher vote shares in Kalimantan (32.09%), Sulawesi (33.94%) and Sumatra (42.88%). See, Suwadirman 2009, 8; Nainggolan 2009a: 8; Nainggolan 2009b, 8.

[16] Feillard 1995, 49. [17] Feillard 1995, 97. [18] Lev 1966, 277.

[19] Feillard 1995, 54.

[20] The term New Order (*Orde Baru*) was used to distinguish the new regime from the Old Order (*Orde Lama*) of President Sukarno.

[21] Liddle 1996, 621. [22] Feillard 1995, 154.

Masyumi party.[23] However, the military banned Masyumi politicians from occupying positions within Parmusi.[24]

The New Order regime intensified its engagement with "Islam" prior to the elections in 1971, the first ballot after the 1965 coup. The government banned many candidates from party lists due to their alleged involvement in the Darul Islam rebellion.[25] Furthermore, the government co-opted the Federation for the Advancement of Islamic Education (Guppi, *Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam*), an organization founded in West Java in the 1950s, and used it to mobilize the electorate. Authorities also tried to co-opt influential religious teachers and leading figures from other Islamic organizations.[26] Two years after the elections, the government announced a "simplification" of the party system and forced traditionalist and modernist Islamic parties to merge into the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) in January 1973.[27]

This forced merger weakened political Islam considerably, not least because of constant tensions among factions within the new party.[28] Still, the PPP increased its vote share by 2 percent in the 1977 elections. This triggered fears of a growing Islamist presence in politics. Consequently, the government began to engage with Islam in a more organized manner.[29] It adopted a new election law in 1980, which banned religious symbols from party logos and during election campaigns.[30] In 1983, the government required all parties to abandon their ideology, whether communist or religious, in favor of the ecumenical Pancasila ideology.

Despite such measures, Islam picked up steam in Indonesian society from the 1980s onward. Ironically, this was to some extent related to New Order politics. As a result of state oppression, many Islamist groups began to focus on proselytizing (*dakwah*) in hopes of making society more receptive to a state based on Islamic law. To this end, many Islamists formed organizations to win over ordinary people. For instance, Muhamad Natsir, the former chairman of Masyumi, founded the Indonesian Islamic Missionary

[23] After Parmusi had to merge with the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) in 1973, it became the Muslimin Indonesia (MI).
[24] Van Bruinessen 1996, 26. [25] Feillard 1995, 122.
[26] This strategy was of limited success with regard to modernist *kyai*. See Feillard 1995, 120–1.
[27] Ward 1970.
[28] For instance, rifts within the PPP erupted prior to the 1977 elections when the modernist Muslimin Indonesia faction competed for party list ranks with the NU faction. See Feillard 1995, 151.
[29] Feillard 1995, 152.
[30] This new election law adopted in 1980 stirred up a heated debate within Muslim circles. Many opportunists within the PPP supported the new law, which created tensions within the party. Consequently, NU left the PPP in 1984. See Feillard 1995, 151–61.

Council (DDII, *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*) in 1967. Deliberately staying outside formal politics, the DDII nevertheless came to play a crucial part in the country's religious revival.[31]

Over the next few decades, the DDII established missionary activities, including training programs for graduates from Islamic institutions who wanted to become university instructors, which helped the DDII to systematically missionize at colleges after 1974 through its program *Bina Masjid Kampus*.[32] Particularly in West Java, the DDII drew members from modernist organizations such as Al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah and Persis.[33] There were also many similar but more local organizations that contributed to the Islamization of Indonesian society. In short, the DDII served as an important transmission belt for Islamist ideologies from the Sukarno era to post-1998 Indonesia.[34]

The changing balance in the relationship between the state and political Islam is also reflected in the policies of these decades. Early in the New Order, Islamist actors had little political influence. Questions about the role of Islamic law resurfaced briefly in 1966 during NU's 30th anniversary celebrations, when leading Muslim scholars called for a reinterpretation of the Jakarta Charter. This triggered a heated political debate about the basis of the Indonesian state, which lasted until 1968, when Suharto tasked a committee of Islamic scholars to integrate the Jakarta Charter with the Pancasila ideology.[35] The committee failed to produce any recommendations, so parliament refused to incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian constitution for a third time.[36] This was the last official debate about a state based on Islamic law for the next three decades.

Several laws with a religious hue, however, were adopted during the New Order. In 1966, the government proposed legislation to regulate religious alms (*zakat*),[37] allowing religious leaders in certain provinces to collect the tithe. The same year, to much public fanfare, Suharto opened a bank account to deposit his *zakat* contributions.[38] The government also

[31] Assyaukanie 2009, 183. [32] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 178.
[33] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 36.
[34] "Almost all radical figures who emerged . . . in the post-Soeharto era had links directly or indirectly with DDII," notes Assyaukanie 2009, 183.

Important Islamists with links to the DDII are *Jemmah Islamiyah* leader Abdullah Sungkar, who headed the DDII branch in Central Java, Ja'far Umar Thalib who founded the *Laskar Jihad* after he had acted as a preacher for the DDII, and Tamsil Linrung who came to play an important role in the Islamist movement in South Sulawesi after 1998, as I will show in Chapter 6.
[35] Feillard 1995, 98–109. [36] Salim and Azra 2003, 186. [37] Feillard 1995, 115.
[38] Feillard 1995, 115. More than US$300,000 was deposited in the account each month, mainly by cutting the salaries of bureaucrats. These funds were sufficient to construct six mosques in Suharto's name every month. See Ensering 1987, 289.

enacted a marriage law in 1974, creating great obstacles for inter-faith marriages. In 1975, Suharto established the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) to act as an "interface between the government and the Muslim umma, advising the government and explaining (i.e. legitimizing) government policy to the nation."[39] In 1983, after years of deliberation, the government enacted a policy to force all parties to adopt the ecumenical Pancasila as their ideology.[40]

These policies, however, did not protect Islam in the eyes of Islamists, a critique that intensified when the New Order regime abolished state subsidies for pilgrims to Saudi Arabia.[41] In subsequent years, the government adopted various policies that were deeply offensive to the *santri* community. In 1978, for instance, it legalized groups practicing mysticism and animism (*aliran kepercayaan*).

Many of these laws triggered protests in Islamist circles. For instance, the 1974 Marriage Law initially had been quite liberal toward inter-faith unions, but then the government made substantive amendments in favor of Islamist groups that had rallied against the bill.[42] Likewise, the New Order government compromised on mystical groups, placing them merely under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Culture rather than the Ministry of Religion, as initially planned.[43] The government also reduced subsidies for mystical groups.[44] In addition, the state wanted to introduce "civic education" to the school curriculum in order to teach pupils about Pancasila. The *santri* community protested many of these New Order policies and wrought some concessions from the state. Overall, however, Islamist groups carried little weight in the early New Order years.

Toward the late 1970s, however, more and more policies in favor of Islam were passed, all at the national level. The government allowed sermons and Islamic instructions to broadcast via radio and television.

[39] Van Bruinessen 2013, xix; See also Ichwan 2013, 60.

[40] The rationale for this policy was to contain the potential threats from an organization with a platform based on Islamic law. "En résumé, le pouvoir ne voulait pas d'une organisation dont l'objectif fût de mettre en place une société islamique ....," as pointed out by Feillard 1995, 178.

[41] Protestors were especially vocal in Islamist strongholds such as West Java province. See Feillard 1995, 116.

[42] See Suryadinata 1989, 75–8.

[43] For instance, *aliran kepercayaan* were not recognized as official religions, their contributions from the Ministry of Religion were cut and plans to provide such groups with official representation within the Ministry of Religion were scrapped. The government also instructed governors and district heads to assure that *kepercayaan* weddings were conducted according to one of the five official religions. Followers of these *aliran kepercayaan* were also required to choose one of the five recognized religions.

[44] Woodward 2010, 11.

The call to prayer (*azan*) aired on television, foreign aid to Christian missionaries became more closely monitored and Islamic prayers were less strictly controlled. Finally, proselytizing among one of the five religions became officially illegal.[45] In 1989, Law No. 7/1989 on Religious Courts took effect.[46] In 1991, the Department of Education and Culture lifted a ban on schoolgirls wearing headscarfs. The next year, Indonesia adopted Law No. 7/1992 on Banking, which established its first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI).[47] New Order leaders also issued a Joint Ministerial Decree on the collection of religious alms in 1991.

The late New Order regime also engaged in more obvious but less formal acts of political symbolism. As the contours of this Islamic revival in Indonesian society became more visible and its representatives more assertive in the late New Order, the Suharto regime increasingly resorted to "Islam" as a means to achieve "various types of social and political projects," John Sidel notes.[48] In 1988, for instance, Suharto recast his public persona, embarking on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia from which he returned as *Muhammad* Suharto.[49] In 1990, the president initiated the prosecution of a Catholic newspaper editor who had allegedly provoked Muslims by rating Prophet Muhammad "less popular than politicians and a pop star."[50] Finally, the government discontinued the national lottery in 1992.[51] However, most emblematic of the New Order's functionalization of Islam for political ends was the regime's engagement with the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia)*. In 1990, a group of Muslim activists, "all of them former HMI members and mostly of Masyumi family backgrounds,"[52] approached Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, a close Suharto ally and then Minister of Technology, to sound out his interest in chairing an organization to represent the interests of Muslims. After Suharto approved the proposal, ICMI was established with Habibie as chairman.[53]

The organization quickly became popular with middle-class professionals in general and with influential figures in Muhammadiyah in particular.[54] While the birth of ICMI signaled the Islamic revival in Indonesian society and the rise of a pious Muslim middle class,[55] it was

[45] Feillard 1995, 154. [46] Lukito 2003, 27. [47] Liddle 1996, 625.
[48] Sidel 2006, 54. [49] Liddle 1996, 625. [50] Ali 1990, online.
[51] Liddle 1996, 614; Salim 2003, 181–2. [52] Van Bruinessen 1996, 19.
[53] Van Bruinnesen 1996.
[54] In 1992, ICMI had already 20,000 members, one of which was Amien Rais who became the chairman of Muhammadiyah in 1995.
[55] Van Bruinessen 1996, 20.

an elite organization with no grassroots or popular support. In fact, when ICMI was established, *santri* organizations such as NU and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI voiced concerns that the Suharto regime was co-opting Islam for political ends. John Sidel notes that, indeed, "... among many of those affiliated with ICMI ... the 'Islam' in whose name they had organized and mobilized was largely a matter of affiliation within the political class, rather than a marker of devout religious faith."[56] ICMI was just another symbolic and politically motivated way for the New Order to make use of Islam as the number of pious Muslims grew across Indonesia. The New Order's co-optation of ICMI marginalized its political influence. ICMI pushed for various "Islamic" policies and prides itself in the establishment of Islamic courts, the Bank Muamalat Indonesia and various media outlets including the Republika newspaper. However, beyond these, ICMI had no significant impact on policymaking.[57]

Overall, the New Order was neither a secular state nor one that rejected policies with an "Islamic" content.[58] However, the inner circle of the regime adhered to syncretistic Islam (*kejawen*), which both Islamist figures rooted in the Darul Islam and the growing number of Indonesian *santri* rejected. In fact, van Bruinessen points out that many Indonesian Muslims perceived the New Order's "officially generalised and shari'ah-less religiosity a reflection of syncretic Javanese mysticism."[59] In this vein, the various policies adopted "... came to be equally seen as protective shield against a state based on Islamic law and an Islamization of the archipelago 'from above,' " according to Andrée Feillard.[60]

The symbolic nature of Sukarno's and then Suharto's engagement with political Islam was also apparent as the state remained insulated from Islamist forces after independence in 1945. Initially, traditional Islam associated with the NU remained close to the state throughout the Sukarno era and the early New Order years.[61] Consequently, many NU members occupied positions in the administration, especially at the sub-national level. They acted as district heads, mayors and directors in regional government units (Kakanwil, *Kepala Kantor Wilayah*). In the early New Order years, in fact, the army depended on the support of traditionalist Islamic group members to run government affairs.[62] In contrast, modernist Islam remained excluded from politics during the Sukarno years.

[56] Sidel 2006, 130. [57] Van Bruinessen 1996, 20. [58] Feillard 1995, 130.
[59] Van Bruinessen 1996, 2. [60] Feillard 1995, 173. [61] Feillard 1995, 119–20.
[62] Feillard 1995, 120.

This constellation changed as the New Order consolidated its power. In Java, the traditional bureaucratic elite, the *priyayi*,[63] dominated the New Order military.[64] The military itself dominated the state and political institutions at both the national and subnational level for at least the first two decades of the New Order. The majority of them were nominal Muslims,[65] called *abangan*, who rejected the idea of an Islamic state.[66] Christians also received a disproportional share of government posts during the New Order and became very influential in the military and civilian bureaucracy. In contrast, the *santri*, devout Muslims, withdrew from the Republican Army in high numbers after 1949[67] and were underrepresented in state positions afterward.[68] A few figures affiliated with modernist Islam came to occupy important positions within the state via the Parmusi that competed in the 1971 elections.[69] However, such figures were the exception, not the norm. In the first two decades of the New Order, then, most positions in the civilian administration and the military were dominated by Christians and nominal Muslims.

A growing number of Muslims made inroads into the circles of power during the last decade of the New Order. Amid an Islamic revival among a burgeoning middle class in the mid-1980s, a growing number of modernist Muslims rose in the ranks of the military and the civilian bureaucracy. In the 1990s, government bureaucrats made up 78 percent of all leadership positions within Muhammadiyah.[70] Some bureaucrats even traced their roots to the same class from which the Darul Islam emerged.[71] However, the majority of these reformist Muslims hailed from a new, urban middle class that sprouted from the economic growth of the New Order. In any case, the majority of bureaucratic positions, particularly at the local level, were occupied by nominal Muslims.

[63] Sutherland 1979.

[64] Crouch 1978; Sutherland 1979. It is important to be aware, as Daniels 2009, 49 noted, that there is a:

> difference between *priyayi* in western Java and *priyayi* in eastern and central Java. *Priyayi* in eastern and central Java are often considered to be within the *abangan* category [nominal Muslims], despite class differences with villagers; because they share a similar syncretistic religious orientation rooted in many traditional Javanese practices, whereas the *priyayi* in western Java, where normative forms of Islam penetrated more deeply into the interior in the early history of Islam in Java, *priyayi* are included within the *santri* category . . . .

[65] Suryadinata 1989, 2–3. [66] Mietzner 2009, 69–73.

[67] Liddle 1996, 620; Suryadinata 1989, 84. [68] Sidel 2006, 50–1.

[69] Feillard 1995, 143. [70] Mietzner 2013, 8.

[71] The prime example is HMI alumnus and two-time Vice-President Jusuf Kalla. Born in South Sulawesi into a class of rich traders and farmers of non-aristocratic origins, he shares a socio-economic background with figures such as Darul Islam leader Kahar Muzakkar.

To summarize, tensions between groups demanding an Islamic state and groups with a secular-nationalist outlook, often adhering to more syncretistic forms of Islam, date back to the very beginning of the Indonesian republic. During both the Sukarno and Suharto years, the secular-nationalist faction dominated the state and political institutions, which counted very few representatives from Islamist groups until at least the 1980s. Even after such groups started to penetrate state institutions, *abangan* Muslims continued to occupy most important posts in the government. Likewise, the "greening" of the Golkar party, the civilian backbone of the New Order regime, was never very pronounced.[72] As Dan Slater notes: "Golkar never enjoyed considerable success at bringing Indonesia's primary Islamic ... organizations into the party fold."[73] Islamist forces were also unable to use various Muslim organizations to strengthen their power. While Suharto appointed various ICMI figures to vital posts in the military and the national bureaucracy after the 1992 elections, ICMI soon "came to resemble just another state-controlled corporatist organization . . .," van Bruinessen notes.[74]

In other words, during the New Order, the state established organizations to accommodate and neuter the mounting strength of Islamic forces in society.[75] However, while the New Order was not so much a "secular state," it remained until the very end a "protector of local religions and beliefs" of the kind adherents of a modernist Islam rejected.[76] Furthermore, while New Order leaders adopted "Islamic" policies in reaction to growing piety in Indonesian society, the regime's overall approach to political Islam was rooted in the military's battles against the Darul Islam.[77] The fact that the state remained relatively insulated from societal forces[78] also shaped its relationship vis-à-vis political Islam. As Martin van Bruinessen writes: "[T]he Darul Islam rebellion and the Jakarta Charter debates have marked state–Islam relations in Indonesia ever since. They lie at the root of the lasting suspicion towards political Islam on the part of the military and political elite and the religious minorities, and they explain much of the government's policy towards Islam in later years."[79] Farish Noor notes that "Suharto's generals were wary of all forms of Islamist mobilization, and the militarized state clamped down on a number of dissident Islamist groups and opposition movements."[80] Hence, the regime outright suppressed Islamist movements and parties for most of the time between 1965 and 1998. For these

[72] See, among others, Van Bruinessen 2013, 32. [73] Slater 2010, 187 and 204.
[74] Van Bruinessen 1996, 19.
[75] Assyaukani 2009, 3; Effendy 2003; Liddle 1996; Ramage 1997; van Bruinessen 1996.
[76] Feillard 1995, 138. [77] Feillard 1995, 138. [78] Slater 2010, 186.
[79] Van Bruinessen 1996, 24. [80] Noor 2011, 2.

reasons Islam continued to be associated with opposition groups until the very end of the dictatorship, as Jacques Bertrand has noted.[81]

State–Islam relations in national-level politics were mirrored at the local level as the political trajectory of West Java and South Sulawesi between 1945 and 1998 shows.

2.4 State–Islam Relations in West Java until 1998

The Dutch ruled indirectly over the region that today constitutes West Java until the late nineteenth century. To do so, they relied on local aristocratic families, called *menak* in Sundanese, the local language. Because the colonial government made posts in the provincial administration hereditary, this aristocracy quickly dominated the local state, particularly the district head offices.[82] These district heads accumulated great fortunes, which they used to establish and maintain authority.

Initially, most of the land in West Java was under the control of the *menak*. The majority of commoners worked in agriculture and belonged to one of two groups: Landholders called *pribumi* and landless households. Both groups were tied to the aristocracy.[83]

Through administrative reforms in 1870, the Dutch abolished *menak* landholdings and banned the aristocracy from collecting taxes and corvée-labor from *pribumi* households. Consequently, "the *menak* class lost its landed power and the economic initiative to new [*pribumi*] landholders who were more efficient at utilizing the market. A new type of capitalists began to dominate the rural economic scene who did not base their position on the powers of state offices ... but on private entrepreneurship."[84] Soon, the Dutch saw these *pribumi* entrepreneurs as the main drivers of economic progress in West Java and tried to support them through favorable policies. Many *pribumi* came to own large landholdings as a consequence of their economic success.[85] At the same time as the Dutch deregulated the market for land, thereby undermining the

[81] Bertrand 2010, 47–8. [82] Lubis 1998, 92–110.

[83] Initially, the *pribumi* households were tied to the aristocracy through taxes and corvée-labor. In addition, there were three broad categories of landless households, namely "(1) *rahayats* who were attached in servitude to different *menak* but occasionally also to [*pribumi*] households; (2) *menumpangs* who, lacking enough land of their own, were dependents of [*pribumi*] households, worked as tenants, sharecroppers, or simply as farmhands, and often bore a substantial part of the corvée-labour that devolved on their patron; [and] (3) *bujangs* who were wage labourers earning their living as more or less mobile workers in areas where a labour market existed," according to Svensson 1990, 288.

[84] Svensson 1990, 295. [85] Ensering 1987, 272.

economic power base of the aristocracy, they transformed the *menak* into a bureaucratic corps.[86] In other words, the *menak* aristocracy remained influential within the state and became even more entrenched in the colonial state apparatus.[87]

After the land reforms of 1870, the role of the *menak* diminished in not only the economic but also the religious sphere. Initially, the *menak* dominated local courts and religious offices. In fact, the religious leaders who controlled water irrigation, issued levies and collected taxes on agricultural products were so closely linked to the *menak* aristocracy through intermarriage that an "Islamic oligarchy" dominated West Java until the late nineteenth century.[88]

After 1870, however, the newfound wealth meant a growing number of *pribumi* could afford the pilgrimage to Mecca. There, they were exposed to ideas associated with modernist Islam. Upon their return from Mecca, the *pribumi* started to criticize the aristocracy's syncretistic forms of Islam.[89] Over time, a class of modernist *ulama* families with considerable landholdings emerged.

These peasant entrepreneurs became patrons in their own right because the combination of newly acquired landholdings and *pesantren* networks allowed them to control the economic and spiritual ascendancy of large parts of the local population. This was especially the case in rural areas, where family networks around local *ulama* yielded great influence over local communities.[90]

For instance, in his study of Lembang village in West Java in the early 1950s Dam writes: "As a result of this combination of forces (land, money, intellect, experience and contacts), the separate individuals belonging to such family groups are much more powerful than might be expected on the basis of their individual holdings, and more powerful not only economically but socially: they are the ones who maintain contact with the government agencies and with prominent members of the civil service (pamong praja)."[91] In other words, the shifts in landownership patterns have resulted "in a close coincidence between well-to-do villagers and Islamic leadership in rural West Java."[92]

Eventually, this increasingly self-confident class of *pribumi* entrepreneurs started to openly challenge the local aristocracy's dominance over the state. To this end, many *pribumi* entrepreneurs joined the Islamic Association (SI, *Sarekat Islam*) in the early twentieth century.[93] The

[86] Svensson 1990, 291. [87] Svensson 1990, 297. [88] Ensering 1987, 270.
[89] Ensering 1987. [90] Horikoshi 1976, 374. [91] Ten Dam 1961, 366.
[92] Goto 1971.
[93] Some also became members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*), which was, at least in the beginning, loosely affiliated with the SI.

SI had been founded in Java in 1912 as an organization to protect the business interests of indigenous merchants against Chinese businessmen. In West Java, however, the SI also protected *pribumi* business interests from abuse by *menak* bureaucrats.[94] The SI expanded quickly across West Java and frequently opposed the policies and regulations issued by the *menak*-dominated local state.[95]

The *menak* aristocracy reacted to these pressures by establishing its own organization, the Green Association (SH, *Sarekat Hijau*).[96] The Dutch tolerated the brutal campaigns of the SH against *pribumi* entrepreneurs because the colonial government depended on *menak* officials to run the local administration and to protect the economic interests attached to it.[97]

Tensions between the *pribumi* situated in society and the *menak* dominating the state continued during the Japanese occupation. Japan's invasion in 1942 initially strengthened the aristocracy because the Japanese replaced the interned Dutch officials with *menak*.[98] At the same time, the late colonial state could never really subjugate these rural *pribumi*-cum-*ulama*-networks due to their relative economic independence.[99] Hence, both the Dutch and the Japanese used these religious figures as unofficial intermediaries in their dealings with the population in rural West Java.[100] This greatly raised the political profile of religious figures, who soon used the frustrations and disappointment among the landless population, farmhands and estate laborers to organize opposition to the aristocratic elites' dominance of the local state.[101] This class of rural entrepreneurs became a springboard for the Darul Islam rebellion under the leadership of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo in West Java.[102]

2.4.1 The Darul Islam Rebellion in West Java between 1948 and 1962

Born in Central Java and raised in West Java's Priangan area, Kartosuwiryo studied Islam in Garut and Tasikmalaya with various locally influential religious leaders, including Kyai Jusuf Tauzi, Kyai Ardiwisastra, Kyai Mustofa Kamil and Kyai Ramli.[103] Kartosuwiryo became an activist with

[94] The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*) established a similar protection organization called the People's Association (SR, *Sarekat Rakyat*).
[95] In 1914, only two years after the organization was founded, the SI branch in West Java's Garut district had already 10,000 members. See Cheong 1973, 16.
[96] See McVey 2006 for more details on the SR and the SH.
[97] The 1860 novel *Max Havelaar* by Eduard Douwes Dekker, a Dutch colonial officer, describes the dilemma the colonial government was facing in West Java at the time.
[98] Svensson 1990, 301–5. [99] Ensering 1987, 274. [100] Horikoshi 1975, 59.
[101] Van Dijk 1981, 373; Kahin 1970. [102] Horikoshi 1975, 66. [103] Noer 1973, 166.

the SI in the 1920s and also ran his own boarding school in West Java's Ciamis district. He later became a leader within the Islamist Masyumi and was involved in the formation of Islamist guerrilla units affiliated with the Masyumi including the Party of God (*Hizbu'llah*) and the Fighters in the Way of God (*Sabili'llah*), which were part of a Japanese effort to create an indigenous volunteer army, as mentioned before.

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, these Islamist militias initially fought side by side with the Republican Army against returning Dutch troops.[104] However, toward the end of the Japanese occupation "the balance of power altered decisively in favor of the politically more experienced nationalists. As a result, by the time of the Japanese surrender, nationalists and Islamic forces were more aware of their antagonism than previously . . ."[105]

After the Republican Army withdrew to Central Java under the Renville Agreement in 1948,[106] the Islamist militia stayed in West Java to carry on the fight and take advantage of the new power vacuum. This helped the militias become the strongest fighting units in West Java.[107] Since they felt betrayed by the Indonesian government, they refused to integrate into the regular army and began to attack the Republican troops after they returned to the province.[108]

In February 1948, Kartosuwiryo established the Islamic Indonesian Army (TII, *Tentara Islam Indonesia*) followed by the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII, *Negera Islam Indonesia*) in May of the same year.[109] A massive military campaign eventually contained the rebellion by 1957. The arrest and subsequent execution of Kartosuwiryo in 1962 officially ended the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java.[110]

Three characteristics of the Darul Islam movement in West Java are worth emphasizing. First, most of the literature has portrayed the revolt as a center–periphery conflict. However, *horizontal* tensions between a local aristocracy in control of the state and new-wealth elites that couched their opposition to the state in Islamist terms were at the heart of the fighting.[111] Social pressures had been building up for some time prior to the outbreak of violence as described above. Second, the Darul Islam was an elite movement. Initially, the Darul Islam gained a large following among landless peasants and the poor[112] since common people saw local

[104] Kahin 1952, 330. [105] Horikoshi 1975, 64.
[106] In 1948, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire between Indonesian and Dutch troops on the USS *Renville* warship. The agreement required the Republican Army to withdraw its forces behind a pre-defined front line.
[107] Van Dijk 1981, 77. [108] Dengel 1986, 54. [109] Dengel 1986, 57–93.
[110] Van Dijk 1981, 124–6. [111] Van Dijk 1981, 127.
[112] Kartosuwiryo claimed after his arrest that a considerable part of TII soldiers were poor farm boys. See Dengel 1986, 164.

state officials as their "chief oppressors."[113] However, already by 1949, the movements had largely disintegrated due to a lack of communication channels. Soon, various Darul Islam commanders terrorized the peasantry across the province and "[n]oncompliance with their regulations and demands for food and services frequently met with sanguinary brutality."[114] Many of these violent spasms exposed the elite-driven nature of this rural revolt. For instance, one report notes how the Darul Islam looted and destroyed the homes of poor farmhands but spared the houses of rich landowners.[115] Likewise, most "rural protests against abuse and taxes were not organized by poor, landless peasants but by rich kiai [and] rural private entrepreneurs."[116] In other words, the catalysts behind the Darul Islam movement were not the poor masses and landless peasants but mostly members of the class of *pribumi* entrepreneurs who had already framed their opposition to the aristocracy in Islamist terms for decades. The Darul Islam movement in West Java was an expression of horizontal tensions between elite groups rather than a mass Islamist movement.

Third, the territory under the control of the Darul Islam movement in West Java was relatively confined. Initially, this area expanded rapidly because the movement rewarded its military commanders with lucrative government posts in the localities they brought under their control.[117] Still, at the height of the revolt only about one-third of West Java was part of the NII. The strongholds of the Darul Islam rebellion were always in the rural areas in the center and east of West Java province, namely Ciamis, Garut, Kuningan, Majalengka and Tasikmalaya.[118] There, by 1948, the Darul Islam had already established Islamist subdistricts (*Kecamatan Negara Islam*) in Bantarujeg, Cadas Ngampar, Cinkoneng, Cihaur and Wado, where it upheld various Islamic laws for a brief period.[119]

2.4.2 Islamist Movements in West Java during the New Order

The Darul Islam rebellion was officially over in West Java in 1962. Yet, "[d]ecades later, it would become evident that the Darul Islam had continued as an underground movement, maintaining the old network

[113] McVey 1981, 272. [114] Kahin 1952, 330. [115] Wertheim 1959, 50–1.
[116] Ensering 1987, 280. [117] Dengel 1986, 64 [118] Dengel 1986, 57.
[119] For instance, a religious tax was introduced that required the local population to pay 2.5 percent of their weekly income to the NII. Another Islamic law required local *ulama* to pray for the success of the Darul Islam in newly established prayer quarters (*markas doa*). See Dengel 1986, 62–4.

of supporters and recruiting new members ...."[120] The Islamist movement also included groups that were sympathetic to the Darul Islam but not actively involved in the revolt such as Al-Irsyad, founded in 1912, and the Islamic Association (Persis, *Persatuan Islam*) founded in 1923, both of which were still strong in West Java at the time of writing.[121]

After the uprising ended in 1962, the Sukarno government offered an amnesty to Darul Islam members to demobilize the movement. In response, many Darul Islam fighters moved back to their villages.[122] After Suharto came to power in 1965, the military even revived parts of the Darul Islam networks to attack communist groups in West Java.[123]

Once the anti-communist purges ended, however, the regime first tried to co-opt the Islamist networks by offering former Darul Islam leaders administrative posts and lucrative business opportunities as reward for their support in the purges.[124] At some point, the regime even tried to incorporate Darul Islam groups into the regime's Golkar party.[125] However, as soon as the New Order had consolidated its grip on politics, it began to suppress Islamist groups and activities across West Java.

Various incidents over the following decades show that the Darul Islam networks remained active throughout the province nevertheless. In 1967, former Darul Islam commanders began to revive the movement.[126] In 1976, various leaders of a group called Holy War Commando (*Komando Jihad*) were arrested in West Java and charged with conspiracy against the state. The group leader Aceng Kurnia had direct links to the Darul Islam.[127]

Such attacks and subsequent arrests often occurred before elections, probably because these Islamist groups were collaborating or used by the Indonesian military and secret service. In any case, the Suharto regime used these Islamist attacks to remind the electorate about the importance of stability guaranteed by the New Order. Arguably, it also served as a pretext to clamp down on Islamist groups and activities.[128] Whatever the role the New Order played in these incidents, it is clear that members

[120] Van Bruinessen 2008, 224. See also van Bruinessen 2002; Temby 2010; Solahudin 2013.
[121] Federspiel 2001, 51. [122] Horikoshi 1975, 78.
[123] ICG 2005, 2–4; Temby 2010; Solahudin 2013.
[124] For instance, one Darul Islam leader received a salaried position with the military unit in West Java and was tasked with administering the rehabilitation program for demobilized Darul Islam fighters. Two other Darul Islam leaders became kerosene distributors in West Java. See, Solahudin 2013, 47. In the context of the amnesty for Darul Islam fighters in the early 1960s, a few returning DI fighters entered the local state apparatus. Darul Islam leader Ahmad Sobari, for instance, became district head in East Priangan after 1962. See ICG 2005, 2.
[125] Temby 2010, 20. [126] ICG 2003, 3. [127] Temby 2010, 6.
[128] Feillard 1995, 151.

of the Darul Islam network remained excluded from the state and formal political institutions throughout the Suharto years, as did members of Islamist organizations sympathetic to Darul Islam's cause such as Al-Irsyad and Persis.[129]

Finally, despite the presence of these groups, state elites did not adopt a single Islamic law in West Java province between 1965 and 1998.[130]

2.5 State–Islam Relations in South Sulawesi until 1998

The Dutch also ruled South Sulawesi indirectly until the early twentieth century. Again, this occurred with the help of a land-based local aristocracy. Similar to West Java, South Sulawesi's aristocracy adhered to syncretistic forms of Islam. This was largely a result of the top-down fashion in which the province had been Islamized, after the king of Gowa converted to Islam in 1605.[131] Soon, other rulers followed and Islamized their own kingdoms. Hence, the Islamization of South Sulawesi "was a conversion of society from the top down, and Islam remained closely associated with the local aristocracy. Royal patronage was important not only in the initial conversion, but in the subsequent spread of the new religion ...."[132] For a long time, Islam in South Sulawesi was therefore a mix of local customs practiced at the courts and Islamic rules found in the Qur'an.

Modernist Islam came to South Sulawesi only in the early twentieth century when mass organizations such as Muhammadiyah settled in the province.[133] An Arab trader called Mansur Al Yamani opened the first local Muhammadiyah branch in the provincial capital Makassar in 1926.[134] From Makassar, Muhammadiyah spread across the province through young aristocrats keen to distance themselves from the older generation.[135] Some aristocrats also embraced Muhammadiyah to oppose rival aristocratic groups.[136] However, the most important group disseminating the ideas of modernist Islam comprises affluent landowners and rice traders of a non-aristocratic background. Muhammadiyah gained most followers among these men due to the organization's message of upward social mobility based on merit rather than aristocratic origin.

[129] Sidel 2006, 204.
[130] In fact, the national government forced West Java province to adopt a controversial lottery scheme, which many local Muslim organizations regarded as sinful.
[131] Harvey 1974, 35. [132] Harvey 1974, 37.
[133] Hamdan 2006, 28; van Bruinessen 1991, 251.
[134] Mattulada 1976, 55; Amal 1992, 16, footnote 11. [135] Harvey 1974, 96–8.
[136] Magenda 1989, 630 mentions the ruler (*arung*) of Wajo sponsoring Muhammadiyah activities to contain the influence of the Bone aristocracy in the areas under his control.

The rifts between an aristocratic class adhering to syncretistic forms of Islam and a non-aristocratic class of affluent landowners and rice traders attracted to modernist Islam became even more pronounced with the outbreak of a rebellion in South Sulawesi province in the early 1950s.

2.5.1 The Darul Islam Rebellion in South Sulawesi between 1953 and 1965

As in West Java, the origins of the Islamist movement in South Sulawesi date back to the independence struggle. The Dutch established the State of East Indonesia (NIT, *Negara Indonesia Timur*) as part of their strategy to eliminate support for the Republic of Indonesia and regain control of the archipelago after the Second World War. However, this plan failed and the NIT was dissolved in August 1950.[137]

The national government established a military the same year but the requirements disqualified most guerrilla members in South Sulawesi who had fought against the NIT.[138] In response, outraged local guerrilla leaders started a rebellion against the republican government.[139]

A prominent figure among these rebels was Kahar Muzakkar.[140] A South Sulawesi Lieutenant-Colonel whose career began with the Republican Army in Java, Muzakkar was initially sent back to South Sulawesi by the national government to negotiate with the guerrillas. However, Muzakkar ended up siding with the rebels.[141] Negotiations between Muzakkar and the national government broke down in August 1951 when Colonel Kawilarang from the Republican Army attacked Muzakkar's forces.[142] After the attack, Muzakkar and 15,000 followers withdrew to the jungles of South Sulawesi and began to attack the Republican troops.[143]

Muzakkar, who was born outside South Sulawesi's influential aristocracy, became decisively anti-aristocratic in tone as the rebellion continued.[144] With Muzakkar's power rising, the local aristocrats feared he eventually would try to abolish the provincial aristocracy altogether. Rifts among the rebels became even more pronounced when Muzakkar formed the People's Security Army (TKR, *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*) and pledged allegiance to West Java's Darul Islam in 1953.[145] Muzakkar's decision to join the Darul Islam triggered an exodus of

[137] See Amal 1992, 28–30 for a brief history of the NIT and how it shaped power dynamics in South Sulawesi during that period.
[138] Amal 1992, 46; Hamdan 2006, 3–4, 34. [139] Harvey 1974.
[140] For a description of Kahar Muzakkar's background, see Amal 1992, 46; Hamdan 2006, 32; Harvey 1974, 247–260.
[141] Hamdan 2006, 43. [142] Amal 1992, 48. [143] Hamdan 2006, 4.
[144] Magenda 1989, 627. [145] Hamdan 2006, 44–7.

most military-cum-aristocratic rebel leaders from his troops. In short, the first rebellion between 1949 and 1953 included a broad range of local elites. Yet the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi between 1953 and 1965 was fought by people who were "generally not from the aristocratic strata."[146]

Several Muslim organizations supported Kahar Muzakkar's movement in the beginning, the Muhammadiyah being the most important. The Muhammadiyah and the Darul Islam were both rooted in the same class of traders and affluent peasants of non-aristocratic origin.[147] In fact, a well-known leader of Muhammadiyah in Makassar, Daeng Maggading, was an active supporter of the Darul Islam at that time. Many Darul Islam leaders also sent their children to Muhammadiyah schools in Makassar during the rebellion.[148] Initially, Muzakkar's insurrection also enjoyed support from various political parties such as the Islamic United Party of Indonesia (PSII, *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*) and Masyumi. Several party members even joined the Darul Islam. Haji Abdul Kadir Daud, one of the first *ulama* to embrace the Darul Islam in South Sulawesi,[149] for example, was also active in the modernist wing of PSII.[150] Likewise, Mohammad Noor, an important Masyumi activist with a Muhammadiyah background, joined the rebellion in 1957.[151] However, the cabinet in Jakarta under Ir Djuanda, which was inaugurated in 1957, co-opted many Muzakkar sympathizers by making concessions to local political elites and appointing them district heads. Enthusiasm for the rebellion dwindled rapidly and many political interests, "... including members of Islamic parties and organizations such as PSII, NU and Muhammadiyah ...,"[152] dissociated themselves from the insurgency.

In 1962, Muzakkar announced the establishment of the Unified Islamic Republic of Indonesia (RPII, *Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia*). RPII's goal was to establish an Islamic caliphate.[153] However, the RPII remained an entity that "barely operated as a state because of military pressure from the republican army."[154] Government troops killed Muzakkar in 1965, which was officially the end of the rebellion.[155]

Again, a few characteristics of the Darul Islam in South Sulawesi are worth emphasizing. First, the rebellion was an expression of tensions along horizontal lines between a local aristocracy in control of the state and a class of non-aristocrats situated outside it.[156] The distinctive sociological composition of the Darul Islam movement is shown by the fact that the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi fell on particularly

[146] Hamdan 2006, 54. [147] Pelras 1996, 342–3; Hamdan 2006, 58–9.
[148] Hamdan 2006, 58. [149] Hamdan 2006, 55. [150] Harvey 1974, 256.
[151] Harvey 1974, 256. [152] Amal 1992, 75. [153] Hamdan 2006, 53.
[154] Hamdan 2006, 4. [155] Amal 1992, 102. [156] Amal 1992, 75.

fruitful grounds in "the areas north of Bone and Pare-Pare district and the border area of Luwu regency"[157] as well as in Wajo district.[158] These were exactly the areas where the traditional elites of South Sulawesi had the least influence and competition was fiercest between the aristocracy and a burgeoning class of non-aristocratic Islamic traders and landowners influenced by the Muhammadiyah.[159] Second, like in West Java, the Darul Islam was an elite-driven movement rather than a mass-based peasant revolt. Locals in South Sulawesi widely feared the movement, whose lower ranks they joined through coercion rather than genuine support.[160] Third, the Darul Islam had a broader territorial reach here compared to in West Java. At one point the Darul Islam movement claimed that almost all districts in South Sulawesi were at least partly under its control.[161]

2.5.2 Islamist Movements in South Sulawesi during the New Order

The end of the Darul Islam revolt in South Sulawesi in 1965 coincided with the rise of the New Order, which led to even more repression against Islamist movements.[162] As local observers noted, after the military had defeated the Darul Islam in South Sulawesi, openly "praising the virtues of Kahar was tantamount to committing suicide. This was also experienced by various former followers of Kahar who became bureaucrats. They experienced difficulties with regard to promotions and bureaucratic rank."[163]

However, despite their oppression, the Darul Islam networks and their *shari'a* ambitions stayed intact throughout the Suharto years, much like in West Java.

Former Darul Islam leaders established organizations and religious boarding schools across South Sulawesi. "Most of them . . . [maintained] their own cohesive group and tried at times to challenge the aristocracy . . .."[164] For example, Sanusi Daris, a former Darul Islam

[157] Magenda 1989, 630.
[158] Magenda 1989, 674. Magenda 1989, 630 also mentions parts of Soppeng and Sidenreng.
[159] Magenda 1989, 630.
[160] Kahar Muzakkar established a *shari'a* police, the *Momoc Ansharullah,* that would watch over the proper implementation of Islamic law in the areas under the control of the Darul Islam and which was feared by the local population. *Momoc* is an abbreviation of *Mobile Operatie Commande. Ansharullah* means "Soldier of God" in Arabic. *Momoc* is a phrase still commonly used by the Bugis people of South Sulawesi to label people with a frightening personality. The word has even made its way into the broader vocabulary of Bahasa Indonesia. *Momok* describes a ghost or a daunting person, as Echols and Shadily 1989, 375 show in their dictionary.
[161] Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 70.
[162] Hamdan 2006, 18.
[163] Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 71.
[164] Magenda 1989, 680.

leader, kicked off a movement he called the Republic of the Federation of Sulawesi (RFS, *Republik Federasi Sulawesi*) from his hideaway in Enrekang district.[165] Daris failed to generate mass support and was arrested in 1982. In 1984, the national government sentenced him to several years in prison.[166] Despite Daris' failure, the networks that had formed around him provided a platform for the politicization and recruitment of new members into local Islamist networks.[167]

Another organization that kept the Islamist agenda alive in South Sulawesi during the New Order was the Foundation of Darul Istiqamah Education (YPDI, *Yayasan Pembinaan Darul Istiqamah*). Founded by Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, a former Darul Islam leader, in the early New Order years, YPDI soon opened a boarding school named *Darul Istiqamah* in Maros district.[168] Many more branches have opened across the province since.[169]

Darul Istiqamah was "strictly committed to the ideology of D[arul] I[slam]. The *pesantren* ... was known to oppose the New Order government which was in its eyes un-Islamic. For example, it rejected ... Pancasila as the sole ideology of the Indonesian nation. Unlike other Islamic boarding houses in South Sulawesi, which were usually supported financially by the New Order government, *Darul Istiqamah* funded itself through its own efforts."[170]

The Islamist networks in South Sulawesi also attracted new members from the Muhammadiyah, despite the fact that the organization had publicly distanced itself from the Darul Islam at the beginning of the New Order.[171] One of the most prominent figures of that kind was Fathul Muin Daeng Maggading, the director of *Ta'mirul Mu'minin*, a center of Muhammadiyah activities in Makassar. Maggading was an open sympathizer of the Islamist movement despite having never been an official member of the rebellion in South Sulawesi.[172]

After the death of Maggading in the 1970s, members of the *Ta'mirul Mu'minin* started a foundation in his honor, the *Yayasan Fathul Muin*

[165] Hamdan 2006, 4.
[166] Kompas November 2, 1984, 9. He served only a few months of his sentence due to the intervention of General Mohammad Jusuf, a former defense minister of Indonesia who was from South Sulawesi. See ICG 2002, 10.
[167] ICG 2002, 11.
[168] The center of *Darul Istiqamah* is in Macopa, a subdistrict of Maros district. As of 2008, it was led by Mudzakkir M. Arif M.A., the grandson of Ahmad Marzuki Hasan. See Fajar June 28, 2006, 26.
[169] Marzuki Hasan established branches of *Darul Istiqamah* in Bulukumba, Gowa, and Sinjai district. The *pesantren* became also active in the city of Makassar. See Hamdan 2006, 152; Fajar June 28, 2006, 26.
[170] Hamdan 2006, 152. [171] Feillard 1995, 119. [172] Hamdan 2006, 153.

(YFM).[173] In 1992, the organization changed its name to Institute for Education and the Development of Islamic Propagation and the Economy (LP2DE, *Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pengembangan Dakwah dan Ekonomi*).[174] The name suggested an ordinary organization, but it was "[i]n fact ... a military organization, set up by Afghanistan returnees to train local recruits for *jihad* [holy war]."[175] In 1998, LP2DE changed its name again and became the *Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyah* (YWI).[176]

By far the most successful boarding school linked to the Darul Islam in South Sulawesi is Guidance of God (*Hidayatullah*), established by Mushin Kahar,[177] a student of the aforementioned Maggading. The history of *Hidayatullah* illustrates like no other story the milieu in which the Islamist movement is embedded, namely a class of economically successful but politically marginalized traders and landowners that sees itself in opposition to aristocratic elites dominating the local state and political institutions, and which resisted state oppression during the New Order years in underground Islamist networks.

After his formal schooling, Mushin Kahar became an activist in the Indonesian Students Action Front (Kami, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*) and the Indonesian Pupils Action Front (Kappi, *Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pelajar Indonesia*).[178] He was also a student of the aforementioned Aceng Kurnia, who tried to re-establish Darul Islam in West Java in 1967. Finally, Kahar was an admirer of Kahar Muzakkar, the South Sulawesi Darul Islam leader.[179]

Mushin Kahar first rose to prominence when he organized a demonstration in Makassar against a lottery the mayor had begun in April 1968 to generate revenues for the city budget. After Islamist protestors vandalized large parts of the city center, Mushin Kahar fled to Kalimantan to escape from New Order authorities.[180]

[173] The few sources available on Maggading contradict each other with regard to who established the foundation. Some sources state that the foundation was established by followers of Fathul Muin after his death while other studies say that Fathul Muin himself established the organization in 1989. It is also unclear when Fathul Muin died. See Hamdan 2006, 153 and ICG 2003, 14.

[174] ICG 2003, 14. [175] ICG 2003, 14.

[176] In 2000, the organization received accreditation from the Indonesian government to run a religious boarding school in South Sulawesi, the *Yayasan Pesantren Wahdah Islamiyah* (YPWI). YWI also runs a hospital in Makassar, the *Clinic Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyah*. See Gatra 2004, 16. The *pesantren*'s website is available at www.wahdah.or.id/.

[177] Mushin Kahar is the cousin of Marzuki Hasan, the aforementioned founder of YPDI. See, Hamdan 2006, 153.

[178] Feillard et Madinier 2006, 98. [179] ICG 2003, 3.

[180] ICG 2002, 18, footnote 76; Hamdan 2006, 153.

Once in Kalimantan, Mushin Kahar changed his name to Abdullah Said, and in 1971 established the aforementioned *Hidayatullah* boarding school.[181] The school quickly grew branches in other parts of the archipelago.[182] In South Sulawesi, a *Hidayatullah* boarding school was opened in the late 1980s by Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the son of Darul Islam leader Kahar Muzakkar.[183]

The school and its network broadened into a disparate mix of companies. It initiated various agricultural businesses manned by members and students[184] "in order to advance the independence of its members."[185] The school network also founded *Hudaya*, a company active in merchandise, manufacturing and distribution, which served as a stepping stone for consecutive moves into the transportation, construction and banking sectors. The *Hidayatullah*-owned Sakinah Group had a small shop in Surabaya city, but it now controls several supermarkets and retail businesses. *Hidayatullah* formed CCM Cargo, a company offering transportation services across Indonesia. The boarding school also owns Intan Travel, a large travel agency whose branch Intan Tour provides exclusive pilgrimage packages to Saudi Arabia. In recent years, *Hidayatullah* has moved into construction and real estate under the company Citra Cipta Madina. In 1986, *Hidayatullah* began publishing its own newspaper, the Voice of Hidayatullah (*Suara Hidayatullah*), an outlet that has itself made a name for anti-Christian propaganda.[186] Finally, *Hidayatullah* established *Baitul wat Tamwil Mashraf al-Madina*, a small-scale *shari'a* banking initiative.[187] Yet, again as in West Java, despite the strong local presence of Islamist networks, state elites did not adopt a single Islamic law in South Sulawesi during the entire New Order.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter showed that Islamist activism dates back to the colonial period but not until the Japanese occupation did it gain political strength. Since Indonesia became independent in 1945, the adoption of Islamic law has been a contentious issue in formal and informal politics at both the national and subnational levels.

[181] Feillard et Madinier 2006, 98; Hamdan 2006, 153, footnote 478.
[182] Hasan 2000, 88; ICG 2002, 18.
[183] *Hidayatullah* was operating at least 127 boarding schools across Indonesia at the time of writing. See, ICG 2003, 26.
[184] Kompas 1996, 21. [185] Hasan 2000, 88. [186] Feillard et Madinier 2006, 99.
[187] Hasan 2000, 88.

After 1949, various Islamist parties entered the formal political system. Despite their relatively strong showing in the 1955 elections, Islamist parties were steadily marginalized, a process that culminated in the ban of Masyumi in 1960. Its successor Parmusi met a similar fate when it was forced to merge with other Islamic parties into the PPP in 1973. The PPP continued to be active at the fringes of the political system throughout the New Order. Only from the mid-1980s onward did a growing number of *santri* associated with modernist Islam enter the state and political institutions. Still, political Islam never managed to enter the state. Instead, nominal Muslims with a secular-nationalist worldview dominated the state.

It is important to note that Islamist groups, whose rise in the state apparatus invited a more conciliatory tone from Suharto in the 1990s, originated from quite a different milieu than the networks rooted in the Darul Islam. While both pursued an agenda based on reformist Islam with the establishment of a state based on Islamic law as the ultimate goal, the former arose from an urban backdrop, while the Darul Islam were strongest in rural areas. Arguably, the various groups affiliated with the Darul Islam movement did not feel represented by nor closely linked to these Muslim networks rooted in a pious urban middle class, which had emerged *relatively recently* during the economic growth of the New Order regime after 1965.[188] The crowds of "university-educated Muslims within the ranks of urban middle class ... [and] the growing number of devout Muslims in the armed forces and officers corps"[189] had little in common with Islamist networks that were affiliated with the Darul Islam movement and derived from a rural peasant milieu dating to the pre-independence era.

The trajectory of Islamist movements in West Java and South Sulawesi mirrors the trajectory of Islamist activism in national-level politics. Rural revolts in the name of Islam flared up in both provinces after independence. The literature has portrayed these upheavals as the result of center–periphery tensions triggered when the newly independent central government expanded its authority across the territory of the former Dutch East Indies. Elites in these areas resisted central government policies because they felt ignored in the staffing of local bureaucracies and the security apparatus and also wanted a bigger share of government resources.[190] Hence, the revolts stopped after the central government had addressed these issues, the argument goes.[191] However, I argue that the

[188] Sidel 2006, 69. [189] Sidel 2006, 71. [190] Van Dijk 1981, 340–91.
[191] Amal 1992, 124–84.

Darul Islam revolts in both provinces were fueled by tensions along horizontal lines.

Concretely, a local aristocracy practicing syncretistic Islam administered the local bureaucracy on behalf of the colonial government and therefore came to dominate the state in both provinces. On the other hand, an emerging class of rich peasants and landowners of non-aristocratic origin situated at the periphery of politics conveyed its opposition to the state in Islamist terms. The Darul Islam rebellion in both provinces emerged from within this distinct class of new-wealth elites. There were also Islamist networks that were not directly rooted in the Darul Islam but nevertheless pushed for the adoption of Islamic law such as Al Irsyiad and Persis in West Java and the networks that formed around the cleric Maggading in South Sulawesi.

Overall, the Darul Islam movement in both provinces was not so much an ordinary peasant revolt as a vehicle for the political aspirations of an entrepreneurially inclined challenger-elite that couched its opposition to the state in Islamist terms. In both provinces, Islamist movements emerged from within a class of rich peasants and traders who were influential in the rural communities of West Java and South Sulawesi. After independence, elites in control of the provincial administration represented a broader range of societal groups. However, figures associated with the Islamist milieu described above remained by and large outside the state apparatus. Few members from within this stratum of Indonesian society and even fewer members of the Darul Islam occupied posts within the local bureaucracy.

Arguably, the fact that these revolts signified class tensions within these provinces explains the longevity and durability of the Islamist movements in both provinces. These cleavages remained intact throughout the New Order. The Islamist movements in these localities survived in boarding schools, foundations and associations established by former rebel leaders in both provinces.

Yet despite their resilience, Islamist activists remained firmly outside the state.[192] The New Order leaders collaborated with Islamist groups at times. For instance, the government sought the help of Islamist networks in its purge against the PKI after the coup in 1965. At some point, the Indonesian Secret Service under the leadership of General Ali Moertopo also relied on local Darul Islam networks to stage attacks prior to elections, thereby rallying voters behind the military-backed Suharto

[192] Feener 2013, 45 shows that some bureaucrats in Aceh province during the New Order were "descendants of ulama," some of whom had been affiliated with the Darul Islam. However, again, the presence of such figures was not prevalent in the local state.

government. However, most of the Islamist figures in these movements were outspoken critics of Suharto's regime.[193] In other words, while there were some links between some of these groups and the early New Order state in West Java, these links were the result of the strategizing of the military and the secret service, rather than a cooperation between equals. In South Sulawesi, the aristocracy dominated the local state throughout the New Order years.[194]

The trajectory of state–Islam relations from 1945 until 1998 also suggests the state shaped the influence of Islamist activists in politics. Few policies with a distinct Islamic content were adopted during the New Order,[195] all of them at the national level. The policies were, in other words, the outcome of a "regimist Islam,"[196] not the expression of Islamist movements and parties' aspirations.

At the subnational level, elites in control of the local state adopted *shari'a* law neither in West Java nor in South Sulawesi. This was despite the ongoing and strong presence of a small but stable set of actors, rooted in a distinct class and linked to one another to varying degrees via a dense mosaic of religious boarding schools, foundations and mosques that have pushed for Islamic law in the two provinces since 1945.

The lack of political influence of Islamist activists in both provinces even with an enduring and strong presence suggests looking elsewhere to discover why Islamist movements gained influence after 1998. As proposed in Chapter 1, the state and political institutions shape the influence of Islamist activism. Since the main argument put forth here is that dynamics in the state allowed some Islamist groups to become influential but not others, I will first examine state institutions and the dynamics within it in the next two chapters before returning to Islamist parties and movements in Chapter 5.

[193] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 89. [194] Magenda 1989. [195] Salim and Azra 2003.
[196] Hefner 2000, 128.

3 State Elites and Institutional Change

3.1 Introduction

The main argument put forth in this book is that dynamics within the state define the influence of Islamist parties and movements that have pushed for the adoption of Islamic law in Indonesia since 1945. In this chapter, I therefore examine the dimensions of "the state," which the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 identified as decisive for the political influence of societal activism. These dimensions are the following: the level of democratization, the partisanship of institutional power holders, state capacity, electoral volatility and the characteristics of the party system.

I assess these dimensions for the Indonesian case in the following way: First, I examine the various institutional changes made after 1998 with regard to the state, namely the introduction of elections, the decentralization of administrative and fiscal authority as well as reforms of the party system.

Second, I outline how these institutional changes altered the dynamics between state elites. After a brief examination of the elites inhabiting the state in West Java and South Sulawesi between 1945 and 1998, I show that a considerable share of these state elites trace their origins in the New Order era. The Islam–secularism cleavage, in other words, has *not* been drawn into the state in the context of democratization after 1998.

3.2 Institutional Changes after 1998

After Suharto's resignation in 1998, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie became the new president of Indonesia. Habibie had been Technology Minister and then vice-president under Suharto and was therefore seen as a figure closely associated with the New Order regime. To change this perception, Habibie pushed through various reforms. The three most important reforms were the decentralization of political and fiscal powers to districts (and to a lesser degree, to provinces), the introduction of free elections, as

well as reforms to the party system, allowing parties to form freely and compete in elections.[1]

Laws on local government enacted after 1998 changed the power relations between and within government layers. Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government shifted considerable political and fiscal powers to the district level, the administrative layer below the province. The national level retained key responsibilities such as security and defense, foreign policy, justice and religious affairs. As a result of these reforms, Indonesia became one of the most decentralized countries in the world.

Law No. 22/1999 also greatly increased the power of local executive governments at the expense of local parliaments. It strengthened, for example, the fiscal authority of district heads to control the financial management of their territories, to authorize spending and to set the priorities and the ceiling of the budget.[2] Theoretically, the budget needs to be approved jointly with the local parliament,[3] but anecdotal evidence suggests lawmakers' participation is limited and fraught with problems. Subnational parliaments report difficulties engaging in budget formulation because of their weak capacity and because the spending plan must be "evaluated" by the central government for final approval. Many local parliaments complain this vetting process undercuts their independence.

Furthermore, Law No. 22/1999 allows district heads together with local parliaments to issue local regulations (*peraturan daerah*) to amend national laws.[4] As in the case of budgeting, the experience of the past decade is that such regulations usually come not from local parliaments but district heads.[5] A comparative study of four districts in East Java province showed, for instance, that between 2001 and 2006, local parliaments initiated just 1.6 percent of local regulations.[6] This, again, was due to a dearth of resources and drafting expertise among committees and council secretariats, making these four case studies indicative of most districts in Indonesia.[7] These dynamics also apply to *shari'a* policymaking, as previous studies have shown and subsequent chapters in this book will confirm.[8]

Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government tilted the balance of power further in favor of the executive branch of local governments. For

[1] Crouch 2010. [2] Law No. 22/1999, Articles 156 and 192.
[3] Law No. 22/1999, Article 18. [4] Law No. 22/1999, Article 18.
[5] Kristiansen et al. 2009, 70. [6] Ibrahim et al. 2009, 1–42.
[7] USAID 2006, 30. In fact, the executive branch of government dominates the policymaking process in most democracies.
[8] See, for instance, Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 181 on *shari'a* policymaking by local executive governments in Pangkep district and South Sulawesi province.

instance, the 2004 law empowered district heads to intervene in the work of the parliament. The appointment and control of civil servants in the local parliament secretariat now fall under the authority of the district head. This has weakened local assemblies' autonomy and ability to scrutinize the executive, given that the secretariat is supposed to prepare materials needed for legislators to hold the regional head accountable.

Legislators used to do this by requesting an annual accountability report from the executive, which was permitted under Law No. 22/1999. If it rejected the report, the local parliament could proceed to impeach the district head and propose his[9] dismissal to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). However, parliaments across the archipelago abused this leverage to extract bribes and favors from district heads in return for rubberstamping the accountability reports. As a result of this blatant corruption, Law No. 32/2004 abolished the need for local assemblies to approve these reports. While it is still possible to impeach a district head, in practice this has become much more difficult. Most significantly, the MoHA has regularly expressed its unwillingness to remove a district head simply because he is engulfed in a dispute with parliament.

In contrast, most powers assigned to local parliaments in Law No. 32/2004 are rather symbolic. First, local parliaments elect members of the Election Monitoring Commission (Panwas, *Panitia Pengawas*), a toothless oversight body. Second, parliaments must inform the commission when an incumbent's term ends, which then determines the date for new elections. Third, parliaments organize the meeting where candidates present their platforms. Fourth, local assemblies have to submit the name of the executive head election winners within three days after the local election commission announces the results. In provincial elections, the provincial parliament submits the winning names to the president via the Minister of Home Affairs. In district elections, the local parliament reports the names to the MoHA via the governor.[10]

[9] Men continue to constitute the overwhelming majority of governors and district heads as mentioned in Chapter 1.

[10] There were concerns that provincial and district parliaments would try to influence the outcome of government head elections by not reporting the names of the winners to the MoHA. The MoHA tried to curb this risk by issuing a circular (SE, *Surat Edaran Mendagri*) on June 27, 2005, just a few weeks after the first district head elections had been held. The circular ruled that if the head of the provincial parliament would not attend to his duties, the deputy head of the parliament could report the results of the provincial election commission to the MoHA. If both refused, the Minister of Home Affairs could report the results from the provincial election commission directly to the president. In district elections, the governor could report the results of district head elections based on the report of the district election commission if both the head and the deputy head of the district parliament would refuse to report the election results. See SE No. 120/1559/SJ.

Other regulations actually *weakened* local parliaments. The Constitutional Court, for example, ruled that they cannot invalidate the results of executive head elections. Instead, any candidate can file a suit with the Supreme Court within three days of seeing the results, and the court then has to reach a verdict within fourteen days.[11] The local parliament may only note irregularities in executive elections in its report to the Minister of Home Affairs or the governor.[12]

The most recent regulation on local governance, Law No. 12/2008 on Regional Government, reduced the duties and authorities of the local parliament even further. Parliamentarians have lost the power to screen district head candidates and to appoint a supervisory committee to oversee elections. These powers had become redundant anyway with the introduction of direct elections for local government in 2005 (on which more below) and the consequent empowerment of regional election commissions to run these ballots. Still, the formal elimination of rights held by local parliaments symbolizes their decline.[13]

In sum, various laws ratified after 1998 increased the powers of local government heads profoundly. This occurred in tandem with the slow but steady erosion of subnational parliaments' horizontal oversight over the executive branch after 1999. One observer of this development aptly concluded that local parliaments had become mere "administrators to legitimize" local executive head elections. Overall, governors and district heads have become some of the most powerful figures in local politics and the formal policymaking process. Hence, I pay particular attention to these figures in the subsequent chapters of this book.

[11] In November 2008, the jurisdiction to handle electoral disputes was handed over to the Constitutional Court as outlined in Law No. 12/2008 on Regional Government, Article 236C. At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court was still the only court with power to resolve these disputes. Over the years, the Constitutional Court has become increasingly interventionist in local elections, often ignoring its narrow mandate to only examine the vote-counting process. See Butt 2013. After a series of corruption scandals and the arrest of the Head of the Constitutional Court for rigging election dispute outcomes in exchange for money in 2013, calls mounted to hand back jurisdiction over electoral disputes to the Supreme Court and High Courts, or even for a new electoral dispute resolution body to be established. I thank Simon Butt for clarifying this point.

[12] One such high-profile lawsuit occurred in December 2007, after Amin Syam, former governor of South Sulawesi province, accused his opponent Syahrul Yasin Limpo of cheating in the first direct gubernatorial elections in South Sulawesi province. At the end of December 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the gubernatorial elections in four districts in South Sulawesi province to be repeated.

[13] The decision by the Constitutional Court was numbered 072–073/PUU-II/2004. The government later stipulated that local election commissions are accountable to the "public" instead of to the local parliaments. The details of submitting election complaints were regulated in Law No 32/2004, Article 106, Paragraph 3 and Supreme Court Regulation (*Perma–Peraturan Mahkamah Agung*) No. 1/2005.

While horizontal accountability between local executive and legislative branches has gradually weakened since 1998, vertical accountability at the local level has been formally strengthened.[14] A comprehensive regulatory framework for both executive and legislative local elections has been established and continually revised since 1999, making democratic elections a regular affair across the archipelago. Local legislative elections have taken place every five years since 1999, held concurrently with the polls for the national parliament.[15] Likewise, democratically elected parliaments selected governors and district heads between 1999 and 2005. The first round of *direct* elections under the new regulations was set for mid-2005 in 226 districts.[16] Since 2005, direct elections for local government heads have been held in all 34 provinces and in more than 500 districts. On average, over 100 subnational elections take place annually, with the ordinary Indonesian voting in seven or eight separate ballots between 2004 and 2009 alone.[17]

I pay particular attention to the electoral mechanisms for local government heads because of their crucial role in local policymaking. Law No. 22/1999 granted local parliaments the task of electing governors and district heads, with each parliamentary faction allowed one nominee.[18] The winner had to obtain 50 percent plus 1 vote from all local parliamentarians present on Election Day.[19] Each candidate had to obtain at least one vote, otherwise the election was void.[20] The law also limited the tenure of local government heads to two five-year terms.[21] In short, from early 2000 to 2005, the elections for governors and district chiefs were

[14] It is important to note that the vertical powers of district heads have also been strengthened in the institutional reforms after 1998. See von Benda-Beckman and von Benda-Beckman 2009.

[15] Legislative elections are usually held in April and direct presidential elections in June the same year. In 2014, the Constitutional Court decided that the legislative and presidential elections will be held concurrently from 2019 onward.

[16] Kompas February 22, 2005, online.

[17] Gunawan and Siregar 2009, 10.

[18] PP 151/2000, Paragraph 18, Article 6. Initially, an MoHA decree had ruled that every party in the district parliament could suggest as many candidates as it wanted. See Kepmendagri, *Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negri* No. 2/2000.

[19] Skep 5/2000, Paragraph 18, Article 1. Skep No. 5/2000 from February 3, 2000, amended Skep No. 2/2000, from January 19, 2000, on the same issue. The most important new ruling in Skep No. 2/2000 was that deputy district heads had to be elected in the same elections as district heads.

[20] Skep 5/2000, Paragraph 18, Article 2.

[21] Law No. 22/1999 in Article 41 limited the number of years someone could be a local government head to two times in five years across Indonesia. Law No. 32/2004, Part 8, Article 58 was more specific and stated that nobody could serve for more than two five-year terms either as a district head *or* a deputy district head. Ironically, the more specific formulation in Law No. 32/2004 has opened up the opportunity for district heads who have served two five-year terms to subsequently run for deputy district head. This has occurred on various occasions in West Java and South Sulawesi as well as other provinces since 2005.

under the sole authority of local parliaments, with the exception of a few districts.[22] These elections were staggered to allow governors and district heads appointed during the New Order to finish their term.

Only weeks after the law was adopted in 1999, local parliaments across the archipelago were abusing their new powers. In exchange for their vote on Election Day many parliamentarians exacted money and favors from candidates. Soon, stories about "money politics" in local executive head elections made daily headlines in a media that visibly enjoyed its newly gained freedom to report on such issues.[23]

Candidates nominated by minority parties defeated candidates who were propped up by parties controlling the majority in the local assembly. In fact, most victors had no links to the parties and parliaments whatsoever. Since their members were too poor to pay the tremendous sums demanded, most parties resorted to selling nominations for executive posts to *non-party* candidates. Many of these nominees did not enjoy the support of a political constituency or party but were sufficiently well off to buy enough party endorsements to reach the nomination threshold. Not coincidentally, the relationship between such candidates and "their" parties often collapses immediately after Election Day.[24]

Overall, these elections revealed for the first time how ill-prepared Indonesian parties were to function in a more democratic and decentralized political system. Most important, parties lacked the financial means to compete in these elections. "The problem is that the prospective candidates of PDI-P don't have money to buy votes," a national party representative of the Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*) told a local newspaper.[25] Vote-buying became endemic in local government head elections and shaped their outcome since many local parliamentarians simply elected the candidate who had made them the highest offer. In 2001, for instance, Roy B.B. Janis, then head of the national party headquarters of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) (*Ketua DPP PDI-P*), said his party would no longer nominate PDIP members for local government head elections but only candidates who had "a true mandate" in a locality.[26] This upset many local party cadres.[27]

[22] Localities that needed a new district head prior to December 1999 applied the old Law No. 5/1974. These were Gresik, Jember, Lamongan, Nganjuk, Situbondo and Surabaya city. See Kompas December 3, 1999, 24. All these localities are in East Java province.

[23] See, for example, the series of investigative articles published in Kompas in March 2000 on "money politics" in the context of district head elections. See Kompas March 14, 2000, 7; Kompas March 15, 2000, 7.

[24] Buehler and Tan 2007, 63.

[25] Kompas January 10, 2001, 6.

[26] Kompas January 10, 2001, 6.

[27] Anecdotal evidence suggests that similar frictions ran through other parties. See Tomsa 2006, 1–22.

These dynamics also diluted the mandate voters had given to their respective parties in the 1999 legislative elections. In many localities, parties that had won a majority of seats in the legislature could not place their nominee in a local executive government head post.[28] Also the amount of money needed to mount a serious bid for the district head post skyrocketed as a result of this horse-trading.[29]

In reaction to these developments, pressure for electoral reform swelled. Experts identified the extensive powers Law No. 22/1999 had given to local parliaments as the main reason for rampant money politics and the flawed outcome of these races.[30] Therefore, by 2000, they were already suggesting *direct* elections for local government heads. Direct voting would give citizens more leverage and provide successful candidates with a stronger mandate.[31] Political parties supported the proposal but wanted to retain control over the nomination process.

Eventually, Law No. 32/2004 introduced *direct* elections for governors and district heads. The 2004 law created the post of deputy government head and therefore ruled that Indonesian citizens had to directly elect *pairs* of candidates.[32] If a pair of candidates received 50 percent of the votes, it would win the election. If none achieved this threshold, the pair earning more than 25 percent of legitimate votes would be elected. If no one reached 25 percent, the elections would have to be repeated.

Law No. 32/2004 also required a candidate to be nominated by a party or a coalition of parties that had earned at least 15 percent of the vote in

[28] For instance, the PDI-P had won the general *legislative* elections in 1999 with a total of 33.7 percent of the votes. See King 2003, 78. It therefore came to control between 18 and 20 of the 30 to 45 seats in Indonesian local parliaments after its victory in the general legislative elections 1999. In several localities, a single party came out of the 1999 elections controlling an *absolute* majority of the seats in the local parliament but subsequently failed to collect the *absolute* majority needed to get its candidate elected as government head.

[29] In Banyuwas district in Central Java, for example, the head of the PDI-P district branch announced in a local newspaper prior to the elections that in order to be *considered* as a nominee by his party one had to at least pay IDR 250 million, which in 2002 was approximately US$25,000. Similar figures were reported from people at the receiving end of these transactions. The head of the Banyuwas parliament said that "several [of the prospective candidates] have offered money, up to US$ 10,000 (IDR 100 Million). I received reports about this from several members of parliament." See Kompas August 20, 2002, 25.

[30] In 2002, I. Made Suwandi, then Director for the Facilitation of Policies and Reporting on Local Autonomy (*Direktur Fasilitasi Kebijakan dan Pelaporan Otonomi Daerah*), explicitly stated that the law allowed local parliaments to abuse their leverage in the elections of district heads. See Kompas May 11, 2002, 8.

[31] Calls for a reform of the election mechanism for executive heads coincided with the drafting period of a new election law that proposed direct elections for the presidency of Indonesia. It was in this kind of climate that direct elections for district heads were proposed and eventually adopted.

[32] Law No 32/2004, Section V, Article 107, Paragraph 1–4.

the most recent legislative election or that controlled at least 15 percent of seats in the local parliament.[33] This concentrated considerable formal power in local party branches, with the effect that contenders in local government head elections started to bribe party ward bosses and local party cadres to secure a nomination. In other words, money politics did not disappear but simply shifted from the local parliaments to local party branches.

To break the parties' monopoly on nominations, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2007 that candidacy for local government heads should be open to all eligible citizens, not just those recommended by political parties. To accommodate the verdict, Law No. 12/2008 on Regional Government amended Law No. 32/2004 and allowed *independent* candidates to contest these elections.

The new law marked the hitherto last step in an overall trend toward greater competitiveness and inclusiveness in local elections. Gradually expanding the importance of the popular vote in selecting local leaders, the new electoral framework introduced a level of vertical accountability in subnational executive government that goes well beyond that offered by any previous system in Indonesia, including parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Due to significant improvements in the formal structures of vertical accountability at the local level, ordinary Indonesians are now, formally, more powerful than at any other time in history.

This has changed the focus of local state elites. In the words of Kallongi, deputy district head in South Sulawesi's Barru district in 2006: "The people have become to local government heads what sugar is for ants. They want to get as close to the sugar as possible."[34] To fully understand how dependent incumbents and aspiring local government heads have become on mass support since 1998, the following section provides a brief analysis of the selection mechanisms for government heads prior to 1998 and how they shaped the composition of elites in control of the local state.

3.3 The Selection of Government Heads 1949–1965

The colonial government ruled most of the Dutch East Indies indirectly, which created an indigenous bureaucratic elite, the *pamong praja*,[35] as mentioned in Chapter 1. The rules the government adopted after 1949 to select local government heads benefited the *pamong praja*. The national cabinet, in consultation with the president, appointed governors. The

[33] Law No. 32/2004, Article 56, Paragraph 2, Article 59, Paragraph 1; PP No. 6/2005.
[34] Kallongi, pers. comm., November 28, 2006. [35] Sutherland 1979.

MoHA appointed district heads. The *pamong praja* dominated the MoHA and therefore succeeded in slotting most of their desired candidates into district head posts. The short tenures of cabinet members and ministers during the turbulent period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s also translated into considerable power for the *pamong praja* to select governors.[36] Hence, the *pamong praja* continued to dominate the local state apparatus after Indonesia gained independence in 1949.

This dominance began to erode after the first legislative elections in 1955. To mobilize the electorate, parties relied on local power brokers who were influential in their communities. After the elections, these popular leaders dominated parliament and were "committed to restructuring and democratizing regional governance."[37] Already in December 1956, parliament adopted Law No. 1/1957 on Regional Government to dismantle the *pamong praja* bureaucratic corps.[38] The law required parties to devise candidate lists from which local parliaments had to elect a local government head. The Minister of Home Affairs and the president only *approved* the elected district chiefs and governors, respectively. The result was a broadening of interests represented in local government offices.[39]

Political parties lost influence to the military after Sukarno declared Guided Democracy in 1959. The military, which was concerned about strong political parties as much as the *pamong praja*,[40] persuaded Sukarno

[36] Magenda 1989, 899. [37] Malley 1999, 219.

[38] The PNI and the Masyumi party were the driving force behind this new law. At the time, these parties were able to unite a broad range of interests located at the margins of the political arena. Hence, they had an interest in changing the selection mechanisms for local government heads to break the dominance of the *pamong praja*. See Magenda 1989, 902.

[39] However, Anderson 1983, 483 also noted that

> . . . it was not only the parties that penetrated the *apparat*. During the Revolution and its immediate aftermath, many of the traditional collaborationist upper classes in the more backward parts of the Outer Island lost, or feared losing, much of their old power and wealth. Feeling vulnerable in the electoral arena, they were eager to protect their lineages' futures by sending their children into the burgeoning civil service academies. These young minority-aristocrat officials added an often energetically conservative and particularistic 'ethnic' dimension to the kaleidoscopic inner life of the state.

[40] Initially, there were close links between elements of the military and political parties. These links developed during the revolution and endured well into the post-independence era. See Malley 1999, 207. However, during the chaotic Sukarno administration during which parties were frequently used by Sukarno to oppose the military, the relationship between the military and political parties grew increasingly hostile. The military feared strong political parties, especially the PKI, which was deeply rooted in society, because it thought that they were an obstacle in the centralization of Indonesian state institutions. "Having achieved a prominent role in the inauguration of Guided Democracy in 1959, the Army was in the position to help the SSKDN [Association of Employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs] (and pamong praja corps) in facing the

to issue Presidential Decree No. 6/1959 on Regional Government.[41] The decree nullified Law No. 1/1957 and gave the national government the power to appoint local government heads. This was part of the military's strategy to establish a system to assign a strong governor with far-reaching competencies to each province. These "single leadership" (*pimpinan tunggal*) posts were to be staffed with members of the bureaucratic corps.[42]

3.4 The Selection of Government Heads 1965–1998

After 1965, Suharto further centralized the selection mechanisms for local government heads. Subnational government leaders were now considered proxies of the national government.[43] In this context, Suharto appointed governors, while governors appointed district heads. In 1974, these rules were codified in Law No. 5/1974 on Regional Government.[44] Now, every incumbent government head had to submit a resignation letter six months before his[45] tenure ended. Theoretically, local parliaments could draw a roster of candidates in the months following the resignation. In reality, the national government would suggest potential candidates already by this point.[46]

challenges from political parties," Magenda 1989, 908–9 noted. For a detailed account of the tensions between the civil servant corps and politicians after 1955, see Malley 1999, 215–29.

[41] Peraturan Presiden No. 6/ 1959 tentang Pemerintah Daerah. For an analysis of the decree, see Magenda 1989, 968, footnote 41.

[42] Magenda 1989, 968, footnote 40.

[43] There were a few exceptions to this rule. For instance, in Central Java's Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY, *Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*) the Sultan automatically became the governor. The New Order tried until the very end to bring such special autonomy regions under national government control. In fact, only a few months after the New Order regime had come to an end, in 1998, the debate whether DIY should retain its special selection mechanisms for the governor post resurfaced. See Kompas August 15, 1998, 8.

[44] Law No. 5/1974 on Regional Government replaced Law No. 22/1948 and Law No. 3/1950 that had previously served as the basis for the appointment of executive heads. The intention of Law No. 5/1974 was to delegate specific tasks to the district level while the national government retained its overall responsibilities. See Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007, 12.

[45] There was no female governor and only two female district heads during the New Order. See Malley 1999, 162, footnote 82.

[46] There were usually two kinds of candidates on these lists. There were "dropped candidates" (*calon dropping*) that were parachuted into local office by higher authorities, usually the MoHA or the army. "Escorting candidates" (*calon pendamping*) stood no chance of getting appointed but "served merely to flesh out the list-accompanying the predetermined winner partway down the path to success," Malley 1999, 165 noted. In many cases, only one candidate was presented to the local parliament. Almost all local parliaments were dominated by the regime party Golkar. See Malley 1999, 287.

Once a pool of candidates materialized, parties in the provincial parliament consulted with national headquarters (DPP, *Dewan Pimpinan Pusat*) for gubernatorial elections. Parties in district parliaments consulted with provincial party headquarters (DPD, *Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*). Each time, the goal was to whittle the field to five names. Usually by this stage, a prospective winner out of the five was tacitly acknowledged.

For gubernatorial elections, the list of five nominees went to the MoHA, which reduced the number to three. For district elections, the governor typically deleted two of the five names. Neither the Minister of Home Affairs nor the governor had to give a reason for rejecting particular names. The parliamentary leaders then took this list of three back to their chamber, which then "voted" for one of the remaining names. This script for elections assured that the intended losers also received some votes, which was important because Law No. 5/1974 invalidated elections for governors and district heads if one of the three candidates received all votes.

After the "elections," the names of the top two vote-getters were sent to the president in the case of gubernatorial elections and the Minister of Home Affairs in the case of district head elections. The higher level executive then selected one winner from the two contenders but not necessarily the one with the most votes.[47]

This overview of the mechanisms for local government elections between 1945 and 2013 suggests the selection procedures shaped the composition of governors and district heads. In the next section, I examine the backgrounds of figures occupying governor and district head posts.

3.5 The Composition of Local State Elites 1945–1998

The number of *pamong praja* in the local bureaucracy had already begun to decline in the early 1950s, but their presence diminished further when the aforementioned Law No. 1/1957 came into force.[48] Now, figures from a broader spectrum of society would occupy local state positions.

The background of governors and district heads again changed profoundly with the onset of the New Order. To consolidate his authority, Suharto replaced many of the locally rooted government heads who had come to power after elections in 1955 with military figures and bureaucrats affiliated with his regime.[49] The appointment of military brass to

[47] Malley 1999, 162.
[48] Subianto 1996, 70–1; Malley 1999, 217–9. The number of *Pamong Praja* in the local bureaucracy increased again briefly in 1959 when Sukarno established Guided Democracy. See Legge 1961, 220.
[49] Malley 1999, 165.

governor and district head posts was a deliberate strategy. Ichlasul Amal writes:

> In some cases assignment to civilian positions is a way of dispensing patronage to loyal officers, in other cases it serves to punish officers regarded as dissident or disloyal. But one major consequence of this streamlined system of appointing military officers to civilian posts has been to tighten government control and make it easier for the government to push through new policies.[50]

After 1969, the military's penetration of the bureaucracy was formalized through the re-organization of the Functional Service Board (*Dewan Kekaryaan*). This body was charged with inserting military personnel in senior civilian positions at all government levels. While the national board proposed military officers for provincial governors, its provincial board did so for district head posts. This task fell to the subregional military command (Korem, *Komando Resort Militer*) at the subdistrict and village levels and to district representatives of the Functional Service Board at the hamlet level.[51] As a result of this appointment scheme, military figures occupied the majority of governor and district head posts in most provinces.[52] In the words of Harold Crouch: "By 1969, the number of military *bupatis* and mayors had risen to 147 out of 271 throughout Indonesia. After the 1971 elections the proportion reached about two-thirds."[53]

Thus, the background of governors and district heads changed with the arrival of the New Order. Military figures and members of the civilian bureaucracy displaced local power brokers with strong roots in local society. This also meant that outsiders with no links to the province or the district were frequently appointed.[54]

The composition of elites occupying the state in West Java and South Sulawesi mirrors these nation-wide patterns. In West Java, the *menak* enjoyed the majority of district head posts during the colonial era, as mentioned before. However, after the Japanese surrender in 1945 the economy collapsed and a broad array of groups started to compete for state power immediately.[55] The *menak's* political decline had already begun in the interwar years, but by the beginning of the New Order, "the menak class lost its paramount position to a new group of state officials with mixed backgrounds in military, religious and intellectual affairs," Svensson notes.[56] As in other provinces, the local administration

[50] Amal 1992, 135. [51] Amal 1992, 135. [52] Malley 1999, 291.
[53] Crouch 1978, 244. [54] Sidel 1998, 160. [55] Smail 1964.
[56] Svensson 1990, 305. However, Svensson may underestimate the continuing importance of the local aristocracy among provincial politics. As Ken'ichi Goto wrote as late as 1971, 46: "The core of the Army Bandung group came ... from the Sundanese

underwent further militarization as officers soon dominated the local state apparatus.[57] After independence the Army Bandung Group became a key player in West Java politics. Between 1965 and 1968, the number of non-military government heads in West Java fell from 65 percent (15/23) to 13 percent (3/23).[58]

Military men also came to dominate the local state apparatus in South Sulawesi. There, as in other areas where local elites had piloted a more confrontational course toward the national government before 1965, Suharto appointed local aristocrats, warlords and military strongmen as governors and district heads to neutralize such potentially rebellious figures and weave them into the wider power structure of the regime.[59] Hence, military figures, many with an aristocratic background, controlled the state apparatus across South Sulawesi. As in West Java, most of these officers were elites rooted in the existing bureaucracy.

In short, the overwhelming bulk of the local state apparatus in West Java and South Sulawesi came to be staffed by military personnel and bureaucrats who had a nationalist worldview and ties to secular parties, mostly Golkar.[60] Society in general and political Islam in particular remained largely excluded from the state in both provinces after Suharto seized power.

Again, this pattern holds true for the rest of the country. As Michael Malley has shown: "The New Order's first task was to choose regional elites on whom it could rely. In the late 1960s local Muslim leaders ... were well disposed to cooperate with the new regime because it shared their opposition to communism. In parts of the country where Islam was relatively strong, such figures and their supporters quickly found positions in regional government. In political terms, however, this welcome was only superficially warm. Its historic association with regional strife and the struggle for an Islamic state made political Islam suspect in the

aristocracy. Thus up to the present, the Siliwangi Division of West Java has been a stronghold of Sundanese military notables."

[57] Arguably, the growing militarization of West Java' s administration from the early 1960s onward was also related to the precarious security situation in the province due to the Darul Islam revolt. Approximately 1,500 people were killed annually in West Java up until 1961 as a consequence of the unstable political situation. See Svensson 1990, 306.

[58] Crouch 1978, 244.

[59] On the islands of Java and Madura, for example, many Javanese aristocrats of lower rungs (*priyayi*) were assigned to local government head positions in the 1960s and 1970s. See Sidel 1998, 167; Malley 1999, 216, footnote 109. Similar was true for Outer Islands, where local aristocrats were co-opted into the New Order structures by being appointed to governor or district head positions. See Magenda 1989, 609; Amal 1992, 162–84.

[60] Sidel 2006, 83.

eyes of the new authorities in Jakarta. Many of the Muslim leaders whom the New Order first favored were soon shunted aside."[61]

3.6 New Order Elite Continuity after 1998

Despite the introduction of elections, the state in West Java and South Sulawesi stayed relatively insulated from society, as shown in the *curricula vitae* of candidates running in gubernatorial or district head elections between 1998 and 2013. I identified 1,128 candidates competing in the elections in these two provinces between 2005 and 2013 and managed to collect 907 CVs, as mentioned in Chapter 1.[62]

The challenge of sorting information from these CVs was to create categories that were broad enough to capture diversity in the candidate pool but specific enough to allow patterns to emerge. I cataloged CVs by identifying the following: the year a candidate had started his career, his profession and the duration for which he had held a specific position. Then I factored in the profession a candidate had occupied for the longest period of time. Most candidates listed their career trajectory for at least 20 years.

I labeled the members of the state apparatus "bureaucrats." This includes career civil servants (PNS, *Pegawai Negeri Sipil*), public school teachers, subdistrict heads (*camat* and *lurah*) and village heads (*kepala desa*).[63] Theoretically, military and police personnel are also "bureaucrats" as members of the state administration, but they dominated the local state during the New Order. Therefore, to gain an understanding of the post-1998 political presence of these figures, I placed them in a separate category.[64]

[61] Malley 1999, 156.

[62] There are no official CVs available for candidates who were competing in local government head elections between 1998 and 2005 since these elections were held behind closed doors of local parliaments. I collected hundreds of biographies of these candidates from local newspaper archives but eventually decided not to include them in the analysis in this chapter due to the unofficial nature of these data. However, the patterns regarding the candidates' backgrounds are largely the same as for the 2005–2013 period.

[63] A *camat* oversees rural subdistricts (*kecamatan*) while a *lurah* oversees municipal subdistricts (*kelurahan*).

[64] Law No. 32/2004 Article 59, Paragraph 5, Section 9 stipulated that military and police personnel were allowed to run as candidates but were not allowed to vote. Also in 2004, Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces was adopted, which stated that members of the Indonesian army were prohibited from joining political parties, being active in politics (*kegiatan politik praktis*) and being involved in business activities. Furthermore, military members were not allowed to vote in legislative and executive elections. They were allowed to run for public offices only if they stepped down from their military duties and would campaign as civilians in such elections. If military candidates were elected as district heads, they would automatically be retired from their military functions. If they lost the election, they could return to the military, although the military could not guarantee them to retain the same position. The same conditions applied to members of the police force that wanted to participate in district head elections. Law No.

University administrators, professors and lecturers I classified as "academics." Even if many of these candidates work at state universities and are therefore bureaucrats, I felt they constitute a specific group within the bureaucracy because their promotion patterns, networks and rent-seeking opportunities differ from those of other bureaucratic posts. They also represent a local intelligentsia, whose potential role in local politics after 1998 merits specific attention.[65]

Candidates who had been local parliamentarians or occupied functions in political parties, I labeled "politicians." Members of Islamist parties fall into this category. Candidates who spent most of their career as businessmen or salaried employees, I tagged as "private sector." Finally, I created a "society" category for candidates representing figures from broader society such as journalists, labor unionists and members of non-governmental organizations. Members of Islamist groups fit in this category too. There were so few figures in this last category that it did not warrant subgroups.

If a candidate changed careers throughout his life, I grouped him by the job he held for most of his career. For instance, a candidate who entered the bureaucracy in 1980 but became a legislator in 2004, I still label as a "bureaucrat." If candidates reported just their current work, I categorized them based on this information alone. It was sometimes impossible to know the time a candidate spent in one career or another, so I created hybrid categories. For instance, candidates who were simultaneously active in politics and the private sector, I tagged as "politicians/ private sector."[66] Finally, I classified incumbents according to their occupation before becoming local government head.

34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces was in conflict with many passages in Law No. 32/2004. Most important, Law No. 32/2004 only stated that military personnel participating in district head elections would have to step down from their positions (*jabatan*). They remained soldiers of the Indonesian army (*prajurit aktif*). As a consequence of this contradiction, the military leadership was bombarded with questions from military personnel with political ambitions, whether Law No. 34/2004 or Law No. 32/2004 would be applicable to them. Eventually, on August 22, 2006, the Defense Ministry issued a decree (SK, *Surat Keputusan*), stating that members of the Indonesian military were not only to step down from their military positions prior to elections as required by Law No. 32/2004 but to leave the armed forces entirely if they were to run in elections. See Kompas November 25, 2006, 4. The discussion whether the right to vote should be returned to military staff continued at the time of writing. See Media Indonesia September 22, 2006, 7.

[65] See Anderson 1990 on the importance of local intelligentsias shaping subnational politics in Thailand.

[66] For instance, many local parliamentarians also own construction companies. See, Aspinall and van Klinken 2011. Of course, most Indonesian bureaucrats are also involved in legal and illegal businesses. Since these activities are not listed on the official forms I collected, and since being involved in corruption, rent-seeking and legal businesses do not change the fact that they are first and foremost bureaucrats, I did not create a category "bureaucrat/ private sector."

An analysis of the CVs of all 907 candidates, who competed in local government head elections in West Java and South Sulawesi from 2005 to 2013, shows that 44 percent (406/907) were bureaucrats. Furthermore, 25 percent (227/907) had a private-sector background, 13 percent (114/907) were politicians and 6 percent (51/907) had worked in the private sector and politics. Military and police personnel made up 5 percent (45/907) and academics 4 percent (38/907). Candidates from "society," such as journalists, members of civil society groups or ordinary citizens, constituted the smallest class, just 3 percent (26/907) of candidates.

Looking at West Java and South Sulawesi separately, bureaucrats constituted by far the largest group of candidates in each province too. Of all candidates in West Java and South Sulawesi, 37 percent (183/499) and 55 percent (223/408), respectively, were bureaucrats. Candidates from the private sector were, again, the second-largest group, with 29 percent (147/499) in West Java and 20 percent (80/408) in South Sulawesi. Those with a background in politics made up 15 percent (73/499) and 10 percent (41/408) in West Java and South Sulawesi, respectively. The share of candidates with a background in both the private sector and politics was modest, standing at 6 percent (28/499) in West Java and 5.6 percent (23/408) in South Sulawesi.[67] Military and police personnel constituted 5 percent (26/499) in West Java and 4.65 percent (19/408) in South Sulawesi, while academics comprised 4 percent (20/499) and 4.4 percent (18/408) in West Java and South Sulawesi, respectively. Finally, candidates from within "society" had the smallest grouping, with 4.4 percent (22/499) in West Java and 1 percent (4/408) in South Sulawesi.

Concentrating just on the backgrounds of *winners* unearths even more pronounced patterns. Nearly half, or 48 percent (95/196), of candidates winning local government head elections in West Java and South Sulawesi between 2005 and 2013 were bureaucrats. The second-largest group of victors with 19 percent (38/196) was the private sector. Of all winners, 14 percent (28/196) had a career in politics, while 6 percent (12/196) combined politics and the private sector. Meanwhile, 5 percent (9/196) were academics and 4 percent (8/196) had a career in the military or the police. Finally, only 3 percent (6/196) hailed from "society."

The patterns remain similar if the numbers are disaggregated by province. Bureaucrats amounted to 40 percent (46/116) and 61 percent (49/80) of winners in the direct elections of local government heads in

[67] Of course, this is not to suggest that the linkages between politics and the private sector are weak in Indonesian politics. It simply shows that the role of local entrepreneurs in politics was relatively weak before 1998. This category of candidates is likely to increase in the future as businessmen, now classified under "private sector," accumulate years spent in politics.

West Java and South Sulawesi, respectively. Private-sector candidates came next, with 21 percent (24/116) and 18 percent (14/80) in West Java and South Sulawesi. Politicians made up the third-largest group, at 17 percent (20/116) in West Java and 10 percent (8/80) in South Sulawesi. Candidates straddling politics and the private sector were a distant fourth in both provinces at 5 percent (6/116) and 7.5 percent (6/80), respectively. Academics constituted 7 percent (8/116) of winners in West Java and 1 percent (1/80) in South Sulawesi. Only 6 percent (7/116) in West Java and 1 percent (1/80) in South Sulawesi had military or police backgrounds. Last, 4 percent (5/116) of winners in West Java and 1 percent (1/80) in South Sulawesi hailed from "society," the smallest category, as shown in Table 3.1.[68]

Overall, figures who had affiliations with the state, including academics, bureaucrats, military officials and police personnel, constituted by far the largest group among both *candidates* and *winners* in direct elections for the two provinces' local government heads. The majority were bureaucrats who entered the state apparatus during the New Order and worked as civil servants for years if not decades. Since bureaucrats were automatically Golkar party members during the New Order, most who became candidates had strong links to this secular party.

The data also show that candidates from the private sector are increasingly making inroads into local government head offices. This is more pronounced in West Java, the economic powerhouse of Indonesia, than in South Sulawesi, where the state looms larger in the local economy and entrepreneurs are therefore less prevalent. However, the growing participation of private-sector figures in these local races needs to be qualified. Only a few candidates with a private-sector background have actually won elections. More important, many of these "entrepreneurs" are the offspring of New Order military families, so-called *anak jendral* (the children of army generals). A growing number of private-sector candidates are linked to former incumbents – who themselves often hailed from within the bureaucracy and accumulated wealth during the Suharto dictatorship – which indicates the emergence of local dynasties.[69] Many business figures

[68] The forms candidates submit to the local election commissions do not include information that would allow an estimate on the percentage of winners that hail from the traditional aristocracy of West Java and South Sulawesi. As mentioned before, the *menak* have lost much influence in West Java since the 1920s. However, the names of some of the candidates suggest that they are linked to the local aristocracy. This is even more pronounced in South Sulawesi. There, many aristocrats regularly compete and win in these elections as honorific titles on candidates' CVs show. Of course, there is also no way to confirm the legitimacy of candidates' claims to have an aristocratic background. I therefore did not include this information in Table 3.1.

[69] Buehler 2013.

Table 3.1 *Background of candidates competing in local government head elections between 2005 and 2013, by province*

		West Java						South Sulawesi						
		G	DG	DH	DDH	M	DM	G	DG	DH	DDH	M	DM	
Academic	**W**	1	0	1	2	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	**9**
	L	0	0	4	2	3	3	0	0	4	8	1	4	**29**
Bureaucrat	**W**	0	1	10	12	12	11	2	0	23	20	2	2	**95**
	L	2	4	50	38	24	19	0	2	85	73	9	5	**311**
Military/Police	**W**	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	**8**
	L	2	1	8	5	3	0	1	0	9	6	1	1	**37**
Politician	**W**	0	0	9	7	1	3	0	2	0	6	0	0	**28**
	L	3	2	12	20	5	11	1	0	7	17	3	5	**86**
Politician/Private sector	**W**	0	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	5	1	0	0	**12**
	L	1	1	5	8	5	2	0	0	6	9	2	0	**39**
Private sector	**W**	2	0	11	4	5	2	0	0	6	3	4	1	**38**
	L	3	1	30	38	22	29	2	1	26	19	7	11	**189**
Society	**W**	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**6**
	L	1	3	3	5	1	4	0	1	0	2	0	0	**20**
Total		**15**	**15**	**149**	**144**	**88**	**88**	**6**	**6**	**173**	**165**	**29**	**29**	**907**

G: Governor
DG: Deputy Governor
DH: District Head
DDH: Deputy District Head
M: Mayor
DM: Deputy Mayor
W: Winner
L: Loser

acquired wealth through close connection to the state, such as owners of construction companies that depend on government contracts or were suppliers to the armed forces during the New Order. In other words, it is the proximity to the state that facilitates the business ventures of most private-sector candidates. Arguably, candidates from the "private sector" therefore do not constitute an independent business class.

Representatives from "society" are almost completely absent from local government head elections. A few academics, many of them state employees in theory, compete in these races and occasionally win. Most other figures jostling for power from within "society" work in the entertainment industry, including comedians, soap opera stars, singers and television presenters. Some managed to enter local governments, most often as deputy government heads.[70] Almost no labor activists, Islamists and NGO workers figure in the candidate pool.

In short, despite the introduction of elections that formally strengthened vertical accountability, Indonesian local politics remained elitist after 1998 due to strong socio-economic countercurrents and institutional hurdles privileging some groups over others. While new electoral regulations carved out opportunities for popular participation in local politics, elites who rose to power during the New Order managed to throw up barriers to entry and restrict participation. Some sections of the election and regional government laws exclude large parts of the population. Both the 2004 and 2008 laws on regional government, for example, stipulate that candidates must have a senior high school degree to stand in local government head elections.[71] In many Indonesian localities, this shuts out the majority of citizens. In West Java's Lebak district, 49.1 percent of people did not even have a primary school degree when direct elections arrived in 2005.[72] In South Sulawesi, 35 percent of the population lacked a primary school education in 2004, and 90 percent had not finished high school.[73]

Other regulations also work in favor of "old elites." The requirement to be nominated by a party or a coalition of parties introduced significant costs for candidates, as mentioned above. All candidates, independent or backed by a party, have to finance their own campaign expenses, including advertisements, surveys, staff and witnesses at the polling stations.[74] Based on personal communications with numerous candidates, a conservative

[70] Due to their face recognition, celebrities have a certain value in Indonesian politics with regard to creating publicity for a pair of candidates and mobilizing large crowds. They reduce campaign expenses, in other words, and candidates therefore often choose celebrities as running mates.

[71] Law No. 32/2004, Article 58c; Law No. 12/2008, Article 58c. [72] Hadi 2004, 1.

[73] BPS Sulawesi Selatan 2004, 38–9. [74] Mietzner 2007.

estimate of the costs a district head candidate incurs in West Java and South Sulawesi ranges from US$500,000 to US$700,000. This multiplies for gubernatorial elections. Furthermore, campaigns cost much more in resource-rich districts where the return on investment after a successful election is likely to be higher.[75]

Most party leaders, but even more so ordinary citizens, cannot raise such prohibitively high sums to launch a serious electoral campaign. Candidates *without* the nomination of a party or coalition of parties also have to post an election bond and collect signatures from 3 to 6.5 percent of the residents in a locality. This requires building out large logistical networks, the mobilization of which entails substantial costs.[76] As another institutional hurdle, an independent candidate pays a fine of IDR 20 billion (US$2 million) if he rescinds his bid after the regional elections commission approves it.[77] Candidates nominated by parties bear no such penalties. Given these administrative obstacles and their high price tags, very few independent candidates have actually run in subnational executive head elections since new regulations were adopted in 2008. To reiterate, although the criteria for subnational government head elections were cast in terms of popular participation, a combination of nomination thresholds and Indonesia's social realities has created a situation in which most figures situated in "society" are unable to run for office. Most important, members of Islamist parties and Islamist groups outside formal politics are almost entirely absent among both candidates and winners of local government head elections. This means the Islam–secular cleavage lingering in Indonesian politics since 1945 has *not* been drawn into the state in the context of democratization after 1998.

3.7 Conclusion

Dynamics within the state are crucial to understand the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after the demise of President Suharto. Hence, this chapter examined the most important institutional changes after 1998. These were the decentralization of political and fiscal authority, the introduction of free elections and the overhaul of the party system. Concretely, various reform initiatives shifted considerable political and fiscal authority to the subnational level. At the same time, institutional changes tipped checks and balances within administrative layers in favor

[75] Anecdotal evidence from East Kalimantan, for example, shows that candidates there face minimum costs of about US$700,000. See Pare Pos June 11, 2005. A 2005 sampling of Indonesia's district and municipal races found that the campaign expenses for winning candidates averaged US$1.6 million. See Rinakit 2005.

[76] Buehler 2013. [77] Law No. 12/2008, Article 62.

of local executive governments. Finally, legislation allowed new parties to form while elections for the newly empowered parliaments and government head posts were introduced, creating additional channels for popular participation.

The aforementioned institutional changes have empowered local government chiefs at the expense of local parliaments. Most important for the argument of this book, parliaments have the right to compose regulations with governors and district heads, but their capacity to do so is weak. Therefore, institutional changes after 1998 turned local government heads into one of the most powerful actors in local politics. It is these figures who define local policymaking.

The selection mechanisms for these powerful local heads have also changed dramatically. The New Order administration appointed local government heads until 1998, when local parliaments took on this task. In 2005 the responsibility shifted again, and Indonesians have directly elected their local executives ever since. Using the Sukarno and Suharto years as a reference point, I showed that societal forces failed to penetrate the local state after 1998. An examination of the candidates participating in these elections showed the overwhelming number of both *participants* and *winners* are bureaucrats or businessmen who owe their wealth to New Order patronage. Most of these bureaucrats-cum-politicians also have close affiliations with secular parties, mainly Golkar. Due to their distinct backgrounds, I call these figures state elites.

The make-up of state elites demonstrates that local cleavages within broader society, particularly between secularism and Islamism, are not expressed in local elections. That is, the state remains insulated from society despite the formal democratization of politics after 1998. Most important for my argument, figures from Islamist groups remain firmly outside the state apparatus.

The next chapter dissects how the post-1998 institutional changes described in this chapter have made relations among state elites more competitive. The chapter then argues that, to gain power, state elites now depend on mass support to a degree not seen in Indonesian politics since 1945. The focus of state elites has therefore shifted downward and outward in the political arena. The challenges that state elites negotiate in establishing linkages to the masses are the subject of the second part of the chapter.

4 The Accumulation of Power in Local Politics after 1998

4.1 Introduction

Institutional reforms after 1998 changed the logics of accumulating and exercising power in Indonesian politics. Competition among bureaucratic elites has become real and intense. Most important, elites now depend much more on mass support to gain and sustain power than during the New Order. They must contend with an electorate who has been empowered by both the institutional reforms outlined in Chapter 3 and the socio-economic developments of recent decades. This relative "economic autonomy"[1] of citizens forces local elites to structure and work the electorate through power brokers and vote-getters, as just one challenge fostered by this new reliance on an independent electorate.

4.2 Competition among State Elites

The institutional changes examined in Chapter 3 may have been unable to stymie the dominance of state elites rooted in the New Order. However, the collapse of the centralized New Order command structures as a result of fiscal and political decentralization after 1998, the introduction of elections for local government heads and the implosion of hierarchical party machines altered power dynamics among elites considerably. Most important, these created true competition between candidates and made the outcome of elections unpredictable.[2]

To show the increased competition in local government head elections, I calculated the number of "effective candidates" for all races in West Java and South Sulawesi since 1998, using data I collected from newspapers

[1] McMann 2006, 28–43.

[2] Immediately after these elections were introduced, local entrepreneurs took advantage of this new unpredictability. For instance, in West Java's Indramayu district, an illegal betting scheme emerged prior to the district head elections in 2000. Locals placed bets in Indonesian rupiah equivalent to between US$100 and US$100,000 and even luxury cars on the competing candidates' predicted electoral performance. See Kompas December 3, 2000, 23.

and visits to local election commissions.[3] I measured the effectiveness of candidates based on their electoral weight and the breakdown of votes in each election. If there are fewer than two effective candidates, the election is uncontested since most votes concentrated around just one candidate.

These data showed that most local government head elections in West Java and South Sulawesi between 1998 and 2013 were contested. In only 18 percent (27/151) of races were there fewer than two viable candidates. Concretely, 15 of 74 races were uncontested in West Java, 4 of 20 races were uncontested in Banten, and 8 of 57 races were uncontested in South Sulawesi, as shown in Appendix 2. In most elections, there were at least two candidates of relatively equal strength, signified by the votes they obtained.

Overall, while rivalries for local government head posts occur between individuals with largely similar career backgrounds and socio-economic standing, competition nevertheless has become real and intense among these state elites compared to the New Order years. The institutional changes after 1998 may not have compromised the *composition* of elites fighting for important posts within the local state, but they have certainly changed the *cohesion* among these figures.

The following section parses the old dynamics of gaining and maintaining local power during the New Order. This will provide a backdrop against which to juxtapose the new logics of power accumulation in local politics after 1998 in the final part of the chapter.

4.3 Accumulating Power during the New Order Era

Except for gap in the mid-1950s, selection mechanisms for local government heads used to concentrate power in the national government, as shown in Chapter 3. This was particularly true in the New Order, when highly centralized bureaucratic structures defined the appointment process of local government heads. The approval of individuals or groups higher up in the state administration was crucial for candidates to gain and maintain power in local politics. Consequently, candidates were oriented toward bureaucratic superiors, rather than local constituencies.

This manifested in distinct patterns of political corruption during local government head "elections." Cash payments and favor swaps were endemic. Interest groups and social organizations, "often at the instigation of potential candidates,"[4] wooed local parliamentarians, usually in

[3] I recast Laakso and Taagepara's "effective number of parties" as the "effective number of candidates." See Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 3–27.
[4] Malley 1999, 162.

the interlude after an incumbent delivered his resignation letter and before local parliaments submitted their five candidates to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Also, the channels for lobbying and bribing were narrow. The Golkar party was the backbone of the New Order regime and therefore controlled the majority in most local parliaments. Consequently, a lot of the lobbying took place within Golkar itself.[5]

To recap, the networks that ambitious politicians needed to master in the Suharto era included a limited number of individuals. Bribing, lobbying and influence peddling occurred within a confined space dictated by the centralized power structures of the New Order. Strong personal linkages to the local population were irrelevant to advance one's career in the authoritarian and unified government apparatus, compared to good relations with power holders at higher levels in the bureaucracy. "Society" was not of immediate concern.

This logic in the accumulation and exercise of power, however, vanished with the Suharto regime in 1998. National bureaucrats in contemporary Indonesia have metamorphosed, from decisive factors in local elections, to mere facilitators for candidates who derive power from being rooted in their respective localities. Often, higher-level bureaucrats contribute financial support for local contests. Overall, however, national figures no longer actively shape district electoral outcomes. In other words, Indonesia's new mass democracy, political competition and logics of power accumulation forced state elites to swing their focus downward in the political arena after 1998. Indonesian state elites are now depending on popular support to gain and preserve power.

4.4 State–Society Relations in West Java and South Sulawesi

Due to the political opening after the demise of Suharto, the support of "society" has become imperative for winning local elections. In this context, it is necessary to understand the relations between state elites and the electorate in West Java and South Sulawesi.

In developing countries, landownership configurations are one of the most important factors linking elites and the masses since "[s]o many reward, sanctions, and symbols that underlay social control ... [stem] directly from questions of access to and use of land."[6] Agriculture remained a major economic sector in both West Java and South Sulawesi at the time of writing[7] so it is important to briefly examine landownership patterns in the two provinces.

[5] Malley 1999, 162. [6] Migdal 1988, 57. [7] BPS 2013a, 2013b.

The Dutch relied on the local aristocracy, *the menak*, to rule most of West Java until the early twentieth century, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The aristocracy's grip on the local population peaked in the late nineteenth century when the Dutch replaced the swidden cultivation system, which had been in place for centuries and given ordinary Indonesians basic mobility and freedom, with wet rice field agriculture, called *sawah*. The two forms of landholding that followed were either attached to offices in the local administration (*sawah carika*) or alienable freeholds that still allowed the aristocracy to claim produce and/or labor (*sawah yasa*). Consequently, the *menak* who owned most of the land in West Java at the time exerted great influence over the local population.

In the context of administrative reforms in 1870 mentioned before, however, the Dutch liberalized landownership by abolishing holdings tied to government posts. This compelled local aristocrats to sell parts of their land. Initially, most *menak* simply underreported their landholdings to protect their assets.[8] "But as the years passed, the *menak* class lost its landed power and the economic initiative to new [pribumi] landholders who were more efficient at utilizing the market. A new type of capitalists began to dominate the rural economic scene who did not base their position on the powers of state offices ... but on private entrepreneurship ... [T]he possibilities of using *official* authority to control people for private purposes had certainly been reduced," according to Svensson.[9]

Yet land reform programs, never really successful anywhere in Indonesia, were particularly slow in West Java[10] and eventually failed entirely.[11] Consequently, land concentration remains considerable in West Java until present.[12] Landholding statistics are rather unreliable in Indonesia,[13] but conservative estimates assume two-thirds of households on the Bandung plateau were landless by the beginning of the twentieth century.[14] Land concentration in the hands of a small

[8] This was also a favored strategy of the aristocracy in South Sulawesi, on which more details are given below.

[9] Svensson 1990, 292 and 295. Emphasis added.

[10] Gotō 1971, 16.

[11] Pincus 1996.

[12] Land concentration in West Java also continues to be higher than in other parts of the archipelago. See Wiradi 1978, 81; Pincus 1996, 161; Jamal and Dewie 2009, 23; Rachman 2011.

[13] The understanding of land "ownership" in West Java and South Sulawesi – land inherited to family members is often still "owned" by the initial landlord – is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to quantify landholdings in the two provinces. See Pincus 1996, 34 and Pelras 2000, 393–432 for West Java and South Sulawesi, respectively.

[14] Svensson 1987, 31. Land concentration in West Java was much higher than in the rest of Java, where at the turn of the century around 9 percent of the landowners owned

number of owners was (and is) especially drastic in the Priangan region of West Java and adjacent areas.[15] While land consolidation in West Java continued after 1870,[16] it became a pursuit not of *menak* but of rural entrepreneurs and traders with a strong Islamist worldview and without links to the aristocracy or the state, as introduced in Chapter 2.

The growing landlessness among the population of West Java created new levers of social control. Many landowners started to mortgage (*gadai*) their rice fields to poor peasants, and landless farmers and sharecroppers accessed land through fixed rent contracts (*sewa*). Today, sharecropping arrangements dominate in West Java, mainly because landless farmers lack access to credit and struggle to pay fixed rents or mortgages upfront.[17]

There are different kinds of sharecropping deals in West Java. Usually, landowners and tenants split the harvest 50–50, under the *maro*-sharecropping system practiced across Indonesia. In West Java, however, this system declined when Suharto came to power. "[A] possible explanation of why maro was reportedly declining is that the landowner, feeling somewhat less constrained than before 1965, persisted in practicing, or began to re-impose the old system of sharecropping with only one-fifth of the product given to the sharecropper."[18] On the other hand, sharecropping contracts in West Java tend to be unusually short, lasting only one year. This increases the mobility of landless peasants and, theoretically, makes it more difficult for landowners to command this population.[19]

Overall, landholders were increasingly situated outside the state so that by the time Suharto grabbed power, elites dominating the state had lost direct control over vast stretches of West Java. While land tenure

one-third of all land while 30 percent of the population was completely landless. See Husken and White 1989.

[15] Gotō 1971, 6.

[16] Svensson 1990, 310. It is difficult to obtain reliable data on the prevalence of such rural credit schemes since moneylending is theoretically illegal for Muslims. See Pincus 1996, 169.

[17] Jamal and Dewie 2009, 30. However, there are also traditional rural credit schemes in West Java that remain popular until today. The most common is called *Ijon*. Drawing its name from the Javanese word "green" (*ijo*), a money lender purchases a farmer's rice *before* harvest, that is when the rice is still green, at a very low price. Since the farmer has only his crop as collateral, the *Ijon*-system has strengthened clientelistic relations across the province. See Wiradi 1978, 30.

[18] Wiradi 1978, 84. See also Pincus 1996, 7.

[19] However, the length of sharecropping contracts varies within West Java. In certain parts of the province, sharecropping contracts last five years or more. See Jamal and Dewie 2009, 26.

arrangements and other rural institutions created and reinforced a variety of dependencies in West Java, these dependencies primarily existed between the masses and landowners *situated in society*. Similar to the Dutch colonial government, Suharto tried to turn the local landholding classes into clients of his New Order regime.[20] However, these direct relations between the state and large landholders were never very sturdy and went out the window together with the New Order regime in 1998.

In addition, the importance of agriculture as a job sector shrunk in recent decades as landless peasants sought work in urban centers and industrializing rural areas. West Java's textile industry in particular grew rapidly toward the end of the nineteenth century.[21] The recent industrialization of the province triggered "a strong process of proletarization and increased bifurcation in rural society."[22] Once again, state elites were not at the receiving end of these new dependencies. Initially, indigenous entrepreneurs successfully expanded into West Java's off-farm sector in droves.[23] However, already by the 1950s, Chinese-Indonesians captured the local textile industry. This trend accelerated with the advent of powerlooms, which required considerable capital investment. In the Majalaya area on the Bandung plateau, for instance, "[f]igures show that in 1975 the Chinese owned 64 percent of the looms . . ., rented another 20 percent, and controlled an additional 5 percent through putting-out arrangements. Only 11 percent of the looms were owned or controlled by Sundanese businessmen."[24]

At the time of writing, many workers depended entirely on manufacturing in West Java and many farmers switched between agricultural and urban jobs. However, the industrial sector of West Java and its laborers were, again, not directly under the control of local state elites.

The electorate is also fairly independent from state elites in South Sulawesi. A close-knit aristocracy has long controlled politics there, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Mythical conceptions of the hierarchical order of society, control over syncretist forms of Islam and intermarriage among the noble families of South Sulawesi strengthened the position of the aristocracy *vis-à-vis* commoners, but it was primarily economics that enabled this dominance. For centuries, the main source of aristocratic political power was an appanage system of landownership that became increasingly exploitative after the Kingdom of Bone, a land-based court without much stake in sea trade, rose to power in 1667.[25]

[20] Svensson 1990, 310. [21] Svensson 1990, 303–4 [22] Svensson 1990, 295.
[23] Svensson 1990, 301. [24] Svensson 1990, 309.
[25] Magenda 1989, 548–55; Pelras, 2000, 38.

The colonial government posed no political threat to this landed aristocracy because, much like in West Java, the Dutch ruled most of Eastern Indonesia indirectly.[26] It was only with the introduction of a modern bureaucracy at the beginning of the twentieth century that colonial rule had a presence across South Sulawesi.[27]

In the following decades, the aristocracy's income from landholdings was successively reduced and with it the direct dependence of ordinary people.[28] Already in the 1920s, the accountability reports that outgoing Dutch officials submitted to the colonial government, the *memories van overgave*, stressed that the local aristocracy had few large landholdings left and that few peasants in South Sulawesi were actually landless.[29] In short, "[w]ith the abolition of the former system of government, the continuous exchange of wealth and services, from the aristocracy downward and from commoner upward, was reduced to a negligible level."[30]

Like in West Java, the economic dismantling of the landed class worked to the advantage of a commercial class of rich peasants and rice traders.[31]

[26] The colonial government failed to make money in Outer Island Indonesia until rather late in the twentieth century. It was therefore economically unviable to establish a bureaucracy and bring these islands under direct political control. See Magenda 1989, 888, footnote 4.

[27] Amal 1992, 13.

[28] As in West Java, the meaning of "landownership" in South Sulawesi is different from Western contexts. Therefore, Pelras 1981, 36–9 cautioned that

> the South Sulawesi nobility was not to be compared, for instance, to the Western aristocracy of former times, who were generally the owners of vast agricultural lands, in contrast to a generally landless people, who had to work the lands of these lords, often in servile status. . . . Indeed, the local concept of property is not exactly the same as the legal, Western-inspired one, which is based on individual property, confirmed by title deeds. In contrast, local people still talk about a few aristocrats, "owning" up to 300 hectares of land. In fact, all that land is registered under the names of a large number of legal landowners who are their kin; this "owning" (*punna*) should be better translated by "controlling" (which was probably often the case in former times as well).

Still, Pelras does not dispute the overall economic decline of the initially land-based aristocracy.

[29] Pelras 2000, 36.

[30] Pelras 1981, 38.

[31] As is the case for West Java, one needs to be careful about thinking of South Sulawesi society in the kind of class terms that have been used to analyze Western societies. However, the similarities between rural South Sulawesi in the years prior to the Darul Islam rebellion and rural France prior to its revolution are striking. What the Baramulli, the Kalla or the Mangabarani were to the local aristocrats of South Sulawesi province in the first few decades of the twentieth century, namely representatives of a class of landowners and traders of common descent that climbed up the social ladder at the cost of a rural aristocracy, the Camus, Laurencin, Varey and Vinois, rising patrician families of the sixteenth century, enriched by trading with cloth and spices, mining and banking, were to the French aristocracy in rural areas around Beaujolais, the Dauphine, Forez and Lyon. In both cases, these businessmen, rich peasants and traders caused *Statusangst* and humiliation among the local aristocrats by ferociously accumulating land and property previously owned by a local aristocracy now in economic decline. It is

Over time, many of these commoners replaced local aristocrats as agricultural patrons (*punggawa allaonrumang*), "either by renting out part of their lands or by having their dependents and followers work in their fields when summoned."[32] However, the aristocracy's economic decline also benefited poor commoners because it led to the repeal of various taxes local courts had imposed on peasants.[33] Overall, land as a source of political power for *elites occupying the state* became less and less important in South Sulawesi.

The outbreak of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s mentioned in Chapter 2 accelerated and exacerbated the economic decline of the local aristocracy. From the very start, the rural revolt adopted a decisively anti-aristocratic tone.[34] This incited an exodus of aristocrats to the cities of South Sulawesi,[35] which isolated them from their landholdings and trading points.[36] Without access to these assets, nobles had to deplete funds accumulated before the rebellion to sustain followers who had migrated with them. Consequently, a great part of the local aristocracy, already in economic distress, lost substantial parts of their wealth during that period.

After the revolt ceased in 1965, aristocrats realized that "[t]he establishment of security was . . . of no assistance to them, since the traditional

also interesting how similar marriage patterns are during the decades of economic turmoil in these geographically and historically distinct cases. In France prior to the revolution, commoners who had acquired massive economic wealth were suddenly able to marry women of noble descent, a trend probably best exemplified by the commoner Claude Laurencin, "son of a draper and grandson of an innkeeper," whose wealth allowed him to marry into the highest aristocratic circles of France. See Bloch 1966, 124. In South Sulawesi, the aristocracy used marriage networks to maintain power vis-à-vis commoners. Intermarriage was also used to soften disputes between courts and to preserve the aristocracy. Hence, "[w]hile intermarriage among the aristocracy of buginese, makassarese, and mandarese was quite common a phenomenon, it was difficult for commoners to marry noble women," according to Magenda 1989, 549. This changed during the twentieth century. "[I]n the period of the late 1950s and afterward, some commoners with substantial achievements could marry noble women if they could pay the increasingly expensive bride price," says Magenda 1989, 549. Harvey 1974, 34 makes a similar point.

[32] Pelras 1981, 37. [33] Magenda 1989, 558.

[34] The leader of the rebellion, Kahar Muzakkar, had a long record of anti-aristocratic agitation. In his youth, as a member of the Muhammadiyah Boy Scouts (*Hizbul Wathan*), he delivered several public speeches in which he criticized the local aristocracy. Consequently, he was condemned to exile in Java by the *hadat*, a customary law council created by the Dutch and staffed by local aristocrats, in his native Luwu district. See Hamdan 2006, 29.

[35] For most of the time during the rebellion, the few cities in South Sulawesi were the only places relatively free from violence as they were under the firm control of the Republican Army. The local population in the countryside even referred to these troops as the "city army" (*tentara kota*). See Pelras 1981, 31.

[36] Prior to the rebellion, the aristocracy in South Sulawesi had primarily lived at the village level together with the commoners, as mentioned previously.

forms of government, as well as the incomes attached to them, had been abolished in the meantime."[37] As a consequence, "nobles who had not already been forced to sell their surplus land to compensate their loss of income had to share it out, mainly among family members."[38] Only in small pockets of South Sulawesi did a sizable part of the population stay chained to the aristocracy via landholdings.[39] In short, although the Darul Islam rebel army was unsuccessful in the end, its years of violent encounters with central government troops inflicted great economic damage to the local aristocracy.

The aristocracy's situation worsened when the national government distributed property to poor peasants across South Sulawesi under the Land Reform Act, which due to the revolt was implemented in the province only after 1965, five years later than the rest of Indonesia. Over the next decade, local newspapers reported on the distribution of thousands of hectares of land that came from absentee landlords (*guntai*), from former autonomous regions under Dutch control (*tanah bekas Swapradja*) and, mostly, from surplus land (*tanah kelebihan*) owned by the aristocracy.[40] By 1968, the government claimed 63,357 peasants in South Sulawesi had received plots of land.[41]

A survey the Australian National University conducted in 1969 corroborates this anecdotal evidence. According to a "rough estimate" of the province's occupational breakdown, about 60 percent of the local

[37] Pelras 1981, 38. Of course, the rebellion had the biggest impact on ordinary Indonesians such as "... poor peasants and agricultural laborers who constitute about 20 percent of the population. Many were previously small landowners whose lands were devastated by the rebellions," says Magenda 1989, 747.

[38] Pelras 1981, 39.

[39] A landownership survey conducted in Anabanua in Wajo district in 1975 including 72 families revealed that only 33 families (45.83 percent) owned their land. Furthermore, landsize differed considerably between societal groups. The biggest plot of land (23 ha) in the village was owned by a prince (*anak mattola*), another noble of lesser status (*anak creak*) owned 7 ha. Almost half of the gentry (*tau deceng*) of the village owned plots of land larger than 1 ha. This was in stark contrast to the landholdings of commoners. Only 7.3 percent owned land of similar size. See Lineton 1975. Hence, in that particular village "most of the commoners could support their families only by working on the land of others, mainly nobles," said Pelras 1981, 36. However, a survey from 1967 conducted in Laerung, another village in Wajo district and near the aforementioned Anabanua settlement, showed that 88.75 percent (213/240) of families owned their land. Furthermore, the average landsize owned by noble families in Laerung village was only slightly higher at 1.74 ha compared to 1.25 ha average size for land commoners owned. See Pelras 1981, 36.

[40] See, for instance, Pedoman Rakyat April 20, 1964, 2.

[41] Pedoman Rakyat April 6, 1968, 2. I could not verify these figures through official sources. Government data on landholdings in South Sulawesi are generally not available.

population in South Sulawesi worked in agriculture.[42] The sector consisted of almost wholly peasant agriculture, with only "two or three very small rubber and tobacco estates" in the entire province. The census showed 60 percent of peasants working in agriculture owned their land[43] and 40 percent were share tenants, approximately a quarter of which cultivated land owned by the local aristocracy. Applying this ratio to the 428,891 *sawah* cultivators registered at that time,[44] only 42,889 *sawah* farmers solely depended on the aristocracy's land. This was a very small fraction of the roughly 5.5 million inhabitants who lived in South Sulawesi at the end of the 1960s.

Although reliable data on landownership patterns in present-day South Sulawesi are not available, it is clear that the local occupational breakdown changed little after Indonesia became a democracy post 1998. Most people in South Sulawesi still work in subsistence agriculture.[45] Similarly, the distribution of land stayed as it had been in the 1960s. As one scholar said at the start of the 1980s, "ownership of land and control of land by the nobility, which was already far from absolute before World War II, is now very limited."[46] Another study from the same year noted that "noble patrons are no longer, as such, in a position to put land at the disposal of their dependents, as was formerly the case."[47] Finally, large-scale plantations, both state and private, remain absent in the province even today.[48]

Unlike in West Java, no large-scale industrialization occurred in South Sulawesi and its few enterprises either did not belong to local state elites or went bankrupt. In the 1960s and 1970s, General Jusuf, a "native son" of South Sulawesi and minister for light industry (*Menteri Perindustrian*

[42] Makaliwe 1969, 18.

[43] However, it is important to note that in 1963, the last year for which data were available used in the survey above, about 57 percent of the *sawah* cultivators had land holdings of less than 0.5 hectars. See Makaliwe 1969, 18.

[44] Makaliwe 1969, 18–20. These figures for South Sulawesi province were gathered in 1963. The territory of South Sulawesi province then still included Southwest Sulawesi, which became a separate province in 1964 based on Law No. 2/1964 on the Creation of Southwest Sulawesi.

[45] BPS 2004, 42–3. In 2004, the provincial statistics office aggregated Agriculture and Fishery in one single category while these professions were listed separately in the 1969 survey. The share of people in South Sulawesi working in agriculture compared to the overall workforce might thus have dropped by more than 5 percent in the last 40 years.

[46] Amal 1992, 179. [47] Pelras 1981, 38.

[48] Satellite images available on Google Earth do not show any plantations in South Sulawesi. Such plantations are clearly visible via Google Earth in other parts of Indonesia such as Sumatra. Furthermore, in 2003, the largest agro-business in the entire province was Budi Daya Tanaman Kehutanan, a government-owned logging company based in Gowa district with only 344 employees according to BPS 2003, 8. Most other agro-businesses in South Sulawesi have less than 20 employees.

Dasar), tried to expand his patronage networks in his home province through several state-owned companies.[49] General Jusuf's success was modest at best because only four larger enterprises were established in South Sulawesi. These were a concrete factory, PT Tonasa, in Pangkep district, a sugar mill, PG Bone, in Bone district, a paper factory, Pabrik Kertas Gowa, in Gowa district and a nickel mining company, PT Inco, in today's North Luwu district.[50]

General Jusuf appointed his protégés to directorial posts in these companies, which put them under the thumb of local military men of aristocratic origin.[51] Both the sugar mill in Bone and the paper factory in Gowa were corporate failures, mainly due to government incompetence.[52] The profitable PT Tonasa and PT Inco were placed under *national* control from the start and remain under central government management at the time of writing.[53] In other words, these enterprises never provided any political leverage over the population to *local* state elites.[54] There were also ten joint-venture companies established in South Sulawesi between 1969 and 1976. However, these companies only created 3,319 jobs, a minuscule number, given a total workforce of 1.6 million people in South Sulawesi in 1976. Half of the companies

[49] For a biography of General Jusuf see Magenda 1989, 787, footnote 93. For an account of the ascendancy of General Jusuf into national politics, see Magenda 1989, 657–61.

[50] See Pedoman Rakyat August 13, 1972, 2.

[51] Andi Rifai, a close friend of General Jusuf, became director of PT Tonasa, while Major Sidharto controlled the paper factory in Gowa district. See Magenda 682, footnote 118 and Pedoman Rakyat April 16, 1968b, 4, respectively. The sugar mill in Bone was, in its early years, run by a civilian named Soebono Hadinoto. See Pedoman Rakyat July 9, 1977, 1.

[52] After the construction of the sugar mill, the company directorate mismanaged the sugarcane fields. Consequently, less and less sugarcane could be harvested on the over-exploited soil. This led to a drastic decline in output over the years. Eventually, the sugar mill ran into liquidity problems, was denied credit by various banks and eventually raked up tax debts of US$370,000 with the district government by the year 2006. See Kompas May 23, 2006, 22. The paper factory in Gowa was equally unsuccessful. It was built between 1962 and 1965 under a Japanese war reparation contract. Soon after General Jusuf had officially opened the company in early 1967, the factory ran into difficulties. The government had purchased unsuitable machines and had forgotten to conduct a feasibility study about the supply of bamboo needed for the production process. See Makaliwe 1969, 17. The company was defunct by 1987 and officially closed in 1994. See Kompas December 12, 1994, 2.

[53] In 2001, the royalties for the provincial government from PT Inco's business were estimated to be US$1 million (IDR 10 milliard). 60 percent of this income was supposed to be channeled back to the government of North Luwu district, the rest was given to the provincial government. See Morell 2005, online.

[54] This is aptly shown by the candidacy of PT Tonasa manager Anfar Tualle in the 2005 district head elections in Pangkep, where PT Tonasa is located. Tualle did not even get past the party nomination stage.

were bankrupt by 1976.[55] In short, large-scale industries do not play a dominant role in South Sulawesi's economy.[56] Hence, there is no electorate that is shackled to the owners of (formerly state-owned) factories, as is often the case in more industrialized countries undergoing democratic transitions.[57]

To summarize, aristocrats ran local state and political institutions in both West Java and South Sulawesi until the end of the colonial period. Their political strength was undergirded by economic resources, mainly control over land. Institutional changes, shifts in landownership patterns and rural revolts all eroded the aristocracy's power base. After independence, military figures and civilian bureaucrats gradually replaced the *menak* in West Java's state apparatus as mentioned in Chapter 3.[58] Albeit now from more diverse backgrounds, state elites in West Java still lack direct control over the local population, the majority of whom continues to work in the agricultural sector. The population may have failed to regain control over the means of production in West Java. However, instead of now *directly* depending on *state elites*, the local population working in agriculture came to rely on members of a new class of farmers and traders that emerged at the end of the colonial era and often couched its opposition to the state in Islamist terms, as mentioned in Chapter 2. These non-aristocratic landowners are firmly positioned *outside* the state, as evident in the previous chapter's analysis of candidates contesting and winning local government head elections.

Furthermore, rapid industrialization slashed the number of households dependent on agriculture. Of course, dependencies also exist in industrialized polities and shape the accumulation of power in the context of democratization. In West Java, however, industrialization did not forge strong linkages between *local* state elites and the masses. Most factories belong to *national* elites or Chinese-Indonesians who are rarely involved in local politics.

In South Sulawesi, too, elites in control of the state have surrendered great leverage over the population since the nineteenth century, as

[55] The military was officially involved in one of these companies, a fishing company owned by the Army Cooperative (Puskopad, *Pusat Koperasi Angkatan Darat*) and controlled by the Regional Army Command (Kodam, *Komando Daerah Militer*) Hasanuddin. The foreign partner was a Japanese company. The other joint ventures were owned by the local civilian government and private-sector partners. See Amal 1992, 178.

[56] In 2004, most privately owned companies in the districts of South Sulawesi had less than 50 employees. See BPS 2004. Bosowa Group, a large conglomerate owned by the family of the former Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, is an exception.

[57] See, for example, Hale's 2003 account of machine politics in industrial towns in various Russian regions.

[58] Svensson 1990, 301.

traditional springs of wealth ran dry. The Darul Islam revolts in South Sulawesi, like in West Java, accelerated and accentuated changes in land-ownership patterns that had started decades earlier. Landownership became more egalitarian, with a great part of the population cultivating their own land. Most people still work in subsistence agriculture.[59] Finally, industrialization is largely missing from the province and most state-owned enterprises were economic failures. Hence, much like in West Java, a majority of the population in South Sulawesi exists outside *direct state* control.[60]

Therefore, Indonesian constituencies are relatively independent, unlike the "locked-in" electorates in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as Filipino voters under the control of a landed oligarchy.[61] Voter intimidation no doubt occurs occasionally but, again, plays a minuscule role in Indonesia compared to neighboring countries.[62] By and large, the electorate cannot be forced to vote in a certain way but has to be won over.

To establish linkages to the independent electorate, candidates in these downward-oriented races require a variety of resources. These can be divided into social, economic and cultural resources.

Most important is access to money. Candidates have to pay parties to secure a nomination or, if they run as independents, to buy signatures from citizens, as mentioned in Chapter 3. They must finance their own campaigns, which includes the lawful expenses of campaign materials and wages for staffers and election witnesses,[63] as well as the illegal costs of paying parties for their nomination and support, "contributions" to power brokers and vote-getters, and flagrant vote-buying.[64] Official data on campaign spending are unreliable. However, anecdotal evidence

[59] Of course, the prevalence of small landholdings and subsistence farming is a relatively crude measure for the independence of the electorate. In his book on agriculture in West Java, Pincus 1996, 48 showed that "[t]he capacity of small owners to maintain control over their land is linked not only to shifts in agricultural wages and the availability of credit, but also to the interest rates charged by moneylenders (who are often landowners), the likelihood of obtaining debt forgiveness in case of crop failure, illness or other economic crises, access to agricultural employment outside the village, and off-farm income." However, most important for the argument put forward here is the fact that a growing number of landless farmers in West Java came to be tied to landholders *situated in society* rather than to elites dominating the state.

[60] Again, they may still depend on figures situated in society such as landowners of the kind described above.

[61] Scott 1969, 1146, footnote 16. [62] Buehler 2009c.

[63] These include campaign material, rallies and salaries for election witnesses.

[64] Vote-buying is endemic in Indonesian elections. Yet many candidates have realized that they have no leverage over the relatively independent electorate that would prevent voters from "taking the money and running." Anecdotal evidence suggests that many candidates have therefore shifted their focus to local election commissions where votes are counted. Arguably, bribing local election officials to tamper with election results is more cost-efficient and more effective than bribing voters. Influence peddling at local

suggests campaign fees have steadily increased in recent years. Studies have mentioned costs of several 100,000 dollars for district election campaigns and above one million dollars for campaigns at the provincial level.[65]

Money, of course, is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition to win elections. Affluent candidates without a close-knit personal network in their localities frequently lose local elections. Research verifies that rich but unsuccessful candidates were usually somewhat detached from their constituency and mainly interacted with the upper level of the party structures, the bureaucracy, and the business community in their district.[66] In other words, wealthy elites without a popular base in their district stand little to no chance of winning elections for local government head.[67]

Hence candidates need social capital to mobilize hundreds of thousands of voters prior to elections. They rarely appeal to voters through mass media based on programmatic politics, especially at the subnational level. Instead, the clientelistic nature of Indonesian politics requires politicians to court voters in more intimate ways. Since they cannot promise favors to every individual, state elites need tools to structure the electorate.

Similar to "neopatrimonial regimes" in parts of the world where the personalization of power relations has created "a constant need to nurture personal relations through frequent contact,"[68] political hopefuls in Indonesia need to "work" the electorate before, during and after elections by enlisting local power brokers. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson have described it:

> [I]n the case of clientelism, under conditions of democratic enfranchisement the major cost of constructing such linkages is that of building organizational hierarchies of exchange between electoral clients at the ground floor of the system, various levels of brokers organized in a pyramidal fashion, and patrons at the top. Politicians have to identify resources they can extract and offer to clients in exchange for contributions to their electoral efforts. Moreover, they must construct organizational devices and social networks of supervision that make direct individual or indirect group-based monitoring of political exchange relations viable.[69]

election commissions and the Constitutional Court has increased in recent years. See Butt 2013.

[65] One study found that deforestation in Indonesia increases during election cycles. Cash-strapped candidates resort to cutting and selling tropical hardwoods to pay their expenses. See Burgess et al. 2012.

[66] Buehler 2009b, 101–24. [67] Buehler 2007. [68] Jourde 2005, 424.

[69] Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 8.

In newly democratic Indonesia, too, candidates need to build their own electoral machines. Establishing such networks requires time and commitment. Elites with serious political ambitions now spend months if not years in permanent campaign mode, touring hamlets and villages to stitch together a web of supporters who will, they hope, help structure and mobilize the masses during elections. The diligence with which candidates try to establish networks prior to elections is testament to their importance.

To form the core of such personal networks, politicians usually call on family members and relatives first. Candidates turn to them because the risk of defection is low[70] and they often work for free. This core of any campaign machine is therefore often called the "team of volunteers" (*tim relawan*).

The next layer in most candidates' networks consists of local power brokers, including ethnic leaders, school teachers and religious figures. Proffering money and favors is important in establishing such bonds. However, money is, again, a necessary but not sufficient condition to build effective relations with these influence peddlers. Many affluent candidates have lost elections because they had no local networks at their disposal.[71] Candidates therefore seek to establish personal bonds with local power brokers or at least establish some relationship with such figures prior to elections. To this end, incumbents often try to use members of the local bureaucracy, including subdistrict and village heads, despite laws against this. They also seek out brokers and local vote-getters who interact frequently with the electorate. Politicians hope these figures have endeared themselves to a constituency so that it will follow their recommendation on Election Day.

Voter intimidation and the "show of force" are less common these days than during the New Order. Still, many candidates at least like to transmit the sense that they command coercive power. If necessary, politicians use thugs (*preman*) to mobilize voters or act as witnesses at polling stations, where such figures "assure" that citizens vote for the "right" contender. In short, groups that can at least project violence continue to have value for candidates.

[70] There have been several elections since 1998 where family members competed against one another. This is not always a sign of a rift within a family but often a deliberate strategy to increase the chances for victory. For instance, in East Java's Kediri district the incumbent sent his two wives into the race for district head in 2013 on two separate tickets. His first wife won.

[71] In South Sulawesi's Soppeng district in 2005, a candidate lost the elections despite distributing motorbikes and TV sets to voters prior to elections. See Buehler 2009b, 101–24.

Finally, the reputation of a candidate has become increasingly important in the context of Indonesia's newly competitive political environment. First and foremost, to gain legitimacy, candidates need to convince the electorate they are one of them.[72] For instance, in a rejection of the New Order policy of appointing executives from *outside* the locality, the democratization of politics after 1998 led to demands for "local sons" (*putra daerah*) to occupy local political positions. Similarly Indonesia has witnessed a revival of local customs (*adat*) and a new interest in local ethnic and religious histories across the archipelago.[73] Hence, candidates frequently refer to local customs and religious traditions in their campaigns and go to great length to be seen by the electorate as one of their own. Candidates also want to seem clean and pious amid growing voter dissatisfaction with politicians in the wake of countless corruption and sex scandals after 1998.

Political parties help candidates accumulate these resources in many consolidated Western democracies. However, this is less straightforward in Indonesia. First, most parties struggle to give state elites social capital because they are poorly institutionalized and rarely have stable constituencies.[74] The weak grassroots of most Indonesian parties hark back to the authoritarian New Order period. Parties were not allowed to maintain structures below the provincial level nor campaign between elections. These rules, however, did not apply to Golkar, which was branded a "functional group" and not a party, theoretically.[75] This allowed Golkar and local worthies affiliated with the party to show constant largesse before, during and after elections toward ordinary citizens. This amounted to infrastructure projects, license approvals and the issuing of contracts and public work jobs.

For these reasons, local power brokers joined Golkar in droves after it had become clear that Suharto had consolidated his power in Jakarta. Another incentive for these figures to join the ranks of Golkar was access

[72] This is what Pierre Bourdieu called "euphemization," which is "an appeal to the presumed values of subordinates . . . [that] aims at showing how power is in fact exercised on behalf of the best interests of subordinates." Quoted in Scott 1989, 160.

[73] Tyson 2010; van Klinken 2004.

[74] Mietzner 2013 argues that Indonesian parties are better institutionalized and that they have more stable constituencies than the existing literature claims. However, Mietzner's study focuses almost exclusively on *national legislative* elections, while I focus on *subnational executive* elections. Furthermore, Tomsa 2014 has shown that political parties at the local level continue to be poorly institutionalized and have command over small local networks only.

[75] In fact, newspapers in South Sulawesi reporting on the 1971 legislative elections, the first in which Golkar participated, constantly referred to "Golkar" and "political parties," making sure the readers understood that these were two different categories. See, for example, Pedoman Rakyat January 26, 1971, 2.

to patronage networks and money that started to flow downward from the mid-1960s onward. Overall, the authoritarian and strongly hierarchical nature of the New Order had a concentrating effect on political parties in local elections.

The Golkar electoral machine, however, stood on feet of clay. Once the centralized administration of the New Order and its patronage networks imploded after 1998 so did the coordinated dispersion of contracts, slush funds and cushy posts.

Local figures defected because they "no longer regarded [Golkar] as the best vehicle for their personal aspirations."[76] After 1998, many Golkar cadres joined other parties because they were offered more favorable list ranks or because Golkar did not nominate them.[77] The party also lost access to funds since Suharto's patronage networks had become fragmented after his fall. The once formidable mobilizational capacity of Golkar was neutralized by centrifugal forces unleashed by the collapse of the New Order's hierarchical structures.[78]

Furthermore, after 1998 the majority of *new* parties were established by elites, as the political opening resembled a palace revolution rather than an upheaval from below.[79] Therefore, most new parties are *not* movement parties with broad constituencies. "Built in the air," they struggle to provide local state elites with social capital, namely access to a latticework of local power brokers and vote-getters.

In addition, Indonesian parties are cash strapped and cannot provide economic capital to candidates competing in local government head elections. As Marcus Mietzner has shown, most parties do not even generate enough membership fees to cover operations. It does not help that government subsidies for political parties have fallen steadily since 1998.[80]

Delivering cultural capital to state elites during elections is also a strain for political parties. In survey after survey, the Indonesian electorate has denigrated parties as among the most corrupt players in Indonesian politics.[81] Not only have almost all parties been bogged down by corruption investigations since 1998, but a fair share of party cadres have also been involved in sex scandals that damaged their group's reputation further. Political parties therefore command little public respect.[82]

[76] Tomsa 2005, online. [77] Tomsa 2008.
[78] However, the party *system* after 1998 is characterized by *centripetal* tendencies. See Mietzner 2008.
[79] Pepinsky 2009; Sidel 1998; Slater 2010; Winters 2011. [80] Mietzner 2013, 114.
[81] Mietzner 2013, 4. [82] Mietzner 2013, 229.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I first showed that institutional reforms after 1998 made relations among state elites truly competitive. I then charted the political landscape state elites encountered after the New Order dictatorship collapsed in 1998. In contrast to the New Order, when local elites needed the sponsorship of *higher-level* bureaucrats and politicians, candidates facing newly competitive elections for governor and district head posts now need *local* allies and mass support. I showed that state elites do not have much *direct* control over the electorate as a result of shifts in land-ownership patterns as well as the peculiarities of local industrialization. In this context, state elites competing against one another for public support have to find ways to establish linkages to voters. To mobilize and structure the electorate, state elites must accumulate social, economic and cultural capital.

Only three parties were allowed during the New Order, namely Golkar, PDIP and PPP. The latter two were amalgams of several parties that Suharto had bullied into merging. Both parties could not have political structures below the district level, nor be active in between elections.[83] Golkar was technically not a party but a "functional group" and therefore allowed to be active during the campaigns' off season. However, Golkar was financially dependent on President Suharto and thus never developed strong constituencies at the local level either. Rather, in order to win elections, the party relied on the personal networks of local power brokers, in combination with steamrolling tactics against local opposition. In addition, Golkar became concentrated thanks to the institutional framework and the broader dynamics within the New Order state, namely a centralized administration and the hoarding of political resources and patronage funds within it. The Suharto regime not only had a large and more or less disciplined administrative apparatus but also controlled a vast store of grants, patronage posts and contracts, which it alone awarded. Skillfully coordinating resources through Golkar, the Suharto regime managed to build a powerful political machine. After Suharto's departure, Golkar's usefulness to state elites plummeted.

Likewise, most parties founded after 1998 are not rooted in any local constituency but usually formed in a top-down fashion from the national rivalries between state elites.[84] The introduction of direct elections for local government heads in 2005 has only exacerbated the deinstitutionalization of parties in subnational politics as described in Chapter 2. Most parties have neither the financial means nor the institutional capacity to

[83] Mietzner 2007, 242. [84] Tan 2006, 88–104.

launch serious election campaigns.[85] Legislative and executive elections after 1998 exposed just how poorly consolidated Indonesian parties were. Most were defunct between elections, especially local party branches.

The incapacity of these poor and weakly institutionalized parties to provide state elites with resources the latter deem useful in their fights with one another has also confined the political influence of Islamist parties, as Chapter 5 will show.

[85] Buehler and Tan 2007, 41–69.

5 Islamist Parties after 1998
Mobilization without Influence

5.1 Introduction

Islamist parties sprouted up and mobilized after the collapse of the New Order in 1998 and immediately began to call for a state based on Islamic law. However, Islamist parties have failed to influence the *shari'a* policymaking process. The first part of the chapter provides an analysis of subnational election data from 1999, 2004 and 2009, which shows that in nearly 1,000 elections, Islamist parties clinched a majority of votes in only two districts. Neither has subsequently adopted a *shari'a* regulation. In other words, secular parties collected a majority of the votes and thus dominated local parliaments in all districts that adopted *shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2013. Even above-average support for Islamist parties has no significant impact on *shari'a* policymaking if one controls for areas where Islamist groups situated outside formal politics have strong historical roots. Concretely, 80 percent (184/231) of localities that were outside the *shari'a* clusters and had above-average electoral support for Islamist parties did *not* adopt any *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013. Finally, the chapter shows that most local government heads who advanced *shari'a* regulations are not from Islamist parties.

In the second part of the chapter, I argue the influence of Islamist parties is confined because they cannot provide state elites with the political resources the latter deem necessary for competing with one another over political power. Concretely, Islamist parties are poorly institutionalized and therefore struggle to provide access to local networks. They are cash-strapped and thus cannot bring economic resources to the table. Their credibility has suffered from a string of corruption and sex scandals. And finally, Islamist parties have been subject to moderating forces in Indonesian national politics. They operate in an institutional framework that has transmitted these moderating tendencies down to local party branches. This has weakened the capacity of Islamist parties further to press for the adoption of *shari'a* regulations.

5.2 The Emergence and Mobilization of Islamist Parties after 1998

Several Islamist parties with strong constituencies participated in Indonesian politics during the 1950s. The strongest and most successful were the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi, *Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*), the *Nahdlatul Ulama* Party[1] and the Islamic Party of the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti, *Partai Islam Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah*). After the bout of post-independence democracy came to an end in 1959, Islamist parties became increasingly marginalized.[2]

In 1960, Sukarno declared the Masyumi illegal because it had allegedly supported the PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra, as mentioned in Chapter 2. After the ban of Masyumi, followers established the Crescent Star Family (*Keluarga Bulan Bintang*) to carry on the fight for an Islamic state. However, Suharto upheld the ban on Masyumi after taking office in 1965.[3] Members of the aforementioned Crescent Star Family established the Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi, *Partai Muslimin Indonesia*) in 1970. Former Masyumi members were forbidden to join the new party, which finished fourth in the first legislative elections of the New Order a year later.[4]

In 1973, Suharto forced all Muslim parties to fuse into the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*). For the remainder of the New Order, the PPP was competing for votes against Golkar, a nominally secular party, and the PDIP, an ecumenical party that had been forced to absorb two Christian parties. All political organizations, including parties, had to abandon religious platforms and adopt the ecumenical *Pancasila* ideology in 1983, as mentioned in Chapter 2.

A new party law adopted after 1998 eliminated restrictions on the establishment of parties and allowed religious platforms. Political parties mushroomed as a result, including those with religious agendas.[5] Several called for a state based on Islamic law, namely the Crescent Star Party (PBB, *Partai Bulan Bintang*), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*), the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party

[1] NU as an organization had a strong pro-*shari'a* stance until the early New Order, Fealy 1998 showed.
[2] The aforementioned PSII is often also considered an Islamist party active at the time. However, the PSII was not too committed to the Jakarta Charter, which is the reason why it is not included in the list above.
[3] Solahuddin 2013, 79. [4] Hindley 1972, 58.
[5] However, the absolute as well as the effective number of parties has declined continuously since the elections in 1999. See Tomsa 2010, 145.

(PPNUI, *Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia*) and the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*).

The PBB was established in 1998 with an agenda inspired by the thoughts of Mohammad Natsir, the head of the Masyumi party.[6] PBB's first chairman was Yusril Ihza Mahendra who had been a member of the DDII and the ICMI,[7] both Islamic organizations mentioned in Chapter 2. The PBB tried to appeal to "puritanical modernist Muslims at the fringes of the political spectrum."[8] In the 1999 elections, the party used "Masyumi symbols and its political language" to mobilize voters.[9] It collected only 2 percent of the votes in the 1999 legislative elections and has remained a marginal party in subsequent elections.

The PPNUI was also founded in 1998 by a group of Islamist figures with a shared background in the Union of Missionaries (IM, *Ittihadul Muballighin*),[10] a conservative pressure group that had rallied against *Shi'a* religious practices already during the New Order.[11]

Initially, the party called itself the Nahdlatul Community Party (PNU, *Partai Nahdlatul Ummat*). However, the PNU won less than 1 percent of the votes in the 1999 legislative elections, falling short of the 2 percent needed to run in the 2004 legislative elections. To bypass this required parliamentary threshold, the party changed its name to Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (PPNUI) in 2003. Nevertheless the PPNUI has remained a marginal player in subsequent elections.

The PPP was born during the New Order through a forced marriage of existing Muslim parties as mentioned before. Since the party is a mosaic of different interests, it has struggled with internecine rifts from inception. However, it was relatively established compared to other Islamist parties that emerged after Suharto, so the PPP reaped the most votes of all Islamist parties in the 1999 elections. However, its share of the vote has declined steadily since 1999.

The most enduring and electorally successful party is the PKS. Since it is the most consolidated and strongest Islamist party in post-1998 Indonesia, its formative years justify a more extensive analysis. The PKS is rooted in social networks that formed at university mosques across Indonesia in the late 1970s.[12] These networks morphed into a close-knit, inward-looking community whose members organized into small cells (*usrah*) to do Islamic outreach (*dakwah*). The members of this "education community" (*tarbiyah*) formed strong bonds for several reasons. New Order oppression forced these networks to operate

[6] Van Bruinessen 2013, 32; Woodward 2001, 33. [7] Assyaukanie 2009, 183.
[8] Mietzner 2008, 448. [9] Mietzner 2008, 439. [10] Kompas 1999, 16.
[11] Zulkifli 2013, 237. [12] Damanik 2002, 63–122.

clandestinely, which was conducive to group cohesion. At the same time, drawing on the agenda of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan*) and the teachings of its founder Hassan al-Banna, these networks followed a distinct religious ideology from the start. The basic doctrine was to build a "pure" Islamic society in an evolutionary manner, mainly through Islamic education. The unique ideology taught in these networks and the strict interpretation of core religious doctrines[13] set the group apart from mainstream Indonesian Islam.[14]

The party's networks also grew out of a very specific class of Indonesian society. Early supporters of the *tarbiyah* movement, who eventually became PKS cadres and followers, were predominantly students from Indonesia's indigenous middle class. This demographic multiplied in the three decades of economic growth under the Suharto dictatorship and profited from the era's improvements in higher education.[15] At the time of writing, PKS strongholds still revolve around urban middle-class neighborhoods.[16]

Unsurprisingly, the PKS features unique characteristics compared to other Islamist parties. It is the only party that eschews any link or historical affiliation with Islamic parties from before the New Order.[17] Furthermore, in the party's infancy, it had no personalities who were well known among the electorate and could serve as vote-getters.[18] Even today, the party remains much less personalized than its rivals. In fact, the PKS relies on schools for its rigorous recruitment[19] and has university campuses as its main base.[20] Hence, most PKS members are young and well educated, which holds true down to local party branches.[21] With 1.4 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections[22] the PKS is the only Islamist party that has increased its vote share in subsequent elections.

5.3 Lobbying without Gaining Political Influence

Immediately after the demise of Suharto, Islamist parties began to push for *shari'a* law. During the constitutional debates from 1998 to 2002, all Islamist parties lobbied to annex the Jakarta Charter to the new constitution and turn Indonesia into a state based on Islamic law. The parties also rejected offers to enter coalitions with their secular counterparts and refused to join the cabinet dominated by secular politicians.[23]

[13] Damanik 2002, 78. [14] Damanik 2002, 88. [15] Damanik 2002, 67.
[16] Setiawan 2009, 8. [17] Damanik 2002, 219–21. [18] Damanik 2002, 275.
[19] Damanik 2002, 82. [20] Damanik 2002, 268. [21] Damanik 2002, 261.
[22] The party was running as the Justice Party (PK, *Partai Keadilan*) in 1999 but then changed its name prior to the 2004 elections due to aforementioned threshold regulations.
[23] Buehler 2012, 216.

Islamist parties' national lobbying, however, did not translate into tangible policy outcomes. In 2002, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) rejected a proposed amendment to chapter 29 that would have integrated the Jakarta Charter into the constitution. Various Islamist parties including the PBB and the PPP opposed the decision but eventually accepted it.[24] The debate about the role of Islamic law in *national* politics came to a halt in 2002 in much the same way it had in 1945 and 1968.

Data on *shari'a* policymaking at the subnational level suggest the lobbying efforts of Islamist parties have not made much headway there either.

The literature that claims *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia are a metonym of Islamist parties' growing political strength never specifies *how exactly* parties exert influence over policymaking. The overwhelming majority of local regulations are initiated, drafted and adopted by local executive governments without much legislative consultation, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, local parliaments are supposed to play a role in the drafting and adoption of local regulations called *peraturan daerah*, as mentioned in Chapter 1. In this context, let us also assume that Islamist parties are collaborating to push for certain policies in a concerted effort. Based on these two assumptions, Islamist parties should stand a good chance of shaping policy if they control a majority of seats in a local parliament.

I used the subnational data from national and local election commissions to calculate the combined vote share for the four Islamist parties for every province, district and municipality in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 legislative elections. I then computed the provincial, district and municipal average for all four parties in all three periods. Finally, I compared this to the number of provinces, districts and municipalities that had at least one *shari'a* regulation in place between 1998 and 2013.[25]

This exercise revealed that in more than 1,000 subnational elections held between 1998 and 2009, Islamist parties nabbed a majority of votes

[24] Assyaukanie 2009, 190.

[25] Remember that only *peraturan daerah* are drafted by the parliament together with the local executive government. Localities that adopted executive instructions during this period were therefore not included in the dataset. Furthermore, it was difficult to identify whether the *shari'a* regulations adopted in the election years of 2004 and 2009 were adopted before or after the elections held in those years. However, given the slow nature of policymaking in Indonesia, these regulations were likely drafted by the parliament that had been in power *before* the elections in these years. Therefore, I counted the *shari'a* regulations adopted in the years 2004 and 2009 for the legislative periods of 1999–2004 and 2004–2009, respectively.

in only two elections: in Aceh Besar district in Aceh province the four Islamist parties together won 51 percent of all votes in the 1999 legislative district elections, and in Bone Bolanga district in Gorontalo province the four parties collectively won 58.6 percent of all votes in the 2004 legislative district elections. Neither of these districts adopted a *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013.[26]

Let us assume, however, that Islamist parties do not need a majority of votes to influence policymaking but merely an above-average vote share. Indeed, an analysis of all localities with an above-average vote share for Islamist parties showed that these places had a higher chance of passing *shari'a* regulations than localities with a below-average Islamist vote share. However, if one controls for the geographical distribution of these localities, the correlation between an above-average Islamist vote share and higher odds of adopting a *shari'a* regulation breaks down.

Concretely, I examined all localities with above-average electoral support for Islamist parties that are outside the six *shari'a* provinces introduced in Chapter 1. I excluded these *shari'a* clusters because there Islamist movements positioned outside formal politics have strong historical roots, as shown in Chapter 2, and actively push for *shari'a* regulations, as I will show in Chapters 6 and 7. In these *shari'a* clusters, it may therefore only look like Islamist parties are steering *shari'a* policies while, in fact, Islamist movements detached from Islamist parties are in the driver's seat.

Controlling for strong Islamist movements then, the data show 80 percent (184/231) of localities that had above-average support for Islamist parties in legislative elections *and* lie outside the six *shari'a* clusters have *not* adopted any *shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2009.

In any case, local parliaments rarely drive policymaking in Indonesia, as studies mentioned in Chapter 1 have shown. Rather, most policies, even of the *peraturan daerah* examined here, are initiated, drafted and adopted by the executive branch. Yet, the relationship between the presence of Islamist party figures in local government head posts and the adoption of *shari'a* regulations is equally tenuous. Between 1998 and 2013, there were 3 governors, 33 district heads and 17 mayors in West Java[27] and 2 governors, 8 district heads and 4 mayors in South Sulawesi who enacted at least one *shari'a* regulation during their tenure.[28] Only 9.4 percent

[26] I would like to thank Ronnie Nataatmadja for analyzing large parts of this dataset.

[27] Remember that the figures for Banten and West Java are combined throughout the book unless stated otherwise.

[28] *Shari'a* regulations here include both *peraturan daerah* and executive government instructions since local government heads are the driving force behind the adoption of *peraturan daerah* and solely responsible for the adoption of executive government instructions.

(5/53) of local government heads who adopted *shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2013 in West Java were members of Islamist parties.[29] In South Sulawesi, none of the 14 chief executives who approved *shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2013 belonged to Islamist parties. In short, only 7.5 percent (5/67) of all local government heads who adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation in West Java and South Sulawesi between 1998 and 2013 were actual Islamist party members.

This pattern holds true in the rest of the country. Only 6 percent (15/243) of all local government heads who adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation in Indonesia between 1998 and 2013 had a background in party politics to begin with. Among this group, no officials were Islamist party members besides the five in West Java mentioned above. Hence, only 2 percent (5/243) of local government heads who adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation anywhere in Indonesia between 1998 and 2013 were actual Islamist party members, as shown in Appendix 3.

In sum, Islamist parties failed to convert their *shari'a* agenda into concrete policies at the national level. An amendment to absorb the Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian constitution was rejected in 2002. Likewise, Islamist parties have not made their mark in subnational policymaking. They did not control a single parliament in provinces and districts where *shari'a* regulations were adopted between 1998 and 2013. The overwhelming majority of provinces and districts where there was above-average electoral support for Islamist parties in past elections and which were situated outside the *shari'a* clusters did not adopt any *shari'a* regulations. Finally, an examination of local government heads who dominate the local policymaking process turned up few Islamist party members among those approving at least one *shari'a* regulation since 1998. In fact, 98 percent of all local government heads who adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013 did not belong to Islamist parties.

Overall, there is plenty of empirical evidence negating the hypothesis that the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 emanates from

[29] Concretely, Ahmad Heryawan, the governor of West Java from 2008 to 2013, was a member of PKS. Likewise, Sa'duddin, the district head of Bekasi from 2007 to 2012, and Nur Mahmudi Ismail, who was the mayor of Depok from 2005 to 2015, were members of the PKS. Tatang Farhanul Hakim, the district head of Tasikmalaya from 2001 to 2011, was a member of the PPP as was Rahmat Yasin, who was district head of Bogor from 2008 to 2018.

To identify these figures, I examined the CVs of all the candidates categorized as "politicians" or "private sector/politician" in the dataset already used in Chapter 3 and compared it with local government heads who had adopted at least one *shari'a* regulation during their time in office.

Islamist parties. This raises the question of why such parties have failed to push the adoption of *shari'a* regulations.

5.4 Failing to Provide Political Resources

Arguably, Islamist parties have struggled to push their agenda since 1998 because they have few resources that state elites deem useful in their political battles. First and foremost, Islamist parties' local networks are feeble. Again, West Java and South Sulawesi exemplify this point.

The weak political influence of Islamist parties in the two provinces has historical and institutional roots. In West Java, Islamist parties have always enjoyed greater visibility in local politics compared to other provinces. In the 1955 elections, secular-nationalist parties accumulated 51.38 percent of the vote while Islamist parties garnered 41.83 percent.[30] The Masyumi became the strongest party in *subnational* parliaments after the 1957 elections for *local* legislatures.[31]

The province, however, has also always been known for the high fragmentation of its party system. Official statistics on the 1955 elections show that of the 75 minor parties that participated, 26 had their stronghold in West Java.[32] Herbert Feith located the origins of West Java's splintered party system in "the absence of strong aliran-based cleavages."[33] Instead, the *kyai*, local religious leaders situated in society mentioned before, shaped local politics. Already in 1954, Samiati Alisjahbana noted that "even politicians ... of parties not based on Islam attempt to secure the influence of the kyayis ... in their appeals to the rank and file, particularly in rural areas."[34] Gotō then showed that the role of local *kyai* and their *personal* networks was prominent both during parliamentary elections in 1955 and the local district head elections in 1957.[35]

The fragmentation of the party system in West Java due to the importance of local religious figures and their *personal* followings undermined the ability of Islamist parties to collect votes *as parties* across the province. Gotō observed that "... [t]he absence of strong aliran-based cleavages

[30] Maftuhin 2007, 33. Maftuhin's figures do not include the election results for AKUI and DDI, parties some would consider as Islamist parties. However, the votes they accumulated are negligible. The AKUI, for instance, collected only 0.2 percent of the national votes in 1955.

[31] Ricklefs 1993, 260.

[32] The 26 parties collected more than 30 percent of their respective votes in the province. See Gotō 1971, 110, footnote 14.

[33] Feith 1962, 127. [34] Alisjahbana 1954, 83.

[35] Gotō 1971, 68. Gotō 1971, 110, footnote 14 concluded that the existence of this high number of parties in the province "hinders West Java's interests as a whole."

allows the growth of many small unideological parties based on the prestige of local notables (bapak) ... While such notables can get their followers to vote for them in elections, they cannot get support outside their immediate neighborhood and find it difficult to link up effectively with notables in adjoining areas."[36] In other words, these small parties struggled to extend their reach beyond their immediate locality because their environment mostly consisted of locally influential religious power brokers and their personal networks.[37]

While parties continued to rely on local Islamic power brokers throughout the New Order to mobilize the electorate in the province, the forced merger of Islamic parties into the PPP in 1973 had a concentrating effect on the Muslim vote. This found its expression in relatively strong support for the PPP in West Java during the New Order. While data for *local* legislative elections in West Java at the time are not available, there is anecdotal evidence that the PPP received relatively strong support also in West Java's subnational elections in the early years of the New Order because many local *kyai*, including several local Darul Islam leaders, persuaded their following to rally behind the PPP.[38] However, from the late 1980s onward, support for the party waned in West Java. The New Order government had arrested various Darul Islam leaders prior to elections to discredit the PPP.[39] In addition, many influential local *kyai* defected to Golkar, the regime party, and took their followers with them.[40]

The collapse of the New Order exposed how poorly institutionalized the PPP was in the province. With the concentrating effects of the authoritarian New Order structure gone, local Islamic power brokers have, once again, started to attach themselves to a broad range of state elites, much like in the 1950s.[41] In a similar vein, democratization after 1998 led to intense rivalries among local *pesantren*, thereby splitting the Islamic vote that used to go to the PPP during the New Order, according to several local election commissioners interviewed.[42] Consequently, the PPP continued its poor showing at the ballot box after 1998. The PBB and PPNUI in West Java failed to capitalize on the political opening due to the same fragmenting dynamics. On the other hand, the PKS does reasonably well in West Java's cities but has only a marginal presence in

[36] Gotō 1971, 68–9. [37] Gotō 1971, 104.
[38] Solahudin 2013, 66. The Darul Islam had issued a statement at the beginning of the New Order to their supporters, urging them not to support any party. Several Darul Islam leaders, however, supported the PPP, and, in fact, even Golkar. See Solahudin 2013, 52.
[39] Solahudin 2013, 66. [40] Sidel 2006, 82. [41] Turmudi 2003, 16–17.
[42] For instance, Soemiati Fajarini, pers. comm. July 15, 2013.

rural areas, where it is subject to figure-centered politics just like any other party. For instance, in West Java's Tasikmalaya district, the head of the local PKS party branch, H. Asep Hidayat, explained his campaign strategy for the district head elections in 2006: "We have been in touch with kyai from Cintawana, Manonjaya, and other boarding schools. We did this because our struggle should also be supported by such scholars."[43] In short, Islamist *parties* in West Java can offer little help to candidates who need to structure and mobilize the electorate through local networks of vote-getters and power brokers.

Local Islamist party networks are also poorly developed in South Sulawesi province. The Masyumi party collected the most votes in the 1955 elections in the province with 40.01 percent, followed by the NU with 14.27 percent. However, the elections were held amid the Darul Islam rebellion and much of the electorate was unable to vote. The accuracy of the results is therefore dubious. In any case, after Suharto grabbed power, South Sulawesi became a bastion of Golkar supporters, who gave the party an average vote share of 87 percent during the entire New Order.

To rule South Sulawesi province after the Darul Islam rebellion had been defeated, the New Order regime relied on the networks of local notables, many of whom joined the regime party with great enthusiasm. Aristocrats in both the local military and the bureaucracy "turned to Golkar in the face of the threat from the Islamic traders and landowners"[44] because the strong anti-Islamic outlook of the military-backed Golkar party strengthened the aristocrats' position vis-à-vis these Islamic challenger elites who gave rise to the Darul Islam. The *mainstream* Islamic organizations, which in South Sulawesi have almost always sided with rather than opposed ruling aristocrats, joined the Golkar party for similar reasons. For instance, the influential leaders of the As'adiah School (*Perguruan As'adiah*) in Sengkang, Wajo district, joined the Golkar party, according to a newspaper report. The same article noted that K.H.A. Poke, a powerful *imam* in the subdistrict of Tanete Riattang in Bone district, and one of South Sulawesi's "foremost religious leader[s] ... has left [his] political party and joined Golkar ... together with all his followers ....This was his own decision ... after he had studied the history ... and also the goals of Golkar ... and he had seen [that Golkar] wouldn't want to get involved in political games ... but would only strive for the public good."[45] Another newspaper article cheerfully reported that the decision of K.H.A. Poke would lead other religious

[43] See Rachman 2006, 140. [44] Magenda 1989, 731.
[45] Pedoman Rakyat April 23, 1971, 2.

leaders (*ulama dan ustaz*) to abandon their political parties for Golkar. Indeed, Golkar was soon joined by H.A. Djabbar, who had been an influential religious preacher (*muballigh*) for more than 30 years in Bone's subdistrict of Simulue.[46] In Maros district, all the spiritual leaders of *Khalwatiyah*, a prominent local Sufi order, joined Golkar[47] and campaigned for the party in elections.[48]

This continued in subsequent election years. In 1977, for instance, K.H. Abdurrachman Ambon Dalle, who at the time ran the largest *pesantren* in South Sulawesi, the *Darul Dakwah Wal Irsyad* (DDI), joined Golkar "to advance the cause of his DDI pesantren . . ."[49]

For its undisputed victory in every election across three decades, Golkar can thank these religious power brokers of a non-modernist religious orientation who mobilized their networks, in addition to aristocrats and business leaders who brought huge numbers of votes. In fact, the electoral successes of Golkar in South Sulawesi were "vastly affected by its ability to coopt the Islamic kyai and organizations such as the DDI."[50]

After 1998, too, Islamist parties established a presence in South Sulawesi. However, they are a marginal political force in the province overall. The weak support these parties managed to attract in elections since 1998 shows their low capacity to aggregate votes. In fact, the Golkar party continued to win absolute majorities in all legislative elections in the province after 1998.

There are reasons distinct to South Sulawesi that Islamist parties struggled to establish local networks. For instance, campuses of secular state universities from which Islamist parties emerged in West Java after the collapse of the New Order have been dominated by figures associated with the Darul Islam networks mentioned in Chapter 2.[51] Examining Islamic student associations at university campuses in South Sulawesi, Burhan Magenda notes that "[t]heir leadership came mostly from Buginese traders and landowners of Islamic backgrounds in rich areas of Bone and Pare-Pare. Many of them had just graduated from Hasanuddin University and were providing badly needed leadership to local Islamic groups which had experienced quite a setback after the

[46] Pedoman Rakyat April 23, 1971, 2. [47] Pedoman Rakyat May 26, 1971, 1.
[48] Van Bruinessen 1991, 2.
[49] Magenda 1989, 726. Dalle later became a member of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) in Jakarta.
[50] Magenda 1989, 822, footnote 175. There are also historical factors that explain the huge margin with which Golkar won the 1971 elections in South Sulawesi. After the turmoil caused by Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion, people longed for peace and stability, something the Golkar party promised to provide with some credibility. See Magenda 1989, 732.
[51] Magenda 1989, 688.

Kahar rebellion. It was from these trading and landowning backgrounds that prominent leaders of the HMI, and later on the KAMI, originated."[52]

At the end of the 1980s, for example, a student named Tamsil Linrung chaired the Makassar branch of the Muslim Student Association (HMI, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*).[53] After 1998 Linrung became one of the main financiers of the Islamist movement that emerged in South Sulawesi. A few years later Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, son of the former Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, replaced Linrung as the head of HMI.[54]

Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar both later joined the Muslim Student Association–The Organization Salvation Council (HMI–MPO, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam–Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*), a radical offshoot of HMI that had sprung up after the New Order had forced all organizations and parties to adopt the ecumenical Pancasila ideology as their platform.[55] In fact, Tamsil Linrung became the national head of HMI–MPO from 1988 to 1990.[56] Both Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Azis Kahar Muzakkar were also members of the Indonesian Islamic Students (PII, *Pelajar Islam Indonesia*). Aswar Hasan[57] and Mansur Sema, two leading figures in the Islamist movement that emerged in South Sulawesi after 1998, were members of the PII too.[58] In short, the

[52] Magenda 1989, 708. Jusuf Kalla, Indonesia's vice-president from 2004 to 2009 and from 2014 to 2019, personifies the sociological basis of these organizations as mentioned before. As a student, Kalla was the chairman of Kami in South Sulawesi and also the head of HMI. "Jusuf Kalla was a son of a prominent Buginese trader from Bone, Haji Kalla who was known for general business activities since the 1950s. . . . In his leadership of the HMI and KAMI, Jusuf Kalla was supported by men like him who were the children of Buginese traders and landowners from Bone, Soppeng, Pare-Pare and Sidenreng-Rappang" according to Magenda 1989, 708. For a biography of Jusuf Kalla and his various organizational affiliations in South Sulawesi province, see Magenda 1989, 813, footnote 150.

[53] See, Kompas July 7, 1988, 8. The article mentions Tamsil Linrung attending the 17th congress of HMI, held in Yogyakarta July 1–6, 1988, in his function as the head of HMI branch in Makassar.

[54] Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar had joined HMI Makassar in 1987 while studying fishery at Hasanuddin University. See Hamdan 2006, 172.

[55] HMI–MPO was founded at HMI's 16th congress in Padang in 1986. See Feillard et Madinier 2006, 254. Due to its ideology, HMI–MPO was never recognized by the New Order state. For the history of HMI–MPO, see Karim 1997.

[56] Kompas March 18, 2002, 11.

[57] Aswar Hasan was born in the district of Luwu, one of the former strongholds of Darul Islam. Aswar Hasan, pers. comm. March 31, 2006.

[58] Hamdan 2006, 154. HMI and PII were the main drivers behind the mobilization of the masses during the "Makassar Affair," severe riots in Makassar in 1967 that were targeting the Christian community in the provincial capital. A teacher of religion of Ambonese-Christian origin, H.K. Mangumbahan, had made some derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic religion. After word had spread through the city about the incident, several churches were burnt down. See Magenda 1989, 697–707.

strong presence of Darul Islam figures on university campuses across the province stifled the mobilizational capacity of Islamist parties in the province further.

Due to their weak local presence, Islamist parties in South Sulawesi too have come to rely on local religious leaders after 1998, with the same fragmenting effects on party cohesion as in West Java. A good example of the centrifugal dynamics unleashed after Islamist parties pegged themselves to local state elites, rather than nominating their own cadres, is the South Sulawesi 2013 gubernatorial election. The PPP supported the candidacy of incumbents Syahrul Yasin Limpo and Agus Arifin Nu'mang. However, several members left the party because they supported the incumbents' main competitors, Ilham Sirajuddin and Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar.[59] A local newspaper said "[t]he fact that they competed for different candidates prevented Islamist parties from establishing a party coalition that would have pushed the Islamist agenda *in a concerted effort.*"[60] In other words, rifts between and within Islamist parties handicapped their ability to mobilize the electorate and to deliver votes. As in West Java, Islamic parties remained weak in South Sulawesi's election because they could not agree on a candidate. The PBB, PPNUI and the PPP are almost completely absent in South Sulawesi politics, as election results show. The PKS is confined to urban areas and therefore not a force to be reckoned with on Election Day in this predominantly rural province.

The patterns described for the two provinces repeat in the rest of Indonesia. Islamist parties, like most Indonesian parties, are poorly institutionalized, particularly at the local level. In the case of the PPP, this is a legacy of the New Order. Suharto barred political parties from establishing structures below the provincial level as mentioned before. The electorate had to remain a "floating mass," only to be mobilized prior to elections,[61] so parties could not engage with ordinary citizens in between elections. For these reasons, parties did not plant local roots, including the PPP. The fact that the PPP is the product of a forced merger of Muslim parties in the 1970s also undermined its coherence and consolidation after 1998. Various PPP members founded their own party after the fall of Suharto. The remaining rump party is characterized by tensions and internecine fighting among factions.[62]

Meanwhile, the institutional structures of PBB and the PPNUI are "topy-heavy." Both parties were established in 1998 by political elites

HMI was again the main force behind violent riots in Makassar in the late 1990s, this time targeting the Chinese community. See Sidel 2006, 95–7.

[59] Ilham 2013a, online. [60] Kompas 2006, 5. Emphasis added.
[61] Feillard 1995, 135. [62] Hamayotsu 2012.

and therefore lack stable constituencies. While all parties are required to have branches across the Indonesian archipelago, local branches are essentially non-existent in between elections, mainly for financial reasons. This is no different in the case of PBB and the PPNUI. As a campaign manager pointed out in an interview:

> It's like this. The Indonesian people are not too smart. They are still traditional voters. Voting is not based on a party's program. There's no direct relation between a party and its constituency. There's only a direct relation between the party and its cadres. But the people don't have a relation with the party. The people in Indonesia still very much depend on the opinion of social notables. They don't ask: is [the candidate] affiliated with this or that party, but [they ask] what is the choice of the local notable? Because the people here are still very traditional, [they] don't vote for the program of a candidate who wants to become mayor or governor. It's not the program that is looked at, but the person. A programmatic campaign is thus unnecessary.[63]

At first sight, the PKS seems different. Because the PKS is one of Indonesia's few enduring movement parties, its grassroots are more developed and extensive than those of any other Islamist party, as mentioned before. However, the formative years of the party are constraining its local networks. Due to the PKS' strong basis in an urban Islamic middle class, the party failed to build links to Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs *as well as* the indigenous Indonesian poor.[64] At the time of writing, PKS networks were almost exclusively confined to urban areas.[65] In addition, the party's unique religious doctrine and the distinct class background of its members make it difficult for PKS rank-and-file members to join and establish links with other political parties. Overall, despite having emerged from within an Islamist movement and being relatively well institutionalized, even the PKS lacks extensive local networks. As John Sidel observes: "Compared to other Islamist parties in the Muslim world, moreover, the PKS seems to lack the kind of densely woven and deeply rooted local infrastructure so carefully nurtured by their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank over the years."[66]

The weak mobilization capacity of Islamist parties in post-New Order Indonesia is clear, as the overall vote share for Islamist parties has been in gradual decline since the first free legislative elections in 1999. The four Islamist parties saw their votes drop from 18.9 percent in the 2004 elections to 15.04 in the 2009 elections. The PBB fell below the 2.5 percent electoral threshold and was therefore represented in neither the

[63] Anonymous, pers. comm. May 3, 2006. [64] Hadiz 2011. [65] Kompas 2009, 8.
[66] Sidel 2006, 180.

2004–2009 nor the 2009–2014 parliament. The vote share of PPNUI and the PPP fell in 2009 compared to the 1999 elections and the number of seats they occupy in parliament is insignificant. The most successful Islamist party is the PKS. It increased its vote share steadily between 1999 and 2009. It was the strongest Islamist party in the country at the time of writing but with still a faint presence in both the national and local parliaments. The PKS is the only Islamist party that expanded its vote share at the national level.

Across Indonesia, Islamist parties were unable to win elections because they scuffled with one another instead of rallying around a shared platform and candidates. This split the Muslim vote, to the benefit of secular-nationalist parties. As a result of the democratization process, "the notion of Islam as a universalist faith and force in Indonesia, so seemingly ascendant in the years leading up to 1998, had fallen prey to the divisive and particularistic dynamics of competitive elections," John Sidel writes.[67]

5.5 Islamist Parties versus Islamist Movements

It is important to note that Islamist parties have a hard time compensating for their lack of local networks by collaborating with Islamist groups outside formal politics. Ideological differences are one reason. Noorhaidi Hasan showed, for instance, that a "total rejection of democracy distinguishes the Salafis from members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-I Islami. Moderate wings of these two movements take part in general elections, deeming them a legitimate way to win control of power and means through which the struggle for implementing the shari'a in a comprehensive manner can be realized. In Indonesia, this position has been taken by the [PKS]."[68] Due to this ideological discord, many

[67] Sidel 2006, 135. Institutional changes of recent years have accelerated these fragmenting tendencies further. In December 2008, the Indonesian Constitutional Court declared party list weighting in violation of the Constitution and annulled Article 214 of Law No. 10/2008. De facto, the party list ranking system was abolished. Hence, only the number of votes determined a candidate's opportunity to secure a seat in the 2009 parliamentary elections. This subjugated Indonesian elections to a most-open list system. An (unintended) consequence of this system is that a single non-transferable vote election is now taking place *within* parties in Indonesia. In other words, intra-party competition has increased tremendously due to the new institutional setting. To mobilize the electorate on a broad, coherent and party-wide programmatic platform, Islamic or otherwise, has become an extraordinary challenge due to the fierce competition between individual candidates from the same party. See Buehler 2009a, 58.

[68] Hasan 2006, 148. The Darul Islam was not born out of a Salafi movement. Most founders and early followers were traditionalist Muslims that followed the Shafi'I school of Islamic jurisprudence. However, Salafi ideas gained traction within Darul Islam over time. See Solahudin 2013, 23.

Islamist groups situated outside the political system see the PKS as a party that "has 'sold out' to the charms of worldly politics and the democratic process, which they regard as un-Islamic."[69] Indeed, Islamist groups frequently criticize Islamist parties for endorsing secular politicians and their agendas.[70]

The aversion is mutual. The PKS is openly proud of shunning Islamist groups,[71] as leading PKS figure Zulkieflimansyah aptly expresses:

> I cannot account for the rise of groups like FPI or HTI, but let's not exaggerate their importance. These are small groups and they have minimal impact as far as the political evolution of Indonesia is concerned. These groups make noise, shout, do demos, but have they really changed the face of Indonesian politics? I don't think so. Personally I don't even bother with the likes of HTI or FPI, because they have nothing to teach us or to contribute to our cause. And as long as they remain violently radical, then they cannot and will not get the support of the mainstream of Indonesian society. And furthermore, the more radical and extremist they get, the better for us, because as a result PKS looks even more moderate![72]

In line with these sentiments, the PKS has a recruitment and training system for new cadres and rank-and-file members that explicitly debars Islamist groups. Party leaders have referred to this as a "preventive radicalization mechanism."[73] Therefore, until today, "[m]uch of the social base of the PKS can be found among . . . upwardly mobile sections of the urban population,"[74] while figures affiliated with Islamist groups have been locked out of the party.

Beyond ideological divides, the PKS stems from a different milieu than most Islamist groups. Zulkieflimansyah, again, states:

> Remember the organic roots of the PKS as a movement. Long before it became a party, it came from the likes of me and my generation who were university students in Indonesia, studying at secular universities like Universitas Indonesia (UI), Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), etc. We were all trained in the hard sciences or the social sciences, and not religion. So our original cadre base does not come from the madrasahs or pesantrens of Indonesia, but rather from the secular universities.[75]

Of course, *individual* PKS members are sometimes present "at venues and events that ought to be outside the parameters of the party's concern."[76] In West Java's Cirebon district, Salim Bajri, the leader of an Islamist group called Anti-Immorality Movement (GAMAS, *Gerakan Anti Maksiat*), on which more in Chapter 6, has close connections to the

[69] Noor 2011, 5. [70] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 143. [71] Damanik 2002, 219–21.
[72] Quoted in Noor 2011, 26–7. [73] Noor 2011, 24. [74] Hadiz 2011, 15.
[75] Quoted in Noor 2011, 6, footnote 9. [76] Noor 2011, 19.

leader of the local PKS branch.[77] Overall, however, the political genealogies of PKS members and figures involved in Islamist groups are very different. Van Bruinessen has emphasized this: "University campuses were also the breeding ground for an entirely *new* type of Islamic movement, organized as semi-clandestine Islamic study groups in the 1980s and 1990s."[78] It is due to this historical context that links between the PKS and Islamist groups situated outside formal politics are weak.

Arguably, ties between other Islamist parties and Islamist groups outside formal politics are somewhat closer. In West Java's Tasikmalaya district, for instance, the PPP Chairman Tatang Farhanul Hakim who became district head in 2001 is also close to the Tholiban, a local Islamist group.[79] Also in the district, the PPP endorsed parliamentarian K.H. Asep Mousul Affandi, who led an Islamist group called FPI and ran an Islamist boarding school called Miftahul Huda Pesantren, on which more in Chapter 6. Another Islamist figure called Ajengan Mubin is a member of the PBB.[80] In some districts in West Java, PBB and PKS cadres were also members of FUI, an Islamist group described in Chapter 6. In South Sulawesi, too, members of Islamist groups have sometimes joined local Islamist parties. Kahar, the head of an Islamist group in Sinjai district, was also the secretary of the PKS district branch.[81]

Occasionally, links between Islamist parties and Islamist groups outside the political system also exist at the *national* level. Hilmi Aminuddin, a major figure within PKS, is the son of Danu Muhammad Hasan, a Darul Islam leader accused of collaborating with the New Order secret service chief General Ali Moertopo.[82] In another example, there was a strong personal connection between Mohammad Natsir, the founder of the DDII, and Deliar Noer, who founded the Islamic Community Party (PUI, *Partai Ummat Islam*) in 1998. Finally, Yuzril Ihza Mahendra, a founder of the aforementioned PBB, was also cozy with the DDII and its founder.[83] However, such relationships are the exception rather than the norm.

In short, Islamist parties rarely hook up with Islamist groups outside the political arena. If links between the social milieux exist, they form on an ad hoc basis between individuals and are by no means institutionalized. Therefore, most of these party-movement ties are unstable and eventually implode.[84] On the rare occasion that such relations prevail

[77] The relations are apparently so close that PKS members often act as security guards for Bajri's house. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 99–100.
[78] Van Bruinessen 2013, 29. Emphasis added. [79] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 281.
[80] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 281. [81] Kompas December 14, 2002, 20.
[82] Machmudi 2008, 93–4. [83] Assyaukanie 2009, 183.
[84] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 124.

over time, they are dominated by local Islamist groups, not parties. Against this backdrop, local state elites in search of social capital have strong incentives to approach Islamist groups directly, as Chapter 6 shows.

In addition to a lack of local networks they could offer to state elites competing in elections, Islamist parties, just like all other parties in Indonesia, are cash-strapped and therefore cannot bankroll campaigns. For instance, Tetep Abdulatip, a PKS cadre who was running for the post of deputy district head in West Java's Tasikmalaya in 2006, said in an interview: "In most PKS strongholds, [our] members live a modest life. If we have money, we prefer to spend it on the community rather than ourselves. . . . We do not yet have access to money from the private sector. We only rely on PKS cadre [but] there aren't too many. We are also trying to raise funds from religiously legitimate [halal] sources."[85] Similarly, in South Sulawesi's Gowa district, the local PPP chairman lamented the fact that they had not *received* enough money from the candidate they supported in the local government head elections: "If we had known we would only get $60,000 [from our candidate], we could as well have taken somebody from inside the party. Why should we support a candidate from outside the party if we only get $60,000? People from within the party could have paid this much as well. We hoped for $200,000. If there's a candidate outside the party who is able to pay this, we will support him [in the next elections]. If not, we will take somebody from inside the party."[86] Islamist parties, in other words, have no economic capital to confer to state elites competing in local government head elections.

Finally, various corruption and sex scandals implicating cadres from Islamist parties in West Java and South Sulawesi have incensed the population, thus kneecapping any chance to deliver "cultural capital." For instance, in West Java's Subang district, a PKS legislator named Usep Ukaryana was arrested in 2013 after embezzling funds from a state program that subsidized fertilizer for poor farmers.[87] The image of the PKS in South Sulawesi has also been tarnished by scandals. In 2013, PKS chairman Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq was accused of using the party's control over the Ministry of Agriculture to raise beef import quotas in exchange for money. The main culprit in the bribery scheme was Ahmad Fathanah, who hails from a family that is influential in South Sulawesi's religious circles. He was a close advisor to Ishaaq and became infamous across Indonesia after being caught in a Jakarta hotel room with a naked high

[85] Quoted in Rachman 2006, 97.
[86] Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, pers. comm. May 24, 2006. [87] Tempo 2013.

school girl he had hired for sex and paid using the bribe money he had received earlier that day.[88] In recent years, corruption and sex scandals have ensnared many Islamist party members in other parts of the archipelago, too. This has given the Indonesian electorate the impression that Islamist parties are no more virtuous than secular parties.[89]

These humiliations have greatly diminished the "cultural capital" state elites can gain from teaming up with Islamist parties. A candidate competing for the district head post in West Java's Garut district said in an interview: "Voters don't trust parties these days and I therefore don't want to be associated with any of them."[90] Similarly, in South Sulawesi, the PKS attracted a great deal of ridicule as people affiliated with the Islamist movement made fun of the party's acronym in local op-eds, suggesting PKS stood for the "Party of Suharto Cronies" (*Partai Kroni Suharto*) or the "Very Dirty Party" (*Partai Kotor Sekali*).[91] These scandals preclude Islamist parties from offering "alternative narratives"[92] to Indonesian voters disenchanted with mainstream parties.

5.6 The Moderation of Islamist Parties

A scarcity of political resources that state elites seek for their campaigns is not the sole reason Islamist parties lack influence. Islamist parties also failed to shape *shari'a* policymaking due to a moderation of party agendas over the years.[93] These developments have their origins, again, within the state and political institutions.

Concretely, moderating impulses have emanated from national politics because of strong institutional incentives to build coalitions across the ideological spectrum. One incentive is the cabinet. National politicians are eager to obtain a cabinet post because it provides their party with access to the patronage-rich executive and the opportunity to manipulate regulations and laws in their favor. By joining political coalitions, parties increase their odds of backing the successful presidential candidate who will bestow cabinet posts.

Election laws adopted after 1998 also introduced thresholds for the allocation of seats in the national parliament. A *parliamentary* threshold, applied in the 1999 and 2004 elections, allowed parties winning less than 2 percent of the vote to take a seat in parliament but not contest future

[88] The Jakarta Globe 2014.
[89] Fealy 2009. In fairness to the PKS, the levels of proven graft in the party are still well below that of Golkar or the PDIP.
[90] Anonymous, pers. comm. June 15, 2013. [91] Hasan 2008. [92] Alagappa 2004, 483.
[93] See Tomsa 2012 for an overview.

elections.[94] An *electoral* threshold was introduced in 2009. It ruled that only parties securing at least 2.5 percent of the national vote may occupy a parliamentary seat, but all parties could contest future polls.[95] These thresholds further incentivize political moderation. To reach the minimum percentage of votes, the usually small Islamist parties conform their behavior to the mainstream preferences of voters.[96]

These institutional incentives are less pronounced at the subnational level. There are no cabinets and no de jure thresholds in parliament in local polities.[97] Parties receive seats in local legislatures based on their vote share per electoral area. The number of eligible seats differs from one electoral area to another and with it the de facto threshold for parties competing in local elections.

Still, the moderating dynamics in national politics have been transmitted to the subnational level for several reasons. The regulatory framework after 1998 introduced territorial requirements for parties.[98] There are no local parties in Indonesia, in other words.[99] These regulations anchored local party branches to national politics, thus exposing them to moderating dynamics from higher up. At the same time, Islamist parties in Indonesia are not very democratically organized but rely on strong hierarchies. Elite parties, such as the PBB, PPNUI and the PPP, have "top-heavy" structures, as mentioned before, so lower-rung party members do not dictate the agenda. Arguably, because the PBB, PPP and PPNUI are elite-driven parties, the national leadership's push to abandon its Islamist agenda over the years has encouraged the same trend at the subnational level, which was poorly developed to begin with.

[94] Due to these threshold regulations, the PKS and PPNUI parties changed their names after the 1999 elections in order to compete in the 2004 elections. The *Partai Nahdlatul Ummat* changed its name to *Partai Nahdlatul Ummah* and the *Partai Keadilan* became the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* prior to the 2004 elections, as mentioned before.

[95] See Law No. 10/ 2008 on Legislative Elections. This threshold was increased to 3.5 percent of the national votes for the 2014 elections.

[96] Tezcür and Künkler 2010, 2.

[97] An electoral threshold for provincial and district legislative elections may be introduced in 2019.

[98] The territorial requirements have become more stringent over the years. The reformed Law No. 2/2011 on Political Parties includes a requirement for new parties to demonstrate regional structures in all of the existing 33 provinces, 75 percent of the districts in those provinces and 50 percent of the subdistricts in those districts in order to be recognized as legal entities for participation in the 2014 legislative elections. Parties that had been recognized as legal entities prior to the 2009 elections need to have branches in 60 percent of provinces, in 50 percent of districts in these provinces and in 25 percent of subdistricts in these districts to qualify for the 2014 contest. The new law thus favors incumbent parties, many of which are tainted by corruption and low voter popularity.

[99] The government allowed a secessionist movement in Aceh province to form local parties as part of a peace agreement. However, these local parties can only participate in provincial and district elections in Aceh.

The PKS has more mature grassroots and therefore potentially more assertive local cadres. However, its formative years created very hierarchical internal structures tilted in favor of the national party leadership. Consequently, local party outlets had no option but to follow the middle way charted by national elites.[100]

In short, dynamics within the Indonesian state and political institutions have moderating tendencies.[101] Consequently, Islamist parties have plotted "a course towards the center"[102] by entering coalitions with secular parties and discarding plans to establish a state based on Islamic law.[103] For example, the PBB joined a coalition with the "ultra-nationalist" Party of Indonesian Justice and Unity (PKPI, *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia*) that was under the control of retired military officers. PBB embraced secular politicians and joined the cabinet.[104] In fact, a "disproportionate number" of Islamist party members filled the cabinet after the 2004 presidential elections.[105] What is more, PPP parliamentarians have stated publicly that their party would only adopt *shari'a* laws if there were public demand for it.[106]

Finally, Marcus Mietzner noted with regard to the PBB that:

> The lifestyles of the party leadership also became increasingly secular. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, then state secretary in Yudhoyono's administration and the founding chairman of the party, divorced his long-time wife in 2006 to marry a 22-year-old beauty of Japanese descent from the Philippines. The high-profile wedding of the couple led to serious debates both within the party and the general public about the credibility of Bulan Bintang's puritanical Islamic image. Yusril tried to contain these discussions by announcing that he would take his new wife on a hadj pilgrimage to Mekkah as soon as possible, but the impression of declining piety in the party elite was difficult to disperse.[107]

These moderating dynamics have eroded the capacity of Islamist parties to influence *shari'a* policymaking further.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I showed that Islamist parties appeared and mobilized after 1998 but subsequently failed to gain and maintain political influence. The few rank-and-file members who won local government head

[100] Buehler 2012.
[101] The moderation of the PKS may not necessarily be the result of "liberalizing values" that is ideological moderation within the party but rather due to "the demands of operating in a corrupt system rife with money politics . . .." See Hadiz 2011, 10.
[102] Mietzner 2008, 448–9.
[103] Buehler 2012; Mietzner 2008, 449; See chapter 4 in Platzdasch 2009a.
[104] Mietzner 2008, 448. [105] Liddle and Mujani 2007, 134.
[106] Hadiz 2011, 6, footnote 17. [107] Mietzner 2008, 448–9.

elections mostly abstained from promoting *shari'a* rules. Furthermore, Islamist parties do not dominate parliaments in localities that adopted *shari'a* regulations. In fact, controlling for areas where Islamist movements situated outside formal politics have strong historical roots, above-average electoral support did not translate into the adoption of *shari'a* regulations.

I argued that Islamist parties face an uphill battle for political influence. Islamist parties lack the wherewithal to galvanize the electorate due to poorly consolidated local networks. In other words, they cannot provide state elites with access to a local tableau of power brokers and vote-getters.

I then showed that Islamist parties also have trouble linking up with Islamist groups placed outside the political infrastructure. The PKS, the strongest and most successful Islamist party in post-1998 Indonesia, has grown out of a patchwork of student associations across the country. These Muslim networks are rooted in a pious urban middle class, which emerged *relatively recently* due to a combination of New Order-induced economic growth and an Islamic revival within Indonesian society. These networks differ from those affiliated with the Darul Islam movement. Both wanted a state grounded in Islamic law, but the former consist of urban dwellers and highly educated individuals from secular universities[108] while the latter have a strong presence in rural areas, based on a class of self-made landowners and traders derived from a peasant milieu dating to the pre-independence era, as shown in Chapter 2. Because these Islamist groups hail from a different social milieu, they do not associate with the PKS. Other Islamist parties examined in this chapter have somewhat closer relationships to apolitical Islamist groups. However, the groups tend to command those relationships, not the parties. Therefore, state elites cannot rely on Islamist parties to produce social capital.

Islamist parties also have been plagued by weak finances and various corruption and sex scandals. As such, elites cannot mine any cultural or economic capital from them.

[108] As Liddle 1996, 624 already observed in the mid-1990s:

> Among Muslim university students, both in Indonesia and abroad, there appears to be a general tendency toward extreme piety. This trend dates from the early 1970s, when campus mosques at leading Indonesian universities began to be known as centers of "fundamentalism." The typical "fundamentalist" student is said to come from a middle-class urban family background, to have received a relatively superficial religious education as a child and to be studying an exact or natural science. They are said to carry their conception of science, that there is only one right answer to any question, into their religious life.

Finally, the moderating tendencies within the state and political institutions have further sapped the influence of Islamist parties over *shari'a* policymaking. Islamist parties have gradually adapted to mainstream views, rather than pulled the formal political system into their orbit.[109] Hence, state elites entering coalitions with local Islamist parties during elections face minimal pressure to adopt *shari'a* regulations. Overall, Islamist parties did mobilize after 1998 but remain enfeebled due to the intervening logics of power accumulation within the state and political institutions.

The impotence of parties to deliver political resources is usually "concomitant with the *personalization* of relations of power."[110] That is, the underdevelopment of parties compels politicians to look for alternative power bases that can supply political goods, such as campaign teams and access to the electorate. This "personalization" of local politics, in which candidates rely on their clout and private networks rather than party machinery, is a phenomenon that can be observed across Indonesia. However, it has acquired a distinct contour in provinces where Islamist networks are strong, as elites frequently adopt a *shari'a* agenda to gain their support. Overall, then, this need to mobilize and structure a relatively independent electorate, especially in the face of poorly consolidated parties, has allowed Islamist groups to amass and exert political influence in West Java and South Sulawesi, as Chapters 6 and 7 show.

[109] Mietzner 2008 and Tanuwidjaja 2010 argue that mainstream parties have absorbed the agenda of Islamist parties. However, no mainstream party ever called for a state based on Islamic law. Overall, therefore, the party system has shifted in the direction of secular-nationalist parties.

[110] Jourde 2005, 424. Emphasis added.

6 Islamist Movements after 1998
Mobilization and Influence

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I describe how the democratic opening after 1998 facilitated the renaissance of Islamist movements in both West Java and South Sulawesi. Details about the origins of groups underlying these movements, relations between them and their reach within the provinces have surfaced only in the past few years due to their clandestine existence before 1998.[1] A definite account of the Islamist networks in the two provinces is thus impossible. However, sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter give readers an accurate and comprehensive portrait of the roots of the Islamist movements, the sociological profile of activists in these networks and the size and nature of the movements. To sketch the Islamist networks in the two provinces, I relied primarily on studies and newspapers but also on in-depth archival research on the ground in both West Java and South Sulawesi between 2005 and 2013. During that time, I also interviewed Islamists, scholars, journalists and government officials to gain a sense of the local role these movements occupy in post-New Order politics.

In section 6.4 of this chapter, I review the agenda of these groups and how they have tried to achieve their goals. Some Islamist activists have resorted to violence. However, those factions have always played a minor role in Islamist politics in Indonesia, and their capacity has been decaying for years.[2] There is also a small number of Islamists who tried to gain political influence by running for office directly. However, state elites dominate elections and have almost always defeated candidates rooted in Islamist circles, as shown in Chapter 3.

The groups described in this chapter are pursuing their agenda relatively peacefully. Their strategies to gain political sway range from staging

[1] The most comprehensive accounts of Islamist networks in West Java and South Sulawesi are Solahudin 2013 and Hamdan 2006, respectively.
[2] IPAC 2013; Sidel 2008.

demonstrations and rallies, to directly lobbying state elites, to collaborating closely with local administrators behind the scenes. Yet they have failed to penetrate the state by directly securing local administrative posts. They are also detached from Islamist parties for reasons presented in previous chapters. Overall these groups idle at the fringes of the formal political arena. Nevertheless, their political influence flourished as a result of changing power dynamics within the state, as seen in Chapter 7.

6.2 The Islamist Movement in West Java

A bewildering number of groups calling for an Islamic state proliferated in West Java within months of the New Order's collapse in 1998. Among the most important are the Alliance of Anti-Apostasy Movements (AGAP, *Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan*), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, *Front Pembela Islam*), the Anti-Immorality Movement (GAMAS, *Gerakan Anti Maksiat*), the Movement Against Apostasy and Misguided Cults (GAPAS, *Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat*), the Islam Reform Movement (GARIS, *Gerakan Reformasi Islam*), the People's Movement Against Ahmadiyah (GERAM, *Gerakan Rakyat Anti Ahmadiyah*), the Institute for the Assessment, Enforcement and Application of Shariah Islam (LP3Syi, *Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan dan Penerapan Syari'at Islam*) and the Tholiban. There are many more but smaller groups.[3]

These groups are often established ad hoc to rally for a cause, only to disappear again after a few months or years.[4] To some degree, this denotes the fluidity and informal nature of the Islamist movement in West Java. However, the movement is more cohesive than the large number of groups and their often brief life spans suggest. Almost all of these groups stem from a network that encompasses Islamist leaders directly linked or sympathetic to the Darul Islam rebellion, as examined in Chapter 2.[5]

For instance, the Islamic State of Tejamaya (NIT, *Negara Islam Tejamaya*) in Tasikmalaya or the Islamic Households Movement (PRTI, *Pergerakan Rumah Tangga Islam*), which surfaced after 1998 and continue to be active in the province, are direct offshoots of the Darul Islam.[6] Likewise, a group called "Ring Banten" emerged in 2004. Its leader, Kang Aja, a.k.a. Akham, had joined Darul Islam in the 1980s.[7]

[3] For a comprehensive overview of these Islamist groups in West Java, see Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 85–6.
[4] For a description of the unstable nature of such coalitions, see Kompas 2005, 27.
[5] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 85–6; Solahudin 2013. [6] ICG 2005, 2–4.
[7] ICG 2005, 27.

Ring Banten's bases overlapped with some of the areas that most fiercely resisted central government authority during the revolt.[8] Finally, an Islamist group was discovered to be under the leadership of a former Darul Islam fighter called Syekh Abdus Salam Panji Gumilang, a.k.a Syamsul Alam, a.k.a. Abu Ma'ariq, in Indramayu district in 2008. Head of the *Al-Zaytun* boarding school, Gumilang and the NII had established a shadow government and already appointed ministerial and bureaucratic posts for the future Islamic Nation of Indonesia (NII, *Negara Islam Indonesia*).[9]

Islamist groups also cropped up around figures with no direct links to the Darul Islam. Still, most of these figures are deeply attached to the Islamic gentry described in Chapter 2 and have championed the Islamist cause in West Java for decades. For instance, two DDII[10] members, K.H. Husein Umar and Dr. Anwar Haryono, initiated the formation of GARIS in Cianjur district in 1998.[11] Several former DDII leaders are sitting on GARIS' executive board (*Dewan Syuro*). These include Qodir Jaelani, K.H. Kholil Ridwan and Ahmad Sumargono. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the *emir* of Jemmah Islamiyah,[12] an Indonesian terror group, is also an official board member of GARIS but was in jail at the time of writing.[13] The current leader of GARIS is H. Chep Hernawan Dapet, an entrepreneur with a long history in the province's Islamist movement.[14] He comes from a family of businessmen who own a plastic recycling company in Cianjur, dabble in the district's property market and control several rice distributors. In his youth, Hernawan was active in the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI, *Gerakan Pemuda Islam*) and the DDII.[15] He also

[8] ICG 2005, 1. Ring Banten made world headlines after it detonated a bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004, killing 12 people. Several of the suicide bombers had fathers who had been active participants in the Darul Islam rebellion. See ICG 2005, i.

[9] Zulkifli 2011, 76. Darul Islam leader Kartosuwiryo declared the NII in1948 as mentioned previously. Al-Jaytun was the headquarters of KW9, one of the "jurisdictions" the Darul Islam had established after it declared the NII.

[10] As already mentioned in Chapter 2, DDII, which was founded in 1967 by Masyumi leaders, is an organization that emphasizes the superiority of Islam over other religions, mainly through its media outlet *Media Dakwah*. DDII also stresses the importance of defending Islam against "anti-Islamic" developments. DDII has been one of the main "transmission belts" through which Darul Islam's Islamist agenda has influenced and inspired the current Islamist movement in West Java. See Feillard et Madinier 2006, 252.

[11] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 85–6. Apparently, Umar and Haryono were concerned about the rise of communist parties when the socialist-inclined People's Democratic Party (PRD, *Partai Rakyat Demokratik*) was established after 1998. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 144. Islamist groups also prevented President Wahid from legalizing the Indonesian Communist Party in 1999.

[12] Ba'asyir has never been formally replaced as emir despite having been jailed since 2010.

[13] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 49. [14] ICG 2010, 14–15. [15] Anonymous 2011.

survived the Tanjung Priok massacre.[16] Finally, Hernawan was a founding member of the Islamist Crescent Star Party (PBB, *Partai Bulan Bintang*) but ditched the party in 2001 because he was disillusioned with what he saw as the PBB's increasingly pragmatic political course.[17]

Besides groups established at the personal behest of Darul Islam supporters, many Islamist groups active in West Java sprouted from religious boarding schools formed around former Darul Islam fighters or founded by religious teachers embedded in the milieu from which the Islamist revolt emerged in the 1950s.

Some of the more prominent boarding schools that undergird the Islamist movement in West Java today are *Pesantren Suci* led by Ajengan Qudsi Nawawi[18] and *Pesantren Cipanas* under the leadership of Kyai Aan Mustofa[19] and Ajengan Saeful Tamam, a former Darul Islam fighter.[20] The two religious boarding schools have become the bases for LP3Syi, an Islamist group mentioned earlier. GARIS has also recruited students from boarding schools *Pesantren Ashabul Yamin* and *Darul Alam*,[21] headed by religious teachers Dadin Jamaludin and Muhammad Hardim Nawate, who are both executive board members of GARIS.[22] Furthermore, the aforementioned FPI has used the religious boarding school *Al-Um* in Jakarta's Ciputat subdistrict as a recruitment hub, mainly because its owner, K.H. Misbahul Alam, was a founding member of the FPI.[23] In Cirebon district, the FUI under the leadership of Salim Badjri is closely connected to the religious boarding school *Babakan* led by an Islamist named K.H. Mahtum Hanan.[24] In Tasikmalaya district, Kyai Zenzen Zaenal (Jainal) Muttaqin Atiq, a long-time Islamist activist who has taught many Islamists in West Java,[25] and Ajengan Asep

[16] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 146. In Tanjung Priok in 1984, the army fired at Islamist groups that were protesting against Suharto's order that all parties had to adopt the ecumenical Pancasila ideology. More than 200 people were killed in the massacre. Allegedly, the core network of GARIS consists of Islamist activists who survived the Tanjung Priok Massacre.

[17] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 88, 92.

[18] K.H. Qudsi Nawawi has been active in Nahdlatul Ulama in Garut district and is affiliated with various other religious boarding schools. He is also actively involved in other Islamist groups including the aforementioned LP3Syi, GERAM and a party member of PPP. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 88–93.

[19] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 88.

[20] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 46.

[21] Several students from pesantren *Ashabul Yamin* in Cianjur acted as suicide bombers in the terror attack against a nightclub in Bali in 2002. They are now buried in Cianjur on land owned by Chep Hernawan. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 149.

[22] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 103.

[23] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 96.

[24] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 94.

[25] Kyai Zenzen Zaenal (Jainal) Muttaqin Atiq led the Taliban Brigade (*Barigade Taliban*) in West Java in the late 1990s. A member of this group, and Zenzen's most prominent student, was Akim Akimuddin a.k.a. Suheb a.k.a. Asep. Born in Cikalang subdistrict in Tasikmalaya, Akim lived in Afghanistan between 1987 and 1991. He then moved to

Maoshul Affandi, the head of *pesantren Al-Irsyadiyah*, are also linked to *Miftahul Huda*, an alumni association of a boarding school started by Darul Islam leader K.H. Choer Affandi.[26] Zenzen and Asep are also members of the Tholiban group and regularly marshal their students for Islamist activities.[27] The *Nurul Jaza* boarding school located in the South of Tasikmalaya has acted as a recruitment center for the Tholiban too.[28] Finally, also in Tasikmalaya, *pesantren Manonjaya* is a base for local Islamist groups.

A few of these Islamist boarding schools maintain their own paramilitary troops. *Pesantren Miftahul Huda* controls the Tasikmalaya Muslim Solidarity (TSM, *Tasikmalaya Solidaritas Muslim*) to which the Santri Student Regiment (RESAN, *Resimen Santri*) is attached. Consisting almost exclusively of *santri*, the RESAN is used as a shock troop during political rallies and sweeps.[29]

In addition to such "modernist" *pesantren*, many "traditional" boarding schools have also become nodes for West Java's Islamist movement after 1998. This is not surprising. Although many leaders of the Darul Islam were reformist Muslims, "especially in West Java, it was mostly traditionalist pesantrens that provided the movement with its fighting power," van Bruinessen notes.[30] The most prominent schools with a traditional bent in the contemporary Islamist movement in West Java are *Ashabul Yamin* and *Darul Aman.* There are many more local boarding schools that play a vital function in the Islamist movements of their respective districts.[31]

Islamist groups in West Java also have infiltrated Qur'an recitation circles (*Majelis Ta'lim*) often affiliated with mosques. Many of these recitation groups are used to enlist and mobilize members for the Islamist cause in West Java.[32] In Cirebon, the Brotherhood of Islam

Malaysia where he was in contact with Islamist activists. Akim also did two tours of duty in Ambon as a member of the *Laskar Mujahidin* forces between late 1999 and 2001 when the Christian–Muslim conflict was at its peak in Eastern Indonesia, Hasan 2006 noted. After joining the Taliban Brigade in the late 1990s, Akim became one of the Christmas Eve bombers in 2000 when Christian churches were attacked in several cities across the country. Akim died when his bomb device went off prematurely. See IRS 2010, online.

[26] Pesantren Al-Irsyadiyah serves as the headquarters for Miftahul Huda.

[27] Kyai Zenzen is also listed as a member of the Education and Culture Committee of the Religious Council (*Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi*) of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), an umbrella organization for Islamist groups based in Central Java.

[28] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 169.

[29] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 169.

[30] Van Bruinessen 2008, 224. Also, the traditionalist pesantren at the coastal areas in Java (*pasisir nahdliyyin*) were always more puritan that those in the inner regions of Java. Particularly the Betawi and Priangan *nahdliyyin* were noted for their conservatism. I thank Greg Fealy for clarifying this point.

[31] For a more detailed list, see Direktorat 2007.

[32] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 48.

Forum (FUI, *Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah*) is led by Salim Badjri,[33] who for decades has been an important figure in religious school networks affiliated with the modernist organization *Al Irsyad Al Islamiyah*.[34] Badjri frequented a Qur'an recitation group called *Majlis Ta'lim Syarif Hidayatullah* from the mid-1990s until 2001. The clandestine reading circle, which strongly opposed the New Order regime and was therefore known as the "Anti-Golkar Ta'lim," had several thousand members.[35] Badjri exploited this circle to not only connect with the masses but also interact with Islamists from other parts of West Java who were frequently invited as guest speakers.[36] Since early 2000, Badjri has enlisted alumni from the *Majlis Ta'lim Syarif Hidayatullah* into various Islamist organizations he established in Cirebon.[37] He recruited *Ta'lim* members for the Cirebon branch of the MMI in 2001,[38] for the FUI in 2004 and for GAPAS in 2005. In another example, FPI members frequently attend the Majelis Ta'lim at the *Al Ishlah* Mosque in Petamburan, situated in Jakarta's Tanah Abang area. Often, FPI founder Habib Rizieq Syihab leads the Qur'an recitations (*pengajian*) himself.[39] Other FPI leaders established their own recitation groups. Habib Muchsin Alatas founded the *Majelis Ta'lim Anwarul Hidyat,* while Habib Salim bin Umar Al Attas created the *Majelis Ta'lim Mahabbaturrasul.* This latter Qur'an reading network frequently has served as a recruitment base for Habib Salim's Islamist group *Laskar Aswaja*, which often exhorts members to join forces with FPI and FUI for demonstrations, lobbying and religious sweeps.[40] Likewise, in Tasikmalaya district, Thursday night recitation meetings at the *Al Irsyadiyah* boarding school are used to draft new members into the Tholiban group.[41]

While most *leaders* of the Islamist movement in West Java are rooted in the class of non-aristocratic farmers and rice traders described in Chapter 2, few studies explicitly dissect the sociological profile of the *lower rungs* of the movement. An exception is Noorhaidi Hasan's study of the *Laskar Jihad*, an Islamist group that was mainly active at the beginning of Indonesia's democratic transition but recently made a come-back:[42]

[33] Born in Cirebon in 1963 and of Arab descent, Salim Bajri is a professor at the local State College for Islamic Education (STAIN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri*). He was the head of the local *Al Irsyad* branch for more than 15 years and an activist for the Islamist cause long before he founded the FUI. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 93 and ICG 2012, online for more details.

[34] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 100.

[35] ICG 2012, 2, footnote 4.

[36] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 94.

[37] See ICG 2012, 2, footnote 4.

[38] The MMI is an Islamist umbrella organization founded in Central Java in 2000, as mentioned before.

[39] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 96.

[40] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 96.

[41] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 169.

[42] Noor 2014.

most students engaged in Laskar Jihad missions ... openly acknowledge their simple rural background; their parents generally live as peasants owning limited farmland ... Some clearly indicate that their families belong to the *abangan* group in Javanese society, who accept Islam only partly and still practice traditional rituals. ... [T]he students themselves have only become acquainted with Islam after migrating to the cities in order to pursue higher education ... To balance the picture, one must note that a significant number of Laskar Jihad fighters come from non-peasant families. Their close relatives are petty bureaucrats, teachers, small merchants, and even businessmen in small towns or villages. Some claim to belong to santri families. Among them are sons of activists of small branches of Muslim modernist organizations, notably the Muhammadiyah ... Many had even completed their secondary education in Muhammadiyah schools and had had experience in Muhammadiyah youth organizations such as the Muhammadiyah Scouts (Hizbul Wathan, HW) and the Muhammadiyah Youth Union (Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah, IRM). In addition to those from the *moderen santri* background, a few fighters came from the kolot, or old-fashioned, santri families associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama.[43]

In West Java, beyond the Islamist movement's core of activists and religious teachers and students, there is an outer layer that is less ideologically inclined. Many of the foot soldiers of Islamist groups here are petty criminals and hoodlums who sought new income streams once their jobs as enforcers of the New Order dictatorship became obsolete after 1998.[44] In this context, a local newspaper reported that Habib Salim's aforementioned Islamist group *Laskar Aswaja* consists almost exclusively of "gangsters and drunks."[45] Similarly, the Tholiban in Tasikmalaya recruits many members from street gangs whose "courage is often useful for Tholiban violence."[46] This *Lumpenproletariat* is usually at the forefront of anti-vice demonstrations, sweeps of nightclubs and liquor stores, the extraction of bribes and levies and violence against religious minorities.

We cannot pin down the exact number of people affiliated with Islamist groups in West Java because the networks are informal and still rather clandestine. However, it is clear they reach tens of thousands of people on the ground on a regular basis. The aforementioned *Majelis Ta'lim Mahabbaturrasul* Qur'an recitation circle has at least 18 branches in the Jakarta area bringing together 10,000 people several times a week.[47] Islamist groups have become particularly visible and vocal in districts that were former Darul Islam bastions, too, such as Cianjur, Cirebon, Garut and Tasikmalaya.[48] In 2010, the Tholiban group was estimated to have around 3,000 members in Tasikmalaya district alone, although

[43] Hasan 2006, 160–1. [44] Wilson 2008. [45] Suara Islam 2008.
[46] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 169. [47] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 114.
[48] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 2.

there are no official numbers and the Tholiban has rarely gathered more than 1,000 people at the same time.[49]

While many of the Islamist groups are very locally defined – they have their stronghold in a particular district or, at most, in a certain part of the province – Islamist groups are also actively reaching out to vote-getters and power brokers outside their immediate spheres. In West Java, the FUI once succeeded in assembling over 200 religious notables from across the province in South Jakarta's *Pesantren Darunnajah*.[50]

In fact, a few groups managed to establish a presence in *several* districts across the province. Graduates of the Islamist *Manonjaya* boarding school in *Tasikmalaya* district started the Alumni Association Miftahul Huda (*Hamida*) that is now mostly active in Cianjur district, as mentioned.[51] Similarly, local observers estimate that GARIS has 28,000 members in Cianjur district and another 5,000 in Sukabumi district.[52] In an interview in March 2011, GARIS founder Hernawan even claimed he commanded more than 200,000 members scattered across West Java.[53] Likewise, Warman, the FPI leader in Ciamis district, said in a 2011 interview that his group had members in over 50 Islamist boarding schools throughout the province.[54] Such numbers are likely exaggerated but nevertheless indicate that Islamist networks are strong and sometimes able to span the province, not just a single district.

These developments are in line with some Islamist groups' attempts to harmonize their activities across the province. To this end, they founded the Islamic People's Forum (FUI, *Forum Umat Islam*) in 2005. The FUI has since become an umbrella of sorts for the Islamist cause in West Java and is supposed to coordinate activities province-wide.[55] Established by former DDII activists, FUI profits from their extensive reach into Islamist circles.[56] The forum also runs its own local branches[57] and relies on *pesantren* networks to manage activities.[58] A smaller umbrella organization

[49] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 168.
[50] For a comprehensive list of clergies in attendance, see Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 113.
[51] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 168. [52] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 143.
[53] Anonymous 2011, 6. [54] Anonymous 2010, 3.
[55] See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 124 for a profile of the organization.
[56] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 85–6, 131–2.
[57] See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 124 for a more comprehensive profile. Many of the local FUI branches are run by an Islamist group called *Islamic Mission Party* (HDI, *Hizbud Dakwah Islam*), which was founded by an FUI leader called Al Khaththath. In Bekasi district, for instance, FUI is under the control of Bernard Abdul Jalal, head of the local HDI branch. This is similar in other provinces. In East Java's Pasuruan district, FUI is run by Rochmat Aminudin, the head of the local HDI branch. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 131.
[58] FUI, for instance, has close relations to K.H. Mahrus Amin, the leader of *pesantren Darunnajah* in Jakarta; K.H. Syukron Ma'mun, leader of *pesantren Daarul Rahman*; and

called the Forum of Discussing the Islamic Shari'a (FMSI, *Forum Mudzakarah Syariah Islam*) was established in 2005 to coordinate the activities of Islamist groups in Depok district.[59]

Of course, there are also rivalries within the Islamist movement in West Java. Friction typically arises from clashing political and economic agendas and often leads to the creation of new groups. The FPI is a case in point. In 1999, K.H. Cecep Bustomi, an FPI founder, left the organization after other members blasted him for joining the PPP party. Soon afterward, Bustomi and FPI members loyal to him started a group called *Front Hizbullah*.[60]

These rifts, however, have not hampered the cohesion and strength of the Islamist movement in West Java. Groups may rise and fall, but they always do so within the Islamist networks that have existed in the province for decades. In addition to a distinct class background, they are held together by shared experiences (such as the Darul Islam revolt, the Tanjung Priok Massacre or paramilitary training abroad) and a common future goal (an Islamic state). Family relations among many of the Islamist leaders provide additional glue to this network. Sidney Jones, a leading expert on Indonesian Islamist groups, captured the nature of West Java's Islamist movement in a report for the International Crisis Group:

"Every time the older [Darul Islam] generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by [Darul Islam]'s history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. The [Darul Islam] movement ... is now one very loose but enduring web of personal contacts ..." Overall, then, "[Darul Islam] is an extraordinarily resilient organization that has gone through cycles of decline and growth, or perhaps more aptly, senescence and rejuvenation .... The common Darul Islam heritage is so powerful a bond that it facilitates contacts and communication across the entire extended family, which today consists of Darul Islam itself, [Jemmah Islamiyah], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jundulloh, the Banten group and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN), to name a few, not counting innumerable DI veterans who have their own large followings but operate completely outside any formal structure. These people know and visit each other, go to school together, intermarry, and keep in touch across generations. They also feud, bicker, and not infrequently, inform on each other. But the network endures, even as its component parts are constantly changing."[61]

K.H. Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi'i, leader of *pesantren As Syafi'iyyah*. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 132. Members of the aforementioned Hamida alumni association in West Java have also co-founded the aforementioned MMI, *Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia*, in 2000, which wants to be an umbrella organization for Islamist movements across Java island. K.H. Asep Mousul and Ajengan Mubin. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 168.

[59] Hasan 2007, 20. [60] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 138. [61] ICG 2005, i–1.

In short, the Indonesian term *keluarga besar*, which translates as "extended family" and describes a network of people with a shared history or cause, most aptly depicts the nature of the Islamist movement in West Java.

6.3 The Islamist Movement in South Sulawesi

Islamist groups also resurfaced in South Sulawesi within months after the New Order regime expired in 1998. As in West Java, most of these groups here are connected to the Darul Islam movement via former fighters or sympathizers rooted in the class of peasant entrepreneurs and traders of non-aristocratic origin examined in Chapter 2.[62] The Islamist groups in South Sulawesi are relatively more coordinated than the scattered and decentralized Islamist movement in West Java. The Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Shari'a Law (KPPSI, *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam*), a province-wide umbrella for local Islamist groups, plays an important role in the Islamization of politics in South Sulawesi. The following section therefore focuses on the origins, composition and lobbying activities of the KPPSI.

In 1999, Islamist activists in South Sulawesi's Islamist network, examined in Chapter 2, founded the Islamic Community Forum (FUI, *Forum Umat Islam*). Most founders had graduated from Hasanuddin University and the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI, *Universitas Muslimin Indonesia*). The driving force behind the FUI's establishment was a UMI student called Agus Dwikarna who was born in Makassar into a non-aristocratic family. His father, Sariful Anam, was the Director of Industry for the Region of Makassar (*Direktur Kawasan Industri Makassar*). Agus Dwikarna studied at the Technical Faculty of the UMI, where he became involved in Islamist groups.[63] Dwikarna's teacher Abdurrachman A. Basalamah, an economist and former UMI dean, became the head of FUI.[64]

[62] See the short biographies of leading KPPSI figures provided in the footnotes on the following pages.

[63] After 1998, Dwikarna became the head of the Makassar branch of an Islamist group called Kompak. Kompak made a name for itself by producing videos that showed the alleged crimes of Christians against Muslims during the conflicts in Poso and Ambon between 1999 and 2000. These videos were used to recruit members for *Jemaah Islamiyah*, an Islamist terror network active in Indonesia mentioned before. Kompak Makassar also provided Muslim fighters in Poso with arms. See Feillard et Madinier 2006, 242. Agus Dwikarna is also close to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the ideologue behind the terror group *Jemmah Islamyiah*. See ICG 2003, 17; Hamdan 2006, 199.

[64] Basalamah was also a DDII cadre and had served as the Coordinator of Islamic Propagation in South Sulawesi during the New Order years. Basalamah was also a key figure in the Islamist movement in Java and participated in the founding congress of the

In 2000, a year after the FUI was founded, Dwikarna organized the "First Muslim Community Congress" (*Kongres Umat Islam Pertama*) at the Asrama Haji in Makassar to discuss the adoption of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Hundreds of national and local academics, politicians and luminaries attended. An important national figure was Jusuf Kalla, an entrepreneur of non-aristocratic origin from South Sulawesi who was active in an Islamic student group in his youth and eventually served as Indonesia's vice-president between 2004 and 2009.[65] Also attending was Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the leader of Indonesia's aforementioned terror network *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

Provincial worthies included Ahmad Ali, the Dean of the Faculty of Law of Hasanuddin University; the aforementioned FUI head Abdurrahman A. Basalamah; and H. Asnawi, then Deputy Governor of South Sulawesi province.[66] A "celebrity guest" was Haji Abdullah Hadi Bin Haji Awang, then (and current) President of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS, *Parti Islam SeMalaysia*), who talked about his party's struggle to adopt *shari'a* in Malaysia. At the end of the congress, the KPPSI was established to serve as an umbrella for all Islamist groups in the province.

Participants at the founding congress in 2000 elected Ahmad Ali, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Hasanuddin University; Sanusi Baco, a member of the province's MUI; and the aforementioned Abdurrahman A. Basalamah as the leaders of the KPPSI advisory council (*Majelis Syura*).[67] The participants also formed an Executive Body (*Lajnah Tanfidziah*). Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the son of South Sulawesi's Darul Islam leader Kahar Muzakkar introduced in Chapter 2, became the chairman of the Executive Body while the aforementioned Agus Dwikarna became his deputy (*Wakil Ketua Lajnah Tanfidziah*). Furthermore, a Department for Paramilitary Activities (*Departemen Kelaskaran*) under the auspices of the KPPSI's Executive Body was established and *Laskar Jundullah* was attached to it.[68] The aforementioned Agus Dwikarna became the head of *Laskar Jundullah*,[69] and Azwar Hasan, who had also long been active in Islamist circles in South

MMI, the umbrella organization for Islamist groups based in Central Java. See Mujiburrahman 2013, 159.

[65] Jusuf Kalla was reelected as vice-president in 2014.

[66] For (incomplete) lists of participants, see Pradadimara and Junedding 2002, online and Hamdan 2006, 161–5.

[67] See Hamdan 2006, 169 for a more comprehensive list of KPPSI leaders.

[68] Hamdan 2006, 169 and Kompas March 18, 2002, 11. ICG 2003, 15 and Fealy 2002, 10 say that *Laskar Jundullah* was founded in 1999 and 2000, respectively. *Laskar Jundullah* was accused of being actively involved in the violence in Poso in Central Sulawesi and in North Malukku. See ICG 2003, 15.

[69] Hamdan 2006, 153.

Sulawesi,[70] became the paramilitary's secretary general (*Sekretaris Jenderal*).[71]

KPPSI held several more congresses in subsequent years, namely in Makassar in 2001, Bulukumba in 2005 and Pangkep in 2006. The fifth congress was held at the *pesantren Masjid Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad* (DDI) in Wajo district in 2010.[72] The most recent KPPSI congress was held in Makassar in March 2014, which shows that the lobbying efforts of the organization continue.

Already in the first congress, the KPPSI unveiled plans to establish a presence across South Sulawesi.[73] In 2004, the group claimed to have branches in every district. A source close to KPPSI claims the organization already had two million members by 2002 and branches in every subdistrict by 2004.[74] This is without question grossly inflated. Despite in-depth research in South Sulawesi between 2005 and 2013, I was neither able to see these branches nor to obtain official membership lists. Eventually, a leading KPPSI figure confirmed in an interview that the group does not have *official* membership structures below the provincial level.[75] This is corroborated by other researchers: "KPPSI does not register its members and has no membership cards because everyone who agrees with the adoption of Islamic law automatically becomes a member."[76] Indicative of the elite nature of the organization was a survey conducted in 2003, which showed only 30.4 percent of people in South Sulawesi had heard of the KPPSI.[77]

The KPPSI's official structures below the leadership bodies may be rather informal, but the organization relies on the heads of local Islamist groups and/or religious boarding schools, who act as local KPPSI proxies and mobilize their networks on its behalf. An analysis of top KPPSI leaders' backgrounds and their boarding schools and foundations reveals the close links between the KPPSI and the Darul Islam movement. For instance, Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the head of the KPPSI's executive board, has close ties to the *Hidayatullah* boarding school in South Sulawesi. He is also an alumnus of HMI–MPO, the Islamist student

[70] Azwar Hasan was born on August 17, 1963 and studied in the Department of Politics at Hasanuddin University, where he worked as a lecturer after graduation. See Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1. He is currently a lecturer in media and communications at Hasanuddin University. Azwar Hasan, pers. comm. March 31, 2006. He is also the South Sulawesi chairman of the Indonesian Broadcasting Committee (KPI, *Komite Penyiaran Indonesia*). See Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1 and Hamdan 2006, 178.

[71] Kompas March 26, 2001, 24. [72] See KPPSI 2005, 59 and Subair 2012, 79.

[73] KPPSI also announced that it would establish an organization for Muslim businessmen and institutions for the collection of religious alms. See Hamdan 2006, 193–5.

[74] See Zainuddin 2004, 52. [75] Syafruddin, pers. comm. February 14, 2008.

[76] Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 56. [77] Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 83.

organization that emerged during the New Order to fight the ecumenical Pancasila ideology, mentioned in Chapter 2. Kamaluddin, the deputy secretary appointed during the KPPSI's first congress, had also been an HMI–MPO activist.[78] The aforementioned Agus Dwikarna was a student at YFM, a.k.a. LP2DE, a.k.a. YWI, the foundation established by Darul Islam sympathizer Fahtul Muin Daeng Maggading, introduced in Chapter 2. Agus Dwikarna had also been under the tutelage of Ale A.T., another former Darul Islam leader from South Sulawesi.[79]

Lower rungs in the KPPSI are closely linked to the Darul Islam too. For instance, the head of the KPPSI branch in Bulukumba district was also leading the local YPDI branch at the time of writing.[80] YPDI founded *Pesantren Darul Istiqamah*, which has been committed to the adoption of Islamic law in South Sulawesi for decades, as noted in Chapter 2. In another example, the Islamist foundation *Wahda Islamiyah*, a.k.a. YMF, which is also running a religious boarding school in South Sulawesi called YPWI and has direct ties to the Darul Islam as mentioned in Chapter 2, sent a large delegation to the KPPSI's third congress in Bulukumba in 2005, including H. Qasim Saguni, then secretary general (*Sekretaris Jenderal*) of YPWI.[81] Furthermore, H. Abdul Majid M. Dg, a close friend of Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, allegedly came to serve as the head of the Islamic Youth Corps (*Korps Pemuda Islam*), the successor organization of *Laskar Jundullah,* the KPPSI's paramilitary wing. In a September 2005 interview, Abdul Majid M. Dg also claimed to be the head of *Hidayatullah* boarding school for the entire province of South Sulawesi and to be responsible for the school's activities in the province.[82]

Many *Laskar Jundullah* members were also recruited through networks formed around Sanusi Daris,[83] the "Defense Minister" of Darul Islam in South Sulawesi who later founded the RFS, an Islamist group mentioned in Chapter 2.[84] Others joined *Laskar Jundullah* out of Islamist student

[78] Kamaluddin attended lectures at the State University of Makassar (UNM, *Universitas Negeri Makassar*), the former Institute for Education and Teacher's Training (IKIP, *Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pengetahuan*). He was active in the campus' HMI–MPO branch and served as the chair of HMI–MPO Makassar from 1995 to 1996. See Hamdan 2006, 178.

[79] ICG 2005, 5. [80] Hamdan 2006, 152. [81] Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 24.

[82] Abdul Majid M. Dg is a graduate from Hasanuddin University's Agriculture Department like Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar. See Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1. The two men became friends when taking a course on fishery together. H. Abdul Majid M. Dg, pers. comm. September 14, 2006. The interview was conducted in *September* 2005, but in *March* 2005, Abdul Azis Kahar Muzakkar was still the head of *Hidayatullah* South Sulawesi province, according to a local newspaper article. See Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1.

[83] ICG 2002, 21. [84] ICG 2002, 10.

associations such as HMI–MPO or were drafted from mosque youth organizations (*remaja mesjid*).[85]

As in West Java, not all supporters of Islamist movements joined for ideological reasons. Many *Laskar Jundullah* members, for instance, were petty criminals who had formed vigilante groups in the districts of South Sulawesi after security deteriorated in the wake of the New Order regime's downfall. KPPSI leaders readily admitted the criminal background of some of its members. Azwar Hasan, for instance, said in an interview that "usually those young people recruited are indeed ... well ... there are many among them that are ... thugs ... but then [after they join *Laskar Jundullah*] they change."[86]

Also similar to West Java, there are tensions and shifting alliances among various Islamist groups underpinning the KPPSI, as shown in the section below on lobbying activities.[87] However, the network that gave birth to the KPPSI is cohesive and stable overall. As was the case in West Java, the Islamist movement in South Sulawesi was durable because of a distinct class background reinforced by blood ties and intermarriage, a shared history and a united agenda. It is due to the cohesiveness and reach of these networks that the KPPSI has become "the most dynamic local movement now existing in Indonesia ... [struggling] ... for the implementation of Islamic law."[88]

6.4 The Lobbying Activities of Islamist Movements

Islamist activists in West Java almost never try to influence politics by running as candidates directly, as explained in Chapter 3. Very few figures within the Islamist movement hold official state positions, and if such overlaps exist, they are defined by personal relationships, not institutions. The MUI typifies the point. In several districts, Islamist groups have been relatively successful in permeating this semi-official government body.[89] For instance, the secretary general of West Java's FUI Muhammad Al Khaththath became a member of the state-affiliated MUI in 2005.[90] The same year, Al Khaththath was appointed to an anti-terror team

[85] Hamdan 2006, 178–80. [86] Azwar Hasan, pers. comm. September 7, 2006.
[87] See also Mujiburrahman 2013, 175–7. [88] Hamdan 2006, 4.
[89] Ichwan 2013, 64 showed that this is a phenomenon which has occurred mainly after 2005. Arguably, it is no coincidence that such forces became more represented in the formal political arena after 2005, which was also the year in which direct elections for local government heads were introduced and state elites therefore began to reach out to a broad range of organizations.
[90] Al Khaththath ran several times unsuccessfully for the post of local government head and for a seat in the local parliament.

funded by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Other important MUI leaders with tight links to the FUI in West Java are Ma'ruf Amin, Kholil Ridwan and K.H. Amrullah Ahmad.[91] The bonds between the two organizations became so close that the FUI was allowed to participate in MUI's Islamic People Congress in 2010. However, the fickle nature of these personal relations is reflected in the fact that the HTI and the FPI were allowed to participate in MUI's 2005 congress but were excluded in 2010 because they had apparently become "radical."[92] Shut out of official state positions and detached from Islamist parties, Islamist groups most commonly try to steer political agendas through direct or indirect lobbying of state elites. The existence and aims of these Islamist groups first became known to a broader public in 2002, when the Indonesian national parliament debated constitutional amendments.[93] As in 1945 and 1968, Islamist groups (together with Islamist parties, as noted in Chapter 5) demanded that parliament revise the constitution to insert the Jakarta Charter, the preamble requiring Muslims to adhere to Islamic law. However, their lobbying efforts failed.[94]

At the same time, West Java's Islamist movement began to petition *local* governments. Many Islamist groups took to the streets to protest against what they considered "immoral activities" including prostitution, the practices of "deviant" religious groups, as well as the production, consumption and circulation of alcohol.

Islamist groups also started to comment on local politics and tried to position themselves as the arbiters of issues pertaining to "Islam," especially what role religion should play in public life. Heated public debates on this issue have erupted amid local elections. In this context, Islamist groups have frequently asked for the resignation of politicians they considered "bad Muslim."[95] In 2012, the candidate for mayor of Bekasi endorsed by the FPI had two wives and was thus lambasted by opponents as a "polygamist." The FPI immediately denounced these attacks as a politicization of religion, declaring that the other candidates were acting against Islam and should drop out of the race.[96]

[91] See Hasani and Naipospos, 2010, 91. Al Khaththath was also the leader of HTI, a transnational Islamist group. See Hasan 2007, 4.
[92] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 187. [93] Mujiburrahman 2013, 146.
[94] Salim and Azra 2003, 186.
[95] Salim and Azra 2003, 186. *Santri* stormed the parliament in Ciamis district in 2013, demanding the immediate resignation of the head of the local parliament as well as the district head. The two politicians were caught having sex with teenagers in a karaoke bar in Tasikmalaya district during a raid. The videos of the *santri* storming the local parliament were later made available online.
[96] Bilal 2012.

On the other side of the coin, Islamist groups publicly backed local candidates they deemed worthy based on their dedication to enacting *shari'a* law. The FPI publicly endorsed the former district head of Indramayu when he was running for governor in 2012, as detailed in Chapter 7. Likewise, the FPI and the FUI in 2009 endorsed the presidential ticket of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, both of whom had allegedly been supportive of FUI's Islamic People Charter (*Piagam Umat Islam*), which was published ahead of the elections and called for a state based on Islamic law. The FUI also was pleased with Jusuf Kalla because he promised the group in a meeting on June 10, 2009, that he would disband Ahmadiyah. The FUI went so far as to run a full-page advertisement in the Republika newspaper in favor of the Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto ticket. The FPI under the leadership of Habiz Rizieq released a similar endorsement.[97]

The FPI has become so self-confident that in 2012 it started to publish "Political Declarations" (*maklumat politik*) in the run-up to elections, backing certain candidates and lecturing the public on how "good Muslims" vote.[98] These lobbying efforts have become increasingly sophisticated. In recent years, local journalists have received FPI's declarations via email, including hyperlinks to pages in an online Qur'an that purportedly buttressed FPI's claims.[99]

Islamist movements also tried to push their agenda in a less visible but no less effective fashion: lobbying state elites directly and working closely with them behind the scenes to draft and adopt regulations. On various occasions, Islamist groups have prepared "academic feasibility studies" (*naskah akademik*) of *shari'a* regulations and presented them to governments.[100] The following anecdotes epitomize a myriad of similar activities throughout the province.

In Tasikmalaya district, Islamist groups cited a national regulation that required every district to establish a "strategic development plan" (*dokumen perencanaan daerah*).[101] The Tholiban and FPI in particular dialed up the pressure on the district head to adopt such a plan centered around Islamic law.[102] Islamist groups closely collaborated with the local government to write *shari'a* Regulation No. 13/2001 on Restoring Peace and Order based on Moral Teachings, Religion, Ethics and Local Cultural

[97] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 139–40.
[98] For example, a good Muslim does not vote for a non-Muslim.
[99] See Gultom 2012. Since 2011, all local regulations need to be accompanied by an academic feasibility report. See Law no. 12/2011 on Lawmaking, Articles 56–65.
[100] Hasan 2007, 19.
[101] See Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 108 Tahun 2000 Tentang Tatacara Pertanggungjawaban Kepala Daerah, Pasal 1, Ayat 4.
[102] Hasani and Naipospos, 2010, 167; Mudzakkir 2008.

Values.[103] The regulation became the basis for the "Tasikmalaya District Strategic Plan 2001–2005."[104] Based on this "strategic plan," Tasikmalaya district head Hakim subsequently approved *shari'a* rules to improve the quality of religious teachings and faith-related activities.[105] Hakim also rubberstamped a *shari'a* regulation that made Qur'an-reading skills an entrance requirement for primary schools and several local boarding schools, including the one where he taught previously.[106] A *shari'a* regulation on visiting public swimming pools followed a few months later.[107] In neighboring Tasikmalaya City, after the 2007 mayoral elections, Islamist groups in the district collected 1,233 signatures from *ulama* and other local notables, all of whom urged the government to enact Islamic law in Tasikmalaya City.[108] The Tholiban, the FPI and other Islamist groups first lobbied the parliament and then established The Preparatory Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (FKPPSI, *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Shariaht Islam*). The FKPPSI drafted an "Islamic local regulations" plan that it presented to the parliament and mayor during the holy month of Ramadan in 2009.

Islamist groups also have organized public gatherings, workshops and seminars and invited local officials to discuss the adoption and implementation of *shari'a* regulations. The groups organized such a *Tabligh Akbar* in Bogor City in 2005. Various government officials attended the meeting, which was held under the motto: "To strengthen the solidarity and coordinate steps to establish a Bogor that implements shari'a" [*Galang Ukhuwah, Satukan Langkah, Menuju Bogor Bersyariah*].[109]

South Sulawesi has seen similar developments. As in West Java, figures associated with the Islamist movement almost never try to influence politics by directly competing in elections for government posts. Over the years, only a few figures tied to the KPPSI ran in local elections, namely Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, Tamsil Linrung, Aksa Mahmud and Mansyur Ramli.

[103] Perda No. 3/2001 tentang Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban yang Berdasarkan Kepada Ajaran Moral, Agama, Etika, dan nilai-nilai Budaya Daerah.
[104] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 167.
[105] Surat Edaran Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 tentang Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan.
[106] Keputusan Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 421.2/Kep. 326 A/Sos/2001 tentang Persyaratan Memasuki Sekolah Dasar (SD), Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) dan Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama (SLTP) dan Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya.
[107] Himbauan Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 556.3/SP/03/Sos/2001 tentang Pengelolaan Pengunjung Kolam Renang.
[108] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 171. [109] Hasan 2007, 20.

The Islamist movement, however, became active in provincial politics after 1998 in a variety of ways. For instance, the aforementioned KPPSI congress in 2000 ended with a crude mix of demands. The group wanted the national government to ban "immoral activities," such as gambling, narcotics, pornography and prostitution. It also released a statement that condemned the politics of Israel against Palestine and the role of the United States in the Middle East.[110] However, KPPSI's main demand was that South Sulawesi enact a legal and political system under Islamic law. This would eradicate corruption and rampant crime, as well as contain the spread of "secularism" and "Western culture."[111]

In a 2001 letter, the KPPSI leadership vowed to pursue Islamic law through the constitution and not through bloodshed, like the Darul Islam.[112] Still, if their demands were not met, they would call for a referendum on special autonomy for the province. Such a referendum was necessary to prevent a new Islamist rebellion in South Sulawesi, the letter ominously warned.[113] The KPPSI reiterated this commitment to fight for Islamic law through constitutional means at subsequent congresses. In 2005, Azwar Hasan, then secretary general of KPPSI, emphasized that the movement chose a "middle road" (*jalan tengah*) to press for the enactment of *shari'a* law compared to more violent Islamist groups in Indonesia.[114]

Despite this peaceful rhetoric of struggle, the KPPSI passed a resolution in 2001 that called for the active enforcement of Islamic Law in South Sulawesi. The KPPSI incorporated the aforementioned paramilitary group *Laskar Jundullah* into its organizational structure and "authorized" the group "to undertake paramilitary action in the name of upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi."[115] *Laskar Jundullah* soon attracted negative press across the province for the aggressive tactics it used to push the KPPSI's Islamist agenda. Already in 2002, a foreign observer noted: "*Laskar Jundullah* has acted as a semi-criminal and vigilante group. Many of its members have backgrounds in local gangs and it is a feared presence in South Sulawesi, where it regularly intimidates parliamentarians, officials and the media into supporting its moves to implement *shariah*."[116] All this raised doubts about KPPSI's peaceful intentions.

Various incidents in the following years confirmed these suspicions. In 2001, a bomb exploded during KPPSI's second congress, injuring two

[110] Hamdan 2006, 168.
[111] For a more comprehensive list of rationales for the adoption of Islamic law the KPPSI put forward, see Hamdan 2006, 158 and Mujiburrahman 2013, 162–4.
[112] Kompas December 20, 2000, 38. [113] Hamdan 2006, 168.
[114] Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1. [115] Hamdan 2006, 167. [116] Fealy 2002, 10.

people.[117] The bad press for the KPPSI continued a few weeks later, when three top KPPSI leaders were arrested at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in the Philippines. Abdul Jamal Balfas,[118] Agus Dwikarna[119] and Tamsil Linrung[120] were accused of carrying C4 explosives and bombs in their luggage.[121]

The KPPSI's pledge to achieve Islamic law through peaceful means received another blow, quite literally, when a suicide bomber detonated a device strapped to his body at a McDonald's branch in Makassar in 2002, killing himself and two others.[122] A few hours later that day, a second bomb detonated in a showroom of a car sales company.[123]

In the days that followed, the police arrested ten men. One of the arrested, Mohtar Daeng Lau, was the secretary general of the aforementioned Darul Islam-linked *Wahdah Islamiyah* Foundation. There, Lau

[117] Kompas January 15, 2002, 20. KPPSI suspected military saboteurs behind the incident, while the military stated that Islamists had carried the bomb into the conference venue themselves, where it then exploded accidentally.

[118] Abdul Jamal Balfas is the owner of a construction company based in Makassar, the PT Bumi Daya Kutat. See Kompas March 18, 2002, 11.

[119] At the time of arrest, Dwikarna was the deputy head of KPPSI and head of *Laskar Jundullah* as mentioned above. See Kompas March 18, 2002, 11.

[120] Tamsil Linrung was a member of KPPSI's Executive Body (*Majelis Syuro*) as mentioned previously. Linrung owns a restaurant in Makassar that specializes in Padang food. He is also the owner of a small plantation outside the city and is involved in the local construction industry. Due to his business activities, Linrung is believed to be one of the main financiers of KPPSI. See Hamdan 2006, 197. In 1998, he joined the National Mandate Party (PAN, *Partai Amanat Nasional*), where he became the national party treasurer (*Bendahara Umum DPP Partai PAN*). See Kompas March 17, 2002, 1. In 2005, he joined the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*) See Tribun Timur March 27, 2005, 1. Linrung is also a board member of the DDII. See Kompas March 12, 2001, 6. Linrung was also the national head of HMI–MPO from 1988 to 1990, as mentioned before. HMI–MPO issued a statement after Linrung's arrest and emphasized that the organization had no links to terrorism. See Kompas March 18, 2002, 11.

[121] Kompas March 17, 2002, 1. Later, the Philippine government also accused Agus Dwikarna of entering the Philippines illegally on several occasions in 1989 and 1991 via the rebellious Mindanao province. The Philippine authorities later sentenced Agus Dwikarna to ten years in prison. The other two men were released. See Kompas July 17, 2002, 26. Dwikarna was released from prison in January 2014.

[122] Witnesses of the incident to whom I spoke in Makassar claimed that the suicide bomber Ashar Daeng Salam a.k.a. Aco panicked once he had entered the restaurant. He then tried to strip the bomb off his body and attempted to run out of McDonalds. The bomb detonated when the half-naked suicide bomber reached the exit door. Allegedly, the death of Salam caused conflicts between *Wahda Islamiyah* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*, the terror organization behind the Bali bombings mentioned before. According to interrogation reports of *Wahda Islamiyah* members, *Jemaah Islamiyah* claimed to have recruited and trained Aco as a suicide bomber, who was then "stolen" by *Wahda Islamiyah* for their plans to blow up the McDonalds restaurant in Makassar. See ICG 2003, 16.

[123] Kompas December 9, 2002, 1.

was in charge of "military affairs."[124] He was also a member of *Laskar Jundullah*[125] and active in the KPPSI.[126] The police also reported that Lau had received "terrorism training" at camps in Moro in the Southern Philippines.[127] A few days later, Kahar, head of the KPPSI branch in Sinjai district and secretary of the district branch of the PKS, turned himself into police and confessed to be the supplier of the bomb detonators. Explosives were found in his parents' house later that day.[128]

KPPSI leaders soon realized that the negative press after the bomb explosions, suicide attacks and arrests of its leaders damaged their efforts to adopt Islamic law in South Sulawesi. "Because KPPSI has an image of being linked to terrorism ... because people ... think our name to be involved in this ... because all this is dangerous for our image ... which is not so good ... that is why [we] are changing," Azwar Hasan said in an interview.[129] After these incidents, the KPSSI changed the name of *Laskar Jundullah* to *Korps Pemuda Islam* (Islamic Youth Corps).[130] During the second congress the KPPSI also no longer assigned its paramilitary wing an official role in the "enforcement" of *shari'a* law. In short, the KPPSI abandoned its overtly confrontational strategy and began to lobby state elites directly.[131]

In subsequent months, the KPPSI organized large rallies against "mysticism," the opening of nightclubs during the holy month of Ramadan, as well as pornography and prostitution.[132] However, the KPPSI leadership

[124] ICG 2003, 14.

[125] Kompas December 9, 2002, 1. There were rifts running through the leadership of *Wahda Islamiyah* at the end of the 1990s. In 1999, *Wahda Islamiyah* allegedly split into two factions, one of them led by Agus Dwikarna, who formed *Laskar Jundullah*. Dwikarna was backed by Mohtar Daeng Lau and Syawal Yasin, both already mentioned previously. See ICG 2003, 14.

[126] Kompas December 12, 2002, 1. Some of the suspects in the Makassar bombing incident claimed to be members of *Laskar Ustadz Syawal*. See ICG 2003, 14. This is a militia that assembled around Syawal, a former student of YFM and founder of *Pesantren Darul Aman*, operating in Gombara, which is an outskirt of Makassar.

[127] When I interviewed Lau in 2009, he said that he had "confessed" these charges after the police had tortured him by sending electric shocks through wires attached to his testicles. During the interview, Lau also gave me a book he had written and which was titled *Why I Am Not a Terrorist*. In the book, he denounced violent means in the pursuit of Islamic law. Two other suspects, Usman and Suryadi, who were arrested in the days following the explosions, were also accused of having received "terrorism training" in Moro. See Kompas December 14, 2002, 20.

[128] Kompas December 14, 2002, 20.

[129] Azwar Hasan, pers. comm. September 7, 2006.

[130] At the second congress, KPPSI already debated over a possible name change for *Laskar Jundullah*. During the congress, the paramilitary wing of the organization was only referred to as the *Departemen Kepemudaan* (Youth Department) (Hamdan 2006, 180). After the congress it was suggested to name the paramilitary wing *Laskar Penegak Syariat Islam* (The Islamic Law Enforcement Brigade).

[131] Hamdan 2006, 130.

[132] Kompas December 6, 2000, 20.

soon concluded that because the group was committed to the constitutional adoption of Islamic law, its best hope was to lobby politicians.[133]

To this end, KPPSI members handed over a declaration, the *Deklarasi Muharram*, to the parliament of South Sulawesi province in 2001. It called for the adoption of Islamic law in the entire province and special autonomy status for South Sulawesi. The same year, a delegation of South Sulawesi politicians and members of the KPPSI issued a similar declaration, the *Deklarasi Makassar*, to Akbar Tandjung, who was head of the national parliament in Jakarta and believed to be sympathetic to the KPPSI's cause.[134] Again, the communiqué demanded special autonomy for South Sulawesi, governed by Islamic law.[135] In that document, the KPPSI made special reference to Aceh, Indonesia's western-most province, where Islamic law had become the legal basis under a special agreement in 1999. The KPPSI letter read: "The existence of Law No 44/1999 on the Special Autonomy for Aceh, which gives authority to Aceh to implement *shari'a* Islam, is proof that the constitution [of Indonesia] has not closed the door for the adoption of *shari'a* Islam in the country."[136] During its second congress, the KPPSI passed a draft constitution that again insisted on special autonomy for South Sulawesi.

Over the years, the KPPSI increasingly threw its weight around to push a *shari'a* agenda. In 2004, the people of South Sulawesi elected Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the head of the KPPSI, into Indonesia's Regional Representative Council (DPD, *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*). Triumphantly, the KPPSI pointed out that Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, a political greenhorn at the time, had collected almost as many votes as Aksa Mahmud, the top vote-getter and one of the richest businessmen in South Sulawesi.

The DPD has no significant powers and is therefore a largely symbolic political entity. Nevertheless, the local press saw Muzakkar's seat as "a strategic position from which to fight for the implementation of *shari'a* law by constitutional means."[137] Indeed, the victory in the DPD elections transformed Muzakkar into a celebrity across the

[133] Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 73; Hamdan 2006, 170.
[134] Tanjung was an HMI activist in his student days. See Mujiburrahman 2013, 167.
[135] The delegation consisted of KPPSI leaders Abdurahman A Basalamah (*Ketua Majelis Syuro*), Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar (*Ketua Tanfidziyah*), Azwar Hasan (*Sekjen Laskar Jundullah*), as well as the head of the provincial parliament Edi Baramuli (*Wakil Ketua DPRD I Sulawesi Selatan*) and Djamaluddin Amin, a social notable (*tokoh masyarakat*) in the province. See Kompas April 26, 2001, 6.
[136] "Lahirnya UU 44/1999 tentang Otonomi Khusus Aceh yang memberi kewenangan pelaksanaan syariat Islam di Aceh adalah bukti bahwa UUD 45 tidaklah menutup peluang bagi pelaksanaan syariat Islam di tanah air." See KPPSI 2005, 5.
[137] Tribun Timur June 16, 2004, 24.

province.[138] For the KPPSI, the election result confirmed South Sulawesi's widespread support for Islamic law.[139]

Arguably, Muzakkar's DPD victory also convinced local state elites of the KPPSI's mobilizational capacity. Hence, the KPPSI became more openly involved in politics. In the 2007 gubernatorial elections, several prominent KPPSI figures, including Tamsil Linrung, Aziz Kahar Muzzakar and Mansyur Ramli, were floated as potential candidates and political parties started to cluster around them.[140] Eventually, incumbent governor Amin Syam secured the support of Ramli, a member of the KPPSI Consultative Council, a former rector of UMI and the brother-in-law of then vice-president Jusuf Kalla. Ramli immediately began to mobilize his religious networks for the campaign.[141]

Syahrul Yasin Limpo, a deputy governor trying to unseat Syam, invited Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar to be his running mate. Muzakkar declined and, encouraged by his DPD election triumph, launched a bid of his own for the governor position with Mubyl Handaling, the former South Sulawesi chairman of the Union of HMI alumni (KAHMI), on his ticket. Muzakkar hoped to win most votes in North Luwu district, which was his birthplace and the center of the Darul Islam, as well as in "districts that have adopted shari'a regulations."[142] However, Muzakkar lost the race.

In the gubernatorial elections in 2013, Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar was again a key player. This time, he was the running mate of Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, the mayor of the provincial capital Makassar who was trying to unseat Governor Syahrul Yasin Limpo. Again, the KPPSI's mobilizational capacity seemed to inspire Sirajuddin's choice of Muzakkar as his deputy. Soon after the announcement of Muzakkar's candidacy, the KPPSI leadership was bragging in the local media that the group had already received 900,000 identity cards (KTP, *Kartu Tanda Penduduk*) from people supporting Muzakkar in the upcoming elections.[143]

The KPPSI also began pulling the strings of other district heads and offering political support during campaigns. Again, the lobbying activities of the KPPSI were most intense and visible in the context of local elections. For instance, after the introduction of direct elections for local government heads in 2005, the KPPSI held a congress in Maros district. At the end of the congress, KPPSI dispatched an official missive to the

[138] Muzakkar received most votes in former Darul Islam strongholds such as Luwu District and the western parts of Bone district.
[139] Hamdan 2006, 174. [140] Fajar July 26, 2006, 10.
[141] Mujiburrahman 2013, 177 also mentions that Ramli was strongly rooted in local NU networks as his father had founded NU in South Sulawesi. Amin Syam belonged to the Advisory Council of NU in South Sulawesi, and the two men may have bonded because of this shared institutional affiliation.
[142] Kompas November 5, 2007, 24. [143] Tribun Timur January 8, 2012, online.

district heads and local parliaments across South Sulawesi with suggestions on how to "overcome vices and injustices that harm the people." They also demanded that local governments adopt regulations with an "Islamic note."[144]

In the same vein, prior to the district head elections in Pangkep district in 2005, Tamsil Linrung, a leading KPPSI figure mentioned earlier, went to great lengths to meet all candidates in that race.[145] A few weeks later, the KPPSI protested against a planned meeting of the Indonesian Church Association in Pangkep. It coerced the incumbent district head into ordering church closings in exchange for its endorsement in upcoming elections.[146] In 2006, it urged the Pangkep district head to strike down a building permit for a Christian church that had already gotten the green light from local authorities. KPPSI Pangkep leader Alwi Fatahilla also spoke out against prayer meetings of Christians in Pangkep and urged the government to "be alert and protect the Muslim congregation [*umat*] from outside influences."[147] Similarly, in Gowa district, the leaders of the Organizing Body of the Youth Groups of Indonesian Mosques (BKPRMI, *Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia*) pressed the local parliament and executive government in early 2005 to adopt *shari'a* regulations on alms (*zakat*), the wearing of headscarves, pornography and alcohol. The Islamist group also demanded that the provincial government consults it on all decisions touching on religion.[148] The KPPSI went on to outline a list of "character traits" it required of contenders in local government head elections before it would support them.[149] In the years that followed, the KPPSI leadership endorsed candidates with a background in Islamist groups, such as Zakir Sabara H.W. M.T., an academic at the Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI) running for deputy district head in Bone district in 2011.[150]

As at the provincial level, the KPPSI came out in force on Election Day at the district level. Activists from the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*), many of whom have close affiliations with the KPPSI, pledged to monitor the elections for government heads in districts across South Sulawesi in 2010.[151]

[144] Subair 2012, 79. [145] Tribun Timur 2005, 5. [146] Suaedy 2007.
[147] Subair 2010, 86.
[148] They also asked for a car and an annual allocation paid from the local budget. See Tribun Timur 2005, 22.
[149] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 181.
[150] Muzakkar's brother Buhari Kahar Muzakkar who is also the head of the PAN party in South Sulawesi secured the PAN nomination for Zakir Sabara. See Tribun Timur 2011, online.
[151] Fajar 2010, 7.

This was part of a broader strategic shift. As political scientists Subair and Pattinjo observe:

> KPPSI dropped the idea of adopting Islamic law via the parliament and changed into a political movement situated outside parliament. [Consequently], reports in local newspapers about KPPSI's support for candidates running for governor and deputy governor became more frequent than stories about the challenges to adopt of Islamic law itself. The KPPSI even established a "Team of Nine" that was formed by Aminuddin Ram, the head of the Lanjah Tanfidziyah KPPSI South Sulawesi. The "Team of Nine" was tasked with embracing (*menjaring*) aspirations and dynamics that emerged in the context of local government head elections.[152]

The KPPSI frequently put district heads on display as it fought for the adoption of Islamic law in the province. For instance:

> The success of Patabai [Pabokori, the district head of Bulukumba] in adopting four *shari'a* regulations [during his time in office] was showcased (*dijadikan*) as a successful example of an Islamic leader. It is therefore not surprising that the KPPSI made Patabai part of their campaign for the adoption of Islamic law in various other districts in South Sulawesi. Bulukumba was also chosen as the venue for the third KPPSI congress to signal that the Bulukumba government has been successful with its religious agenda.[153]

In a similar tactic, the KPPSI organized its fourth congress in Pangkep. The organization chose this location to reward the district head, Syafruddin Nur, who had been amenable to KPPSI lobbying and signed off on several *shari'a* regulations. At the congress in Pangkep, the KPPSI reiterated its mission to bring Islamic law to South Sulawesi. It appealed for the control of social and traditional media against un-Islamic content, the release of Agus Dwikarna from prison in the Philippines and the establishment of schools across South Sulawesi that required girls to wear headscarves. The KPPSI also "called on the public to elect those local district heads who have a strong commitment to the enforcement of Islamic law." The group went so far as to suggest an award for public figures who advocated *shari'a* law.[154] Finally, Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar promised to increase the KPPSI's lobbying at the local level. One priority was to establish model Muslim villages in each district in the province. "We hope that in 2010, there will be two [model Muslim] villages in every district that serve as pilot projects. If this is taking off, it

[152] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 180. [153] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 184.

[154] The figures suggested were Islamists such as Sanusi Baco, the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah and Djamaluddin Amien, all mentioned previously, as well as local bureaucrats such as former governor Amin Syam and district heads Andi Patabai Pabokori in Bulukumba and Syafrudin Nur in Pangkep district.

can be assumed that in the years ahead the people will live a more Islamic life," he stated.[155]

The KPPSI's activities also involved co-opting local politicians. It appointed Bahar Ngitung, a bureaucrat on the Regional Representation Council (DPD) for South Sulawesi, as the Chairman of the KPPSI Congress Committee (*Ketua Panitia*). Patabai Pabokori, the aforementioned former district head of Bulukumba, who had made a name for himself by adopting *shari'a* regulations, was formally incorporated into the KPPSI organization. The Islamist group also selected the provincial parliament head H.M. Roem as a speaker during the KPPSI congress. At the congress, Roem promised to goad provincial lawmakers into embracing *shari'a* regulations. "We will try to issue two *shari'a* regulations per year," Roem said.[156] Henky Widjaja, a political scientist who followed the 2010 local government head elections in South Sulawesi, concluded: "KPPSI still has a strong influence as vote-getter purpose in [South Sulawesi] for their strategic and durable networks in many districts, including Makassar. My last meeting with Azwar [Hasan] ... confirmed this although he was never explicit about kind of agreements made with politicians."[157]

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained how the democratic opening in 1998 allowed Islamist movements, which trace their origins to the very birth of the Indonesian Republic, to resurface in West Java and South Sulawesi. Most Islamist groups that popped up after 1998 are linked to the Darul Islam rebellion in both provinces from the 1940s to the 1960s. Many of these groups remain somewhat clandestine, frequently change names and do not publish official membership numbers. Still, the evidence is sufficient to show that the current Islamist activities in the two provinces are driven by Islamist movements that date back decades.

Most of these Islamist groups formed around prominent Islamist figures who are, directly or indirectly, linked to the Darul Islam and rooted in the class that engendered the movement. These Islamist leaders command sizable local networks, including thousands of *santri* attached to Qur'an recitation circles and religious boarding schools. These spheres of influence often include hoodlums and petty criminals.

The chapter demonstrated that the number of Islamist groups fluctuates and relations between them are fluid. However, despite the seemingly

[155] Fajar 2010. [156] Fajar 2010.
[157] Email conversation, Henky Widjaja October 21, 2013.

ephemeral nature of these groups and their rivalries in both South Sulawesi and West Java, these movements are held together by a shared past and a common future goal.[158]

Overall, then, these Islamist networks are the most coordinated and established societal players state elites encounter as they "meet" society to shore up political support in elections.[159]

I showed that members of these Islamist groups remain outside formal politics. In both provinces, Islamists rarely hold state positions directly. Most of the time they do not bother to run for office, while those who do compete usually get trounced in the polls.[160] This is consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 3 that state elites dominate formal politics in both provinces.

Instead, Islamist groups apply pressure on state elites in both straightforward and oblique ways. In the beginning, most lobbying was confrontational and included violent rallies, sweeps against un-Islamic practices and even bomb attacks. Yet over the years, the strategies of these movements underwent a "professionalization." While protests and sweeps continue, confrontation was supplanted by a more direct approach. In both provinces, Islamist groups went straight to state elites and lobbied them in the context of elections. During campaigns, they positioned themselves as gatekeepers of religious authenticity. They sparked debates on which candidates are "true Muslim," only endorsing the political hopefuls they deemed worthy of that label. Most important, Islamist groups in both West Java and South Sulawesi began to lobby local parliaments as well as governors and district government heads. The consequences of this growing proximity between Islamist groups and state elites are the subject of Chapter 7.

[158] Hasan and Naipospos 2010, 137.

[159] It is important to note once more that establishing linkages to such Islamist networks in the context of competitive elections is only one of many strategies candidates employ and by no means guarantees electoral success.

[160] Arguably, they do not compete in elections for both ideological and financial reasons.

7 Providing Resources in Exchange for *Shari'a* Regulations

7.1 Introduction

The following comparison of West Java and South Sulawesi provinces will show that Islamist groups peddle political resources to state elites competing for local government head posts. The increasingly cozy relationship between Islamist groups and state elites after 1998 has resulted in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations. Comparing cases that were selected based on the dependent variable is considered problematic for reasons outlined in Chapter 1.[1] Yet, in Section 7.2 of this chapter I am first and foremost interested in evaluating the *processes* through which *shari'a* regulations are adopted. For *this* purpose, selecting cases on the dependent variable is less of a concern.[2]

To address concerns about selection bias in the findings, however, I will briefly examine patterns of *shari'a* policymaking in all provinces of Indonesia. This will verify that the majority of *shari'a* regulations after 1998 cluster in provinces where Islamist movements have historically been strong. This suggests that Islamist groups situated outside formal politics play a crucial role in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in other parts of the archipelago, too, and not only in West Java and South Sulawesi.

Furthermore, the patterns in the Islamization of politics across Indonesia after 1998 reflect the mediating role of state elites. Temporal and spatial dimensions of *shari'a* policymaking examined in Section 7.3 of this chapter prove that even the influence of Islamist groups is restrained by the interests of state elites. Concretely, *shari'a* regulations are adopted mainly in the context of elections and overwhelmingly during local government heads' first term. In their second term, when state elites no longer fret about re-election, they lose interest in *shari'a* regulations. The power of Islamist groups also seems confined to the very local level, where most *shari'a* rules take effect. Because the electoral calculus of state

[1] Geddes 1990. [2] Collier and Mahoney 1996, 56–91; George and Bennett 2005, 84.

elites changes at the provincial and national level, *shari'a* regulations seldom make it to the upper reaches of government.

7.2 The Provision of Political Resources

The newly competitive political environment, in combination with a relatively independent electorate, has created a need for various resources among state elites competing for government posts, as shown in Chapter 3. These include social capital, that is, linkages to power brokers and vote-getters; economic capital or the means to pay both legal and illegal campaign expenses and to assure the support of major power brokers; as well as cultural capital, which can boost the credibility of candidates in the eyes of the electorate. Albeit to different degrees and with varying success, Islamist groups in West Java and South Sulawesi can deal out all three resources to state elites. This is evident in Cianjur in West Java and Maros in South Sulawesi, the two districts that adopted the most *shari'a* regulations in their respective provinces between 1998 and 2013 and that are indicative of similar dynamics in other localities across the two provinces.

7.2.1 Islamist Groups and Electoral Politics in West Java's Cianjur District

Cianjur was a Darul Islam stronghold in the 1950s and part of District No. 9 of Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State of Indonesia.[3] During the late Sukarno years, NU was the strongest party in Cianjur. As the New Order took hold, Cianjur became a PPP bastion. Over time, though, the party lost votes to Golkar, which won solid majorities in the district for more than three decades. Overt political Islam was suppressed in Cianjur during the New Order and many *santri* were forced to join Golkar.[4] Today, Cianjur is proud of its reputation as a pious place with more than 3,000 Islamic boarding schools scattered across the district.[5]

Within months after the New Order crumbled in 1998, the ambitious District Secretary Wasidi Swastomo announced he would run for district head in 2001. Swastomo had entered the local bureaucracy under Suharto in 1974 and has been a Golkar party member for most of his professional life.[6]

At the same time as Swastomo declared his candidacy, the Islamist group GARIS, which boasts of more than 28,000 followers in Cianjur

[3] NII KW9 (*Negera Islam Indonesia Komandemen Wilayah 9*). See Wattimena 2001.
[4] Turmudi 2003, 16. [5] Turmudi 2003, 13–14. [6] Alawuddin et al. 2006, 56.

alone,[7] started to exert pressure on the local government. This ranged from insisting that police take action against "deviant" Islamist groups[8] to demanding the closure of religious minorities' places of worship.[9]

To garner support for his candidacy in the 2001 elections, Swastomo began to interact with GARIS and various local Islamist groups. For instance, just weeks after announcing his bid in 1998, Swastomo pledged to "formalize" Islamic law in Cianjur district if elected.[10] He promised to draft a plan on how to "Islamize" Cianjur district[11] and courted local MUI branches. Several MUI cadres held seats in the local parliament, whose support could be decisive in the elections.[12]

Swastomo's main adversary was Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh, a bureaucrat in Cianjur since 1977. The third candidate, Maskana Sumitra, was another career bureaucrat in the district. Hence, the race for the Cianjur government's top job occurred entirely among state elites.

The elections were held February 19, 2001, in the district parliament. Since local government head elections were conducted via the parliament between 1999 and 2005, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Swastomo did not depend directly on Islamist networks extending into the broader population. He did, however, need them to pressure parliamentarians. To this end, hundreds of Islamists, as well as roughly 50 members of the Islamist party PPP, gathered outside the local parliament on Election Day to voice their support for Swastomo.[13] Eventually, 22 of the 45 legislators voted for him and 21 for Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh. Two parliamentarians abstained.[14]

A month after his victory, Swastomo invited Islamist groups to his residency to draft a road map to institutionalize Islamic law in the district. These groups included GARIS, Hamida (the alumni association of the Islamist boarding school *Miftahul Huda* mentioned in Chapter 6) and

[7] ICG 2005, 6. This number is undoubtedly exaggerated. However, GARIS has had a long presence in the district and is part of a close-knit Islamist network as shown in Chapter 6.

[8] Kompas 2005, 19. [9] Bastiyandi 2011. [10] Kompas 2004, 38.

[11] Arguably, Islamist groups found these promises credible because Swastomo had been a student of Kyai Dadun Kahar. Kyai Dadun Kahar, a religious teacher affiliated with the Persis branch in Sukabumi district and who had made a name for himself by preaching against "spirit cults" and local traditions allegedly in violation of Islam, was considered a hardliner even within Islamist circles. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 225 and Mudzakkir 2012. Islamist groups may also have found Swastomo's promise credible because he had always been a devout Muslim, as he claimed in an interview. Swastomo, pers. comm. July 4, 2013.

[12] Remember that local parliaments elected district heads before direct elections were introduced in 2005.

[13] Kompas 2001; Swastomo, pers. comm. July 4, 2013. [14] Mudzakkir 2008.

local MUI branches.[15] The head of the Cianjur MUI branch K.H.R. Abdul Halim made it clear the government had a responsibility to mold a society guided by Islamic law: "To enforce *shari'a* law is not only the obligation of the religious teachers [*kyai*] but the duty of all Muslim, particularly the government apparatus. If only the government had the will to strictly follow rules that are in line with Allah and his messenger, surely the problems in this country would be overcome quickly."[16]

The close collaboration between Swastomo and Islamist groups resulted in a white paper titled "The Gate to Marhamah," an acronym for the "The Movement for the Development of a Noble Society" (Gerbang Marhamah, *Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah*). In it Swastomo states: "In order to fight for better conditions in the world in this time of moral crisis, the Islamic community, particularly in Cianjur, demands from the local government to become directly involved in fostering the community and establishing moral values through adopting Sharia'a Law for the Islamic community of Cianjur."[17]

In a meeting on March 26, 2001, held under the auspices of district head Swastomo, GARIS and 35 other local Islamist groups pledged allegiance to the Marhamah agenda and promised to support "the noble will" of the Cianjur district head to execute Islamic law.[18] At the end of the meeting, Swastomo "commanded" (*mengomandokan*) the adoption of the Program for the Implementation of Shari'a Law (*Program Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam*). In May 2001, Swastomo issued a decree for the "Establishment of a Center for the Assessment and Propagation of Islam" (LPPI, *Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam*).[19] LPPI employed various Islamist figures in Cianjur, including members of GARIS and MUI.[20] Muhammad Kusoy, a local figure with strong links to MUI and Islamist groups, became the head of LPPI.[21]

LPPI was tasked with executing the Marhamah agenda. Subsequently, the LPPI in collaboration with the executive branch of government drew up various *shari'a* regulations.[22] As a result, Swastomo signed no less than six *shari'a* regulations over the next five years, as shown in Appendix 1.

In addition to policymaking, Swastomo tried to bring the cultural life of Cianjur in line with his *shari'a* agenda. He sponsored Qur'an readings, Islamic calligraphy competitions and religious music groups. He also

[15] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 168. [16] Ruddy 2005, 11–12.
[17] Ruddy 2005, 11. Feener 2013 has discussed the link between the adoption of *shari'a* regulations and "social engineering" for the case of Aceh province.
[18] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 145; Ruddy 2005, 18.
[19] Keputusan Bupati No. 36 Tahun 2001 LD No. 34 Tahun 2001 tentang Pembentukan Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam (LPPI).
[20] On the organizational structure of LPPI see Turmudi 2003, 29. [21] Ruddy 2005, i.
[22] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 227.

outlawed spirit cults and tomb-sweeping rituals and ordered frequent raids against massage parlors and liquor stores.

As a result of this partnership with Islamist groups, Swastomo increased the budgets for education and religion. In Swastomo's first year, the district government spent US$11.5 million (IDR 115 billion) on education and another US$11.4 million (IDR 114 billion) on religion. This increased to a total of US$25.4 million (IDR 254 billion) at the end of his term, or around 20 percent of Cianjur's annual budget. Swastomo bragged to local media that the share of Cianjur's budget spent on education and religion exceeded the national average.[23]

Swastomo also used his Islamization agenda to tap into local networks by building mosques and financially supporting teachers and Islamic boarding schools, often using government funds to guarantee loyalty in Islamist circles. For instance, under the pretense of aligning "school culture" with the Marhamah vision and to "nurture" students in the district, 2,000 "supervisors" for the Marhamah agenda were trained and deployed to schools across Cianjur. The MUI was also asked to train 500 instructors (*Penyuluh Akhlakul Karimah*) who were recruited from preachers (*ustadz*) and proselytizers (*penda'i*) "at the cutting edge" of Islamic teaching. Many of these teachers came from Islamist groups. These educators received free books and instruction materials for their mission to bring the Marhamah agenda to "every corner of Cianjur district."[24]

Swastomo formed a government body, the Foundation for the Empowerment of the Marhamah Community (YASPUMAH, *Yayasan Pemberdayaan Ummat Marhamah*) and placed it under the authority of MUI. It quickly got to work and gave "development funds" (*dana permodalan*) to selected mosques, amounting to US$1,000 (IDR 10 million) per mosque annually.[25] Official data show that from 2001 to 2005 the Swastomo administration spent US$73.07 million (IDR 7,307 billion) on building 1,639 religious facilities (*sarana keagamaan*), including 1,240 mosques (*masjid jami*), 12 large mosques, 246 religious boarding schools and 78 Qur'an reading circle facilities (*Majelis Ta'lim*).[26]

YASPUMAH also made payments to "elite religious leaders" (*kader kyai*) across the district.[27] In this context, the Cianjur government subsidized motorbike purchases in cooperation with Bank Syariah to "facilitate" the work of instructors and teachers of the Marhamah agenda. Rini Suwandi, the head of the local branch of the Ministry for Industry

[23] Ruddy 2005, 78. [24] Ruddy 2005, 59–60. [25] Ruddy 2005, 88.
[26] Parts of that money also went into the renovation of existing religious buildings as well as the maintenance and operational costs of educational facilities. See Ruddy 2005, 83.
[27] Ruddy 2005, 94.

and Trade (Menperindag, *Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan*), joined Swastomo to distribute subsidized motorbikes to 2,000 *shari'a* instructors in August 2004.[28] In return, Bank Syariah "invited" mosques to deposit their money with the bank.[29] In subsequent months, the MUI branch in Cianjur also issued a legal document (*fatwa*) urging all Muslims in the district to switch to Islamic banking.[30]

Swastomo justified these actions by frequently pointing out that he enjoyed the backing of LPPI and the MUI.[31] Indeed, Islamist groups as well as the local MUI branch lauded Swastomo in the local press.[32] In return for their support, Swastomo defended the various Islamist groups against detractors. For instance, when a local military commander suggested adding Cianjur to a terrorism watch list due to Islamist activities in the district, Swastomo told the press that the "hardline Islamist groups" (*Islami garis keras*) had nothing to do with terrorism.[33]

The first direct elections for district head in Cianjur were held in 2006. As in 2001, all of Swastomo's competitors were bureaucrats with long careers in the district administration.[34] Once again, the strong presence of local Islamist groups made it essential for candidates to project sympathy for Islamist causes. Hence, Islam and Islamic law became increasingly politicized as the vote drew nearer. At the height of the campaign season, hundreds of men swarmed the Cempaka and Cibeber subdistricts of Cianjur on September 19, 2005, vandalizing mosques, boarding schools and property belonging to the Ahmadiyah community, including four branch offices in Cicakra, Ciparay, Negalsari and Panyairan.[35]

Ten days *after* the attacks against the Ahmadiyah community, Swastomo adopted a *shari'a* regulation that declared all Ahmadiyah activities in Cianjur illegal.[36] He justified the decree as a way to prevent future violence against Ahmadis.[37] Swastomo said he had acted on the recommendation of MUI, the local military branch and the local

[28] Ruddy 2005, 60–1. [29] Ruddy 2005, 94. [30] Ruddy 2005, 92. [31] Kompas 2002.
[32] See, for instance, Kompas 2001. [33] Kompas 2004.
[34] A local newspaper attributed the fact that only bureaucrats were running in the 2006 elections in Cianjur to parties' incapability to provide their own cadre with a chance of winning these elections. See Kompas 2010. Like in 2001, Swastomo's strongest competitor was Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh, a bureaucrat, as was his running mate Dadang Sufianto. The other two pairs of candidates were Dadang Rachmat and his running mate Kusnadi Sundjaya, both bureaucrats, and Yayat Rustandi, a bureaucrat, and his running mate Titin Swastini, a member of the local PPP party and member of Aisyiyah, a women's organization affiliated with Muhammadiyah. See Awaluddin et al. 2006, 53–73.
[35] The damage was more than US$10,000 according to Mudzakkir 2012.
[36] Surat Keputusan Bersama No. 21/2005 tentang Larangan Melakukan Aktivitas Penyebaran Ajaran/Faham Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Cianjur.
[37] Mudzakkir 2012. Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 148.

parliament, after meeting with more than 40 "Islamic mass organizations" from across Cianjur. Most of these groups had fervent anti-Ahmadiyah views and some helped destroy the Ahmadiyah property just days before. In fact, Chep Hernawan, the head of the Islamist group GARIS, publicly claimed responsibility for the attacks. Both K.H. R. Abdul Halim and K.H. Abdul Qadir Razy, two Islamist figures mentioned earlier, also publicly condemned Ahmadiyah activities.[38]

Local observers had no doubt that the district chief had adopted the *shari'a* regulation against the Ahmadiyah community to ensure Islamist groups backed him in the upcoming election. Local political scientist Mudzakkir noted:

> Ideological and practical motivations start to overlap during election times. Looking at the actors involved, elections are representing a battle between elites for political control over economic resources. This shapes the mobilization of the grassroots. Especially in Cianjur, elections show to what extent the Marhamah-agenda still plays a role in Cianjur politics ... Regardless who takes advantage of the Ahmadiyah issue ... it becomes clear that violence against Ahmadis converges in the context of elections. This convergence is not only visible with regard to violence but the Islamic discourse [in the district prior to elections] in general.[39]

In addition to these Islamist groups, Swastomo approached religious leaders affiliated with the "traditionalist" NU, which has always been more modernist in its orientation in West Java than in other parts of Indonesia, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Various local NU leaders endorsed Swastomo's campaign, including the aforementioned K.H. R. Abdul Halim, who not only runs a religious boarding school in Cianjur but also has been the head of the MUI branch in Cianjur for more than 25 years. The two men became increasingly chummy during Swastomo's term. A local observer said of Halim's motives: "During Wasidi's time in office [Halim] always presented himself as a supporter of the government's policies. He cared a lot about the Gerbang Marhamah, because besides the ideological motivations, the Gerbang Marhamah, in fact, also contributed to MUI economically."[40] Other NU figures included K.H. Abdul Qadir Razy, who was a member of the Rais Syuriah NU Cianjur branch. Halim and Razy were among the "most motivated" spokespeople for Swastomo's 2006 re-election campaign, a local analyst pointed out.[41] In addition to

[38] Mudzakkir 2012. [39] Mudzakkir 2012.

[40] Mudzakkir 2012. Part of the money the district head Swastomo allocated to religious instruction in the local budget was dispersed through MUI's local infrastructure as shown below. This not only elevated the stature of the MUI in the district but also provided MUI members with opportunities to channel some of the funds back into their own pockets.

[41] Mudzakkir 2012.

these personal relations, NU stood behind Swastomo because the district government financed numerous "traditional" boarding schools across Cianjur. In February 2005, just weeks before the elections, Swastomo donated US$1,500 (IDR 15 million) to more than 70 such traditional schools. The district government together with the MUI "supervised" the dispersion of these funds.[42] The same month, Swastomo gathered all the leaders of these boarding schools at the Asrama Haji Cianjur, where he promised that "in the future" (i.e. after the elections), he would make funds available for over 130 traditional boarding schools.[43]

On January 31, 2006, Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh won 34.37 percent of the vote, edging out incumbent Swastomo, who had 34.08 percent.[44] After losing by such a narrow margin, Swastomo immediately challenged the results in court but eventually lost his appeal.[45] Mochtar was sworn in as Cianjur district head on March 17, 2006.

Despite Swastomo's defeat, the imperative role that Islamist groups played in the race remains obvious, as analysts sought to rationalize the election's outcome. Andi Rahman Alamsyah, a sociologist at Universitas Indonesia and a close observer of the Cianjur elections in 2006, said in an interview that Swastomo refused to order new sweeps against religious minorities after the Ahmadiyah incident. Islamist groups then turned against him.[46] Another observer attributed the defeat of Swastomo to the fact that a porn movie, showing a local schoolteacher having sex with his students, surfaced in Cianjur in November 2005 and was widely reported in the local press. Evidently, this convinced Islamist groups that Swastomo's plan to Islamize Cianjur had failed. Asked to explain his electoral defeat, Swastomo himself said in an interview that he initially wanted to nominate Anjep Hermawan, then head of GARIS in Cianjur, as his running mate. The political parties that backed him, however, wanted a party cadre on the ticket. Swastomo therefore ran with Ade Barkah Surahman, a party figure without a local network.[47] Since he could not nominate Anjep Hermawan, GARIS not only withdrew its support but also instigated a smear campaign against him, Swastomo explained. Islamist groups pointed out that during his single term Swastomo had approved a permit submitted by a Christian-Chinese community to build a "retreat." In their campaign, GARIS now claimed that Swastomo would build "a church a day" if re-elected.[48] Swastomo further dismissed the MUI for withdrawing its support, saying "the MUI loses its religion" during elections and merely sides with the candidate

[42] Ruddy 2005, 82. [43] Ruddy 2005, 81–2. [44] Awaludin et al. 2006, 123.
[45] Maulana 2006. [46] Andi Rahman Alamsyah, pers. comm. June 30, 2013.
[47] Awaluddin et al. 2006, 59. [48] Wasidi Swastomo, pers. comm. July 4, 2013.

who offers it the most lucrative deal.[49] It is impossible to verify whether these events indeed tilted the election results. However, they all show the importance that both observers and candidates ascribe to Islamist groups in local elections.

7.2.2 Islamist Groups and Electoral Politics in South Sulawesi's Maros District

In South Sulawesi's Maros district, local Islamist groups also were a key supplier of resources that bureaucratic elites need in their electoral battles. Unlike Cianjur district, Maros was not a Darul Islam stronghold in the 1950s. In fact, the district is known for being home to one of the largest *sufi* communities in Indonesia,[50] attracting hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from across the archipelago each year.[51] Other local communities adhere to traditional customs (*adat*), such as the Pakalu in Bantimurung subdistrict.[52] However, Maros does contain various Islamist boarding schools linked to the Darul Islam. The most famous is *Pesantren Darul Istiqamah*, founded by Darul Islam leader K.H. Marzuki Hasan, mentioned in Chapter 2.

During the New Order, Maros was a Golkar stronghold under the control of local military commanders. Nadjamuddin Aminullah, the first post-Suharto district head, had entered the bureaucracy in 1968 and became a subdistrict head (*camat*) in Maros in 1969.[53] He steadily climbed the district bureaucracy until jumping to the provincial administration in 1994. He worked there until winning the district head post in 1999. Aminullah has also held various positions in the Golkar party for the past three decades and was active in youth organizations affiliated with Muhammadiyah.

The first direct election for district government head was scheduled for June 27, 2005. Aminullah, the incumbent, squared off against three competitors, all bureaucrats with career-long histories in the New Order state apparatus.[54] In the months before the election, Aminullah adopted in rapid succession *shari'a* regulations on Qur'an-reading skills,[55]

[49] Wasidi Swastomo, pers. comm. July 4, 2013.

[50] In Maros, about 70 percent of men are members of Khalwatiyya. In South Sulawesi overall, around 5 percent of the population are followers of this Sufi order. See van Bruinnessen 1991, 1.

[51] Kompas 2002, 19. [52] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 186. [53] Gianie 2009.

[54] These were Irwansyah Kasim (Head of Mining and Energy Department Maros), Bachtiar Mahmud (State Electricity Company Persero Makassar) and Anwar Baso Mapparessa (Director for Industrial Relations at the Ministry of Manpower). All the candidates for deputy district head were bureaucrats too.

[55] Perda No.15/2005 tentang Gerakan Buta Aksara dan pandai Baca Al-Qur'an dalam Wilayah Kabupaten Maros. The *shari'a* regulation ruled that schoolchildren can only transfer to the next higher school tier if their Qur'an-reading skills are sufficient.

dress codes for Muslims[56] and local bureaucrats,[57] prayers and religious alms.[58]

As in West Java's Cianjur district examined earlier, the regulations here allowed Aminullah to accumulate social and cultural capital that was pivotal in a district teeming with Islamist groups operating outside formal politics. These groups under the auspices of the KPPSI, the preeminent Islamist group in South Sulawesi mentioned in Chapter 6, "started Islamic law enforcement activities" and "prepared" the population of Maros for the adoption of Islamic law as early as 1999.[59] Against this backdrop, Aminullah highlighted his religious credentials by rubber-stamping rules favored by Islamist groups. A local observer noted: "The existence of these *shari'a* regulations clearly led to a discourse among elites that the district head was a new kind of ruler in Maros. The *shari'a* issue is without doubt a very effective way to improve one's reputation as a leader."[60]

In addition to fostering cultural capital, *shari'a* regulations helped Aminullah add important social networks to his political arsenal. In the 2005 district head elections, the KPPSI and pesantren *Darul Istiqamah* campaigned on his behalf.[61] Mannan Nur, the head of NU in Maros and member of the campaign team of Aminullah's competitor, complained:

> The *shari'a* discourse in Maros district is the result of the new district head who won the last elections due to the strong support of Islamic organizations (*ormas Islam*) such as Darul Istiqamah and KPPSI Maros. Until today, most of the support for the district head's *shari'a* program comes from Islamic groups. [This support] is also the result of the fact that the current district head is part of the *pesantren Darul Istiqamah* network (*keluarga besar*) [and] that the current Darul Istiqamah Maros leader Saudara Muzakkir was appointed [by the district head] as the head of the Maros District Shari'a Advisory board (*Dewan Syari'ah Kabupaten Maros*).[62]

On June 27, 2005, Aminullah was re-elected district head with 44 percent of the vote.[63] The following year, he issued a *shari'a* regulation on

In addition, the regulation required Haji pilgrims to pass a Qur'an-reading test. See also Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 189 for an assessment of the legal contradictions associated with this *shari'a* regulation.

[56] Perda No. 16/2005 tentang Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah.

[57] These were decrees (*surat edaran*).

[58] Perda No.17/2005 tentang Pengelolaan Zakat. The district head argued that this *shari'a* regulation was necessary because without political strength (*kekuatan politik*) it would be difficult to "force" (*memaksakan*) citizens to pay religious alms. See Anwar dan Turmudi 2003, 77.

[59] Amal dan Panggabean 2004, 86. [60] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 192.

[61] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 192. Aminullah's competitors were supported by more mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and DDI Mangkoso.

[62] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 193. [63] JPPR 2008.

religious alms[64] and another on establishing "Muslim areas."[65] In 2007, the district head adopted a *shari'a* rule to extend *zakat* collection to Haj pilgrims.[66]

After the elections, like his colleague in Cianjur, Aminullah established "Model Muslim Areas" (*daerah percontohan*) in two subdistricts called Lau and Maccini Baji.[67] There is written evidence that at least in the case of Maccini Baji, the KPPSI selected the subdistrict and designed the rules for "Muslim life" in it. The district head simply followed KPPSI's guidelines.[68] Apparently, the KPPSI zeroed in on this area because some of its leaders had been born there.

A lot of the "Islamization" efforts in these "Muslim villages" were largely symbolic, with street names changing from Latin script to Arabic and women having to wear headscarves in government buildings.[69] However, the Islamization agenda resembled the one in West Java's Cianjur district in that it smeared religious cosmetics onto clientelistic politics. For instance, Islamist networks in the "Muslim areas" received support from the district head "to prepare the implementation of Islamic law . . . Every village received a computer, every village head and member of the Syariah Board in Maccini Baji village received a cell phone, and still other special funds were disbursed [to facilitate] the development of these villages."[70] In a similar vein, the government provided "donations" to roll out the headscarf mandate in Maccini village.[71]

Again echoing patterns in Cianjur, the district head of Maros expanded the *shari'a* bureaucracy, most importantly by appointing a Shari'a Board (*Dewan Syariah*) in 2006. The board, financed through the district budget, brought together religious and local notables and was designed "to study [Islamic law], issue fatwas, to counsel on, . . . and to supervise the implementation of shari'a law in Maros."[72] Most of the figures on this board came from MUI, Islamist circles and the local branch of the Ministry of Religion.[73]

A report by two Indonesian political scientists concludes: "The process through which *shari'a* regulations are adopted in Maros is not different

[64] Decree No. 451.12/498/Set/2006 on Zakat Collection.
[65] Public Servants and Decree No. 29.A/KPTS/451/I/2006 on Establishing Maccini Ward as a Permanent "Muslim Area."
[66] Decree No. 451.12.413/Set/2007 on the Extension of Zakat Collection to Haj Pilgrims.
[67] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 190. [68] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 177.
[69] This headscarf requirement was enforced despite the absence of any *shari'a* regulation saying so. See Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 200.
[70] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 193. [71] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 198.
[72] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 194. [73] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 195.

from other districts. The support from Islamic groups served an important role in promoting the adoption of *shari'a* regulations."[74]

7.2.3 *The Adoption of* Shari'a *Regulations across West Java and South Sulawesi*

The dynamics behind *shari'a* policymaking in Cianjur in West Java and Maros in South Sulawesi are duplicated in other districts. Elsewhere, state elites also adopted *shari'a* regulations to reap political resources from Islamist groups situated outside formal politics. In 2009, Diani Budiarto campaigned for a second term as mayor of Bogor city in West Java, promising Islamist groups he would demolish Bogor's Ahmadiyah mosque.[75] After Budiarto's success at the ballot box, the mosque was bulldozed in July 2010 under police supervision. The following year, the mayor issued a *shari'a* regulation prohibiting Ahmadiyah activities in the entire city.[76]

When Syarif Hidayat, then deputy mayor of Tasikmalaya City, was running for mayor in 2007, he pushed through a *shari'a* regulation prohibiting the activities of the Ahmadiyah community.[77] Subsequently, the Tholiban endorsed Syarif Hidayat by making him an official member of their organization. In the years after the elections, Hidayat adopted more *shari'a* regulations.[78]

Preparing for his re-election bid in 2012, Hidayat sought once more the support of Islamist groups in the city. A prominent Islamist leader mentioned in Chapter 6, Ajengan Zenzen, who is the head of the Tholiban and runs *Pesantren Al-Irsyadiyah*, endorsed H. Syarif Hidayat and his running mate H. Dede Sudrajat. During the campaign in 2011, Hidayat adopted a *shari'a* regulation on religious education.[79]

In Tasikmalaya district, district head Tatang Farhanul Hakim passed a *shari'a* regulation banning the activities of the Ahmadiyah community during his bid for a second term.[80] Islamist groups had signaled before the

[74] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 193. [75] Primanita 2010.

[76] Keputusan Walikota No. 300.45–122 Tahun 2011 tentang Pelarangan Aktivitas Jemaat Ahmadiyah di Kota Bogor.

[77] Surat Keputusan Bersama No. 450/Kep. 72 – Kesbang/ 2007 Tentang Pernyataan Sikap Terhadap Jemaat Ahmadiyah di Kota Tasikmalaya.

[78] Peraturan Daerah No. 12 Tahun 2009 tentang Tata Nilai Kehidupan Masyarakat yang Berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama Islam dan Norma-Norma Sosial Masyarakat di Kota Tasikmalaya; Perda No. 8/2009 tentang Pendirian BPR Syariah.

[79] Perda No. 2/ 2011 tentang Pendidikan Diniyah di Kota Tasikmalaya.

[80] Surat Keputusan Bersama No. 450/Kep. 72-Kesbang/ 2007 tentang Pernyataan Sikap Terhadap Jemaat Ahmadiyah di Kota Tasikmalaya. Tatang Farhanul Hakim, a religious teacher at *Madrasah Tsanawiyah*, who had also served as a chair and parliamentarian for the Islamist PPP party in the Tasikmalaya parliament from 1992 to 2001, had been elected as mayor in 2001.

elections that a candidate with an Islamist agenda would win their support.[81]

Indeed, Islamist groups and religious power brokers were indispensable to Hakim's campaign. A local observer provided a first-hand account of the dynamics that unfolded between Hakim and boarding schools in the context of the local election:

> [*Kyai*] were backing (*membacking*) candidates from the start. Pesantren Sukahideng that is led by K.H. Sihabudin Muchsin, invited religious boarding schools and local notables [*tokoh masyarakat*] to launch a book that was written by the incumbent who is running for re-election, namely Tatang Farhanul Hakim. In his speech, Kyai Sihab said that Tatang is one [*identik*] with the [*Sukahideng*] boarding school and that all religious leaders in Tasikmalaya will support Tatang.[82]

Various religious boarding schools directly tied to the Darul Islam, such as *Pesantren Miftahul Huda* in Manonjaya and *Pesantren Suka Manah* in Sukarame, also joined the campaign.[83] The leader of the Islamist *Pesantren Miftahul Huda* in Manonjaya, Kyai Asep Maoshul Affandi, was a key agent in Tatang's campaign whose role in "coordinating campaign activities behind the scene" (*melakukan gerakkan-gerakkan strategis di balik layar*)[84] was as crucial as it was discreet. In the words of a local scholar:

> In an effort to pave the way for Tatang in the local government head elections, K.H. Asep Maoshul, one of the kyai who was championing (*menjagokan*) Tatang as district head, was busy weaving together (*menjalin*) various groups through organizing social gatherings [*silaturahmi*]. He established these movements well before the official campaign period. During the official campaign period . . . at the local level [K.H. Asep Maoshul] was acting behind the scene only. During the [entire] campaign period, he did not leave the boarding school once.[85]

To give a final example of the political capital that Islamist groups grant state elites in West Java's elections: In the gubernatorial elections in 2013, candidates sought the endorsement of local FPI branches in various districts. Both the provincial headquarters and local branches of the Islamist group FPI said they endorsed Irianto M.S. Syaifudin, a.k.a. Yance, because he had adopted various *shari'a* regulations as district head of Indramayu.[86]

Islamist groups also influenced political and public life in West Java beyond the introduction of *shari'a* regulations. In a report on violence against religious minorities in West Java, Ismail Hasani, head of the

[81] See Rachman 2006, 149. [82] See Rachman 2006, 114.
[83] Deden Nurul Hidayat, pers. comm. June 26, 2013. [84] Rachman 2006, 138.
[85] Rachman 2006, 115. [86] Radar Sukabumi 2012.

SETARA Institute, a local watchdog, concluded: "When these attacks [against religious minorities] were becoming frequent in 2007, we assumed that they were the workings of the [Islamist Party] PKS .... But then we studied it more and we learned it was something else .... These incidents illustrate the political motives of certain organizations to gain supporters ... These mass organizations are frequently used for political reasons. For instance, approaching regional elections, mass organizations are used to win more votes."[87]

In South Sulawesi, too, *shari'a* policymaking beyond Maros district is motivated by state elites' need for political resources in elections. When authorities in Pangkep district agreed to a *shari'a* regulation against alcohol, one local observer said this was "very much driven" (*didorong dengan sangat kuat*) by the KPPSI district branch.[88] The alcohol ban became a gateway for other *shari'a* regulations on dress codes for women and bureaucrats and the establishment of "Muslim" subdistricts.[89] As in Maros district, it was the KPPSI that chose Bonto Manai and Bonto Kio subdistricts to host "Muslim villages"; the local government merely kowtowed to the Islamist group's recommendation.[90]

In Pangkep district, government head Syafruddin Nur not only adopted *shari'a* regulations but actively promoted the closure of Christian churches after he had received the support of the KPPSI branch in the 2005 election. Nur also allowed the KPPSI to obstruct a meeting of the Indonesian Church Association in Pangkep. As a local observer noted, such meetings had been held without any problem in the years prior to the democratization of politics in 1998.[91] Again, Nur was endorsed by Islamist groups and eventually integrated into the KPPSI apparatus in return for welcoming *shari'a* regulations. After the 2005 elections, Syafruddin Nur became a member of the Dewan Syura KPPSI Pangkep.[92]

Like in West Java, state elites competing in South Sulawesi's *provincial* elections tapped Islamist networks for their campaigns. In August 2013, Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, who was challenging incumbent governor Syahrul Yasin Limpo, met with KPPSI leaders at the provincial level and at branches in Gowa, Makassar City, Maros and Takalar districts. On this occasion, Sirajuddin's running mate Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar appealed to the citizens of South Sulawesi via the local press to "not let the government fall into the hands of secular people."[93] Throughout their

[87] Primanita 2010. [88] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 201. [89] Subair 2012, 86.
[90] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 177. Similar "Muslim model villages" were adopted in Bulukumba district. There, no less than 12 such villages were established and financially supported by the district government.
[91] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 208. [92] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 206.
[93] Ilham 2012, online.

entire campaign, Siradjuddin and Muzakkar relied on the local networks of KPPSI to mobilize crowds.[94]

The KPPSI and other Islamist groups in the province, such as the Islamic Community Forum (FUI, *Forum Umat Islam*), endorsed the coalition between Sirajuddin and Muzakkar[95] and offered their networks during the election. Muzakkar enlisted Islamic preachers across the province to campaign on his behalf[96] and held meetings in mosques with district heads in Bantaeng and Jeneponto.[97] Less than a week before Election Day, more than 2,000 members of Islamist paramilitary groups gathered at Villa Lantebung in Bontomarannu subdistrict in Gowa to receive training in "self-defense" and "observe the collection of votes." The local KPPSI boss Muhammad Nasrun, who also ran an Islamist paramilitary group called *Laskar Juang IA Gowa*, said: "The members that were recruited have the mentality, the guts and the physique to conduct several kinds of training programs. In addition to technical issues and strategy, they are also going to be equipped with martial art techniques. [We do this to] anticipate fraud, anarchy, intimidation, the rigging of data and voter lists as well as the collection of false votes." Nasrun announced that 16 paramilitary groups, each containing around 150 fighters, would swarm villages on Election Day to "encourage" citizens not to be intimidated by other candidates. The KPPSI-linked paramilitary groups also would observe the transport of the votes "from the ballot box to the local election commission."[98] Similar coalitions between state elites and Islamist groups materialized amid local elections across the province.[99]

Again, anecdotal evidence from across South Sulawesi suggests a clear impetus for state elites to enact *shari'a* regulations: as electoral competition grew, so too did their need for political resources.[100] Initially, KPPSI demands for a state based on Islamic law elicited a lukewarm response from national and local politicians. During the first KPPSI congress in 2001, for instance, Jusuf Kalla said it was unnecessary to adopt Islamic law because the state posed no obstacles for Muslims to follow Islamic teachings.[101] Likewise, in 2006, South Sulawesi governor Amin Syam said he supported KPPSI's agenda as a private individual but not in his official capacity as chief executive of the government.[102] Syam's stance,

[94] Tribun Timur 2012, online. [95] Ilham 2013b, online.
[96] Mujibuhrraman 2013, 177. [97] Kambie 2012. [98] Ilham June 30, 2012, online.
[99] See, for instance, accounts of the mayoral campaign of H.M. Adil Patu in Makassar in 2008 and the central role KPPSI figures played in it, as reported in *Fajar* 2008, 6.
[100] For an account of Islamist groups' involvement in Sinjai district, a Darul Islam stronghold in the 1950s, see Amal dan Panggabean 2004, 86.
[101] Hamdan 2006, 193. [102] Hamdan 2006, 190.

however, changed when he ran for re-election in 2007. On the eve of Election Day, Syam said in an interview: "Yes, if people elect me again, I will continue to adopt *shari'a* regulations in South Sulawesi province."[103]

In addition to providing social capital through local networks and cultural capital through endorsements, Islamist groups have arguably helped state elites attract economic capital, albeit in a more indirect manner.

Shari'a rules on religious alms have become one of the most popular regulations in both West Java and South Sulawesi, targeting both individuals and businesses.[104] Many local governments lack the state capacity to collect such alms. In a leaked diplomatic cable from 2007, the US embassy in Jakarta emphasized the challenges navigated by South Sulawesi's Bulukumba district head: "The Bulukumba government deducts 2.5% from the salaries of government employees every month for zakat, but has no method of requiring private sector employees to make similar payments. [Local observers] suggested that absent any tangible enforcement capacity, the local government relied on the community's moral sanction to force compliance."[105]

In many districts across West Java and South Sulawesi, the presence of local Islamist groups poses precisely such "moral sanctions," empowering district heads who deal with citizens and local businesses hesitating to pay the religious tithe.[106] Arguably, the groups ensure that *shari'a* regulations on religious alms remain lucrative, making up for the government's weakness in collecting such taxes. In this context, Azwar Hasan, a leading KPPSI member in South Sulawesi, said in an interview with a grin on his face: "[O]verall, local governments are [adopting] *zakat* regulations quite enthusiastically because they profit from them."[107] Islamist groups can deliver economic capital via religious alms collected at boarding schools as well. The *Hidayatullah* boarding school, which has close links to the KPPSI movement mentioned in Chapter 6, is a highly efficient fundraiser across South Sulawesi, as local newspaper reports attest.[108]

Finally, on several occasions, Islamist groups have been (implicit) helpers to state elites who set up and profit from de facto alcohol monopolies by enforcing *shari'a* regulations.[109] In Bulukumba district the Kajang religious minority bore the brunt of a sanction against the consumption of alcohol. Some of their animist practices were forbidden

[103] Amin Syam, pers. comm. October 31, 2007.
[104] In fact, *shari'a* regulations on religious alms are popular across the archipelago. See Buehler and Muhtada 2016.
[105] Embassy of the United States 2007. [106] Buehler 2008.
[107] Azwar Hasan, pers. comm., September 7, 2006. [108] Ansar 2013.
[109] Buehler 2008.

because they included the consumption of *tuak*, an alcoholic beverage made of fermented rice, yeast and sugar. At the same time, tourists visiting the Kajang communities were allowed to consume alcohol in their hotels. A local observer notes:

> This goes to show that the leverage the tourist industry, with all the investment it brings has [vis-à-vis the local government] is much stronger than that of local communities. This raises the question whether Islamic law can be more compromised by hotels and clubs for tourists, which are often accused of being a source for vices, or by the traditions of local people that are far from being sinful . . . Is it possible that the decision whether vices are prevalent in an area or not depends more on how much money they contribute to the district revenues rather than ethic values? It is one of the ironies of living in this nation these days that the government cares more about capital than human rights.[110]

7.3 The Adoption of *Shari'a* Regulations across Indonesia

I have traced the processes through which state elites and Islamist groups situated outside formal politics collaborated in West Java and South Sulawesi. Their interactions reflect the causal *mechanisms* that allow Islamist movements to shape policymaking among state elites in localities with strong Islamist networks. To see whether the dynamics in the two provinces may also be at work elsewhere in Indonesia, I examined the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in the country overall.

Data from all 34 provinces show that the bulk of the 443 *shari'a* regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 cluster in the districts of a relatively small number of provinces, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. The provinces with the highest number of *shari'a* regulations are West Java (103), West Sumatra (54), South Sulawesi (47), South Kalimantan (38), East Java (32) and Aceh (25). In other words, 67.7 percent (300/443) of the *shari'a* regulations are concentrated in just six provinces. On top of this, more than 66 percent (289/443) of all *shari'a* regulations were adopted in *rural* areas, as shown in Appendix 1.[111]

With the exception of East Java, Islamist networks have existed for decades in all these provinces. Albeit of different intensity and length, rural revolts occurred in the *shari'a* bastions of Aceh, West Sumatra and South Kalimantan. Islamist groups affiliated with West Java's Darul Islam were active in South Kalimantan (1950–1963) and Aceh (1953–1962).[112] West Sumatra was part of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic

[110] Subair 2010, 89.
[111] This is in congruence with Mujani and Liddle 2004, 110 who state that support for Islamist ideologies on a mass level in Indonesia is a rural phenomenon.
[112] Van Dijk 1981.

Indonesia/Universal Struggle Charter Rebellion better known under its Indonesian acronym *PRRI/Permesta* (1958–1958).[113]

As in West Java and South Sulawesi, there were considerable cleavages fortified by socio-economic differences arising from *within* these regions. After Indonesia's independence in 1949, the secular outlook of the national government in Jakarta concerned many religious players in Aceh province. In this context, Daud Beureu'eh, a local religious leader, declared in 1953 that Aceh would join the Darul Islam rebellion that had started in West Java a few years earlier.[114] The uprising in Aceh petered out in 1959 but tensions between elite factions persisted. Once again, it was mainly the non-religious leaders of the Darul Islam who moved into important state positions, while religious figures remained at the fringes. Many men from this latter group came to found the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*) in 1976 to engage the state in an armed resistance until 2005.[115]

The Free Aceh Movement, as a byproduct of the Darul Islam rebellion, initially expressed its opposition to the state in religious terms. It evolved over time to frame its struggle in nationalist language.[116] However, most important, elites entrenched in government institutions continued to *perceive* these groups as pursuing an Islamic agenda.[117] They viewed *shari'a* regulations as a prudent strategy to appease such groups in Aceh.

There was also a rebellion under the Darul Islam banner in South Kalimantan province in the years after Indonesia gained independence. This revolt was "a relatively minor one" compared to the upheavals in other provinces.[118] Still, the political cleavages resemble those in other *shari'a* clusters. Local guerrilla units were disgruntled because of the way the central government treated them after the independence war had been won. Many jobs in the local bureaucracy had been given to figures parachuted into the local state apparatus from outside the province.[119] Groups under the leadership of Ibnu Hajdar took up arms against the government and demanded the replacement of certain *local* bureaucrats, as well as a fairer distribution of spoils within *local* army and police postings.

Once again, this opposition to the local state was manifested in religious phrases. "One of the outstanding features [of the local rebel group] had been its strict adherence to the tenets of Islam. Its [leadership], besides aiming at radical social and economic reform in the rural areas, devoted

[113] Amal 1992. [114] Aspinall 2009, 31; Van Dijk 1981, 305–6.
[115] Aspinall 2009, 63. [116] Aspinall 2009, 193–219. [117] Feener 2013, xi.
[118] Van Dijk 1981, 218. [119] Van Dijk 1981, 244.

much of its energy to the promotion of Islam and the enforcement of its laws," an expert on the conflict said.[120]

Finally, West Sumatra was not part of the Darul Islam unrest but the province shows similar political cleavages, namely a long history of conflicts between traditional state authorities and representatives of Islamic reform movements situated outside the state apparatus.[121] West Sumatra was already fertile soil for Islamist movements during the colonial period. In the nineteenth century the Padri movement sought to impose *shari'a* law in the province despite the resistance of traditional leaders and local aristocrats.[122] As Ricklefs points out: "Despite their military defeat, the Padris had left a deep and lasting mark upon Minangkabau society. A strong commitment to Islamic orthodoxy remained. In the fluid balance between *adat* and Islam, the role of Islam as a part of the whole set of rules which governed Minangkabau society had been greatly increased."[123] Once more, the colonial powers repressed religious figures in favor of elites rooted in customary law. Hence, it was predominantly traditional leaders who came to occupy posts in the *Nagari* administration, which Japan had established in West Sumatra during the Second World War.[124] After independence, traditional leaders continued to dominate local government. This heightened the "old social tension" between traditional elites and religious leaders.[125]

In newly independent Indonesia's first election in 1955, the Islamic Masyumi party won the majority of votes in West Sumatra,[126] and yet it was increasingly marginalized in national politics. At the same time, the Javanese, Indonesia's main ethnic group, became more and more influential in the national army. It was against this backdrop that West Sumatra's army commanders, with the support of a strong faction of Islamic leaders, absconded to form the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Universal Struggle Charter (*PRRI, Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Permesta*) in 1958.[127]

Central government troops quickly squelched the local uprising, but the conflict shaped power constellations in the province for years. It was predominantly the military section of the rebellion that had decided to return to the Republican government as early as December 1958. Some leaders of the Islamic Masyumi party, however, fought until 1961.[128]

[120] Van Dijk 1981, 260. [121] Amal 1992, 14.
[122] The twentieth-century *Kaum Muda* movement is another example of an Islamist movement in West Sumatra. See Abdullah 2009.
[123] Ricklefs 2001, 184. [124] Amal 1992, 17. [125] Kahin 1974, 76–117.
[126] Amal 1992, 57.
[127] Feith and Lev 1963, 39; Amal 1992, 80. The PRRI had lost connections to the Darul Islam. See Hindley 1966, 268.
[128] Feith and Lev 1963, 42–3.

Therefore, military commanders were propelled into important positions within the local state, while networks affiliated with the Islamic Masyumi party were sidelined politically.[129]

This falling out between Muslim groups on one side and the army and traditional leaders on the other reverberated for decades. Animosities between the army and Muslim groups in West Sumatra, simmering since at least 1967,[130] came to a boil ahead of the 1971 elections. Eventually, steamrolling tactics, the co-optation of influential Islamic figures and vote-rigging led to a Golkar victory at the expense of Islamic parties. Most important, the majority of Islamic leaders remained outside formal power structures in West Sumatra up until the collapse of the dictatorship in 1998.[131]

Recent local studies confirm that in West Sumatra, too, state elites adopted most *shari'a* regulations[132] to forge ties with important power brokers and vote-getters.[133] As elsewhere, those Islamist groups supply economic resources to the elites. One local report based on dozens of interviews with bureaucrats and Islamist figures, including members of a group called "Aliansi Padri," stressed that almost all "anti-vice" regulations were ineffective because the "targets of these regulations" simply bribed officials to skirt the rules. Again, local Islamist groups helped the local government head to collect economic capital. In Bukitttinggi city, for instance, "there were allegations that the enforcement of anti-vice [*shari'a*] regulations against certain places was conducted by a group of thugs who were supporters of the mayor. By having access to the mayor, [the thugs] provide assurance that the city government will not sanction these places. In return, [the thugs] receive bribes [*upeti*] from the managers of those places. This also means that the mayor does not have to bother with draining personal funds or access the local budget (APBD) in order to subsidize the group of thugs. [In addition], the major hotels are spared from these [Islamist] activities because they are protected by the higher level [government] apparatus."[134]

Finally, East Java province is the only *shari'a* cluster where Islamist movements affiliated with the Darul Islam have no strong historical presence. It is important to note, however, that until the early New Order years, the NU pushed an Islamist agenda in East Java, as mentioned in

[129] Amal 1992, 88; Feith and Lev 1963, 46. [130] Amal 1992, 118.

[131] Islamic networks made themselves heard in West Sumatra during the New Order. For instance, Islamic groups tried to detonate a bomb inside a Christian hospital in West Sumatra in 1976. See ICG 2005, 7. As the New Order dictatorship became more consolidated, these open hostilities between elites affiliated with the local state and Islamic groups outside the state became increasingly rare in West Sumatra.

[132] Alamsyah 2013, 9. [133] Alamsyah 2013, 14. [134] Alamsyah 2013, 29–30.

Chapter 2.[135] The adoption of *shari'a* regulations in this province may therefore herald a revival of sorts of these earlier dynamics.[136] However, it also should be emphasized that East Java lags on *shari'a* regulations, which only recently have gained traction in districts around the province. Many of the *shari'a* rules are simply copied from the five other *shari'a* clusters that pioneered these policies.[137] Future research will have to show why the Islamization of politics occurred in East Java too and took off after 2005.

In short, like in West Java and South Sulawesi, socio-economic tensions led to the mobilization in the name of Islam in all *shari'a* clusters except East Java. As in West Java and South Sulawesi, these upheavals were couched in religious rhetoric and had their strongholds in *rural* areas.[138] The fact that most *shari'a* regulations are adopted in the countryside strengthens the argument put forward in this book, namely that the regulations exhibit the political power of Islamist movements with strong, historical roots in their localities. This power is derived from the heightened competition among elites in control of the state. The rise of *shari'a* regulations in this setting reinforces the causal link between the presence of entrenched Islamist networks and the embrace of such regulations among state elites. The similar political trajectories across provinces indicate this conclusion is not a result of selection bias in the two case studies, West Java and South Sulawesi, but a phenomenon visible in all *shari'a* clusters. However, further research on the interplay between Islamist groups situated outside the formal political system and state elites in these other *shari'a* provinces is needed to gain more insight into the specific dynamics between local actors.

7.4 State Elites: Mediating Islamist Influence

The case studies above showed that Islamist groups gained influence in politics because they provided state elites with resources they could use in elections. Islamist parties, by contrast, lacked power to demand *shari'a* law because they could not deliver such political ammunition to state elites. At the same time, the experience in West Java, South Sulawesi and other localities that adopted *shari'a* regulations also demonstrates how elites mediate the influence of Islamist groups placed outside formal party politics.

Temporal and spatial patterns in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations are indicative of this. State elites adopted *shari'a* regulations more frequently

[135] Hefner 1987. [136] Turmudi 2000. [137] Buehler and Muhtada 2016.
[138] Van Dijk 1981, 7 has argued that the Darul Islam shared many commonalities with peasant rebellions in other countries.

as competition among them increased. Between 1998 and 2004, when local government heads were *indirectly* elected and the political fortunes of state elites therefore depended less on linkages to society, 34 *shari'a* regulations were adopted in West Java. This amounts to an annual average of 4.9 *shari'a* regulations. However, during the period of *direct* local government head elections from 2005 to 2013, 69 *shari'a* regulations were adopted. In other words, 8.6 *shari'a* regulations were adopted each year on average, almost twice as many as during the time of indirect local elections. Similarly, in South Sulawesi, 12 *shari'a* regulations were adopted during that earlier period, translating into an annual average of 1.7 *shari'a* regulations. Between 2005 and 2013, in the context of direct elections, 35 *shari'a* regulations were adopted, or an annual average of 4.4 *shari'a* regulations.

In addition, across Indonesia, 54.5 percent (241/443) of all *shari'a* regulations appeared within two years *after* a local government head election. And 45.5 percent (201/443) of all *shari'a* regulations were adopted within two years *before* a local government head election. These patterns suggest elites swap *shari'a* regulations in exchange for political support during electoral campaigns.

The political motives behind the Islamization of politics and the mediating role of state elites become even clearer if one asks whether *shari'a* regulations were adopted in local government heads' first terms, when they faced re-election, or during second terms when no re-elections were looming. In West Java 68 percent (71/103) and in South Sulawesi 61.7 percent (29/47) of all *shari'a* regulations were adopted during local government heads' inaugural terms. Again, trends in the rest of Indonesia mimic those found in West Java and South Sulawesi, with 68 percent (200/293) of all *shari'a* regulations outside West Java and South Sulawesi approved by local government heads during their *first* terms in office, with only 29 percent (85/293) during second terms, as shown in Table 7.1. This indicates local chief executives who are termed out of office[139] lose interest in *shari'a* regulations because they no longer have to build bonds with the electorate by catering to local Islamist movements.

There is also a spatial component to the Islamization of politics that, again, proves how state elites curtail the influence of Islamist groups situated outside formal party politics. During the New Order, when power was concentrated at the national level, most laws with a religious hue were adopted by the central government. After Indonesia became one of the most decentralized countries in the world in 1998, *shari'a* law

[139] Remember that according to the electoral framework sketched in Chapter 3, local government heads in Indonesia can only run for two five-year terms.

Table 7.1 *Number of* shari'a *regulations adopted 1998–2013, by term of government head*

	First term	Second term	Caretaker[a]	N/A
West Java	71	31	1	
South Sulawesi	29	18		
All other provinces	200	85	6	2
Total	300	134	7	2

[a] If a newly elected district head is unable to take up office immediately (because other candidates challenge the election results in court, for instance) caretakers (*pejabat*) appointed by the national governments run local governments. Most of these interim district heads are in office for only a few months. Nevertheless, there are seven *shari'a* regulations that have been adopted by such caretakers during their time in office. Since these caretakers are not subject to electoral dynamics, I listed these *shari'a* regulations separately in Table 7.1.

became an issue in subnational politics. Very few laws with an Islamic connotation were adopted nationally between 1998 and 2013.[140] Of at least 443 *shari'a* regulations that took effect at the subnational level in those years, 9.1 percent (41/443) were adopted at the provincial level, 65.2 percent (289/443) at the district level and 25.5 percent (113/443) at the municipal level. In short, the higher one moves in Indonesia's administrative structure, the lower the number of Islamic laws.

Arguably, provinces enacted relatively fewer *shari'a* regulations because Islamist networks do not have a strong presence at that level of government. Islamist groups tried to fan out across West Java and even managed to establish a province-wide umbrella organization in South Sulawesi, but overall most Islamist groups exercise very local influence only. Most likely, this is because they coalesce around local boarding schools of charismatic individuals. The realm of authority such individuals can control is limited by the highly personal nature of their power

[140] National laws with a religious component adopted between 1998 and 2013 are the Law No. 38/1999 on the Administration of Zakat (alms); Law No. 13/2002 on Child Protection; Law No. 32/2002 on Broadcasting Rights; Law No. 20/2003 on the National Education System; Law 42/2006 on revision of Law No. 41/2004 on Wakaf (donations for religious or community use); Law No. 3/2006 on revision of Law No. 7/1989 on Religious Courts; Law No. 13/2008 on the Haj; Law No. 21/2008 on Shari'a Banking; Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography and The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister of the Interior of the The Republic of Indonesia No. 3/2008; KEP033/A/JA/6/2008; as well as Circulation No. 199/2008 in the Matter of a Warning and Order to the Followers, Members, and/ or leading Members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jama'at (JAI) and to the General Public. See Eddyono 2010, 14–15 for a summary of the content of these laws.

base. Rivalries among Islamist groups are another reason they struggle to coordinate beyond the district level. Hence, the groups cannot muster the same social capital to serve state elites in higher office, as they do for district heads.[141] In addition, provincial-level elites competing for public support must tackle a more diverse electorate, including urban voters and often relatively sizeable religious minorities, particularly Christian communities. They therefore have to tread the *shari'a* issue more lightly in their campaigns, or risk alienating vital voting blocs.[142] In short, the political capital Islamist groups can provide to provincial elites is considerably lower than at the district level. Consequently, *shari'a* policy-making is a less valuable card in the hands of elites competing in provincial and national elections. Overall, these spatial differences in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations show once more that state elites mediate the influence of Islamist forces in politics.

The contingency of Islamist movement influence on dynamics within the state is also seen in the *execution* of *shari'a* regulations, which is patchy at best. A lack of political will, the poor legal quality of most of these regulations and low state capacity hamper their implementation.

In the case of religious alms and dress codes, weak state capacity has obstructed the enforcement of Islamic policies. These two types of *shari'a* regulations end up targeting local bureaucrats more than any other group. It is relatively straightforward to collect religious alms from civil servants because local governments can simply deduct the alms from their employees' paychecks. It is also easier to punish government workers who flout dress codes, compared with offenders among the general public. Many local governments lack the resources to enforce these policies in the broader population.[143]

The poor legal quality of *shari'a* regulations also hinders their implementation. In South Sulawesi's Maros district, for example, *shari'a* rules

[141] Of course, the promises such national politicians can make to local Islamist groups are also limited since *national* politicians cannot adopt *local shari'a* regulations. Still, occasionally, national-level politicians try to tap into the networks of local Islamist groups in the context of elections. For instance, Jusuf Kalla, Indonesia's vice-president from 2004 to 2009, approached Islamist groups in the context of his bid for the presidency in 2009 in both West Java and South Sulawesi. See Zulkifli 2011, 76–94. See also ICG 2005, 13, footnote 47.

[142] This has not stopped national state elites that are *not* directly exposed to popular elections to weigh on the *shari'a* discourse at the district level. For instance, in 2013, Gawaman Fauzi, who adopted several *shari'a* regulations in his capacity as local government head in West Sumatra's Solok district, appealed (*mengimbau*) to local government heads to collaborate closely with Islamist groups such as FPI once he had become Home Affairs Minister. See Aritonang 2013.

[143] Arguably, the fact that *bureaucrats* are a target of many *shari'a* regulations is also a sign that *state* elites want to present *the state* in a certain fashion.

on an agricultural *zakat* stirred up controversy as farmers questioned whether they had to pay the tithe before or after receiving government subsidies. In Bulukumba and Enrekang district, new *shari'a* strictures meant schoolchildren had to prove their fluency in the Qur'an to move to the next grade, but the government was unsure who had the authority to test pupils.[144] Sometimes, legal ambiguities are so severe that authorities enforce regulations that had never been adopted. For example, women were forced to wear headscarves in some districts in South Sulawesi, despite the fact that local governments had never actually passed any such ordinance.[145]

Finally, *shari'a* regulations are rarely applied due to a shortage of political will. In West Java's Cianjur district, Islamist groups were deeply frustrated that many of the adopted *shari'a* regulations were not enforced and blamed the government. District boss Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh came to power in 2006 and was less committed to the *shari'a* agenda of his predecessor, Wasidi Swastomo, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. After this power transition, Chep Hernawan, the aforementioned leader of Cianjur's largest Islamist group GARIS, said in an interview: "The current government consists of assholes [*brengsek*]. If it is just us [fighting for Islam] it is difficult if the government is not pro-active."[146]

Likewise, in 2006, Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, then mayor of South Sulawesi's capital Makassar, approved a *shari'a* regulation limiting the circulation and consumption of alcohol as well as permits for liquor stores.[147] However, sales and consumption continued unabated. A local newspaper lamented the absence of a "firm commitment" by the city government to enforce the *shari'a* regulation. Even the former mayor had to admit that the regulation meant little on the streets of Makassar.[148] In another example of the sporadic use of most *shari'a* regulations, residents of South Sulawesi's Maros district were still unaware of a policy requiring women to wear headscarves two years after the regulation had been adopted.[149]

On the rare occasion that *shari'a* regulations *were* enforced, they were implemented selectively and through means that often fell outside the legal boundaries of local governments. Across the *shari'a* clusters, governors and district heads who adopted *shari'a* rules emphasized that only Muslims would have to abide by them. However, non-Muslim Indonesians were forced on many occasions to adhere to these regulations. In Aceh,

[144] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 187. [145] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 191.
[146] Unpublished report 2011.
[147] Perda No. 7/ 2006 Tentang Pengawasan, Pengendalian, Pengedaran dan Penjualan, serta Perizinan Tempat Penjualan Minuman Beralkohol.
[148] Fajar 2010, 15. [149] Subair dan Pattinjo 2007, 192.

schoolgirls of Chinese descent were made to wear headscarves. In Bulukumba, women of any religion were not admitted into government buildings with their heads bare. In Maros district, a non-Muslim schoolgirl was forced to wear a headscarf.[150]

The enforcement of *shari'a* regulations was flimsy even in South Sulawesi's Bulukumba district, which in Islamist circles had become a model for the Islamization of politics. This so enraged local Islamist groups that they threatened to take action without government sanction. Ahmad Kadir, the head of the local Islamist group FPI, complained in an interview in 2012: "The local government is not serious about enforcing the *shari'a* regulations which it has adopted in past years. I come to the district head office every week to remind the district head of these regulations. Last year we gave [the district head] an ultimatum that we would take the enforcement into our own hands."[151]

In fact, in numerous districts, Islamist groups took the enforcement of *shari'a* regulations into their own hands. Islamist vigilantes conducted "sweeps" of stores and restaurants selling alcohol and closed karaoke bars and nightclubs. In West Java, violence against places of worship of other religions or heterodox Islamic sects has spiked since 1998.[152] AGAP, GAMAS, GAPAS, FUI (*Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah*) and FUUI (*Forum Ulama dan Umat Islam*) all have attacked Ahmadiyah congregations in West Java's Cirebon district multiple times. Likewise, GARIS roughed up Ahmadis in Cianjur district, LP3Syi and GERAM led assaults in Garut district, and the FPI and the Tholiban attacked Ahmadiyah communities in Tasikmalaya district.[153] There, the FPI even pounced on an Ahmadiyah orphanage.[154] Since 1998, Islamist groups also have gone after Christian sects and forced the closure of churches they claimed were built without permits. The civilian "implementation" of *shari'a* regulations has come to constitute one of the core activities of Islamist groups. GARIS leader Chep Hernawan said in an interview: "'[Attacking] Ahmadiyah and unofficial Churches is our 'food.'"[155]

[150] Subair 2010, 87.

[151] Ahmad Kadir, pers. comm. June 6, 2012. In fact, local governments' lack of commitment to enforce *shari'a* regulations has occasionally triggered new protest movements in both West Java and South Sulawesi. In Garut district, for instance, Islamist groups accused the government of providing government posts to Ahmadiyah members and protecting the heterodox Islamic sect. As a consequence of their disappointment with the local government, Islamist groups founded LP3Si and GERAM in 2005 and 2010, respectively. See Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 29.

[152] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 107; Rogers 2014.

[153] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 46.

[154] Hasani and Naipospos 2010, 170.

[155] Suara Islam 2011.

The erratic approach to enforcement is also apparent in the fact that *shari'a* law rarely affects (state) elites.[156] Rather, implementation disproportionally falls on the most vulnerable of Indonesian society, including women and youth groups, which both have been persecuted for dressing "improperly" and violating new curfews. Religious minorities are frequent targets, too, especially Christians and heterodox Islamic groups.[157]

To "implement" *shari'a* regulations, local governments often collaborate with Islamist groups, or rather, "outsource" the dirty work to them. In West Java's Tasikmalaya district in 2004, the Tholiban conducted a raid *together* with district police against restaurants suspected of selling alcohol. In South Sulawesi's Bulukumba district, the Islamist paramilitary organization *Laskar Jundullah* played the vigilantes for local police during the tenure of district head Patabai Pabokori.[158] A group called the Bulukumba Muslim Alliance (*Aliansi Muslim Bulukumba*) was the driving force behind the closure of an Ahmadiyah Mosque and the expulsion of Ahmadis from the district. A local observer notes that these activities went hand in hand with the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in the district and the general aim of the local head to paint an image of Bulukumba as an Islamic district.[159] In South Sulawesi local KPPSI branches "supervised" (*disaksikan*) police raids against liquor stores, just as Islamist groups did in West Java. In one last example of these rather opaque means of enforcement: Bonto Manai, a village in South Sulawesi's Pangkep district, apparently was chosen as a "Model Muslim Community," as mentioned in Chapter 5, because it was one of the poorest villages in the district. This gave the government and Islamist groups great leverage over the local population. As one resident said in a focus group discussion: "We wear the headscarf because we were told to do so (*disuruh*) by the village head. He said that if we do not wear the headscarf we won't receive rice donations from the government."[160] Overall, state elites who *do* execute *shari'a* regulations mostly rely on partnerships with Islamist groups. Unsurprisingly, the enforcement of *shari'a* regulations is often strictest in areas of South Sulawesi and West Java that contain boarding schools of Islamist groups.[161]

These enforcement patterns are replicated in other *shari'a* clusters. In Aceh province, Islamist groups, not the executive branch of the

[156] This is true for the enforcement of laws in Indonesia in general. See Winters 2011a, online.

[157] For a more extensive analysis of the discriminatory nature of many of these *shari'a* regulations, see Bush 2008, 172–4; Buehler 2008, 262; Hasani 2012; Holike 2008, 63–9; Lindsey 2008, 214; Balowski 2012.

[158] Widjaja 2012. [159] Subair 2010, 85. [160] Suaedy 2007, 207.

[161] Subair 2010, 88.

government, frequently carry out local *shari'a* regulations. What became known as "the white robes groups" (*kelompok jubah putih*) conducted "sweeps" aimed at women they judged to be dressed inappropriately. These activities were entirely "outside the law," a local observer notes.[162] In West Sumatra, a local report emphasized how the province's various *shari'a* regulations had "no feet" to walk on (*tidak memilik kaki*).[163]

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I showed how Islamist groups situated outside the formal political domain have helped to craft religious policy. The vast majority of *shari'a* regulations were adopted in rural areas where such Islamist groups have been robust historically. Furthermore, *shari'a* regulations cluster in provinces that have withstood revolts in the name of Islam. I then described how state elites traded Islamic regulations in exchange for the political resources provided by Islamist groups outside formal party politics. A "thick description" of *shari'a* policymaking in West Java and South Sulawesi showed that Islamist groups transferred political capital of various kinds to state elites. Locally connected Islamist leaders frequently acted as power brokers and vote-getters through the groups and boarding schools under their control.

The adoption of *shari'a* regulations also enabled state elites to accrue cultural capital. In districts where Islamist groups positioned themselves as the arbiter of who constitutes a "good Muslim," it has become necessary for state elites facing elections to be seen as leaders who "care" about religion. To drum up such a reputation, politicians not only authorized *shari'a* regulations but often pursued a broader "Islamization" agenda that is high in symbolism. State elites ordered sweeps of nightclubs, the public destruction of alcohol bottles and pornographic material and the persecution of religious minorities branded as "heretical." These elites also established "model villages" where everyday life was supposed to be guided by Islamic law and showered such constituencies with government funds.

In Section 7.3, I applied my argument to the rest of Indonesia by extrapolating the findings from West Java and South Sulawesi provinces. This showed that the majority of *shari'a* regulations cluster mainly in the rural areas of provinces with shared characteristics: intense competition among state elites and non-state elites, as well as a history of couching such rivalries in religious terms.

[162] Subair 2010, 88. [163] Alamsyah 2013, 29.

Finally, I showed that state elites even mediate the influence of Islamist movements. These elites became more inclined to adopt *shari'a* regulations because their reliance on mass support increased after the shift from indirect to direct elections in 2005, as seen in the data. Furthermore, the preponderance of *shari'a* regulations was inked when politically expedient, in the first term of local government heads. State elites became less willing to adopt *shari'a* regulations when they were no longer facing re-election.

8 Conclusion
Summary of Findings and Avenues for Future Research

The democratization of politics in Muslim-majority countries around the world has increased pressure on elected politicians to adopt Islamic laws. However, research on the topic remains underdeveloped and the literature review at the beginning of this book showed that there are various gaps in existing scholarship, particularly on how Islamist parties and Islamist movements situated outside party politics interact with the state in these countries.

In this chapter, I will first summarize the main findings of the book. I will then elaborate on how these findings contribute to existing and future research on the Islamization of politics in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

8.1 Summary of Findings

The opening chapters showed that the Islamization of politics that ensued in Indonesia after 1998, expressed in the form of Islamic regulations, has several distinct characteristics:

One, a growing number of *shari'a* regulations have been adopted in Indonesia despite a steady decline in the electoral support for Islamist parties. After the demise of Suharto, four parties emerged that explicitly called for the establishment of a state based on Islamic law. The combined vote share of these parties has continuously decreased since the first legislative elections in 1999. Furthermore, there is a weak link at best between the presence of Islamist parties in local executive and legislative government and the uptake of *shari'a* regulations. Data in Chapter 5 revealed that the overwhelming majority of local government heads adopting such *shari'a* regulations were closely affiliated with the New Order state and bore no relation to Islamist parties. In addition, secular parties controlled a majority of seats in all the parliaments that backed *shari'a* regulations between 1998 and 2013. Finally, an analysis of all localities with above-average support for Islamist parties outside the *shari'a* clusters showed that 80 percent of

such localities had *not* adopted any *shari'a* regulation between 1998 and 2013.

Two, the data showed that there is considerable variance across time and space in the adoption of these *shari'a* regulations. With regard to *temporal variance*, the bulk of *shari'a* regulations arose *after* the political opening in 1998. Few national Islamic laws and no subnational *shari'a* regulations were enacted during the 32-year reign of the authoritarian New Order. Furthermore, adoption patterns of *shari'a* regulations after 1998 turned out to be cyclical. As electoral competition between state elites increased over the years due to institutional changes, so did the pace with which *shari'a* regulations gained steam. This was corroborated by anecdotal evidence. In areas where Islamist movements were strong, state elites suddenly began to care for *shari'a* regulations once they had to compete in elections, despite snubbing Islamist policy earlier in their careers.[1] Local government heads were much more likely to adopt *shari'a* legislation during their first term in office than their second term, when they no longer had to face re-election due to Indonesia's term limits.

As for *spatial variance*, the majority of *shari'a* regulations cluster in the rural areas of only six of Indonesia's 34 provinces. In these areas, local Islamist groups situated outside formal party politics have strong historical roots and resurfaced as politics opened up in 1998. In addition to this variance *within* government layers, there is also variance *across* government layers. *Shari'a* regulations, as a synecdoche of Indonesia's political Islamization, occurred almost exclusively at the local level. Most *shari'a* rules were adopted by districts but almost none at the provincial and national levels.

These findings exposed two shortcomings in the literature on the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998.

The literature hovers predominantly around Islamist parties and therefore credits the parties as the main driver behind *shari'a* regulations after the fall of Suharto. However, Islamist parties are present all across the archipelago, and yet *shari'a* regulations converge in just a small number of provinces with a shared past of Islamist activism. This suggests that the Islamization of politics is driven by Islamist movements outside formal party politics.

[1] Amin Syam, the governor of South Sulawesi mentioned in Chapter 7, was such a figure as was Jusuf Kalla, the vice-president of Indonesia between 2004 and 2009 and between 2014 and 2019. Both politicians became suddenly interested in adopting *shari'a* regulations in the context of the gubernatorial elections in 2007, as well as the presidential elections in 2009 and 2014 respectively.

The scholarship on Islamist movements is incomplete, too. The movements remained relatively stable in size and numbers in these *shari'a* clusters for decades, but they began to wield political clout only after institutional changes in 1998. Thus, factors *external* to these movements need to be taken into account to explain the Islamization of politics in Indonesia.

These observations led to the main hypothesis of the book, namely that the influence of Islamist activism in democratizing Muslim-majority countries is contingent on power dynamics within the state.

With regard to the Indonesian local state, there has been relative continuity before and after 1998 in the composition of elites occupying the most powerful posts in subnational politics, that is governor and district head offices. What *did* change were the power dynamics between members of this bureaucratic elite. Institutional reforms after the New Order not only turned elections for public office into truly competitive affairs but also forced state elites to seek the support of the masses.

Concretely, an appraisal of the "sociology of the state" based on biographical data of candidates competing *and* winning in elections for local government heads[2] in West Java and South Sulawesi showed that these elites consisted primarily of bureaucrats, businessmen with close connections to the New Order state, as well as military and police personnel. I therefore labeled them state elites. Most important, Islamist activists failed to perforate the political system.[3] With few exceptions, most Islamist parties could not get their members elected into local government head posts. Most figures affiliated with Islamist movements situated outside formal party politics did not field official candidates for elections and have therefore also avoided public office.[4] In short, the state–Islam cleavage that has existed in Indonesia since at least 1945 has *not* been folded into the state through the democratization of politics in 1998.

The puzzle, then, was why state elites with long careers in the New Order, a regime that actively suppressed political Islam for decades, have become more receptive to the lobbying of nonpartisan Islamist groups but not Islamist parties. Asked differently, why has institutionalized Islam

[2] The sociology of the state was based on the analysis of the *curricula vitae* of local government heads because they are the main force behind the formulation, adoption and implementation of local regulations, as shown in Chapter 3.

[3] A few members affiliated with the Islamist cause were represented in the local government apparatus during the New Order. Furthermore, Islamist groups have somewhat successfully penetrated semi-official government bodies such as the MUI in the context of democratization after 1998. However, Islamist figures do not occupy governor or district head posts in large numbers, as shown in Chapter 3.

[4] A few such figures competed against other candidates in local elections but usually lost, as shown in Chapter 6.

failed to affect politics while uninstitutionalized Islam has gained and exerted political influence since 1998?

The argument put forward was that dynamics within the state and political institutions underlie the peculiar nature of political Islamization in post-New Order Indonesia. These dynamics govern how friendly officials will be toward *shari'a* policies because the process is almost never under the absolute control of a single political actor.

While the *composition* of ruling elites has remained similar to what existed in the New Order, the *cohesion* of elite relations has changed. Chapter 4 illustrated how Suharto's demise transformed relations among squabbling state elites into a genuinely competitive struggle for state power. The new institutional framework also flipped the logics of accumulating power upside down. After 1998, candidates running for governor or district head posts no longer had to win over a small number of politicians stationed higher up in the state apparatus, as was the case during the New Order, but now needed the support of the populace to win public office.

This dependence on popular support bred new challenges for state elites vying for state power. The economic autonomy of Indonesian voters is relatively high, as shown in Chapter 4, which dilutes the leverage of state elites considerably. Since candidates in local elections cannot rely on "locked-in" electorates, they require diverse forms of capital to energize voters if they want to have a shot at the ballot box. State elites need networks of power brokers and vote-getters to mobilize and structure the masses. They need to find the financial means to pay for campaigns. And, thanks to a more democratic environment, they need to worry about public perception. In short, state elites wrangling for political power must accumulate social, economic and cultural capital.

In this context, I hypothesized that Islamist actors gain and exercise influence in Muslim-majority countries shedding authoritarianism, only if they can disburse these three types of capital to the vestiges of the former regime during their newly democratic campaigns. Islamist actors who *do not* deliver such resources may emerge and mobilize in the context of democratization, but stand little chance of later steering political agendas. In other words, forces in control of the state mediate the influence of Islamist activism.

I then provided evidence in support of this hypothesis through a structured comparison of West Java and South Sulawesi, the two provinces that adopted most *shari'a* regulations in Java and Eastern Indonesia between 1998 and 2013. Politically, the two provinces sketched parallel trajectories after 1945 in several ways: One, there was no correlation between the electoral strength of Islamist parties and the propagation of

shari'a law. Islamist parties did not enjoy parliamentary majorities in districts that adopted *shari'a* regulations, nor did Islamist party members hold local government posts there. Even under more relaxed premises, when looking at local legislatures in which Islamic parties merely had an above-average presence, the odds of adopting *shari'a* regulations were no greater.

A detailed account of electoral politics in both West Java and South Sulawesi showed that Islamist parties struggled to furnish state elites with social capital because the parties were poorly institutionalized and did not command extensive grassroots networks. This derives either from historical reasons, as in the case of the PPP, which suffered internal schisms after it artificially merged parties under pressure from Suharto, or from the "top-heavy" structures that *elites* built when they founded Islamist parties after 1998, as in the case of the PBB and the PPNUI. Even the PKS, Indonesia's only Islamist party that grew out of a social movement, failed in both provinces to plant grassroots beyond its core constituency. Arguably, the PKS' distinct historical and socio-economic roots confined the party to the urban middle class. All this has greatly undermined the mobilizational capacity of Islamist parties. Built "in the air," they lack stable local constituencies that can be marshaled during campaign periods.

Islamist parties also have trouble coming up with economic and cultural capital. The parties face tight budgets and cannot help state elites meet the financial pressures they now confront in the wake of democratization and mass elections. State elites had to finance their own campaigns in both provinces. In fact, parties *asked* for money if a candidate wanted their nomination.

Lastly, Islamist parties became enmeshed in various corruption, drug and sex scandals after entering mainstream politics. Thus they have stumbled off any high moral ground that would appeal to Indonesian voters disenchanted with secular parties. Since Islamist parties command little public respect, their endorsement is unlikely to boost the religious credentials of political hopefuls eager to curate a public image to compete in mass elections.

Two, Islamist movements situated outside formal party politics have been active in West Java and South Sulawesi. These movements are rooted in social cleavages that date back to the late colonial period. The comparison showed that the legitimacy of traditional elites was corroded by their close connection with Dutch and Japanese colonial rule in both provinces. Consequently, local dynamics of contention "developed along the dividing lines defined by the long-standing antagonism between Islam and customary law (*adat*), or between Islam and

traditional rulers."[5] These fissures gave birth to revolts that waved the banner of Islam and opposed the state. The military eventually ended these rebellions but the tensions remained in place. In fact, they were "frozen" for the next three decades due to the oppressive military regime that came to power in 1965.

The Islamist movements that the Suharto dictatorship had driven underground resurfaced after the political opening in 1998. Chapter 6 showed that the seeming evanescence of many of these groups, the frequent bickering between them and the informal nature of Islamist networks belied the overall consistency and coherence of the Islamist movement in West Java and South Sulawesi. Held together by a shared past, a shared vision for the future and strong roots in a class of non-aristocratic entrepreneurs, these movements constitute some of the most coordinated and established political players state elites encounter as they "meet" society in their search for mass support in the context of newly competitive electoral politics.

Besides providing social capital, local Islamist movements also often played an important auxiliary role in state elites' endeavors to amass economic capital. In both provinces, state elites tried to erect political machines by expanding the local state apparatus and establishing government programs in the name of Islam. This bureaucratic apparatus was often financed by religious taxes and other levies and fees. Islamist groups not only helped to collect such fees but also engaged in the extortion and blackmail of local businesses and religious minorities. Islamist groups were at the forefront of "sweeps" against bars, brothels and congregations adhering to religious practices deemed heretic. In various districts, a big portion of the funds collected in this fashion were channelled back to Islamist groups so as to integrate them into state elites' broader political machine, as shown in Chapter 7.

Accommodating the agenda of Islamist movements also rendered state elites with cultural capital. The poor reputation of Islamist parties opened up a vacuum in local discourses where Islamist groups could become the arbiter on what constitutes a "good Muslim politician." The regular endorsement of certain candidates by Islamist groups prior to elections described in Chapter 6 showed that these groups are well aware of their role as proliferators of cultural capital and often manipulate this status to push their agenda.

In short, thanks to the changing power dynamics within the state and the political imperatives that ensued from it, the lobbying activities of informally organized groups at the political fringes have been more

[5] Van Dijk 1981, 12.

consequential for the adoption of Islamic law than the presence of Islamist actors maneuvering formal party politics. The political advantages that arise from a hospitable stance toward local Islamist groups are the reason state elites pushed an Islamization of politics in the regions of Indonesia where such Islamist movements have strong historical roots.

To avoid fallacious reasoning, that is to assume that "traits or properties specific to a well-studied region ... [constitute] ... a national paradigm ...,"[6] I then examined the Islamization of politics across Indonesia. An analysis of the 443 *shari'a* regulations adopted after 1998 showed the majority of the regulations concentrate in Aceh, East Java, West Sumatra and South Kalimantan in addition to West Java and South Sulawesi. Congruent with the characteristics of Islamization in the two case studies described earlier, local parliaments and government head offices in all the other *shari'a* clusters were also dominated by secular parties and elites with no affiliation to Islamist parties. In short, the link between the presence of Islamist parties and the adoption of *shari'a* regulations is weak across the entire country.

Islamist movements have strong historical roots in all *shari'a* provinces except East Java. The origins of these movements date back to the pre-independence period (1945–1949) when Islamist groups had already positioned themselves firmly against the state. Tensions between these groups and state elites were then exacerbated during various Islamist revolts (1948–1965) and "locked-in" during the authoritarian regimes under Guided Democracy (1959–1965) and the New Order (1965–1998). Islamist movements have had a reawakening in these regions, albeit with different intensity, in the context of the political opening after 1998. Again, the historically grown networks of these groups are strongest in the countryside, which is precisely where *shari'a* regulations came to cluster within these provinces after 1998. This suggests that state elites in all other *shari'a* hubs rely on the resources of Islamist groups situated outside party politics, too, when trying to accumulate political capital for their electoral battles with one another.

Overall, parties are void of much political capital, which causes state elites to instead turn their attention to campaign apparatuses based on informal networks that span groups outside party politics. This "personalization" of local electoral politics, in which politicians rely on their clout and private networks rather than party structures, is a phenomenon that can be observed across the archipelago. However, it has acquired a distinct form in jurisdictions where local Islamist groups external to

[6] Snyder 2001, 99.

formal politics are strong. There, state elites try to bargain for electoral resources from such groups by promising them *shari'a* regulations.

It is important to note once more that establishing linkages to such Islamist networks in the context of competitive elections is only one of many strategies candidates employ and it by no means guarantees electoral success. Islamist groups are attractive partners to candidates owing to the *relative* strength of their networks compared to Islamist parties' local apparatuses. They also inhabit a strategic position in the political ecology of their respective districts due to their deep historical roots and the name recognition their leaders enjoy. In other words and as pointed out in Chapter 1, I am not suggesting these Islamist movements in and of themselves are of sufficient breadth to provide a genuine social base to state elites. Hence, claims that the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 has resulted from an *increase* of such movements[7] are as ill-conceived as arguments that the increase of Islamist parties in the context of democratization accounts for the adoption of *shari'a* regulations. Islamist groups maintain a high profile through public protests, project violence at politically opportune moments, extort rents and regulate moral conduct. Through these techniques, the groups have settled into a perch as avowed representatives of Islam, a station that is disproportionate to their numbers. In the context of state elites' attempts to establish local electoral machines, these Islamist movements encourage the "bandwagoning" that is crucial for turning out the vote and getting the machines into gear. In short, it is not an increase in the number or size of Islamist groups but the *changing* political context that has allowed these rather *stable* movements to gain influence in politics.

Finally, I showed how power dynamics within the state also curbed the influence of these Islamist groups situated outside formal party politics. The *limits* of their influence were obvious as state elites lost interest in *shari'a* regulations when they were no longer exposed to electoral competition. The majority of *shari'a* regulations were adopted during local government heads' first terms, not during second terms when the prospect of re-election disappeared.

The contingency of Islamist activists' influence on power dynamics within the state is also showcased by the fact that Islamist movements that are political outsiders gained influence over the *agenda-setting* and *adoption* stage of the policy cycle after 1998, but are mostly irrelevant in the *implementation* stage. The *shari'a* regulations that have been adopted in Indonesia since 1998 are rarely enforced due to weak state capacity, a lack of political will or a combination of both. This is not to say *shari'a*

[7] See, for instance, Hasan 2007.

policies have no impact on the lives of many Indonesian citizens.[8] However, if *shari'a* regulations *are* implemented, it is in a highly selective and arbitrary manner. Enforcement is hardly compatible with Islamist groups' vision of a state ruled by comprehensive Islamic laws that apply to all.

Finally, the fact that the *shari'a*-ization of politics has not spilled over into provincial and national politics is another sign that the influence of Islamist groups is shaped by the political interests of state elites in control of the state. The networks and mobilizational capacity of Islamist groups are less developed at higher levels of the Indonesian bureaucracy due to the groups' very local roots. State elites at these levels of government are therefore less likely to approach Islamist groups. Furthermore, elites at the provincial and national level face a more heterogeneous electorate and thus need to tread the *shari'a* issue more lightly. Consequently, less than 10 percent of all *shari'a* regulations were adopted by provincial governments because the politics of *shari'a* policymaking yield fewer benefits for these state elites.

To summarize, this book examined the political influence of Islamist activism in democratizing Indonesia. In doing so, it emphasized the importance of dynamics *within* the state and the *interaction* between the state and Islamist activists for our understanding of political Islamization in the context of democratization. Such an approach can better explain the timing and sequencing, the subnational variance and the overall contours of political Islamization in Indonesia, compared with existing accounts that focus on Islamist parties or "conservative pressure groups." The argument presented here also seeks to go beyond the literature that talks about a vaguely conceptualized "convergence" between "the state" and "society" in the context of democratization.

The Islamization of politics through the adoption of *shari'a* regulations has predominantly occurred in areas where local politics are defined by tensions that arose from the different class background between state elites and challenger elites excluded from formal politics. Arguably, the structural origins of these cleavages underscore the *longevity* of these Islamist networks in a select number of provinces.[9] The intricacies of

[8] Often, the patchy enforcement of these regulations has also encouraged local Islamist groups to act "in the name of law" and to enforce these regulations themselves. In this context, attacks against religious minorities have soared in all *shari'a* clusters in past years. See Crouch 2011, online; Lindsey 2008, 206–8; Rogers 2014; Salim 2007, 126; Tanthowi 2008.

[9] John Bowen 2013 has recently claimed that the uneven pattern in the Islamization of politics across Indonesia is an expression of regional frustrations with the national government. His argument is (implicitly) based on the mainstream narrative of the Darul Islam revolt, which says that these local upheavals were triggered because local elites felt

shari'a policymaking in post-1998 Indonesia, particularly the territorial variation of *shari'a* regulations, can only be understood by considering the long history of class conflict between elites controlling the state and challenger elites situated in society.

At the same time, approaches that focus solely on socio-economic tensions and class struggles couched in religious terms cannot explain the timing and sequencing in the Islamization of Indonesian politics. Why have these class conflicts only had political consequences after 1998? The book showed that placing greater emphasis on dynamics *within* the state can more accurately outline the contours of democratization in Indonesia than structural approaches. The political opening in 1998 has indeed failed to turn over elites in control of the state, as shown in the preceding chapters. Politics and policymaking, however, look quite different compared to the New Order. This change has been possible despite the lack of a comprehensive elite makeover or a fundamental shift in class relations because of the new dynamics among state elites that are relatively detached from society. In other words, class relations and struggles remain an important determinant of state–society relations in Indonesia.[10] However, they became politically consequential only *after* relations among elites in control of the state changed. The spatial variance in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia is the outcome of a *combination* of institutional changes and socio-economic structures.[11]

8.2 Avenues for Future Research

Despite its status as the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world, Indonesia has received scant attention from mainstream comparativists interested in how Islamist activists interact with forces tied to

excluded from access to state resources. The rebellions stopped after the central government had accommodated these local elites. See Amal 1992, 124–84; Van Dijk 1981, 340–91. However, such arguments cannot account for the fact that Islamist groups remained in place even after center–periphery conflicts eased or disappeared. Rather, it is deeply engrained *local* cleavages that fueled and perpetuated the Darul Islam. Such a view explains better why these movements continued even *after* center–periphery relations improved. In short, Bowen's argument that subnational variance in the adoption of *shari'a* policies after 1998 are an expression of reinvigorated center–periphery tensions ignores the fact that the Darul Islam was, above all, fueled by *local* tensions rather than center–periphery relations and that these local tensions continue to be present in contemporary Indonesian local politics.

[10] Hadiz 2011; Hadiz and Robison 2004.

[11] See Amenta 1998 for an account of how a *combination* of institutional and political factors accounts for variance in welfare policy programs across the United States of America.

previous regimes in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.[12] Yet, the Indonesian case has much to offer to broader theoretical debates. There are several themes that emerge from the account provided in this book, all of which point to avenues for future research on the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

8.2.1 Future Research on the Role of Islamist Parties in the Islamization of Politics

Indonesia's experience showed that Islamist parties may struggle to incorporate, aggregate and represent Islamist sentiments that exist in the broader political arena. They struggle because they often are poorly institutionalized, lack grassroots and are subject to moderating dynamics in formal politics that dilute their ideological platform, which may subsequently alienate them from Islamist groups situated outside formal politics.

Scholarship that assigns causal primacy to Islamist parties needs to scrutinize the conditions through which parties become institutionalized to a degree that they can influence politics. Future research also should probe into why and how they are linked to Islamist groups outside the party system and how the electoral and institutional framework of a country shapes the capacity of Islamist parties to push through their *shari'a* agenda.

Concretely, with regard to party institutionalization, the findings published in this book suggest that the weak consolidation of Islamist parties was one of the main reasons state elites did not collaborate with them, thereby containing their influence in politics. Future research needs to examine under what circumstances Islamist parties become institutionalized to a point where they can be considered a political ally by elites who are a holdover from the previous authoritarian regime. Factors endogenous and exogenous to Islamist parties deserve attention. For instance, the formative years of a party decide whether it establishes strong institutions or remains poorly consolidated. Often, a party's origin story also determines whether internal hierarchies will work in favor of the national party leadership or rank-and-file members.[13] These vertical structures matter because, as this book showed, state elites have fewer incentives to adopt *shari'a* regulations in national politics compared to local politics, where Islamization is more pronounced. Arguably, Islamist parties organized along hierarchies of power that favor national leaders are more susceptible

[12] Several area specialists have looked at the relationship between the Islamization and democratization of politics in Indonesia in a comparative perspective. See Heiduk 2012, 28; Pepinsky 2012; Sidel 2014a; Winters 2011c.

[13] Panebianco 1988.

to the moderating tendencies at the national level, compared with Islamist parties that rest on an apparatus that empowers grassroots. Both the institutionalization and power distribution of parties may decide whether they become attractive to state elites in control of the state in democratizing Muslim-majority countries. This, in turn, affects the parties' chances of serving as a transmission belt for the political aspirations of Islamist activists in post-authoritarian states.

With regard to linkages between electoral Islam and movement Islam, the findings presented in this book also suggests that the environment where Islamist parties incorporate, aggregate and represent Islamist movements based outside party politics is far from straightforward. The Indonesian case showed not only that all Islamist parties are rooted in Islamist movements but also that not all Islamist movements morph into Islamist parties in the context of democratization. Previous chapters discussed the weak links between Islamist movements and elitist Islamist parties such as the PBB, PPNUI and the PPP. As the country's only Islamist movement party, the PKS fared better than other Islamist parties after 1998 because it gleans strong support from Indonesia's pious urban middle class. However, the PKS is also *enclosed* within its small urban middle-class base. Due to animosities and deep-seated mistrust, the PKS rarely collaborates with Islamist movements, which come from an altogether different class background that also underpinned the Darul Islam movement.

In fact, the disarticulation of electoral Islam vis-à-vis movement Islam transcends *Islamist* parties in the country. After 1998, the PAN and the PBB, Indonesia's two main *Islamic* parties, grew out of Muhammadiyah and NU, Indonesia's two largest Muslim associations. The dismal election results for both PAN and PBB in all post-New Order elections show that these parties too have failed to incorporate, aggregate and represent the aspirations of Muhammadiyah and NU communities. One of the reasons for this is the fact that PAN and PKB both refused to prioritize Muhammadiyah and NU members when assembling party lists prior to the 1999 and 2004 elections.[14] This eroded the relationship between the parties and the Muslim associations. Eventually, Muhammadiyah and NU declared that they would remain politically neutral and not endorse political parties.[15] At the time of writing, the associations were marginalized within both PAN and PKB.[16] This gap between "electoral Islam" and "movement Islam" had important implications for how the Islamization of politics unfolded in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto.

[14] The closed party list system that was used in the 1999 and 2004 elections favored candidates who were highly ranked on party lists, as mentioned before.
[15] Individual PAN and PBB members are allowed to join parties. [16] Jung 2014.

In light of the Indonesian experience after 1998, future research on the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization needs to acknowledge that the relations between "electoral Islam" and "movement Islam" is more protracted than most studies are ready to admit. Recent research suggests that the relationship between Islamist parties and Islamist groups is more complex than previously thought in many other Muslim-majority countries too.[17] Consequently, the linkages between Islamist parties and Islamist movements require more critical inquiry. Specifically, under what circumstances do Islamist movements morph into political parties in the context of democratization? Ideological and strategic reasons may play a role, as mentioned in Chapter 1, as does the institutional context such as electoral and political party laws.

Furthermore, when do Islamist parties and Islamist movements join forces to promote their agenda *in the context of elections*? Movements in consolidated democracies gravitate to political parties, either to influence their platforms or to funnel activists into official posts through the parties.[18] Islamist parties in many countries also establish links to Islamist groups to gain strength prior to elections.[19] However, the Indonesian case shows there is nothing preordained about this process. The close links between Islamist parties and movements in other Muslim-majority democracies may have more to do with the shared class origins of party and movement members than a shared ideological agenda. In Indonesia, Islamist parties and Islamist movements are separated to a great degree by the different milieux in which they are rooted. How this relationship shapes the Islamization of politics warrants more attention in future research. If Islamist parties have snug ties with movements, the *shari'a* discussion may shape politics beyond elections. In the United States, for instance, morality laws pushed by local fundamentalist groups have caused a realignment of the country's party system over the decades.[20] At the same time, a disconnect between Islamist parties and movements may not necessarily soften the impact of Islamist activists situated outside the political arena.

Dynamics surrounding the adoption of *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia also shows that formal participation in politics is not needed to influence politics. Studies focusing on the political power of movements in consolidated democracies argue that "challengers can gain political leverage ... through connections with political parties and

[17] Noor 2011, 18; Storm 2009, 1000–5; Ullah 2014.
[18] Amenta et al. 2010, 289; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 2003, 1–26; Meyer 2004, 138.
[19] Sarkissian and Ozler 2009; Ullah 2014, 137. [20] Mooney 2000, 172.

through electoral activity as well as through ... challengers occupying state positions."[21]

Research that obsesses about the role Islamist parties play in the Islamization of politics (implicitly) assumes that Islamization is contingent on Islamist forces being officially represented in politics.[22] In other words, the absence of such parties from formal politics is expected to preclude the Islamization of politics or at least contain it.

Indonesia tells a different story of relevance to underdemocratized polities. Islamist movements had impact and achieved *shari'a* regulations. Movements can have an impact on politics even if they do not attach themselves to political parties and even if they remain outside formal politics.

This realization may also shape the strategizing of Islamist groups. Research on socialist and Catholic groups shows that many such groups initially only wanted to establish autarkic communities like many Islamist movements, but eventually recognized that they needed to become more actively involved in politics to push their agenda.[23] Recent scholars have alluded to similar developments in Muslim-majority democracies.[24] However, it remains unclear why certain movements enter politics through alliances with parties, while others remain on the perimeter of the political arena. Being represented in formal politics does not guarantee political influence, as validated in the Indonesian case.

Finally, with regard to institutional dynamics shaping the influence of Islamist parties on policymaking, future research needs to evaluate how the introduction of elections for *executive* government posts and the subsequent personalization of politics affect these parties. The personalization and commercialization of elections in Indonesia that resulted from institutional reforms have made party platforms highly susceptible to outside influences, as most candidates have only loose ties to the party written on their ticket. This may also be the case in other places. Further research on the role of Islamist parties in democratizing Muslim-majority countries should also examine the impact that reforms for *legislative* elections have on the capacity of Islamist parties to influence politics. In Indonesia, a legal overhaul replaced parties' closed-list systems with open-list systems, unleashing fierce competition between individual candidates *from the same party*, which further undermined party coherence, as mentioned earlier.[25]

[21] Amenta et al. 2010, 143. [22] Akinci 1999, 84.
[23] Kalyvas 1996; Przeworksi and Sprague 1986. [24] Ullah 2014, 41.
[25] See Buehler 2009, 58 for a further discussion on this issue.

8.2.2 *Future Research on the Role of Islamist Movements in the Islamization of Politics*

It is surprising that few studies on *shari'a* law in Indonesia after 1998 have factored in Islamist movements operating outside the domain of formal politics, inasmuch as a key hypothesis in social movement theory is that informal movements can be more influential than established parties under certain circumstances.[26] It is all the more surprising because students of Islamist activism have for a long time had an interest in informal networks and how they shape politics in Muslim societies.[27]

The Indonesian case shows that political Islamization is not contingent on Islamist forces being officially represented in formal politics. This is important to consider in future research on how Islamist activists gain and maintain influence in democratizing Muslim-majority countries because Indonesia's story contradicts narratives elsewhere. The path the Islamization of politics took in other Muslim-majority countries with competitive elections, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey, suggests that a prerequisite for Islamization is a political system that is structurally permeable for Islamist activists seeking representation. Following this logic, students of Indonesian politics have argued that the Islamization of politics in the archipelago will remain confined. For instance, Merle C. Ricklefs emphasizes that Islamists have no prospect of winning power in Indonesia via the electoral process and that this therefore diminishes the prospects of political Islamization.[28] Yet, this book showed that formal representation in the political system is not necessary to have political clout. Indonesian politics may seem impervious in terms of representation[29] but it has nevertheless accommodated certain groups with regard to agenda-setting and the adoption of policies.

Research on Indonesia conflates conditions that allow Islamist actors to mobilize with conditions that allow them to influence politics, mirroring a problem in the broader literature. Calls to integrate scholarship on Islamic activism into mainstream social movement theory[30] have led to extensive research on the political conditions that facilitate the *emergence* and *mobilization* of Islamist movements.[31] However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research that explains the *influence* of Islamist

[26] Piven and Cloward 1977.
[27] Denoueux 1993; Ismail 2000, 363–93; Wiktorowicz 2004, 12.
[28] Asyaukanni 2009, 231.
[29] Buehler 2010, 267–85; Boudreau 2004, 233–53; Hadiz 2011.
[30] Wiktorowicz 2004, 6.
[31] See, for instance Goodwin 2011, 452–6; Turam 2004, 2007; Yavuz and Esposito 2003.

movements in politics. Future research needs to question whether the conditions for the emergence of Islamist activism differ from the conditions that allow Islamist activists to gain and sustain power in other Muslim-majority countries too.

The Indonesian case also provides insight into social movement impact theory more broadly. The majority of studies on the political bearing of social movements in general, and the literature on the influence of movements over policymaking in particular, focus on consolidated democracies in "the West."[32] These studies claim that social movements are most likely to have an impact on policymaking in consolidated democracies where the state is bound to democratic practices. In "underdemocratized" polities and low-quality democracies, in contrast, movements are negligible in policymaking compared to political parties and public opinion.[33] Indonesia, however, forces us to rethink such assessments. There, relatively unorganized groups operating outside the formal party system were more effective in influencing *shari'a* policymaking than political parties and public opinion. In fact, Islamist groups situated outside formal politics became influential *precisely* because of the weakly institutionalized party system and Indonesia's low-quality democracy.[34]

At the same time, the Indonesian example substantiates results from previous research on social movements in underdemocratized polities that showed how movements rarely gain influence beyond the agenda-setting stage in such environments.[35] Because they are not formally represented in the system, the influence of Islamist groups has been confined to the agenda-setting and adoption phases of the policy cycle. Islamist movements have considerably less sway over the implementation phase of the cycle, so enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia is patchy at best. In this context, future research on the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries needs to examine if, and if so how, Islamist activists have gained influence over the implementation stage of the policy cycle.

[32] Burstein and Linton 2002, 476.

[33] Amenta and Caren 2004, 462; Amenta et al. 2010, 295; Burstein and Linton 2002, 382; Burstein and Sausner 2005, 403–19; Skocpol 2003; Giugni 2007, 53–77. The few scholars that consider social movements to be highly influential in politics are Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005, 65–86; Piven 2006.

[34] There are parallels to policymaking processes in other parts of Southeast Asia. As Magadia 2003 has shown in his assessment of policymaking in the post-Marcos Philippines, the country's weak party system and the *de facto* absence of political parties in the policymaking process has allowed political actors situated outside the formal political arena to fill this niche and to transform some of their agenda into concrete policies.

[35] Amenta et al. 2010, 296.

Furthermore, not enough attention has been paid to the influence of movements that engage with the electoral process. Overall, there is "little research on movement influence over elections and the political influence gained through such electoral support."[36] This is also the case for scholarship on Islamist activism, in general, and Indonesia, in particular, where most scholars interested in Islamist activism focus on protests, riots and other relatively spontaneous forms of contentious politics.[37] Arguably, this is because research on movements in Southeast Asia has traditionally seen activism as assimilative when pointed in the direction of institutions and electoral politics, thus seeming less influential compared to demonstrations, riots and violent protests.[38]

Based on this logic, Noorhaidi Hasan has argued that the Islamization of politics in Indonesia is "crisis driven" and mainly occurred in the years right after the collapse of the New Order regime.[39] In a similar vein, Robert Hefner argued that "if political and moral crises on a scale like that of 1998–2002 can be avoided, [Islamist movements] are not likely to make great headway."[40]

The findings from this book cast doubt on such conclusions. In Indonesia, the adoption of *shari'a* regulations continued beyond the immediate post-New Order years.[41] The Islamization of politics is the result of a sustained effort by Islamist groups that is by no means crisis driven but related to *regular* elections. In other words, the lobbying efforts of Islamist activists are far more routinized and part of "ordinary" politics than existing accounts are ready to acknowledge. In fact, the Islamization of politics through *shari'a* regulations in Indonesia confirms research from consolidated democracies that movements that *develop electoral strategies* are often far more successful than movements that engage in other forms of contentious politics.[42] Examining the role Islamist movements have come to play in Indonesia's new electoral democracy, this book not only responds to calls for more research on movement

[36] Amenta et al. 2010, 297. [37] Sidel 2006, 216.

[38] For an argument of how elections isolate, punctuate and therefore domesticate political activism in Southeast Asia, see Anderson 1996, 12–34. In the case of Indonesia, the argument that movements which enter formal party politics become assimilated over time has been made for both the Communist Party and Islamist parties. See Hindley 1966, 45 and Tomsa 2012 respectively. Similar arguments have been made in scholarship on other Muslim countries. For instance, Brown 2011, 109 emphasized how the Muslim Brotherhood, after entering the Egyptian parliament as a *party* in 2005, stopped pushing for the adoption of Islamic law.

[39] Hasan 2006, 175. [40] Hefner 2011, 308.

[41] Bush 2008, Hefner 2011, 308–9; van Bruinessen 2013, 11; Makruf and Halimatussa'diyah 2014.

[42] Amenta et al. 2010, 297.

activities directed at *elected* officials.[43] It also makes the case that Islamist activism geared toward elections and elected officials was far more decisive in the Islamization of politics in Indonesia than terrorist attacks and other violent activities conducted in the name of Islam, which usually receive most attention from both scholars and the media. In light of these findings, future research in other Muslim-majority democracies has to examine in more detail the lobbying of Islamist activists once the tumultuous aftermath of regime change passes and how successful such lobbying is.

8.2.3 Future Research on the Role of the State in the Islamization of Politics

This book also shows that the adoption of *shari'a* regulations is the outcome of a growing *interdependency* between state elites and Islamist activists that is defined by elites' need for political resources in the wake of increasing electoral competition after 1998.

Previous research has hinted at the importance of factors external to Islamist groups for our understanding of political Islam in Indonesia. Martin van Bruinessen states, "[t]he nature of Muslim political movements in Indonesia appears to be a response to the changing political environment ... rather than to some inherent internal dynamic."[44] Indeed, a longitudinal analysis of Islamist activism in Indonesia since 1945 suggests that the influence of such activism is contingent on dynamics within the state. Concretely, Islamist parties and Islamist movements have participated in Indonesian politics since the country declared independence in 1945. In the brief democratic interval of the mid-1950s, Islamist parties mobilized and made their mark on politics. This changed when Indonesian politics took an authoritarian turn in 1959. Few Islamic laws were adopted for the next few decades. However, as competition within the New Order elite intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, the state reacted to "demands from various Islamic organizations ... for policy changes."[45] In 1989, Law No. 7/1989 on Religious Courts was adopted and a year later the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) was established. In 1991, the Department of Education and Culture lifted a ban on schoolgirls wearing headscarfs. The next year, the government ratified Law No. 7/1992 on Banking, which opened Indonesia's first Islamic bank (BMI), as mentioned in Chapter 2.

[43] Burstein and Linton 2002, 398. [44] Van Bruinessen 2002, 149.
[45] Liddle 1996, 614.

While the growing Islamization of Indonesian society from the mid-1980s onward certainly compounded the pressure on officials to take Islam more seriously, it was competition *within the state* that truly created an environment amenable to *shari'a* policies. With regard to the ICMI and the BMI, Robert Hefner notes: "The fact that President Soeharto overruled military and technocratic advisers and supported the establishment of ICMI and BMI was seen by many observers as a sign of a growing rift within the ranks of the government."[46] Indeed, the government had suppressed prior attempts to establish an organization such as the ICMI.

By one common explanation, the government's attitude shifted because it dawned on Suharto that he was losing military support, which he had to replace with civilian allies. It has also been speculated that ICMI Chairman Habibie wanted to construct a civilian support base he could use to vie for power after Suharto's reign had ended.[47] As competition increased within the state in the twilight of the New Order, so did the propensity to allow the Islamization of national politics.

The Islamization of subnational politics during the New Order followed a similar logic. When the New Order had not yet consolidated power at the subnational level, various districts adopted *shari'a* regulations for a brief period. In 1968, for instance, several local government officials in West Java and South Sulawesi wrote the Jakarta Charter into local regulations.[48] However, as the New Order strengthened its grip on local politics and competition among state elites became contained and upward-oriented, such local *shari'a* regulations evaporated. For the rest of Suharto's rule, not a single *shari'a* regulation was adopted at the local level. This shows, again, that factors external to Islamist parties and movements have to be accounted for when studying the Islamization of politics.

In many Muslim-majority countries, decades of authoritarian rule have allowed elites who do not share the ideological inclinations of Islamist activists to become deeply entrenched in state institutions. These elites often remain powerful despite democratic reforms since most authoritarian leaders are ousted by upheavals that resemble palace revolutions rather than social revolutions. Few studies have talked about this "deep state" and how it shaped the influence of political Islam in Muslim-majority countries undergoing democratization in regions as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.[49] However, most studies do not describe why and how the state under the

[46] Hefner 2003, 155. [47] Van Bruinessen 1996, 19.
[48] Raillon 1984, 207. Similar attempts were made in Aceh in 1968, Nirzalin 2012, 14 showed.
[49] The Economist 2013; Heydemann and Leenders 2013; Stacher 2002.

control of elites rooted in the previous regime checks the influence of Islamist activists that became more visible and vocal in the context of democratization.

The Indonesian case urges more research about changing dynamics *within* elite networks in control of the state and the rising influence of Islamist activism, despite the fact that the make-up of elites remains largely the same and political Islam remains fragmented and poorly represented in formal politics. The political incentives state elites face to embrace or shun Islamist activists explain why conditions that allow Islamist activists to emerge and mobilize often differ from conditions that allow Islamist activists to gain and maintain influence.

Future research also should dig deeper into the temporal and spatial variance in the Islamization of politics *within* democratizing Muslim-majority countries. The Indonesian case exposed great discrepancies as to *when* but also *where shari'a* regulations were adopted, an outcome affected by power dynamics within the state.

As for the timing of political Islamization, research in other Muslim-majority countries needs to examine whether the Islamization of politics follows electoral cycles, too, and whether term limits for politicians constrain the adoption of *shari'a* regulations, as they did in Indonesia after 1998. The temporal dimension warrants more attention because the Islamization of politics is rarely understood as a dynamic process that unfolds over time. Most studies on other democratizing Muslim-majority countries only show *that* the democratization of politics often occurs after the political arena is broadened. Yet, democratization is not rolled out in a linear fashion. Rather, it is a protracted process with frequent setbacks and without a predefined outcome.[50] Since the Islamization of politics is tied to the democratization of politics, it is highly likely that Islamization in democratizing Muslim-majority countries is an uneven process, too. It is therefore important to understand what facilitates and obstructs the Islamization of politics over time. Scholars must track the manner in which Islamic laws spread from one jurisdiction to another because the diffusion process itself may shape *shari'a* laws. Research in the United States, for example, concludes that the longer a jurisdiction takes to adopt morality laws, the stricter those laws tend to be. In other words, morality laws became more extreme as they diffused over time.[51] Recent research on the expansion of *shari'a* regulations suggests that in Indonesia also the state

[50] Carothers 2002, 5–21.

[51] In the United States, "laggard districts" often adopted harsher morality laws because politicians there had been able to observe the public reaction to morality laws in jurisdictions that had adopted similar laws earlier. They therefore had a good sense of the boundaries of what was possible. See Karch 2007, 70.

played an important role in the diffusion of *shari'a* regulations across time[52] and that certain types of *shari'a* rules have become more acute as they diffused.[53] Future research needs to examine whether the extension of Islamic laws within Muslim-majority democracies over time is subject to similar dynamics and what role states play in it.

The fact that the Islamization of politics is largely confined to the subnational level in Indonesia is again contingent on power dynamics within the state. Arguably, the different electoral challenges state elites face at different levels of government are the reason Islamist influence has been mostly local in Indonesia since 1998. The great differences in the adoption of *shari'a* regulations both within and across government layers also show the need to dissect the Islamization of politics across space and to consider the possibility of spatial variance in the *shari'a*-ization of politics. This matters because democratization advances unevenly across a country's territory, as the growing literature on subnational authoritarianism shows.[54] In many Muslim-majority countries, the democratization of politics has also been accompanied by a decentralization of power.[55] Yet, despite findings from other countries that democratization spreads unevenly across a country and that power moves away from the national level, the literature on the Islamziation of politics in democratizing Muslim countries consists mostly of cross-country or single-country national-level comparisons.[56] There are occasional calls for a focus on local politics amid Islamization,[57] but surprisingly few studies analyze the Islamization of politics from a *subnational* perspective and explicitly address the possibility of variance *within* countries.[58]

This possibility deserves more research for several reasons. A local perspective is important because studies with a national focus risk miscoding Muslim-majority countries in quantitative studies that include many nation-states. Scholars conducting quantitative research on radicalization, for example, tend to label Indonesia as a "democratic" case where a moderate "civil Islam" holds sway over politics.[59] This is not entirely correct, as the Islamization of various provinces and districts

[52] Muhtada 2014; Buehler and Muhtada 2016; Hasyim 2013.
[53] Buehler and Muhtada 2016.
[54] Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2015; Sidel 2014b; Weitz-Shapiro 2015.
[55] Riaz 1985; Villalon 1994; Yavuz 1997. [56] For an overview, see Hefner 2011, 1–53.
[57] Riaz 2004, 136.
[58] Pargeter 2009, 1034 is the only study I am aware of that explicitly mentions subnational variance in the Islamization of politics in Northern Africa. Luebeck 2011, 267 mentions subnational variance in Nigeria with regard to Islamization and sees the dispersion of Christians and Muslim populations as the main reason for this variance. However, this explanation is not very useful for the Islamization of politics in Muslim-*majority* countries.
[59] See, for instance, Künkler and Stepan 2013.

since 1998 has shown. Quantitative research may make similar misattributions in the case of "undemocratic," "radical" Muslim-majority countries, thereby ignoring or glossing over local pockets of relative religious tolerance and democratic politics.

It is also important to note this variance across government layers because the literature on the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries usually considers local politics to be a stepping stone for Islamist activists with national ambitions.[60] Scholars working on Indonesia have similarly argued that local developments predict state–religion relations overall.[61] However, the preceding chapters showed Islamist influence remains locally confined and spillover effects into national politics are minimal, despite the bottom-up process described in most of the literature on Islamist activism. Local influence does not necessarily lead to national influence, and why it does in some countries but not others is an issue that requires further research.

Overall, as the political and institutional context in Muslim-majority countries becomes more heterogenous amid democratization and decentralization, we need an explicit focus on the spread of Islamic law across time, as well as within and across government layers. Identifying the reasons behind such variance will enable a more nuanced understanding of the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

8.2.4 Future Research on the Limits of Islamist Activism in the Context of Democratization

The Indonesian experience after 1998 also demonstrates how the state and political institutions *limit* the influence of Islamist activism under democratic conditions. The moderating tendencies of national party politics, as well as internecine feuds, have contained the influence of Islamist parties. Electoral and institutional reforms, such as the decentralization of political and fiscal powers, the introduction of direct elections for local government heads, the abolishment of horizontal accountability mechanisms, and the resulting empowerment of local executives all have driven a personalization of Indonesian politics after 1998, to the detriment of political parties. Electoral competition also prevents political Islam from fulfilling its agenda in a concerted fashion through the formal political arena.[62] Finally, electoral calculations of state elites operating in national politics further mitigate the pull of Islamist parties.

The local nature of Islamist movements and their position outside formal politics have shielded them from these dynamics to a great degree.

[60] Akinci 1999, 79; Köker 1995, 51–62; Yavuz 1997, 73.
[61] See, for instance, Sirozi 2005, 91; Woodward 2010, 6.
[62] Hadiz 2011, 10.

Under Indonesia's current institutional conditions, one could then argue that such local groups are the largest "working units" available to political Islam to influence the policymaking process. The niche that Islamist movements have come to occupy in the political ecology of post-New Order Indonesia gives them influence. However, it is also the only space where political Islam *can* be influential in contemporary Indonesia. If Islamist activists try to move beyond the space they have been assigned by the logics of power accumulation among state elites, they become as impotent as Islamist parties. Islamist movements after 1998 largely failed to alter provincial and national politics, as the low uptake of *shari'a* regulations at these levels attests. This is because Islamist networks did not really spread their tentacles beyond the district level, which made them less useful to state elites, but also because the electoral calculus of elites in higher office differs from that at the district level. Facing a more heterogenous electorate, including sizeable religious minorities, they have to tiptoe around the *shari'a* issue at the provincial and national level.

The influence of Islamist movements but also limits imposed by dynamics within the state show that the *position* these groups inhabit in the political ecology of post-New Order Indonesia determines their impact on politics, rather than their *absolute size*. This means scholars who use the size and numbers of Islamist movements and groups to forecast the trajectory of political Islamization in Indonesia[63] miss the point as much as analysts who focus on the electoral strength of Islamist parties. While official membership numbers are unavailable, a close reading of in-depth expert studies suggests the scale of Indonesia's Islamist movements has remained mostly constant since 1945. Sidney Jones, the preeminent expert on Islamist activism in Indonesia, notes in a report: "The recycling of old [Darul Islam] members . . . suggests that the recruiting base for jihadists may not be expanding significantly, and that it is difficult for them to move very far beyond old DI or existing JI constituencies."[64] In short, Islamist movements that are relatively static in size were ill-positioned to influence policymaking before 1998, but are *currently* well-poised to take up this influence. They may lose power again in the future should the political winds change relations among state elites.

[63] Hadiz and Teik 2011, 463–85; Hasan 2006; Hicks 2012, 39–66; Hookway 2012, online. Sirozi 2005, 103 is the only author I am aware of who argues that the influence of radical groups in Indonesia is disproportional to their rather small absolute numbers.

[64] ICG 2005, i. Arguably, the historical roots and the origins of these movements in a distinct class of wealthy traders and farmers of non-aristocratic origin explain why the size of these Islamist movements remains confined.

In light of these findings, future research on the Islamization of politics ought to spend less time "counting numbers" in hopes of deciphering the influence of Islamist activism. It should instead focus on the position Islamist activists occupy vis-à-vis other political actors and whether logics of power accumulation that resulted from democratization offer Islamist groups new leverage. Once again, to understand democratizing Muslim-majority countries, we must study dynamics within the state and political institutions, especially if they create interstices that might invite Islamist activists.

8.3 Ideological Realignment or Political Expediency?

A final avenue for research would ask what the contours of *shari'a* policymaking say about state–society relations in democratizing Muslim-majority countries more broadly.

Studying policymaking can illuminate state–society relations because "the policy realm is where each new regime attempts to alter the power relationships within civil society and between it and the bureaucracy itself."[65] With regard to the relationship between the state and society in Indonesia, Benedict Anderson notes in a similar vein: "[T]he policy outcomes of nation-states under unexceptional circumstances will typically represent a shifting balance between the [state and society]."[66] The adoption of Islamic law has been a point of contention between "the state" and "society" since Indonesia declared independence in 1945. Ruth McVey reckons political Islam to be an expression of societal objection to the New Order state.[67] Noorhaidi Hasan and John Sidel argue that groups situated in society fell back on Islamist activism as a result of blocked upward mobility within the Indonesian political system.[68]

The onset of hundreds of *shari'a* regulations since 1998 therefore raises the question of whether Islamic laws denote a fundamental shift in Indonesia's power configurations, or whether state elites rooted in the New Order remain dominant in politics. While this book looks at the *causes* of the adoption of *shari'a* regulations, more research is needed on the *consequences* political Islamization has on power configurations in Indonesia and other democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

The Islamization of politics has undermined the political supremacy of elites in control of the state in various countries, according to existing research. Olivier Roy argues Islamization in Central Asia dispersed state

[65] Janoski et al. 2005, 25. [66] Anderson 1983, 478. [67] McVey 1983, 219.
[68] Hasan 2006, 181; Sidel 2006.

power.[69] Gregory Starett finds in the case of Egypt that "elites ... are caught up in the 'self-damnation' ... of contradictory processes of cultural and social reproduction ... [P]olitical elites regularly make choices that threaten their power in the very attempt to ensure its spread."[70] Nathan Brown is even more explicit in a recent analysis of *shari'a* policy-making in Egypt. He believes state efforts to expropriate the *shari'a* discourse in Egypt led to the "emergence of multiple and competing voices within the state itself ... [T]he attempt to subsume the shari'a has resembled a boa constrictor working to digest an elephant: the shape of the serpent dramatically changes as a result of the audacious effort."[71] In most studies, the adoption of Islamic law leads to real ideological realignments in Muslim-majority countries in democratic transition.

To evaluate whether post-1998 Indonesia has started to resemble an elephant or continues to look like a boa constrictor, it is instructive to examine a similar debate that bubbled up during the New Order. As pressure swelled from devout Muslims, the New Order regime adopted various laws with an Islamic connotation, as mentioned before. These developments led scholars to wonder if the Islamization of politics and public life equated to a weakening of the New Order state.[72] Most agreed that increased pressure from groups largely excluded from state power and organizing under the flag of Islam was behind the growing Islamization at the time. However, they also agreed that the political monopoly of state elites was never really in doubt. Martin van Bruinessen notes:

> It has been observed by several scholars that governments of Muslim countries (and perhaps especially the secular governments among them) have often, in order to pre-empt radical Islamic opposition movements, taken policy measures that have served to Islamize the economy, legislation, and culture. One might think of Suharto courting the Islamists as another example of such an accommodation were it not that Suharto did not have to fear a strong Islamic opposition but rather released the movement and then managed to keep it as his apologist and defender.[73]

Assessing the political role of Islam toward the end of the New Order in 1998, John Sidel reached a similar conclusion:

> From Islam as a banner of sometimes violent, often disruptive, popular mobilization *from below*, "Islam" now reappeared as a rubric for regime consolidation and legitimation *from above*, with violence and disruption in the name of the faith represented as an *excess* variously deployed and disavowed by those civilian and military seats of state power according to the ebb and flow of the political tides.[74]

[69] Roy 2001. [70] Starett 1998, 59. [71] Brown 2011, 117.
[72] Liddle 1996; Van Bruinessen 1996. [73] Van Bruinessen 2002, 150.
[74] Sidel 2006, 140.

In other words, Islamic policies expressed the adjustment strategies of elites in control of the state, rather than the thorough Islamization that activists envisioned. The adopted policies were politically motivated and thus symbolic rather than substantive. Power ultimately remained in the hands of elites running the state who merely used "Islam" to strengthen their own political position. No "competing voices" became represented *within* the state.

The Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 has reinvigorated this debate. Various scholars have argued that Islamization indicates the growing power of societal forces.[75] However, the findings in this book suggest that assessments of political Islam's status during the New Order still apply to the power constellation on the ground after 1998. While Islamist forces may have secured influence over the public discourse and various stages of the policy cycle, forces *external* to Islamists have to be taken into account to accurately assess the variegated dynamics of Islamization in the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy. Islamist actors remain subordinate to state elites' political ploys and have acquired new importance only *after* competition among state elites increased. Their position in Indonesia's political ecology, in other words, depends on relations between elites in control of the state. The Islamization of politics as a strategy of deflating opposition and, eventually, of tightening control describes the situation in Indonesia much more precisely than accounts that see Indonesian politics overrun by Islamist forces.[76]

Recent studies have reached similar conclusions about the significance of the Islamization of politics in other Muslim countries where elections are meaningful. Haroon Ullah, for instance, shows that in Pakistan "Islamist politics is not driven solely by ideological absolutism "[77] but more often by political expediency. In this context, Ullah argues the democratization of politics in Muslim-majority countries often prefigures an instrumentalization of Islamic law that is different from ideological shifts.[78]

Rather than symbolizing philosophical realignments then, the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries may simply resemble the "brand politics" that have become so ubiquitous around the globe in recent years. In many democracies, particularly at the local level, politicians have abandoned parties because they "no longer see mass parties as able to offer a persuasive ideology, significant resources, or the organizational support needed to win elections."[79] Just as marketing managers brand a product, politicians style themselves in a fashion they

[75] Heiduk 2012. [76] Dhume 2007. [77] Ullah 2014, 174. [78] Ullah 2014, 155.
[79] Pasotti 2009, 1.

hope will win public support without expending too much energy on policy implementation. "[C]onsumers are convinced to acquire the product not because of a cost-benefit analysis of the quality-price ratio ... but rather because of the values associated with owning it ... By acquiring the product, consumers aspire to become different people ... A successful brand also helps to differentiate the candidate from the competition. Hence, the brand must innovate: it aims to awaken interest by surprising the voter ... [A] good brand resonates with the public, but there is a high level of uncertainty and error in assessing a brand's potential resonance."[80]

Brand politics offers a solution to the mobilization dilemma politicians face in countries where parties are poorly institutionalized and the demand for patronage far outstrips the resources officials can deliver.

Arguably, the Islamization of politics through the adoption of Islamic law is a form of political branding that state elites resort to when heightened competition for power is brought about by the democratization of politics.

Adopting *shari'a* regulations is an efficient way to exploit brand politics because they are like morality laws in conservative Christian-majority democracies such as the United States, "technically simple and potentially salient to the general public, [they stimulate interest easily] ... Morality-policy conflict sells papers and attracts viewers, thus generating a cycle of conflict and media exposure that feeds on itself, pushing these issues quickly onto the political agenda and into the active phase of policymaking."[81]

In Indonesia, Islamist movements have become crucial actors in the "theater" that state elites stage around the adoption of *shari'a* regulations so as to convince voters that they are a force to be reckoned with. These politics of spectacle[82] are also performed in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries where local elites suddenly need to show ingenuity to mobilize voters. In her account of Afghanistan's local machine politicians, Dipali Mukhopadhyay describes the country's Herat province, where not-so-pious local strongman Ismail Khan introduced "a Talibanesque legal and moral code to the province" amid democratization efforts in the aftermath of the US invasion. There the Islamization of politics ought to be understood "as a means of concentrating the relative connectivity of Heratis to one another through rules and rituals that reinforced the

[80] Pasotti 2009, 4–22. [81] Mooney 2000, 176.

[82] There are obvious parallels to Guy Debord's culture critique in his book *The Society of the Spectacle*, published in 1967, in which he pointed out how "spectacle" maintains social control by commodifying radical ideas, thereby incorporating them into mainstream society.

governor's role at the epicenter of provincial politics."[83] The accounts of *shari'a* politics in West Java and South Sulawesi exemplifies how candidates from within the bureaucratic elite collaborated with Islamist groups precisely to place themselves at the epicenter of local politics in their respective jurisdiction.

Whether the adoption of *shari'a* law indicates something more profound than the mere strategizing of political elites in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries needs to be the subject of future research. This book has shown that in the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy, the adoption of *shari'a* policies is contingent on the political interests of state elites who remain the dominant player in state–society relations. State elites in Indonesia are opportunist Islamizers whose affection for Islamic law is less emotional than transactional and is therefore easily replaced should more efficient strategies to accumulate and exercise power present themselves in the future.

[83] Mukhopadhyay 2014, 265–6.

Appendix 1 Number of *shari'a* regulations adopted, 1998–2013, per administrative unit

Province	Administrative layer in which *shari'a* regulation was adopted	Local regulations[1]	Executive instructions and decrees; Circulation letters; Appeals letters; Executive regulations[2]	Total
Aceh	Province	13[3]	1[4]	14
	District	9[5]	1[6]	10
	Municipality	1[7]	–	1
Bali	Province	2[8]	–	2
	District	2[9]	–	2
	Municipality	–	–	–
Banten	Province	1[10]	1[11]	2
	District	6[12]	3[13]	9
	Municipality	6[14]	1[15]	7
Bengkulu	Province	–	–	–
	District	1[16]	–	1
	Municipality	1[17]	1[18]	2
Central Java	Province	–	–	–
	District	12[19]	–	12
	Municipality	4[20]	1[21]	5
Central Kalimantan	Province	–	–	–
	District	2[22]	–	2
	Municipality	1[23]	–	1
Central Sulawesi	Province	1[24]	–	1
	District	1[25]	–	1
	Municipality	2[26]	–	2
East Java	Province	–	1[27]	1
	District	23[28]	1[29]	24
	Municipality	7[30]	–	7
East Nusa Tenggara	Province	–	–	–
	District	–	–	–
	Municipality	1[31]	–	1
East Kalimantan	Province	–	–	–
	District	7[32]	–	7
	Municipality	2[33]	1[34]	3

(*cont.*)

Province	Administrative layer in which *shari'a* regulation was adopted	Local regulations	Executive instructions and decrees; Circulation letters; Appeals letters; Executive regulations	Total
Gorontalo	Province	2[35]	–	2
	District	–	–	–
	Municipality	–	–	–
Jambi	Province	–	1[36]	1
	District	5[37]	–	5
	Municipality	–	–	–
Kepulauan	Province	2[38]	–	2
Bangka	District	9[39]	–	9
Belitung	Municipality	2[40]	–	2
Kepulauan Riau	Province	–	–	–
	District	3[41]	–	3
	Municipality	3[42]	–	3
Lampung	Province	–	–	–
	District	14[43]	–	14
	Municipality	3[44]	–	3
North Maluku	Province	–	–	–
	District	–	–	–
	Municipality	4[45]	–	4
North Sumatra	Province	–	–	–
	District	2[46]	–	2
	Municipality	1[47]	–	1
Riau	Province	1[48]	1[49]	2
	District	6[50]	1[51]	7
	Municipality	1[52]	1[53]	2
South	Province	2[54]	1[55]	3
Kalimantan	District	25[56]	1[57]	26
	Municipality	9[58]	–	9
South Sulawesi	Province	1[59]	1[60]	2
	District	31[61]	5[62]	36
	Municipality	9[63]	–	9
South Sumatra	Province	1[64]	1[65]	2
	District	5[66]	–	5
	Municipality	2[67]	1[68]	3
Southeast	Province	–	–	–
Sulawesi	District	3[69]	–	3
	Municipality	1[70]	–	1
West Java	Province	–	1[71]	1
	District	44[72]	19[73]	63
	Municipality	18[74]	4[75]	22

(*cont.*)

Province	Administrative layer in which *shari'a* regulation was adopted	Local regulations	Executive instructions and decrees; Circulation letters; Appeals letters; Executive regulations	Total
West Kalimantan	Province	1[76]	–	1
	District	2[77]	–	2
	Municipality	1[78]	1[79]	2
West Nusa Tenggara	Province	–	–	–
	District	5[80]	7[81]	12
	Municipality	–	1[82]	1
West Papua	Province	–	–	–
	District	2[83]	–	2
	Municipality	1[84]	–	1
West Sulawesi	Province	–	–	–
	District	1[85]	–	1
	Municipality	–	–	–
West Sumatra	Province	2[86]	3[87]	5
	District	26[88]	2[89]	28
	Municipality	20[90]	1[91]	21
Yogyakarta	Province	–	–	–
	District	2[92]	1[93]	3
	Municipality	–	–	–
Total	–	377	66	443

[1] *Peraturan Daerah*.
[2] *Instruksi; Keputusan; Surat Edaran; Surat Himbauan; Peraturan gubernur/ bupati/ walikota*.
[3] [1999; 2000; 2000; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2002; 2003, 2003, 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009].
[4] [2011].
[5] Aceh Singkil (2 [2010; 2010]); Aceh Tamiang (2 [2009; 2011]); Bireuen (1 [2008]); Pidie (3 [2010; 2010; 2011]); Simeulue (1 [2012]).
[6] Aceh Barat (1 [2010]).
[7] Banda Aceh (1 [2002]).
[8] [2003; 2012].
[9] Buleleng (1 [2009]); Jembrana (1 [2007]).
[10] [2004].
[11] [2011].
[12] Pandeglang (3 [2003; 2007; 2007]); Serang (2 [2006; 2006]); Tangerang (1 [2011]).
[13] Lebak (1 [2011]); Pandeglang (2 [2004; 2011]).
[14] Cilegon (4 [2001; 2001; 2005; 2008]); Tangerang (2 [2005; 2005]).
[15] Tangerang (1 [2008]).
[16] MukoMuko (1 [2011]).
[17] Bengkulu (1 [2000]).
[18] Bengkulu (1 [2004]).
[19] Banjarnegara (1 [2002]); Batang (1 [2011]); Cilacap (2 [2000; 2003]); Kebumen (1 [2011]); Kendal (1 [2009]); Kudus (1 [2004]); Magelang (1 [2012]); Pati (1 [2002]); Purworejo (1 [2006]); Sragen (2 [2007; 2009]).

[20] Semarang (2 [2009; 2009]); Tegal (2 [2006; 2006]).
[21] Semarang (1 [2008]).
[22] Kotawaringin Timur (1[2011]); Sukamara (1[2006]).
[23] Palangkaraya (1 [2002]).
[24] [2009].
[25] Morowali (1 [2009]).
[26] Palu (2 [2004; 2006]).
[27] [2011].
[28] Blitar (2 [2002; 2008]); Bondowoso (1 [2009]); Gresik (1 [2002]); Jember (1 [2001]); Jombang (1 [2009]); Lamongan (1 [2007]); Magetan (2 [2008; 2008]); Mojokerto (1 [2009]); Pamekasan (2 [2004; 2008]); Pasuruan (3 [2003; 2006; 2009]); Probolinggo (1 [2005]); Sampang (1 [2002]); Sidoarjo (1 [2005]); Situbondo (3 [2003; 2004; 2007]); Sumenep (1 [2002]); Tulungagun (1 [2011]).
[29] Pamekasan (1 [2002]).
[30] Malang (1 [2005]); Mojokerto (4 [2009; 2009; 2010; 2010]); Probolinggo (2 [2006; 2010]).
[31] Kupang (1 [1999]).
[32] Berau (3 [2003; 2007; 2009]); Kutai Kartanegara (1 [2008]); Penajam Paser Utara (3 [2009; 2010; 2012]).
[33] Bontang (1 [2007]); Samarinda (1 [2007]).
[34] Samarinda (1 [2001]).
[35] [2003; 2005].
[36] [2011].
[37] Bungo (1 [2008]); Kerinci (1 [2012]); Tanjung Jabung Timur (1 [2008]); Tebo (2 [2003; 2003]).
[38] [2006; 2009].
[39] Bangka (1 [2006]); Bangka Barat (1 [2008]); Bangka Selatan (3 [2007; 2008; 2008]); Bangka Tengah (3 [2007; 2007; 2010]); Belitung Timur (1 [2011]).
[40] Pangkal Pinang (2 [2006; 2011]).
[41] Bintan (1 [2010]); Natuna (2 [2005; 2008]).
[42] Batam (3 [2001; 2002; 2009]).
[43] Lampung Selatan (1 [2004]); Lampung Tengah (4 [2007; 2008; 2009; 2009]); Lampung Timur (2 [2007; 2008]); Lampung Utara (2 [2006; 2007]); Tanggamus (4 [2003; 2005; 2008; 2009]); Way Kanan (1 [2001]).
[44] Bandar Lampung (1 [2002]); Metro (2 [2004; 2008]).
[45] Ternate (4 [2007; 2011; 2011; 2011]).
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[57] Banjar (1 [2004]).

[58] Banjarbaru (3 [2002; 2006; 2007]); Banjarmasin (6 [2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011]).

[59] [2006].

[60] [2011].

[61] Bantaeng (1 [2005]); Barru (2 [2001; 2005]); Bulukumba (7 [2002; 2003; 2003; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006]); Enrekang (2 [2005; 2005]); Gowa (3 [2001; 2003; 2011]); Jeneponto (2 [2005; 2006]); Luwu Timur (2 [2007; 2007]); Luwu Utara (2 [2005; 2005]); Maros (5 [2001; 2002; 2005; 2005; 2005]); Pangkep (1 [2006]); Selayar (2 [2007; 2007]); Sinjai (1 [2007]); Soppeng (1 [2006]).

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[70] Kendari (1 [2005]).

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[83] Kaimana (1 [2007]); Manokwari (1 [2006]).

[84] Sorong (1 [2006]).

[85] Polewali Mandar (1 [2006]).

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[88] Agam (3 [2005; 2005; 2009]); Dharmasraya (1 [2009]); Lima Puluh Kota (2 [2003; 2003]); Padang Pariaman (2 [2004; 2007]); Pasaman (2 [2003; 2003]); Pasaman Barat (2 [2007; 2007]); Pesisir Selatan (4 [2003; 2004; 2005; 2006]); Sawahlunto/Sijunjung (3 [2003; 2003; 2006]); Solok (3 [2001; 2002; 2003]); Solok Selatan (3 [2005; 2006; 2007]); Tanah Datar (1 [2007]).

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Appendix 2 Number of effective candidates in West Java and South Sulawesi government head elections, 1998–2013, per administrative unit and year

Province/ District	1998*	1999*	2000*	2001*	2002*	2003*	2004*	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Banten province***	–	–	–	2.4 (3)	–	–	–	–	3.09 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.4 (3)	–	–
Cilegon City	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	2.25 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.86 (5)	–	–	–
Lebak	–	–	–	–	–	2.2 (3)##	–	–	–	–	1.93 (3)	–	–	–	–	1.8 (3)
Pandeglang	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.1 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.38 (6)	–	–	–
Serang	†	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.9 (5)	–	–	–	–	2.36 (3)#	–	–	–
Serang City*******	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.94 (8)	–	–	–	–	2.22 (5)#
Tangerang	†	–	–	–	–	3.42 (6)	–	–	–	–	2.12 (3)	–	–	–	2.6 (4)	–
Tangerang City	–	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	1.27 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.99 (5)
Tangerang Selatan City********	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.23 (4)	–	–	–
Province/ District	**1998***	**1999***	**2000***	**2001***	**2002***	**2003***	**2004***	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
West Java province	–	–	–	–	–	2.5 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.4 (3)	–	–	–	–	3.8 (5)#
Bandung	–	–	2.4 (3)	–	–	–	–	2 (2)#	–	–	–	–	1.99 (8)	–	–	–
Bandung Barat*******	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2 (2)	–	–	–	–	3.1 (5)#
Bandung City	–	–	–	–	–	2.1 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.01 (3)#	–	–	–	–	3.7 (8)
Banjar City*****	–	–	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	1.13 (2)#	–	–	–	–	2 (5)
Bekasi	1.5 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.5 (3)	–	–	–	5.5 (6)	–	–	–	–	2.92 (3)	–
Bekasi City	†	–	–	–	–	2.5 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.30 (3)	–	–	–	3.3 (5)	–
Bogor	2.1 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.3 (3)#	–	–	–	–	1.86 (5)	–	–	–	–	2.1 (4)#
Bogor City	—	2.2 (3)	–	–	–	–	2 (2)	–	–	–	2.24 (5)#	–	–	–	–	4.4 (5)
Ciamis	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.4 (5)#	–	–	–	–	2.4 (4)
Cianjur	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	3.4 (4)##	–	–	–	–	3.43 (6)	–	–
Cimahi City****	–	–	–	†	–	–	–	–	–	2.6 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2.96 (5)	–
Cirebon	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.4 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2 (2) [6]
Cirebon City	†	–	–	–	–	2 (3)	–	–	–	–	4 (5)#	–	–	–	–	3.3 (5)
Depok City**	†	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.8 (5)	–	–	–	–	3.33 (4)#	–	–	–
Garut	–	1 (3)	–	–	–	1.9 (2)	–	–	–	–	1.97 (7)	–	–	–	–	2 (2) [10] ##
Indramayu	–	–	2.1 (3)	–	–	–	–	1.9 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2.43 (6)	–	–	–
Karawang	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.8 (4)	–	–	–	–	3.53 (5)##	–	–	–
Kuningang	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	1.69 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2.8 (4)
Majalengka	N/A	–	–	–	–	1 (2) [3]#	–	–	–	–	5.25 (7)	–	–	–	–	1.8 (4)
Purwakarta	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A (5)	–	–	–	–	2.95 (3)#	–	–	–	–	1.99 (3)
Subang	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.3 (3)#	–	–	–	–	3.65 (6)	–	–	–	–	2.9 (5)#
Sukabumi	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.1 (4)	–	–	–	–	4.38 (7)	–	–	–
Sukabumi City	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.8 (4)	–	–	–	–	3.1 (4)

(*cont.*)

Sumedang	†	–	–	–	–	1.9 (2) [4]	–	–	–	–	1.98 (2)#	–	–	–	–	4.8 (8)
Tasikmalaya	–	–	–	1.7 (2)	–	–	–	–	3.3 (4)#	–	–	–	–	4.31 (8)	–	–
Tasikmalaya City	–	–	–	–	2.3 (3)	–	–	–	–	3 (3) ##	–	–	–	–	2.19 (3)	–
Province/ District	**1998***	**1999***	**2000***	**2001***	**2002***	**2003***	**2004***	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
South Sulawesi province	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.59 (3)	–	–	–	2.86 (3) ##	–	–	–	–	–	2.2 (3)#
Bantaeng	N/A	–	–	–	–	N/A#	–	–	–	–	3.25 (4)	–	–	–	–	1.4 (5)#
Barru	–	–	2.1 (13)	–	–	–	–	2.59 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.95 (4)	–	–	–
Bone	–	N/A#	–	–	–	1.08 (3)	–	–	–	–	2.18 (3)#	–	–	–	–	3.2 (6)
Bulukumba	–	–	1.95 (4)	–	–	–	–	4.24 (5)	–	–	–	–	1.98 (2) [6]##	–	–	–
Enrekang	2.4 (3)	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.8 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2.3 (4)
Gowa	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	–	3.73 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.05 (4)#	–	–	–
Jeneponto	–	1.9 (3)	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	2.43 (6)#	–	–	–	–	2.1 (3)
Luwu	–	N/A	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.83 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.4 (3)#
Luwu Timur ******	–		–	–	–	–	–	2.96 (4)	–	–	–	–	2.4 (4)#	–	–	–
Luwu Utara**	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	–	2.70 (3)#	–	–	–	–	2 (2) [9]	–	–	–
Makassar City	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	1.99 (2) [3]	–	–	–	2.04 (7)#	–	–	–	–	5.2 (10)
Maros	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	–	3.01 (4)#	–	–	–	–	4.02 (6)	–	–	–
Palopo City	–	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	2.31 (4)#	–	–	–	–	2 (2) [9]
Pangkajene Kepulauan	–	N/A (5)	–	–	–	–	–	2.30 (3)	–	–	–	–	3.48 (6)	–	–	–
Pare-Pare City	2.2 (3)	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.4 (5)#	–	–	–	–	2.9 (5)
Pinrang	–	N/A	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	1.99 (2) [7]	–	–	–	–	4.3 (6)#
Selayar	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	–	4.02 (5)	–	–	–	–	2.62 (3)#	–	–	
Sidenreng Rappang	–	†	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.8 (6)	–	–	–	–	2.7 (7)#
Sinjai	N/A#	–	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	1.94 (2)#	–	–	–	–	4.2 (9)
Soppeng	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.16 (4)	–	–	–	–	3.52 (7)#	–	–	–
Takalar	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.32 (4)#	–	–		–	4.7 (7)	–
Tanah Toraja	–	–	N/A (5)	–	–	–	–	4.28 (6)#	–	–	–	–	4.41 (6)	–	–	–

(*cont.*)

Tanah Toraja Utara********	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2 (7)	–	–
Wajo	–	N/A	–	–	–	N/A	–	–	–	–	3.34 (4)	–	–	–	–	3.5 (6)#

(Note: Number of total candidates in parentheses and number of candidates prior to second-round elections in square brackets)
† appointed
* indirect elections via local parliaments
** established in 1999
*** established in 2000
**** established in 2001
***** established in 2002
****** established in 2003
******* established in 2007
******** established in 2008
# incumbent won
incumbent lost
Source: own calculations based on newspaper archival research and data obtained from local election commissions.

Appendix 3 Background of local government heads who adopted *shari'a* regulations, 1998–2013

		Academic	Bureaucrat	Military/ Police	Politician	Politician/ Private sector	Private sector	Society	N/A	Total
Aceh	Province	1	1			2				4
	District	1	4						1	6
	City									0
Bali	Province		1	1						2
	District						2			2
	City									0
Banten	Province				1		1			2
	District		1				2		1	4
	City		2	1						3
Bengkulu	Province									0
	District		1							1
	City		2							2
Central Java	Province									0
	District		4	1			4		2	11
	City			1			1			2
Central Kalimantan	Province									0
	District		1		1					2
	City			1						1
Central Sulawesi	Province			1						1
	District								1	1
	City		1						1	2
East Java	Province		1							1
	District	1	10	1	2	2	2		3	21
	City		1				2			3
East Kalimantan	Province									0
	District		1		1		1		1	4
	City		1					1		2
East Nusa Tenggara	Province									0
	District									0
	City			1						1
Gorontalo	Province						1			1
	District									0
	City									0
Jambi	Province		1							1
	District		2				1		1	4
	City									0
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Province		1	1						2
	District		4							4
	City		1							1
Kepulauan Riau	Province									0
	District		1		1				1	3
	City		2							2
Lampung	Province									0
	District		5				3			8
	City							2		2
North Maluku	Province									0
	District									0
	City		2							2

(*cont.*)

		Academic	Bureaucrat	Military/ Police	Politician	Politician/ Private sector	Private sector	Society	N/A	Total
North Sumatra	Province									0
	District		2							2
	City						1			1
Riau	Province					1				1
	District		2			1	1		1	5
	City		2							2
Southeast Sulawesi	Province									0
	District		1						1	2
	City		1							1
South Kalimantan	Province		2							2
	District	1	8			1			1	11
	City		2		1		1		1	5
South Sulawesi	Province		1	1						2
	District		6	1	1					8
	City		1			1	2			4
South Sumatra	Province		1	1						2
	District		3							3
	City		1							1
West Java	Province	1								1
	District		9	3	5	1	6		5	29
	City	1	7	2	1	1	1			13
West Kalimantan	Province		1							1
	District		2							2
	City	1						1		2
West Nusa Tenggara	Province									0
	District		1						3	4
	City		1							1
West Papua	Province									0
	District		2							2
	City		1							1
West Sulawesi	Province									0
	District		1							1
	City									0
West Sumatra	Province		1				1			2
	District		7	2	1		2		1	13
	City		3	1			2		3	9
Yogyakarta	Province									0
	District		1					1		2
	City									0
Total		7	121	20	15	10	37	5	28	243
Percentage		3	50	8	6	4	15	2	12	%

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The Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 presents an underexplored puzzle: Why has there been a rise in the number of *shari'a* laws despite the electoral decline of Islamist parties? Michael Buehler presents an analysis of the conditions under which Islamist activists situated outside formal party politics may capture and exert influence in Muslim-majority countries facing democratization. He argues that introducing competitive elections creates new pressures for entrenched elites to mobilize and structure the electorate, thereby opening up new opportunities for Islamist activists to influence politics. Buehler's analysis of changing state–religion relations in formerly authoritarian Islamic countries illuminates broader theoretical debates on Islamization in the context of democratization. This timely text is essential reading for students, scholars, and government analysts.

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